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ABSTRACT 
 
This research explores how memory and national identity have been articulated in the 
context of competing discourses after the presentation of the Annan Plan in Northern 
Cyprus. Focussing on key mechanisms of memory such as history textbooks, 
commemorations (national days, museums, monuments), traditions (flags, national 
anthem and myths) and the media (especially newspapers) the thesis explores the 
mobilization, articulation and construction of memory/ies in relation to national identity.  
 It is argued that the Annan Plan constitutes a turning point in Cypriot politics as it 
proposes a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a 
solution of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, the Cyprus problem is understood as the 
outcome of the clash between two antagonistic nationalisms which has caused the 
division of the island since 1974. Thus, the Annan Plan is the most serious step on the 
way to the reunification of the island since then and, as such, it has functioned as a 
catalyst and precipitated an intense competition between alternative, often opposing, 
discourses on Turkish Cypriot national identity.  
The primary goal of this study is to open up the field of knowledge about the 
reconciliation of physically and/ or mentally divided communities through a critical 
analysis of the ‘mechanisms of memory’, of how they construct and articulate the ‘past’, 
in the present, for the future. The theoretical framework of the research draws upon 
approaches from a variety of fields such as social psychology, sociology, history, politics 
and media studies, while the empirical investigation consists of in depth interviews. The 
analysis of the respondents’ narratives is informed by textual analysis and in particular 
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (i.e Wodak, Fairclough). Furthermore, the discourse 
theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe are adopted in the examination of memories and 
their articulation, construction and transformation.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Cyprus is one of the most controversial regions of the Mediterranean. Due to its 
geographical location, the island has been the focus of power struggles since ancient 
times; it has attracted many colonizing powers and been ruled by them in the past. Today 
it continues to be a field of power relations between Turkey and Greece because of their 
political interests in the island; these two countries also have historical and cultural 
connections with the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the natives, who therefore consider 
them to be their respective “motherland countries.” In addition, the United States, 
European Union countries and Russia are third parties involved in Cyprus for a variety of 
global, political and geographical reasons. These conflicting interests make Cyprus one of 
the most problematic areas of the world and create, reinforce and reproduce what is 
known as the ‘Cyprus problem’. 
 The Cyprus problem can be explained as the confrontation of two antagonistic 
Greek and Turkish nationalisms that led to the Cyprus war of 1974 and the division of the 
island that has continued since then. The Greek Cypriots, whose language is Greek, have 
been living since 1974 in the southern part of the island, the Republic of Cyprus; while 
the Turkish Cypriots, who speak Turkish, have been living in the northern part, the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). This is an unrecognized state and 
therefore unable to participate independently in the European Union negotiations for a 
solution to the problem; however, European Union membership has been highly debated 
in the TRNC over the last few years because of the Annan Plan, a potential solution to the 
Cyprus problem, and the possible participation of the whole of Cyprus in the European 
Union following a solution.  
 Memory has been a central factor in the construction of the ‘Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus’ as a nation. Premised on the argument that memories are 
socially/discursively constructed, this research intends to explore how opposing 
discourses came to articulate memory after the presentation of the Annan Plan in 
Northern Cyprus. It will do so by focussing on the examination of some key “mechanisms 
of memory” − in particular the role of history textbooks, commemorations (national days, 
museums, mass graves, monuments, martyrdoms, graveyards), symbols of tradition 
(flags, national anthems, myths) and the media (especially newspapers) − as they are used 
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in the mobilization, articulation and construction of memories in relation to national 
identity in Northern Cyprus.  
 The research focuses on the period of the Annan Plan because the plan 
functioned as a catalyst and precipitated an intense contradiction and struggle between the 
discourses in relation to national identity in Northern Cyprus. The Annan Plan, the first 
plan to propose possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a 
solution of the Cyprus problem, was the most serious step taken towards unification of the 
island after its division. The plan was presented on 11th November 2002 and referenda on 
it were held simultaneously in the south and the north of Cyprus on 24th April 2004. In the 
referendum, the Turkish Cypriots in the north had to make a decision about the 
participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union within the framework of the 
Annan Plan. However, this decision meant a lot for the people living in Northern Cyprus, 
as it involved re-evaluating their identities and historical and cultural backgrounds. Their 
memories and re-evaluation of the past thus provided the context for a decision about the 
future prospects of Northern Cyprus. 
 In the process, dominant public memory mediated by the official mechanisms of 
memory (i.e history textbooks, traditional symbols, commemorations), public memories 
mediated through alternative/counter narratives and autobiographical memories played a 
crucial role. This study examines the similarities, differences, parallels and 
inconsistencies amongst dominant/public and autobiographical memories and explores 
the impact of the interrelationship between them on the political views of the respondents 
regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. In this respect, the use of the term 
‘memory’ in the thesis can be narrowed under these main subtitles (dominant/ alternative 
public and autobiographical memories). In the general sense, memory can be defined as 
the capacity/ability to retain and recall past experiences (Ferrante 2008: 91) or knowledge 
(Burns 2001:1). These past experiences mainly compose the autobiographical (private) 
memories which are the memories of those events that the individuals ‘experience’. 
However, as Carther and Hirschop (cited in Grainge 2003:3) argue, memory depends less 
on a conscious decision to record than an inability to forget, the negotiation of memory 
describes the echo and pressure of the past as it is configured in present based struggles 
over the meaning of lived experiences. In other words, our past experiences are not 
always the outcome of what is recorded consciously into our memories. Memories are the 
field of contestation and struggle and our past experiences are articulated in these power 
relations. Hence, experience can be evaluated as the interpretation that is articulated in the 
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social and political circumstances shaped by power relations. Thus, even the 
autobiographical memories that are conceived as the reflections of ‘personal’ and 
‘private’ experiences are social and interpersonal.  
  Autobiographical memories are mediated through public memories that 
encompass the memory of small or large formations such as family, society, government 
and nation. Autobiographical memories give information about the self and thus, they are 
also related to the narrations of the individuals about their national identities. On the other 
hand, public memories are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the 
single social individual (i.e society, nation and family). Public memories are highly 
crucial in the construction of national identities of the individuals as nobody can have a 
private national identity. Public memories articulate how we remember the ‘past’ in 
relation to our national identities in present for the future. In this case, ‘memory about 
national identity’ differs from ‘opinion about national identity’ because memory is about 
the ‘past’ and without a constructed past, it is not possible to talk about national identities. 
As Weil (1971 cited in Lowenthal 1985:44), suggests, "collectivity has its roots in the 
past".   
 In this respect, the ruling groups produce the official mechanisms of memory to 
construct the memories of the individuals about their national identities. The official 
mechanisms of memory that includes commemorations (museums, monuments, national 
days), traditional symbols (flags, national anthems, myths), and history textbooks play the 
primary role in the construction of the dominant public memory of past in relation to 
national identity. Therefore, the mechanisms compose the backbone of the national 
identity and nation. The official mechanisms construct the memories of the social 
individuals about themselves (their national identity) and the ‘others’ through the shared 
experiences (i.e performing and celebrating the commemorative acts, hanging flags and 
singing national anthems). Hence, the dominant public memory provides the necessary 
framework for the imagination of a nation. As Keren and Herwig suggest, (2009:169) the 
more a community is imagined, as in the case of the nation, the more ‘memory’ is 
necessary to it. Therefore, the articulation and construction of the memories in relation to 
national identity plays the primary role for the formation and survival of a nation.   
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 Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the debate in the academic field of 
communication by exploring ‘memory’ from a cultural studies perspective, providing an 
approach to the role of the ‘mechanisms of memory’ (history textbooks, symbols of 
tradition, commemorations and media) in mobilizing memories in relation to national 
identity. At present, there are few studies that focus on the complex functioning of history 
textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations and media in the articulation and 
construction of memories in relation to national identity. An examination of the 
production of the mechanisms of memory in power relations and their function in the 
mobilization, articulation and construction of memories in relation to identity could 
empower the formation of a critical understanding about memory/memories that are our 
primary sources of ‘information’.  
 The continuing division of the island since 1974 is created by and also creates a 
special historical and political situation in Northern Cyprus. Thus case studies of divided 
communities in Cyprus could contribute to opening up the field of knowledge regarding 
the reconciliation of physically and/or mentally divided communities in general, through 
a critical analysis of the ‘mechanisms of memory’, of the construction and reconstruction 
of the past on a public level and of personal narratives that provide information about the 
experiences of people living in divided communities. In the context of Cyprus and its 
recent historical, political and cultural circumstances, it is crucial to explore how 
memories of the past are constructed and articulated and to observe how respondents 
articulate the ‘information’ they provide. My research questions and hypothesis are 
therefore as follows, 
    
Research Questions 
 
1) What are the different or opposing discourses in relation to national identity in 
Northern Cyprus and how do these discourses represent the memory of the past? 
 
2) How do the ‘mechanisms of memory’ mobilize, articulate and construct these 
discourses in relation to national identity?  
 
3) How do respondents articulate the ‘information’ they get in their everyday lives? 
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4) What are the similarities, parallels, inconsistencies and differences between 
dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories? 
 
5) What is the impact of the interrelationship between dominant/alternative public 
memories and autobiographical memories on political discourses about the future 
prospects of Northern Cyprus?     
 
Hypothesis 
 
Autobiographical memories are mediated through public memories. The mechanisms of 
memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) mobilize, 
articulate and construct memories in relation to national identity in the context of 
changing power relations. They therefore have a crucial influence on the respondents’ 
political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus that both construct and are 
constructed by their memories in relation to national identity.  
 
Methodology  
 
This research analyses respondents’ narratives about their memories in relation to national 
identity through textual analysis and in particular ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (i.e 
Wodak, Fairclough). I adopt the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe in the 
analysis of memories as the product of discourses. Foucault’s genealogical analysis, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s approaches on nodal points and master signifiers, the logics of 
equivalence and the logics of difference and antagonism, are the tools used for empirical 
analysis; and I also make use of Wodak’s three dimensions of analysis in the discursive 
construction of national identity. These three dimensions − ‘contents’, ‘strategies’ and 
‘means and forms of realization’ − play the primary role in the analysis of the narratives 
of the respondents. In addition, I explore the memories of the respondents through in-
depth interviews, as it is not possible to determine them by textual analysis: for the 
purposes of this research, in-depth interviews were conducted with 60 community 
residents of Northern Cyprus. The research involves the critical examination of the 
narratives of the respondents. 
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Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first four explore the conceptual/theoretical 
dimensions of my research project, and the next three focus on the analysis and discussion 
of the empirical material generated in the course of my ethnographic research. The last 
chapter reflects the findings of the research. 
 The thesis begins by examining the concept of ‘memory’ in the light of past and 
present approaches. The aim of the first chapter is to explain how the concept of memory 
is used throughout the thesis; thus it presents an analytical evaluation of descriptions of 
the concept of memory in various theoretical approaches during different time periods. 
This chapter constructs the framework of my research in three sections, each of which 
involves discussions, interpretations and explanations of the major concepts employed − 
i.e., dominant/public and autobiographical memories and narratives, identity, official 
history and historiography. In the first section, I define the past and present theoretical 
context for the re-evaluation of ‘memory’ in this study. The second section explains the 
interrelationship between memory and history and how politics is embedded in the 
construction of the official/ history; here I examine ways in which the official history 
might be challenged by the alternative narratives that can be uncovered by the 
historiography. In the final section, I explain the interrelations between memory, narrative 
(i.e ontological and public) and identity.  
 These theoretical considerations are expanded on in the second chapter, where  the 
primary focus is on memory and national identity, showing how mechanisms of memory 
(history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) function in the 
articulation and construction of national identity: In the first section of the chapter, I 
examine the role of dominant/alternative public (i.e narratives of commemorations, 
symbols of tradition, history textbooks, media, families, school education) and 
autobiographical narratives in the articulation of national identity during the socialization 
processes. The second section focusses on the mechanisms of memory, which include 
traditional symbols (flags, myths, national anthem), commemorations (museums, 
monuments, national days), history textbooks and the media; here I examine the role of 
each mechanism in the mobilization and articulation of memories in relation to national 
identity. The last section describes how the mechanisms articulate and construct each 
other and what the parallels and interconnections are amongst them; the analysis shows 
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how they function like a single body in the articulation and construction of national 
identity. 
In chapter three I explain the theoretical and methodological framework and the 
ethnographic research conducted to examine how public memories are produced by the 
mechanisms of memory and how respondents articulate the ‘information’ provided by the 
mechanisms. The chapter shows how the respondents’ narratives can be analysed by 
adopting the theoretical and methodological approaches of Foucault, Fairclough, Laclau, 
Mouffe, Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart. I explain the techniques used in gathering 
information about the memories of the respondents through in-depth interviews, and 
discuss how the questionnaire was created, the questions of the in-depth interviews and 
the research sample. Finally, I talk about my personal experiences and methods during the 
research.  
The fourth chapter presents an overview of the ‘history of Cyprus’ and of the 
functions of the mechanisms of memory (media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition, 
commemorations) within the society/culture of Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus’s history is 
examined under various headings: the colonization between 750 BC-1960, the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the Cyprus war and the division of the island 
from 1974 onwards. In the last part of the chapter, the Cyprus problem is examined within 
a broader political context that considers the role of external powers such as Turkey, 
Greece, the European Union and the United Nations, on the Cyprus problem. 
 Chapter five analyses how the official history that encompasses the official 
mechanisms − history textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, national anthem, myths) and 
commemorations (museums, monuments, national days) − mobilize, articulate and 
construct the respondents’ memories in relation to national identity. I show how the 
official mechanisms are articulated differently according to the dominant discourses 
during the Denktaş presidency and UBP government (1974-2003) and during the period 
of the CTP government (2003-2009) in Northern Cyprus.  
In the sixth chapter I focus on the function of the media in the articulation and 
construction of memories in relation to national identity; this chapter expands the 
arguments concerning the mechanisms of memory that were developed in chapter five. 
The media’s (particularly the newspapers’) role is examined in the first section as one of 
the mechanisms in the mobilization of the political ideas that construct and are 
constructed by the respondents’ memories. The second section explores the different 
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functions of the mechanisms of memory − media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition 
and commemorations − in the respondents’ memories. 
Chapter seven shows the complex functioning of the dominant/alternative public 
and autobiographical memories in the articulation of the respondents’ political ideas 
regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. This last analytical chapter illustrates 
the constant articulation of the respondents’ memories about self-other relationships. 
The concluding chapter brings together the theoretical approaches and 
ethnographic research and presents the research findings and conclusions in this context; 
it also discusses possibilities for further research.   
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CHAPTER 1: MEMORY- CONSTRUCTING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter begins by exploring and defining the concept of memory in order to 
construct the framework of the study; the past and current theoretical context sheds light 
on the re-evaluation of memory. The second section looks at the role of history in the 
construction and articulation of memory in the political contexts shaped by power 
relations; the focus is on the interrelationships between memory, official/history and 
historiography. In the third section, memory is examined in relation to identity.  
 
1. 2 Section one: Memory- Theoretical and historical inquiry 
 
The idea of ‘memory’ has always attracted considerable attention because memory is 
conceived as directly related to ourselves, emotions, beliefs and destinies. ‘We are what 
we remember’ (Fentress and Wickham 1992:7), because as Amery suggests, ‘no one can 
become what he cannot find in his memories’ (cited in Young 1993:1). Thus our 
memories construct and are constructed by what we know and believe. Our past, present 
and future are determined not by our destinies but by memories that are formed in cultural 
and social contexts.  
For this reason the concept of ‘memory’ has been defined and evaluated with great 
interest from the earliest historical periods. However, the definition of memory can only 
be realized within the limits of ‘memory’ shaped by certain discourses of its time; in other 
words, the concept can only be defined through the recollections of social individuals 
constructed in social and cultural circumstances. As Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen and 
Kurzweil (1984:156) point out, cultural factors limit our thinking; time and space 
predetermine the social individual’s scope of thought and action. My aim in this chapter is 
therefore to interpret and narrate the concept of ‘memory’ in the light of ‘past’ and 
‘present’ theories without the intention of presenting an ‘absolute’ or ‘objective’ 
definition, following Somers and Gibson (1994:62-63): ‘social researchers construct the 
concepts and explanations through conceptual narrativity that forms their analytical 
categories which are temporal and spatial’.   
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The conceptual narration of the concept of ‘memory’ is not fixed and stable, as it 
changes in different contexts; from ancient times to the present, the definition of 
‘memory’ has been re-negotiated, re-articulated and re-shaped. Once conceived as a 
goddess by the ancient Greeks, ‘Memory’ has today been transformed into the ‘slave’ of 
discourse by new approaches and perspectives in social sciences. Changes and 
developments in the approaches of the fields of history, social psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, cultural studies and post-structuralism significantly affect the 
understanding of ‘memory’ at different moments in history; an analytical evaluation of 
different theoretical approaches in their historical contexts is therefore the focus of this 
section.  
The goddess of memory Mnemosyne, according to the ancient Greeks, was the 
mother of the muses, each of whom presided over literature, art and science (Bulfinch, 
Holme and Campbell 1981:32, Grant 1989). The ‘mother’ symbolised productivity, 
creativity and protection; and so the goddess of memory was conceived as necessary for 
the creation, existence and preservation of literature, art and science. Memory was thus 
accepted in early historical periods as the source of information and knowledge. In order 
to improve the capacity of memory and to deal with large quantities of information, 
Greeks invented ‘the art of memory,’ which entailed remembering through a technique of 
impressing ‘places’ and ‘images’ on the memory (Yates 1966); memory was perceived as 
a store of information that could be improved by training.  
Studies related to memory became ‘science’ when they were examined 
systematically and the behavioural phenomena analysed. These studies sought to find 
answers to questions related to the general principles governing the mechanisms of 
memory that include its processing and capacity (Flaherty et al. 1977) by using formal 
experimental techniques in laboratories (Cohen 1989). However, in changing 
circumstances, the scope of memory was diverted toward different matters and the 
concept was re-examined and re-evaluated. Cognitive psychologists questioned the 
traditional laboratory experimental method and asked questions about the complex 
functioning of memory in everyday life. They were concerned with its operation in 
natural environments (Neisser 1982) and the ways in which individuals take in 
information from the outside world (Groome 1999:2). 
 Most cognitive psychologists conceive the function of memory as the encoding, 
storage and retrieval of information (Eysenck & Keane 2005:189, Groome et al. 1999:96) 
and talk about the familiar parallel between a computer and a human being (Ashcraft 
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1994, Baddeley 1997:2, Groome at al. 1999:7, Neisser 1967): memory is treated as the 
retrieval of information and internal mental processes that store and fix information in the 
brain independent of social and communicative practices (Radley, 1990, Shotter, 1990). 
According to Ulric Neisser (1967), one of the founders of modern cognitive psychology, 
human behaviour and consciousness depend entirely on the activity of the brain in 
interaction with other physical systems. Thus remembering and thinking are also inner-
directed. 
 However, human beings are social creatures and their memories are also social as 
they are largely delivered from symbolic communications. What we think, feel, know, 
remember and forget is largely the result of what we have experienced, shared and 
communicated with other people (Edwards & Middleton 1986); hence individual 
memories cannot be evaluated as independent of communicative and social activities. In 
‘Remembering: A study in Experimental and Social Psychology’ (1932), Bartlett, one of 
the first theorists to consider the importance of social influences on remembering and 
perceiving, treats memory as a social activity of remembering and questions the 
approaches that define memory as a store of fixed and stable information. According to 
Bartlett, “remembering is not the re-excitation of fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It 
is an imaginative re-construction or construction” (1932:213). The construction of 
memories is never-ending, because when we communicate we constantly create, 
reproduce and transform certain modes of social relationships (Shotter, 1990). Thus, as 
historical, social and cultural factors are embedded in it, there cannot be any given, 
determined nature of memory.  
Individuals are born into social formations that are constituted from small or large 
groups such as families, societies and nations; as such, social individuals are always 
connected to other social individuals with a shared understanding. Our memories are 
borrowed and inherited from our families, communities and nations as a result of 
communication and social interaction (Fentress and Wickham, 1992). As Maurice 
Halbwachs among the first theorists to look at memory beyond the individual level, noted 
(1980:23-24), ‘individuals can only be alone in physical appearance as their thoughts and 
actions even during the period that they are alone are only explained by their social being 
as a member of their social groups’. Halbwachs (1950 cited in Bodnar 1992:11) 
developed and popularized the concept of ‘collective memory’ as “…a current of 
continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial, for it retains from the past 
what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of groups keeping the memory 
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alive”. In other words, ‘collective memory’ takes its roots from a constructed past and 
keeps the memory of the past alive for the continuity of the recollection that binds group 
members to each other; for this reason Halbwachs emphasizes the role of social groups in 
the formation of a ‘collective memory’ among group members.  
Halbwachs’s concept has been highly influential, as it has contributed to the 
development of the understanding that memories are not only ‘social’ but also ‘shared’: 
social individuals are united around a shared remembering that is established and 
mobilized through communication. This concept of ‘collective memory’ forms the basis 
of other concepts such as ‘social memory’, ‘cultural memory’, ‘public memory’, and 
‘dominant memory’; and although there is no single agreed-on concept of ‘memory’ that 
implies the shared remembrance (Nerone and Wartella 1989:86), all of these concepts 
emphasize the communicative aspect of memory. Without transmission and 
communication, it is not possible to locate a shared remembering. 
‘Cultural memory’ and ‘social memory’ are problematic concepts, because the 
classification of memories as ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ connotes the presence of memories that 
are not ‘cultural’ and ‘social’. However, as individuals are born into social frameworks 
and their memories are constructed in social formations, whether beyond the ‘individual’ 
level or not, memories are always ‘social’ and ‘cultural’. Thus, the concepts of ‘social 
memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ do not fully embrace the social and cultural aspect of 
‘memory’ in the general sense.  
Furthermore, the term ‘collective memory’ connotes the presence of a common 
memory shared by all the members of a unitary group or society. According to Halbwachs 
(1950 cited in Olick and Robbins 1998:109), memory is a matter of how minds work 
collectively in society and how their operations are structured by social arrangements. 
However, as Laclau (1990:90) suggests, any structural system is limited because it is 
always surrounded by an 'excess of meaning' which it is unable to master. Thus, 
'collective memory' as a unitary object which grounds its own partial processes is an 
impossibility because the permanent articulation and construction of memories prevent 
the total fixity and formation of collective memory under structural constraints. It is 
therefore not possible to locate a collective memory that binds all members of a social 
group together.  
In the same way that social constructionist arguments challenge ‘essentialist’ 
accounts of collective identities that are based on some essence or set of core features 
shared by all members of the collectivity and no others (Calhoun 1994:13), it can be 
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argued that it is meaningless to talk about a ‘collective memory’ that is shared by all 
members of a social group. The social constructionist arguments reject the notion that 
social individuals can have singular, integral, altogether harmonious and unproblematic 
identities (ibid). From this perspective, it is not possible to locate collective, integral or 
harmonious memory because ‘memory is a contested territory’ (Schudson 1989:112) and 
different social individuals construct different memories at different times that prevent the 
total fixity of memory as ‘collective’ within their social frameworks.  
In contrast to the essentialist accounts, the concept of ‘dominant memory’ locates 
‘memory’ as a field of contestation, negotiation and struggle, which is therefore never 
fixed or altogether harmonious. The concepts of ‘public memory’ and ‘dominant 
memory’ complement each other and provide a fuller account of the complex functioning 
of ‘memory’ beyond the individual level. Public memory is embedded in cultural, social 
and institutional formations and encompasses the memory of small or large formations 
such as family, society, government and nation. 
Public memory is a collection of signs, symbols and practices: memorial dates, 
commemorations, museums, language (Olick and Robbins 1998; Klein 2000) and general 
forms like tradition, myth and identity (Olick and Robbins 1998:106). According to 
Young (1993:ix), ‘public memory’ encompasses not just the memorials physically but 
also includes the activity and practises that brought them into being, the constant give and 
take between memorials and viewers. ‘Public memory presents a body of beliefs and 
ideas about the past that help a public to understand both its past, present and by 
implication, its future’ (Bodnar 1992:15).  
On the other hand, ‘dominant memory’ is the ‘public memory’ that ‘points to the 
power and pervasiveness of historical representations, their connections with dominant 
institutions and the part they play in winning consent and building alliances in the 
processes of formal politics’ (Popular Memory Group 1982:207). Hence, public memory 
may transform into ‘dominant public memory’ if it acquires enough power through the 
pervasiveness of its dominance. Thus, the concepts of dominant memory and public 
memory are interrelated and complete each other. Both public memory and dominant 
memory are the outcome of the partial fixity of certain discourses in power relations.  
The discourse theories of Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault provide crucial openings 
for evaluating and discussing the concept of ‘memory’. Although these theories of 
discourse have commonalities, their focus of study is different; hence in combination they 
provide a fuller account of the ways in which the concept of ‘memory’ can be explained 
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as the product of discourse that is changing, articulated and constructed in power relations 
that are shaped in historical, political and cultural circumstances.  
Laclau and Mouffe develop a theoretical framework that is useful for examining 
the concept of ‘memory’ as a field of social practices which is constantly changing, 
negotiated and constructed through articulations. Although they do not focus on 
‘memory’ as their field of study, their theories of ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’ are highly 
applicable in developing approaches to ‘memory in relation to identity’. In addition, a 
Foucauldian approach provides the opportunity to focus on the importance of power 
relations in the construction of memory in historical and political contexts. The theories 
of Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault thus complement and enrich each other when they are 
combined, and provide an important framework for this research.  
In the context of this study, one of the most significant contributions of Laclau and 
Mouffe is the concept of articulation. They note that ‘articulation is any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of 
the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, 
we will call discourse’ (1985:105). In this sense, memory, which is the product of 
discourse, can be conceived as the result of articulatory practice; and the fixity of memory 
is temporal because the articulation of discourses is never-ending. The logic of 
articulation entails a continuous transformation, creation, change and reproduction of 
memory; so as a result, complete structures and closures of memories are impossible.  
Laclau and Mouffe (1985:112) explain that, ‘any discourse is constituted as an 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct 
a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixity, nodal points’. 
In this sense, in the discourse of ‘memory’, the ‘past’ functions as a nodal point as it 
partially fixes ‘memory’. According to Jorgensen and Philips (2002:26), ‘[a] nodal point 
is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their 
meaning from their relationship to the nodal point’. In this respect, other signs such as 
experience, history, commemorations and symbols of tradition acquire their meanings 
from their relationship to the nodal point (‘past’) in particular ways.  
The ‘past’ moments are articulated to each other and form a consistent whole in 
our memories. They are conceived as lived realities and facts in a specific time and space. 
However, as Jorgensen and Philips (2002:5) suggest, 
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Reality is only accessible to us through categories, so our knowledge and 
representations of the world are not reflections of the reality ‘out there’ but rather 
are products of our ways of categorising the world, or, in discursive analytical 
terms, products of discourse. 
 
Thus, our knowledge, representations and categorising of past moments should not be 
treated as ‘objective’ truths. They are not reflections of the reality ‘out there’ but rather 
are the products of our interpretations constructed by certain discourses that are 
constantly changing, negotiated and articulated through dynamic social interaction.  
 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) strongly emphasize the importance of a dynamic 
process in the formation of discourses. From their perspective, the tension between 
interiority, which is related to the fixity of discourses, and exteriority, which is related to 
their non-fixity, is the main source of the dynamic social process. Laclau and Mouffe also 
discuss the interrelationship between ‘moments’ and ‘elements’ in a similar way. The 
differential positions as they appear articulated within a discourse are called moments. 
Moments can be conceived as the memories that sustain a particular discourse and are 
therefore attached to it. In contrast, an element is any difference that is not discursively 
articulated: elements are memories which are unattached and non- articulated; they are 
left over from the present discourse because they are different and thus they create 
inconsistencies. It should be noted that the elements (memories) that are not interior to the 
present discourse are potential threats to its partial fixity, as they provide alternatives and 
oppositions, and so constitute the surplus of meaning that creates the necessary conditions 
for the formation of new discourses. Laclau and Mouffe (ibid.111) explain the surplus of 
meaning as follows: 
 
Discourse as a system only exists as a partial limitation of a ‘surplus of meaning’ 
which subverts it. ‘Surplus’ is inherent in every discursive situation and is necessary 
for the constitution of every social practice. It is called the field of discursivity’ (ibid: 
111).  
 
Surplus is thus excluded by discourse, as it is a threat to the structured totality. In this 
way, discourse as the partial fixity of meaning includes moments and excludes elements. 
However, the transition from elements to moments is always incomplete. Articulation 
plays the main role in the transformation from fixity to non-fixity and vice-versa; the 
tension between interiority and exteriority is the condition of any social practice. Thus 
“every social practice is articulatory” (ibid: 113).  
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Complementing this approach, Michel Foucault (1977d), who has had a huge 
influence upon the popularization of the concept of ‘discourse’, emphasizes the role of 
historical factors in the construction of discourses:  
 
Discourse is a group of statements that belong to the same discursive formation. It 
is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of 
existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form that 
possesses a history. Hence,it is, from beginning to end, historical. (1972:117)    
 
Thus discourses cannot be evaluated as independent of historical, social and political 
constraints that form their conditions of existence. Foucault rejects the approaches that 
treat discourse solely as a linguistic phenemona; he is not interested in language as a 
communicative tool but rather in how language use is always articulated with other social 
and cultural practices that are shaped by power relations (Storey 2001:78). Likewise, 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest that systems of social relations are not purely linguistic 
phenomena, because a discursive structure is an articulatory practice which constitutes 
and organizes social relations. Hence, ‘speaking is a way of acting and not simply a way 
of reporting and describing what is done’ (Thompson 1984:6).  
Thompson (ibid:2) takes ideology as something that emerges from and shapes 
language in everyday social life, from an ordinary encounter between friends and family 
members to the forums of  political debate. Like Foucault, he emphasizes the importance 
of power relations in  language: “the uses of language intersect with power, nourishing it, 
sustaining it, enacting it” (ibid.). Thompson uses the term ‘ideology’, but Foucault prefers 
the term ‘discourse’ because in his view the term ‘ideology’ connotes the existence of an 
ideal sphere (Howkes, 2003): ‘ideology always stands in virtual opposition to something 
else which is supposed to count as truth’ (Foucault 1980:118). However, ‘truth’ is 
produced within discourse and located in language. As Jorgensen and Philips (2002:8-9) 
suggest, ‘our access to reality and truth is always through language. With language, we 
create representations of reality and truth that are never mere reflections but 
constructions’.   
Discourses, which are the outcome of the partial fixity of meaning, naturalize 
some memories and make them seem like 'objective truths'. Roland Barthes (1974) 
addresses naturalization and legitimization through his concept of ‘myth’, understood as a 
system of communication. For Barthes (ibid: 143), 
  
 17 
 
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; 
simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and 
eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but 
that of a statement of fact. In passing from history to nature, myth acts 
economically: It abolishes the complexity of human acts… It organizes a world 
without contradictions. It establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean 
something by themselves.                  
 
In this respect, myth functions to naturalize and universalize dominant discourses 
and to present them as being for the good of all members of society (Storey, 1999). In 
other words, myth functions in such a way as to make historical events be conceived as 
natural and legitimate facts that cannot and should not be changed. This situation prevents 
antagonisms and conflicts because everything seems natural and factual and there is no 
need for struggle. In this way, according to Barthes (1974), myth is constituted by the loss 
of the historical quality of things in memory. Memory is formed according to the ‘reality’ 
which is constructed by myth.  
Barthes’s concept of myth is very close to that of ideology. Like ideology, myth is 
a body of ideas and practices which seek to defend the pervasiveness of the power of the 
dominant group (Storey 1999:65). Furthermore, like ideology, the concept of myth stems 
from the idea of a distorted ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. Both myth and ideology distort, convert 
and cover the ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ and present historical and political interests as naturally 
justified. Barthes formulates the concepts of connotation and denotation to explain the 
relationship and difference between plain and ideological expression: "denotation is the 
plane of expression or signifier of the second system connotation" (ibid.). However, 
discourse is always in process and there is no objective, factual or plain expression; 
meaning is an interpretation. As Storey (ibid.72) points out, ‘denotation is no longer a 
neutral level; it is no more than the last connotation. Denotation is just as ideological as 
connotation’. 
 Similarly, it is pointless to support the idea of ‘neutral’, ‘objective’ or ‘factual’ 
memory because, as Laclau (1990:28) points out, the 'objectivity' of the social would stem 
from the impossibility of managing a total fixity. Total fixity is not possible because 
discourses are never-ending articulations; ‘[a]rticulation is constant because discourses 
are in conflict with other discourses that set other guidelines for social thought and action’ 
(Jorgensen and Philips 2002:47), and this is the only way they can maintain their presence 
and dominance. As Foucault (1977b:214) argues, “each struggle develops around a 
particular source of power”. According to Foucault (1979 cited in Megill), Memory is 
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actually a very important factor in struggle… if one controls the memory of the people, 
one controls their dynamism… It is vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, 
administer it, tell it what it must contain. ‘Dominant memory’, which points to the 
winning consent through the pervasiveness of historical representations and their 
connections with dominant institutions, is produced in the course of these struggles. But 
this does not mean that conceptions of the past that acquire dominance in the field of 
public representations are ‘collectively’ believed or that they create a collective memory. 
Dominant memory is always open to contestation (Popular Memory Group, 1982) and 
contestation produces antagonism that prevents the establishment of a ‘collective 
memory’.  
Antagonism has an ‘outside’ characteristic and it creates ambiguities, threatens the 
partial fixity of the social agents and prevents their permanent fixity. As Laclau (1990:17) 
suggests, "with antagonism, denial does not originate from the 'inside'  but, in its most 
radical sense, from outside and the presence of the inherent negativity of a constitutive 
outside means that the social never manages to fully constitute itself as an objective 
order". Antagonism is a necessary step in the journey toward transformation and change; 
without it, it is impossible to change the domination of memory.  
Antagonism is located in communication and social interaction. In the 
communication process, there is a certain give and take. What we forget (give) is as 
crucial as what we remember in the formation of memories through the communication 
process. Both forgetting and remembering are related to the selective and distorted feature 
of memories, and in this sense, what we remember and forget function in antagonistic 
relations. Thus the line between remembering and forgetting is the mystery of memory 
and provides the power to alter, reproduce or transform (Kaha, 1989). What we remember 
and forget is shaped in power relations that produce the dynamic for a change of 
dominant memory.  
Foucault (1980:119) argues that discourses are inseparable from power relations: 
“what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not 
only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse”. Power is therefore not related to 
force and obligation, but to the discourses that construct knowledge, moral values, 
emotions and beliefs to verify, legitimate and naturalize the dominant memory. In this 
respect, as discussed above, dominant discourses produce the official history for the 
construction and reproduction of memory in order to maintain their dominance.  
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This theoretical framework provides crucial openings for me to reinterpret the 
concept of memory and to specify how it will be applied in the course of my research. In 
its most general sense, the concept of ‘memory’ encompasses the ‘past experiences’ of 
social individuals. In mainstream thinking, neither the past nor its experiences can be 
changed, as they have already been lived; however, my approach does not conceive past 
experiences as the outcome of static and fixed events, because social individuals are 
constantly reinterpreting and reevaluating the ‘past’ in changing historical, political and 
cultural circumstances shaped by power relations. Some of the past experiences are in 
harmony with each other and have dominance over the memories of the social 
individuals; on the other hand, there are alternative ‘past’ experiences that are inconsistent 
with the dominant memories. These alternative experiences are potential threats to the 
partial fixity of memories, as they can gain dominance in changing historical, political 
and cultural contexts. In this context, it is possible to talk about the constant 
reinterpretation and rearticulation of memories: the memories of social individuals about 
an event might change and be re-interpreted over time. What is important for the purposes 
of my research is to explore how the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, symbols 
of tradition, commemorations and media) that are examined in the following chapter are 
constructed by the ruling groups to sustain, transform and change memories in relation to 
national identity. This section therefore lays the foundation of the theoretical framework 
that explains memory.     
 
1. 3 Section two: memory − Official/history − historiography 
 
In this section I explore the function of history in the construction and reproduction of 
memory in relation to the past. As Rusen notes (2005:129), ‘memory covers the entire 
field of dealing with the past, thus includes the realm of history as a mode of recalling the 
past into life of its representation in the cultural framework of human activities’. 
Beginning with an account of the relationships among memory, history and narrative, I 
then describe how politics is embedded in the construction of the official/history and 
examine ways in which this official history might be challenged by alternative narratives 
that can be uncovered by the historiography.  
The approaches of Halbwachs (1950), Nora (1989), Benjamin (1999b) and 
Foucault (1980) provide a comprehensive understanding of memory and history. 
Although these thinkers share the understanding that history plays a crucial role in the 
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reproduction of memory, each conceives and presents a different relationship between 
memory and history. The differences between their conceptions raise important questions 
relating to dichotomy, interrelationship or similarity between memory and history and 
provide crucial openings for the evaluation of history in relation to memory.  
According to Halbwachs (1980:78), history starts only when tradition ends and the 
social memory is fading or breaking up. Social memory appeals to history when its 
presence is in crisis; history shapes and keeps memory alive. Halbwachs classifies 
‘memory’ as ‘social memory’, ‘historical memory’ and ‘collective memory’; collective 
memory incorporates both historical memory and social memory. Historical memory is 
our knowledge of the past and social memory is our lived experiences (Yekelchyk 
2004:8). However, Halbwachs misses the point that these categories of memory are 
artificial because individual practices of remembering shape and articulate memory 
without any classification; it is not possible to locate memory as consisting of different 
segments that have fixed and stable locations in the brain. Yekelchyk’s (2004) argument 
on the internalization of historical knowledge by memory of social individuals points to 
the idea that, historical or not, knowledge is not an ‘objective’ or raw entity but the weave 
of memory that is internalized by social individuals. There is therefore no clear distinction 
between what Halbwachs classifies as ‘historical’, ‘social’ and ‘collective’, as these are 
all interwoven.  
In the common understanding, history occupies a privileged position as the 
objective, systematic and accurate reflection of the memory of the past; thus Halbwachs 
(1980: 79), for example, argues that history is the record of past events and the objective 
reflection of memory. The historian’s intention is to be objective and impartial; however, 
memory, as a sequence of events, is based on the support of a group for only a specific 
time and space. Thus, although history is universal and objective, memory is not. Hence, 
Halbwachs argues, there is an ultimate opposition between memory and history. History 
is a kind of ‘true’ reflection of memory, and so it functions objectively to reflect memory.  
On the other hand, according to Nora (1989), although history’s effort is to 
establish a “true” memory, its main mission is not to exalt but to suppress, destroy and 
annihilate memory, the actual phenomenon. From this point of view, history does not 
function to reflect a “true memory” but to reconstruct and represent the past. However 
autobiographical or public, memory is also not constituted from a ‘true’ and ‘objective’ 
reflection but through the reconstruction and re-articulation of the past. As Jeffrey and 
Edwall (1994) argue, historians rewrite history to fit different interests and interpretative 
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frameworks and social individuals similarly reshape their memories and make new sense 
out of past experiences. Therefore, as in the case of history, it is not possible to locate a 
fixed and factual memory. 
Nora (1989) and Benjamin (1999b) share a common understanding regarding the 
subjectivity of historical writing; however, Benjamin does not support the idea of 
objective or factual memory as Nora does. According to Benjamin (1999b:97), memory 
manifests itself in a form quite different from the way it manifests itself in the story: 
memory is not an ‘actual phenomenon’ as Nora claims, but historical, as it is reshaped 
and constructed in stories. Benjamin (ibid) argues that memory creates the chain of 
tradition which passes a happening from generation to generation; in this way it 
constitutes a shared remembering among generations through narrative stories. 
 According to Benjamin (1999c:247), to articulate the past historically does not 
mean to recognize it the way it really was. History is not the reflection of ‘realities’ but 
the construction of them in power relations: ‘even the dead will not be safe from the 
enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious’. In other words, the 
victor can even make use of the dead who conceived him as the enemy and reshape the 
past to maintain his power and dominance; hence the importance of historical narratives 
in legitimizing and verifying constructed ‘realities’.  
Benjamin, in a discussion of ‘dialectical images’, suggests there is a dialectical 
relationship between past and present (Roberts, 1982, Osborne 1994): neither the past nor 
the present can represent only themselves. The relationship between images of past and 
present works like the montage technique of cinema: montage creates a third meaning by 
the juxtaposition of two images, rather than fixing the meaning of each image. In this 
sense, past and present function as thesis and antithesis in Benjamin’s ‘dialectical 
images’. The dialectical image transforms both the past and the present (Evans 2000).  
For Benjamin (1999c:245-246), ‘there is a secret agreement between past 
generations and the present one’. The selected images of the past are embedded in 
political and historical factors and “every image of the past that is not recognized by the 
present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably”. In this respect, 
the images of the past are selected according to how they harmonize with the political and 
historical circumstances of the present. What Benjamin is pointing to is a politics of 
memory, for which the character of the present and the future is determined by its 
relations to a series of specific pasts (Osborne 1994:89).  However, the meaning of ‘past’ 
and ‘present’ is the result of interpretation and construction; as Brandwein (1999:209) 
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argues, frameworks are knowledge systems that are historical products; and the past is 
itself the practice of past ‘experiences’ and struggles: no sharp break can occur between 
‘now’ and ‘then’.  
According to Foucault (1977c:156-158), the validity of 'truth' is changeable 
according to the historical period: 
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types  
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and  
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by  
which each is sanctioned…the status of those who are charged with saying what  
counts as true (Foucault 1980 cited in Hall 1997:49).  
 
Foucault argues that knowledge and power are related to each other and knowledge can 
make itself 'true' by using power. In consequence, truth is not outside of power 
(Esbenshade 1989: 87). 
Foucault (1972:6) refuses the division of historical periods into continuous, stable 
and unified entities in memory, arguing that ‘the history of thought, of knowledge, of 
philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking, and discovering more and more 
discontinuities, whereas history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in 
favor of stable structures’. He rejects the approach that conceives historical events as 
recurrent because according to him, it is not possible to locate historical events as 
homogeneous and identical. His argument is that "events and their consequences are not 
arranged in the same way. They do not have the same incidence and cannot be described 
in the same way at both levels. On each of the two levels, a different history is being 
written" (ibid: 4-5). Thus history is not linear and constant; in each period, it is being 
rewritten according to the dominant discourse of that time. In this way the ‘past’, 
‘present’ and their interrelationships are constructed by discourse to maintain its power 
and dominance: history is in the service of dominant discourses and functions to reinforce 
and reproduce the dominant discourses.  
Subsequent studies on memory have conceived the past as a social construction 
that represents the problems and concerns of the present (Schwartz 1996). Accordingly, 
memory that is articulated by dominant discourses is always in process and actively 
shaping the past in the present for the future. As Faulkner (cited in Samuel 1994) points 
out, “[t]he past is not dead. It is not even past yet”. The past is not gone because it is 
embedded in the present (Tonkin, 1992). It is still living and is influencing political 
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decisions in the present. In Lowenthal’s formulation (1985:26), “the past as we know it is 
partly a product of the present; we continually reshape memory, rewrite history, re-
fashion relics”.  
History is an influential process of constructing narratives of the past (Nerone 
1989; Roberts 2001). As the construction of the past, present and future, it represents 
what to remember and ‘forget’ (Roth 1989). Because it permanently constructs and is 
constructed by memory that is changing according to the different political, cultural and 
social contexts of the present, it should not be evaluated as a passive record or reflection 
of the past that is fixed, universal and objective. Politics, the primary field of struggle, is 
highly influential in the administration and control of history. In political practices, 
history provides the necessary background for maintaining the fixity of social formations 
according to the ideals of dominant discourse; it plays a crucial role in providing the 
necessary substructure to ‘fill’ the lack of closure of the social. Although the full closure 
of the social is not realizable and unachievable in any actual society, its need does not 
disappear: societies are organized and centred on the basis of such (impossible) ideas 
(Laclau cited in Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis 2000:8) and history plays a crucial role in 
providing the necessary conditions by presenting the past according to the uses of present 
political ideals and exigencies.  
It should be noted that all political activities involve a historical argument and 
definition which are the foundation of the construction of the past and even the future. 
Without historical definition it is not possible to locate political domination (Popular 
Memory Group 1982). This is why Koonz (1994: 258) describes official history as being 
related to the ‘organized oblivion’ that imposes a single narrative that vindicates the 
leaders’. Official history can be used by ruling groups to prevent possible alternative 
narratives of the past and to maintain their dominance. Official history that includes 
symbols of tradition (i.e., a national anthem, flags), history textbooks, commemorative 
sites (i.e., museums, monuments) and organizations that promote historical knowledge 
legitimizes itself through the history canon that is supposed to be the distilled version of 
the past. However, the history canon always changes radically over time (Barber 
1994:23), and there has never been a single historical canon. Since the cultures they 
capture are forever in flux, canons cannot be canonical (ibid: 28).    
Within the scope of this research, history textbooks, commemorations (national 
days, museums, monuments) and symbols of tradition (flags, national anthems, myths, 
public rituals) are explored as the ‘mechanisms of memory’ which play a crucial role in 
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the dissemination of the official history constructed by ruling groups. According to 
Thelen (1989:1120), ‘memory begins when something in the present stimulates an 
association that might be recognition of the context of the thing or recall of an image or 
emotion’. Commemorations, symbols of tradition, and history textbooks are explored as 
sites of memory, as they stimulate associations for remembering the ‘past’ in parallel to 
the official history in the present. They enter into the everyday lives of social individuals 
and construct and reproduce their memories. These mechanisms (which are examined in 
detail in the next chapter) are constructed to fix the ‘past’ in parallel to the discourse of 
the ruling groups, in order to promote uniformity and stability for the continuation of the 
dominant discourse. As Collins (2004:10) notes, ‘memory can be a tool in the hands of 
presidents, corporations, and others who seek to extend their domination by fixing the 
meaning of the past’. According to Gregory (1999:13), ‘recollection and reworking of the 
past through social practices of memory bring the meanings of the ‘past’ to bear on 
conditions in the present’. Thus, mechanisms of memory function to reproduce the ‘past’ 
according to the conditions of the present. In this sense, in a study of memory, the 
important question is not how accurately a recollection fits a past ‘reality’, but why and 
how certain memories are constructed in particular ways at particular times (Thelen 
1989:1125).  
In answering this question one might consider the cultural and political 
circumstances that are embedded in the construction of the official history, which might 
be challenged by alternative narratives of the ‘past’ such as the ontological narratives of 
the social individuals. In this respect, oral history − the interviewing of eye-witness 
participants in the events of the ‘past’ for the purposes of historical reconstruction − is a 
significant political and historical resource for history (Perks & Thomson 1998: ix). Oral 
interviews could uncover the experiences that are hidden from the official history 
(Thompson 1998:25); oral history can thus be very useful in the formation of  knowledge 
for historiography, which can be defined as the history of history-writing (Deloria 
2004:6). Oral history interviews enable historians to recover and explore particular 
aspects of historical experience which are rarely recorded in documentary sources, such 
as personal relationships and domestic life (Thompson 1998:25).  
 Historiography raises critical questions such as “how do people use their pasts 
to perceive ideas about cultural and social difference?” and it requires us to think about 
epistemology − how we know what we know − in complex ways (Deloria 2004:6). It 
therefore plays an important role in the formation of critical thinking about history and 
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history writing. However, as Benjamin (1999b:87) argues, the storyteller takes what he 
tells from experience − his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the 
experience of those who are listening to his tale. Thus the historiographer, as a storyteller, 
uses his or her experiences and interpretations while writing the history of history.  
 Both official history and historiography stem from memory and articulate and 
construct the ‘record’ kept by it. In this sense, the history teller narrates the happenings 
according to his or her interpretation; and historiography constitutes the creative matrix of 
the various epic forms. Hence it shapes and reworks epic writing (the story and the novel) 
that can absorb the course of events only through a comprehensive memory (Benjamin, 
1999b). According to Wohlfarth (1981), historiography exists neither wholly inside nor 
entirely outside the spectrum of epic forms because it is contained within epic. 
Historiography cannot therefore be located as transcendental or neutral, and it is not 
possible to argue that the historiographer presents much more ‘objective’ picture of the 
‘past’ to the people than the writer of the official history.  
 
1.4 Section three: Memory in relation to identity 
 
This section highlights the interrelationship between memory, identity and narrative. The 
aim is to understand the interrelationship between the discourses of memory and identity 
and to synthesize both concepts in order to explain how they are constructed and 
articulated in order to create, transform and reproduce each other. After examining the 
relationship between the two concepts, I explore the role of the narratives in the 
combination of identity and memory to form a connected whole. Thus ‘memory in 
relation to identity’ is considered as it is constructed in narratives; as Anderson notes 
(1991: 204), “identity, which because it cannot be ‘remembered’, must be narrated”.  
Stories related to identity are examined as both ontological and public narratives. 
This focus provides a fuller account of the construction and articulation of memory in 
relation to identity in cultural and social contexts. Narrative memory is categorized as 
ontological and public here not for the purpose of locating a fixed polar division of 
memory, but to provide a better understanding of the communicative aspect of memory. 
At the end of this section, ‘memory in relation to identity’ is explored as a discursive and 
narrative action and as a political practice that is constantly articulated and constructed in 
historical and social contexts. 
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 Identity that is a construction (Laclau 1994:1) is closely interrelated with memory 
discourse. There is a mutual relationship between identity and memory, as they partially 
fix each other: identity depends on memory (Davis and Starn 1989:4) and without 
memory, it is not possible to locate a coherent identity. In the meantime, identity fixes 
memory to verify itself; since without a ‘stable’ memory, it is impossible to locate a 
coherent identity. However, the fixity of both memory and identity is partial, temporal 
and open to new articulations as we are constantly reinterpreting and renegotiating our 
memories and identities (Fentress & Wickham 1992; Middleton & Edwards 1986, 1987, 
1990). According to Lowenthal (1985:199), “[t]he frequency with which we update and 
interpret our memory weakens coherent temporal identity”. Thus one cannot talk about 
fixed and stable memories and identities, because complete structures and closures of 
discourses are unrealizable; they change and are re-interpreted and re-explained through 
articulations (Berger 1963, Bhabba 1990, Laclau & Mouffe 1985, Middleton & Edwards 
1990).  
However, the impossibility of an ultimate fixity of memory and identity implies 
that there have to be partial fixities; otherwise the very flow of differences would be 
impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning” 
(Howarth, Norval and Stravrakakis 2000: 21, Laclau 1990). Hence, without partial 
closure and fixity, it is not possible to address the nature of discourses relating to memory 
and identity.  
‘Memory in relation to identity’ can only exist through narratives that are shaped 
by certain discourses. As Somers and Gibson (1994:58-59) suggest, “it is through 
narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it 
is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities”. Without 
narratives, it is not possible to locate ‘memory in relation to identity’. When we listen to a 
narrative story, memory is always there (Fentress and Wickham 1992) and it constructs 
and is constructed by the narrative: the relationship between narrative and ‘memory in 
relation to identity’ is mutually constitutive. 
 In order to grasp the complex functioning of memory, it is useful to examine the 
identity as it is constructed through ontological and public narratives. Ontological 
narratives provide a useful insight into autobiographical memories that are mainly related 
to the narratives of the subject. ‘Autobiographical memory is the memory for information 
related to the self’ (Brewer 1986:26): these memories are acquired through a complex 
interrelationship between ontological and public narratives. On the other hand, public 
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narratives are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single social 
individual like society, nation and family (Roberts 2001, Calhoun 1994). In this sense, 
while ontological narratives appear to be ‘interior’ because they are related to the 
narratives of the subject, public narratives seem to be ‘exterior’ because they are 
connected to cultural and institutional frameworks. However, as Laclau and Mouffe 
suggest (1985:111), “neither a total interiority nor a total exteriority is possible” because 
they are interrelated and they complete and transform each other.  
In “Sources of the Self” (1989), Charles Taylor develops an important insight into 
ontological accounts (ontological narratives) and webs of interlocution (public 
narratives). Ontological narratives are used to define who we are (Somers and Gibson 
1994:61). When we define ourselves, our identities are constructed through narratives, so 
‘our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us and what is not’ (Taylor 
1989:30). Hence, ‘no matter how much it feels like a discovery, both self identity and self 
knowledge are always constructions’ (Calhoun 1994:10) that form and are formed 
through narratives.   
Our definition of who we are relies considerably on our autobiographical memory, 
which is the memory of those events that we ourselves ‘experience’ (Olick and Robbins, 
1998:111), and we construct information related to ourselves out of this experience. 
Ontological narratives process these events into episodes (Calhoun 1994:59). Thus, our 
self-understanding incorporates narrative (Taylor 1989): the ‘events’ that we ‘experience’ 
are always embedded in and occur through narrative frames. There is therefore no primal, 
unmediated experience that can be recovered (Olick and Robbins 1998:110): we 
‘experience’ the world because we understand and interpret it in certain ways, not vice 
versa” (Bakhurts & Sypnowich 1995 and Bruner 1989:19). 
Similarly, we ‘experience’ events in certain ways as we remember, forget and 
narrate them accordingly. In his essay on ‘The image of Proust’, Benjamin (1999a:198) 
analyses the distinction between ‘experienced event’ and ‘remembered event’: although 
the experienced event is finite, the remembering event is not. The experienced event is 
confined to one sphere of experience in a specific time and place, whereas the 
remembering event is influential both before and after the event, as it is the weaving of 
memory. The way we remember the event is constructed by our memories, which are 
articulated by certain discourses. Hence our interpretations of an event are not the 
outcome of our ‘experiences’ but of a remembering that is embedded in social and 
cultural constraints. Thus, although autobiographical memories are mostly conceived as 
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the reflections of ‘personal’ and ‘private’ experiences, they are social and interpersonal. 
‘Experience’ is the interpretation that is caused by inter-subjective exchange with others 
and embedded in social relations. As Thelen (1989:1122) points out, “people depend on 
others to help them decide which experiences to forget and which to remember and what 
interpretation to place on an experience. People develop a shared identity by identifying, 
exploring and agreeing on memories”.         
According to the Popular Memory Group (1982), the authors of ontological 
narratives are social individuals who speak out of particular positions in the complex of 
social relations characteristic of particular societies in particular historical times. 
However, not only societies, but also other social formations and institutions such as 
families, nations, communities and media, play a crucial role in the construction and 
articulation of ontological narratives. The narratives of these social frameworks can be 
called public narratives because they are related to social and institutional formations that 
are larger than the single individual (Roberts 2001, Calhoun 1994). In this respect, it is 
not possible to locate ontological narratives as independent of public narratives. Our 
identities exist only within public narratives because one cannot form an identity on one’s 
own; identity can only be described with reference to those who surround it. From this 
perspective, ontological and public narratives look like different sides of the same coin; 
although they represent a different side, they complete each other and compose a single 
identity. However, this does not mean that memories specific to the social individual do 
not exist. Autobiographical memories that consist of those events that we ourselves 
experience are peculiar to us as individuals. Thus, although public narratives that 
encompass the narratives of families, connections, school education, official history (i.e 
history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) and media influence how we 
interpret the events that we experience alone, they can be defined as our public memories 
as they are mediated through the public narratives.   
Moral values and beliefs also play a role in the articulation of identity that is 
constructed through the interrelationship between public and ontological narratives. 
Oyserman and Markus (1998:107) note that, ‘[a] cultural group’s shared ideas about “how 
to be” are reflected in culturally significant stories, sacred texts, proverbs, icons, and 
institutions, as well as lived in the everyday practices such as language, schooling, media, 
religious and workplace. According to Taylor (1989), to know who we are is to be 
oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good and bad, 
what has importance and what is trivial. The moral space is located within public 
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narratives that are the sources of our identity; moral values and beliefs function like the 
cement which fixes and constructs the structure. And without partial fixity, one cannot 
talk about the existence of the structure that forms the identity. 
 The dominant public memory of identity represents temporal fixity; it is 
connected with dominant institutions and is supported by public narratives that construct 
moral values and beliefs within a specific time period. Moral values and beliefs are 
effectively used by the dominant public memory for the continuation of its power. In this 
respect, as Foucault (cited in Clifford 2001) argues, ‘counter-memory’ liberates us from a 
particular mode of subjectivity, as it consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a 
forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind 
us to an identity. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter 
memory. In this way, ‘counter-memory might evoke symbolic struggles over the meaning 
of events’ (Fowler 2005: 60).  
Dominant discourses play a crucial role in the process of turning cultural and 
social practices into identities: identity is not natural, but historical and political. 
According to Gregory (1999:13), the social construction of identity or the ‘fixing’ of 
racialized, gendered, and other subject positions within a given social order is not only 
political, it is also the precondition of politics. Identity is constructed by politics to 
support and undermine particular relationships. As Leed (cited in Gillis 1994:4) points 
out, identities imply and mask a particular social relationship that is constructed and 
sustained through social and cultural practices constructed in power relations. In 
Foucault’s terms, there is no recourse to objective laws and no recourse to pure 
subjectivity. There are only the cultural practices which have made us what we are. To 
know what that is, we have to understand the history of the present and that politics is 
immanent in it (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). Cultural and social practices are thus the 
main source of our memory in relation to identity, which is constructed and articulated 
through political discourses formed under historical constraints. Without a structured 
identity, the field of politics would be indefinite and uncertain (Gregory 1999) as the 
construction of identity provides politics a means for retaining its control. From this 
perspective, in the next chapter, I examine memory in its relation to national identity and 
politics, exploring the ways in which ruling groups use the mechanisms of memory 
(symbols of tradition, commemorations, history textbooks and media) to mobilize 
memories in the service of concepts of national identity that are parallel to their 
discourses.      
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CHAPTER 2: SYMBIOSIS- MECHANISMS OF MEMORY AND 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter develops and expands the theoretical discussions of Chapter 1, focusing on 
the function of the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols 
of tradition and media) in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation and 
construction of national identity.  
In the first section, on ‘articulation of memory in relation to national identity in the 
socialization processes’, I explore the role of dominant/alternative public and 
autobiographical narratives in the articulation of national identity during the socialization 
processes. Some narratives can be interpreted as dominant and others as alternative public 
narratives in the context of changing power relations. The focus of the second section is 
primarily on the mechanisms of memory in relation to national identity. However, it 
should be noted that national identity is worked out through the socialization processes; 
the separation of these two sections is only reasonable on the basis of an analytical 
purpose, which is to facilitate the examination of the function of the mechanisms of 
memory in different aspects. In the third section on ‘mediating mechanisms: sites of 
memory as a single body’, my aim is to explore how the mechanisms of memory work 
together like a single body to mobilize and articulate memories in relation to national 
identity.   
 
2.2 Section one: Articulation of memory in relation to national identity in the 
socialization process 
 
Memories in relation to national identity are articulated through communication and 
mediation, starting from childhood. According to Hermes (1999:71), ‘identity 
construction needs to be understood as a process of meaning making whereby individual 
identities are formed as a result of social interaction based on or making use of cultural 
sources of meaning production’. In this respect, the national identities of social 
individuals are constructed in many ways, which include the webs of social relations such 
as family and connections (Gillis 1994:35), official history that encompasses history 
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textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, public rituals, myths, national anthems) and 
commemorations (national days, museums, monuments), organizations that promote 
historical knowledge, media and compulsory and standardized public mass education 
systems through which state authorities hope to inculcate the social individuals with 
national devotion (Smith 1993:16-17).  
 Definitions of national identity provide the community with a sense of who 
belongs and who is differentiated, what is the norm and who is the ‘other’ (Price 
1995:42). According to Connolly (1991:64-65), an identity is established in relation to a 
series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential 
to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not be possible for any identity 
to exist in its distinctiveness and solidity. Differences in race, language, religion, 
geographical location, cultural and historical background are generally represented as 
natural factors in the formation of a nation or a national identity; however, these are not 
natural, but historical (Wertsch 2002:68). “Identity requires difference in order to be, and 
it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (Connolly 
1991: 64). Therefore the discourse of national identity is inevitably based on the 
assumption of the ‘other’. In the most general sense, the ‘other’ can be characterized as 
any person, group, or institution which is placed outside the system of normality or 
convention to which one belongs oneself (Goring, Hawthorn and Mitchell 2001). As Hall 
(1996:5) suggests, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only 
because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, and to render ‘outside’, abjected. Paez, 
Taboada, Arrospide, Insua, Ayestaran (1998:228) note that groups in general view 
themselves as superior in comparison to other groups on the basis of those attributes 
which define them or which are typical of them, and tend to perceive outgroups as less 
variable or more homogeneous. In this way, the concept of national identity is reinforced 
by creating “imagined” friends and foes that construct the differentiation of ‘self’ and 
‘other’ and ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Salecl 1994, Schlesinger 1999, Woodward 1997). Salecl 
(1994:211) comments: 
 
As with all nationalisms, national identification with the nation (‘our kind’) is 
based on the fantasy of the enemy: an alien which has insinuated itself into our 
society and constantly threatens us with habits, rituals − indeed discourses − 
that are not of ‘our kind’. No matter what this other ‘does’, it threatens us with 
its existence.    
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Thus, the others are represented and narrated with negative terms and feelings. However, 
in the meantime, our feelings towards the ‘others’ are generally reinforced with the 
representations and narrations of negative feelings and attitudes of ‘others’ towards ‘us’. 
The ‘otherness’ in relation to national identity is supported through discourses on 
familiarity, security and unity that form the basis of nationalistic values and beliefs. Each 
discourse is like a different piece that completes the same puzzle; without the ‘other’ it is 
not possible to locate these discourses, because in order to feel the necessity of 
familiarity, security and unity, there should be an existing or potential threat. According 
to Morley (2000:4), 
 
There is a mutually dependent process of exclusion and identity construction, in 
relation to the domestic home, the neighbourhood and the nation as spaces of 
belonging. The other is continuously a threat to the integrity of those who share a 
common national identity and home.  
 
National identity connects social individuals to the community or nation with a shared 
memory; and it is located in public narratives, as nobody can have a private national 
identity. As noted in Chapter 1, public narratives encompass the narratives of families, 
connections, school education, official history (i.e., history textbooks, commemorations, 
symbols of tradition) and the media.  
In the domestic environment, family narratives play the primary role in the 
construction of memories in relation to national identity. Fairbrother (2003:21-22) 
explains: ‘parents try to intentionally teach particular political attitudes’. Thus, family has 
an important role in inculcating basic political attachments, attitudes and loyalties such as 
patriotism. Family memories are internalized in a way that influences autobiographical 
memories (the memories of those events that we ourselves experience) and decisions of 
social individuals in their everyday lives. Hence, our ‘experiences’ that constitute our 
autobiographical memories are constructed and shaped in the social context of everyday 
life which is partly cultivated in the most private fields such as family and home. As 
Killoran (1998:167) notes, “a national identity constructed through the body as memory 
works to connect individuals to the imagined community by exploiting their sense of self 
located in the private realm of the home; family and the body”. However, families might 
provide alternative narratives opposing the dominant discourse that supports the nation. In 
these circumstances, the ideas of children might be articulated in parallel with the family 
narratives. Children are also unintentionally exposed to political education; youth can 
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sense their parents’ political attitudes from family discussions and their parents’ own 
political involvement’. As a result, as Gordon (2007:233-234) suggests, ‘family discourse 
can socialize children into the political beliefs of their parents. This situation reproduces 
political values and behaviours across generations of the same family. Hence, an 
individual’s political identity is a part of their family’s identity’.  
In addition to families, schools as public spaces play a central role in the 
construction of national identity in modern-states (Danahay 1996:3). Fairbrother 
(2003:22) explains that schools teach or promote particular political values and attitudes. 
They influence students’ political attitudes by conveying knowledge through the 
curriculum and textbooks. Thus, courses such as citizenship education, national history 
and geography, national language and literature play a crucial role in transmitting 
knowledge about the nation and the political system. Schools might also prescribe 
attitudes through children’s participation in extracurricular and ritual activities such as 
ceremonies and the celebration of national days in schools. These activities that take place 
at school reinforce positive attitudes toward the nation. Some schools display the national 
flag, pictures and sayings of national heroes and leaders. Activities such as the raising of 
the flag, ceremonies, singing national anthem and patriotic songs emphasize the public 
nature of patriotism. The influence of teachers is also important in the construction of the 
political attitudes of students, as they may serve to reinforce the messages of the 
curriculum and extracurricular activities. However, they also have the potential to 
undercut the school’s intended socialization efforts if their political views are against the 
status quo (ibid: 23).      
 The media are another institution that plays a crucial role in the construction of 
memories in relation to national identity in the socialization process (Martinelli 2005).  
According to Cardiff and Scannell (1987:162), the press and broadcasting have replaced 
older institutions such as the school in linking individuals to an increasingly corporate, 
public and national process, as they are placed in close association with the centres of 
political, economic and cultural power and authority. The media therefore play a crucial 
role in the mobilization of the ideas of people in parallel with the dominant discourses in 
a society. As Uchida (1999:207) points out, ‘media have the power to influence and 
change the modes of thought and perception’. However, the media might use their power 
to disseminate alternative narratives that are against the dominant discourses.   
 In addition to the media, official history that encompasses the history 
textbooks, commemorations (national days, museums, and monuments) and symbols of 
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tradition (flags, public rituals, myths and national anthems) plays a substantial part in the 
socialization into national identity. History textbooks, symbols of tradition, 
commemorations and media that are explored as mechanisms of memory within the scope 
of this research construct the way social individuals remember and forget the ‘past’ in 
relation to national identity. Media, in the form of new twentieth-century technologies of 
narration (Tomasulo cited in Hoskins 2001) play an important role in the representation of 
the other mechanisms as well; however, although the mechanisms of history textbooks, 
symbols of tradition and commemorations are produced directly by the ruling groups, it is 
not always possible to talk about an organic relationship between media institutions and 
the ruling groups.  
   Public narratives, including those of history textbooks, traditions, media, 
commemorations, family and school, are interrelated and they influence each other’s 
functions. As Fairbrother (2003:22) suggests, ‘the family for example, may exercise 
control over children’s exposure to the mass medium of television, which may be used by 
the state or other economic or political interests to convey particular political viewpoints’. 
Furthermore, school education may be the primary factor in constructing the ideas of 
children about the ‘past’, through history textbooks and ritual activities in schools such as 
the celebration of national days and commemoration of national heroes.    
 The mechanisms play a substantial part in the constitution of the moral 
conscience, which is necessary for the construction of a nation through the mobilization 
of people’s emotions and ideas regarding their national identities. As Renan (1990:20) 
states, ‘man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the 
direction taken by mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm 
of heart, creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation’. However, this does 
not mean that national identities are fixed and stable. Mechanisms of memory constantly 
articulate national identity through its representations and narratives. In Hall’s (1996) 
terms, national identities are formed and transformed within and in relation to 
representation. Every statement or practice of identity changes our relationship to who we 
are. Thus, there is no definite way to specify who we are. When we talk or practice 
identity, we change or construct it (Handler 1994:30). Hence, narrative stories have a 
transformative dynamic, not only for the teller but also for the listener. In this respect, the 
narratives of the mechanisms of memory also transform the way individuals remember 
their own past (Trigeorgis 1998). Through these narratives, the mechanisms of memory 
provide the constant repetition that is necessary for the construction and re-construction 
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of national identity. And as Bellah (cited in Kitch 2005:4) points out, repetition plays a 
crucial role in the construction of social identity by the narratives because in order not to 
forget its past, a social group must retell its story, its constitutive narrative”.  
The narratives of the mechanisms of memory have the ultimate role of articulating 
dominant public memory of the past, because when communication takes place the 
memory is carried a stage further – through its articulation (Fentress and Wickham 1992). 
Without communication and mediation, it is not possible to locate the memory of a 
‘common past’ because an agreed version of the past can only be established by 
communication, and not by ‘private’ remembrance (Fentress and Wickham, 1992, 
Lowenthal, 1985). The articulation of the dominant memory of the past plays a crucial 
role in the construction of national identity because remembering the past is essential for 
our sense of national identity. As Lowenthal notes (1985:197), “to know what we were 
confirms who we are”.   
In this sense, it is possible to talk about the role of the mechanisms of memory in 
the transformation of autobiographical memories into public memories. As Lowenthal 
(ibid: 196) puts it, ‘we need other people’s memories to confirm our own and to give 
them endurance. Sharing and validating memories sharpens them and promotes their 
recall’; memories produced and narrated by the mechanisms of memory may play a 
crucial role in legitimating and confirming our autobiographical memories, because the 
mechanisms of memory narrate the memories of the ‘public’ to us and thus construct our 
experiences. However, the confirmation of our individual memories occurs when they are 
consistent with public memories; thus, in the case of our autobiographical memories 
being inconsistent with public memories, they might lose their certainty and 
trustworthiness. In other words, autobiographical memories − the memories of those 
events that we ‘experience’ privately − might be forgotten after a period of time as there 
is no possibility of their repetition or/and mobilization by the public narratives. As 
Lowenthal argues (ibid), ‘events we alone know about are less certainly, less easily 
evoked’; so in the process of articulation, autobiographical memories may be revised to 
fit the past that is represented as publicly remembered, as they gradually lose their 
peculiarity. The past represented as publicly remembered may then become more 
dominant in the memories of social individuals. Similarly, the mechanisms of memory 
play a significant role in the transformation of ‘public memory’ into ‘dominant public 
memory’, because public memory can only be dominant through its pervasiveness, which 
is made possible by the mechanisms. The domination and pervasiveness of public 
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memory depend largely on the selective representation of the mechanisms, through which 
public memory is repeated and articulated; this is necessary for the emergence of a 
‘dominant public memory’. The role of the mechanisms of memory in the construction 
and articulation of ‘dominant public memory’ is therefore primal. 
‘Dominant public memory’ is formed in a complex relationship between 
mechanisms of memory and society. The mechanisms serve society/culture by 
constructing the ‘dominant public memory’, which is necessary for the partial closure of 
any society/culture. According to Stuart Hall (1980:134), ‘any society/culture tends, with 
varying degrees of closure, to impose its classification of the social, cultural and political 
world. These constitute a dominant cultural order, though it is neither univocal nor 
uncontested’. In other words, partial closure is the precondition of every society/culture, 
as it constitutes and is constituted by political, social and cultural conditions. However, 
neither society/culture nor political, cultural and social conditions are fixed and stable. 
Hall (1980) uses the term ‘dominant’ to explain that there exists a pattern of 
preferred meanings that are embedded in the institutional and political order. However, he 
emphasizes that the dominant cultural order is the outcome of a partial fixity that is 
always open to contestation. In his view, ‘dominant does not mean determined because it 
is always possible to decode an event within more than one “mapping”’ (ibid.). 
‘Mapping’ provides a kind of liberty as social individuals choose which direction they 
want to follow in certain frameworks, but in the meantime it represents the boundaries 
and structural constraints, as there are pre-existed directions to be followed.  
Hall’s arguments raise important questions regarding the interpretation of texts by 
the social individuals. His encoding/decoding model was central to the birth and 
development of the reception paradigm that emerged from within cultural studies (Corner 
1996, Alasuutari 1999b, Stevenson 2002). However, according to Alasuutari (ibid: 2-4), 
Hall’s model is a way of explaining only certain societal and cultural frameworks in 
which texts are embedded. Thus this encoding/decoding model lacks the approach of the 
production process of texts. In addition, Hall focuses more on the psychological aspects 
of the interpretation of messages in his arguments about decoding (ibid: 3-14). Meanings 
are produced in social formations such as family, nation and community and individuals 
interpret the texts by using social and cultural codes constructed and articulated in these 
formations. It is therefore an oversimplification to evaluate the interpretations of the 
social individuals merely on the basis of cognitive and psychological reasons. As Ang 
(1996:142) suggests, what a critical ethnography of reception needs to discover is the 
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unrecognized, unconscious and contradictory effectiveness of hegemony and the relations 
of power that are inscribed within the very texture of media reception practices. Ang 
points to the importance of the historical, political, cultural and social contexts that are 
shaped by the power relations in audience interpretations and uses of media texts and 
technologies.     
Although Hall’s encoding/decoding model is criticised because of his lack of 
focus on the social and cultural factors regarding the interpretation of agencies, the 
criticisms of his psychological and cognitive evaluations relating to interpretation provide 
important openings for the consideration of the interpretation as the product of social and 
cultural circumstances. His encoding/decoding model also forms the basis of concepts 
like resistance (Alasuutari 1999b:4-6) and negotiation. As Ang notes (1996:139), Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model opened up the space to examine the ways in which the media’s 
preferred meanings could be ‘negotiated’ or even occasionally subverted in audience 
readings. 
The issues of remembering and forgetting are closely related to the negotiated 
readings of the audiences. Hence the examination of the influences of 
dominant/alternative public narratives on memory is a complex issue, because each of us 
remembers and forgets by using differing social and cultural codes; as a result of this 
process, there may be correlations and discrepancies between public memories partly 
mediated through mechanisms and the autobiographical memories of individuals, 
because, as Nerone (1989:91) suggests, ‘narratives can be interpreted by social 
individuals in different manners’. Thus, it is not possible to talk about a ‘collective 
memory of the past’ that is constructed by the mechanisms and absorbed by each member 
of a social group. In Friedman’s (1992:853) terms, ‘the past is always practiced in the 
present, not because the past imposes itself, but because subjects in the present, fashion 
the past in the practice of their social identity’.  
The concepts of ‘negotiation’ and ‘resistance’ provide the possibility of 
encompassing the complicated ways of understanding the position of the social 
individuals. ‘Resistance’ is a substantial departure relating to the position of ‘agencies’ in 
the interpretation and consumption of texts in their everyday lives. In his research on 
children in schools, Spyrou (2006:131) describes how children did not absorb messages 
without reinterpreting them; they constructed and reworked meanings in ways that made 
sense to them. Spyrou (ibid) continues: 
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... I have seen children on a number of occasions resisting − sometimes subtly, 
sometimes more directly − what the teacher said by bringing alternative 
knowledge into the classroom such as knowledge from parents, grandparents, the 
mass media or their own experiences which contradicted the official nationalistic 
discourse of the curriculum. Thus, children make sense in an active way, not by 
passively internalizing what is out there. In this way, they contribute to cultural 
production that is the production of new meanings and understandings by 
combining and recombining what they know in ways that make sense to them.   
      
In an article entitled ‘Bombs, Bikinis and the Popes of Rock ‘N’ Roll’, Maddox 
(2001:276-279) describes three different events1 as examples of resistance in the affairs of 
                                                 
1 The first event is narrated by Maddox (2001:276) as follows: “One summer morning in 1983, a 
garbageman in Aracena happened across a peculiar-looking box that had been deposited in the trash bin in 
front of the branch office of a national bank. The day before, a terrorist bomb had devastated another office 
of this bank in the Basque country, and the incident had been extensively reported on the television news. 
The trashman poked the box anxiously a few times and decided to call for the municipal police to 
investigate. As he waited, a group of about twenty people gathered and began to tease the increasingly 
embarrassed garbageman. Most of the jokes were about the unlikelihood of Aracena as a terrorist target. 
But despite the joking, when a police officer arrived on the scene, the crowd spontaneously backed up 
twenty feet or so, a distance that would have done little to protect them from the effects of an explosion.”       
According to Maddox (ibid:279), “In the case of the imaginary bomb, it was not Basque terrorists 
but televised images of carnage and destruction that penetrated the community. These images, though 
fleeting and commonplace, were sufficiently strong to induce a state of nervousness that led to the anxious 
and startled reactions to the threat of the bomb, despite almost everyone’s conscious estimation that a 
terrorist act in Aracena was extremely unlikely.”  
The second event that Maddox (ibid:277) describes is about a mother who had been widowed ten 
months earlier: “Despite the fact that she and her husband had been estranged for several years, she had 
been strict about observing the long period of mourning and confinement that local custom required. 
Recently, she had even refused to indulge in her great passion for bullfights, choosing not to attend the 
corrida celebrated in association with Aracena’s annual fair. However, she had persuaded her future son-in-
law to make a home movie of the event, which she had watched in the privacy of her house; and in return 
for this favor, she had promised him that she would bring her period of seclusion to an end. When the 
moment of truth arrived, however, she dressed from head to toe in traditional black as she had been for 
months, declared that she was not going anywhere, because, as she said people would certainly talk. 
However, her son in law declared that he had a marvelous solution to the problem that would surely silence 
wagging tongues and still permit his mother in law to enjoy. With this statement, he reached into a bag that 
he had been carrying and pulled out a bikini bathing suit. As he stressed, the bikini was black and therefore 
was totally appropriate for the occasion. Even his mother smiled at this mock concession to tradition, she 
was more or less carted off to the beach. Neverthless, once there, she kept on her mourning garb and also 
remained firmly tucked inside the car, saying that she preferred to stay there in her house.” 
Maddox (ibid:279) argues that in the case of the black bikini, the home movie of the bullfight 
undermined the distinction between domestic and public domains, and the reference to it, as well as the 
sudden materialization of the black bikini itself, subverted the significance and coherence of traditional 
mourning customs.  
The last incident that Maddox (ibid:278) describes is the concert of a nationally famous rock band 
in Aracena: “Most young people enthusiastically welcomed the concert. For weeks afterward, it seemed that 
every bar with a youthful clientele was constantly blaring the band’s songs into the streets − much to the 
annoyance of many of the town’s older inhabitants, who were almost equally vocal in expressing their 
disapproval of the whole affair. Antonio Vargas, a man whose opinions were consistent with those of his 
neighbours, was also enraged that the Socialist town council had officially sanctioned the concert. One of 
his more colorful speeches went like this: That is what happens in this so-called democracy. It is an abuse, 
and the fault is with the parents, the teachers, and the sons of whores on the town council... But let me tell 
you, better the Pope than these degenerates with respect for nothing.” Maddox (ibid:279) states that the 
local appearance of the popes of rock ‘n’ roll transformed a conventional folk fiesta into a performance of 
modernity and in so doing introduced a cleavage both within the community and within the ordinarily 
largely undifferentiated category of  “popular culture”. Thus the ‘free’ flow of information − a phenomenon 
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daily life. In giving three different incidents as examples, Maddox (2001) emphasizes the 
importance of the comparative analysis of resistance which, he argues, enables us to 
observe particular forms of resistance, and which helps us to understand better why the 
strengths of one form of opposition and resistance are the weaknesses of another.                 
Maddox (ibid: 279) suggests that each of the incidents involved a sort of 
transgression of boundaries − of the body, the home, or the community − by a dominant 
power. He describes the public narratives and the representations of the media as being 
encompassed by the dominant power, and the re-articulation and re-construction of social, 
local and traditional values through the penetration of the dominant power into the 
domestic and public fields of everyday life such as body, home and community. The 
penetration can be realized through a news story, a home movie or a public concert. He 
also analyses the people’s different responses, interpretations and reactions to the 
experiences of penetration, transgression and violation; some responses might be strong, 
defiant or weak.  
 According to Maddox (ibid: 280) each incident can be interpreted as ‘resistance’ 
because “it reaffirmed local values in a way that opposed them to dominant tendencies in 
the larger society”. In his view there are two crucial matters that should be considered in 
the analysis of resistance. First, the motivations and modes of interpretation of people 
involved in a particular statement or act should be observed immediately, because it will 
be subjected to constant articulation and changes of interpretation Secondly, it is 
necessary to examine and make some critical judgements about the extent to which the 
act or statement represents a way in which “difference” is incorporated within dominant 
tendencies. Without difference, it is not possible to locate resistance that causes the 
articulation and change of dominant tendencies. According to Maddox (2001), dominant 
regimes always allow some more or less limited forms of opposition and diversity. Thus, 
the existence of dominance arouses resistance and enables the individuals to negotiate 
meaning. However, as Gupta and Ferguson (2001:19) argue, ‘as a form of experience, the 
effects of resistance may be transformative. But it may equally result in contributing to 
maintaining the status quo’.    
The term ‘negotiation’ further implies the process of discussion for an ‘agreement’ 
over the meaning of texts. However, to reach an agreement does not always mean to 
possess a definite and fixed conception of meaning. On the contrary, it is mostly related to 
                                                                                                                                                  
that townspeople closely associate with the global processes of liberalization − was experienced by many 
townspeople as a violation of the social body.                
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ambiguity, confusion, questioning and contradiction because the partial fixity of 
‘agreement’ carries with it its possible oppositions. The debates on ‘negotiation’, 
‘contestation’ or ‘resistance’ should not be conceived as the claim of the complete 
freedom or autonomy of the agencies in their choices, decisions, thoughts and beliefs 
about any issue; they refer to the dynamic interpretation of meaning by agencies, the 
‘negotiations subjects’ (Ang 1996). The agencies are constrained by the web of 
relationships and structures which constitute them as social subjects (Ang 1996: 41). 
Therefore, the interpretations of social individuals should be evaluated by a consideration 
of societal and cultural circumstances that individuals pass through. Cultural factors play 
a major role in the constant articulation of narratives, as they cause the dynamic 
negotiation and contestation of meaning. As Ang (ibid: 2) suggests, ‘cultural pervades 
everyday life and... cultural meanings are not only constructed, but also subject to a 
constant contestation’. This situation prevents the permanent fixity of memories in 
relation to the national identity of the social individuals.  
 
2. 3 Section two: Mechanisms of memory in relation to national identity 
 
In ‘modern society’, the political character of memory functions for the purpose of 
maintenance of the modern nation-state (Uchida 1999:205) through the formation of 
symbols of tradition, commemorations, history textbooks and media – the areas that are 
explored as the mechanisms of memory in this research. These mechanisms compose the 
backbone of the modern nation-state by reproducing national identity. Without them, the 
system of the nation-state cannot function properly. However, it is also possible to talk 
about the alternative narrations of history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of 
tradition and media that produce and are produced by conflicting discourses about 
national and political issues.  
The role of each mechanism in the mobilization and articulation of memories in 
relation to national identity is examined below. Although the mechanisms are examined 
under different subheadings, this does not mean that the function of each mechanism is 
independent from another. On the contrary, they are interconnected and complete each 
other. The purpose of their division under subheadings is not to emphasize the 
independence of the mechanisms from each other, but to create an opportunity to examine 
the theoretical framework of media, commemorations, symbols of tradition and history 
textbooks more clearly. 
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2.3.1 History textbooks  
 
The nation, which is the product of narration, is legitimated and naturalized by history 
(Bhabba 1990, Anderson 1991). Official history that is disseminated by the ruling groups 
plays an essential role in the empowerment and reinforcement of the national identities as 
political discourses. One of the primary sources of official history is history textbooks. 
According to Kook (2002:109), “the process of writing the past, in the formal framework 
of history books, is perhaps the most direct way of constructing a national memory”. It is 
largely in this way that “textbooks convey the official or approved knowledge that the 
state aspires to transmit to the next generation” (Podeh 2002:8).  
Schools and universities play the primary role in transmitting the ‘past’ that is 
constructed by the ruling groups, through history textbooks. As Hein and Selden (2000:3) 
suggest, “schools and textbooks are important vehicles through which contemporary 
societies transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized past and the promised future 
of the community”. In this sense, one can argue that history textbooks articulate the 
memories of the past in relation to national identity and shed light on the future. 
Therefore, as Soysal and Schissler (2005:2) suggest, “teaching history has been a priority 
for modern nation-states, since it carries the burden of the identity-building of citizens”.  
Although textbooks pretend to teach neutral and legitimate knowledge, they are 
often used as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and naturalize an 
established political and social order (Podeh 2002). As Foster and Crawford (2006) 
suggest, history textbooks involve narratives and stories that nation states choose to tell 
about themselves and their relationships with other nations. “History textbooks bring 
certain events and set interpretations of these events to the process of remembrance” 
(Canefe 2004:92) and make them be conceived as lived ‘realities’. The textbook version 
of the past is rendered undeniable, infallible and future proof, because the language use in 
textbooks leaves no room for discussion or questioning (Stojanovic 2004:338). This 
situation legitimizes and naturalizes the ways in which the ‘information’ in the history 
textbooks is conceived as unquestioned realities. 
 This legitimization process can only function through the limitation of the 
creativity and imagination of the social individuals. However, the limitation does not 
involve any kind of pressure or compulsion. It works insidiously through the 
internalization of the political discourse. According to Kaes (1990 cited in Baer 
2001:493), history is recreated in conventionalized fictional and nostalgic forms and 
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colonizes the individuals’ historical imagination instead of stimulating and liberating it. In 
this sense, history textbooks, which are the primary vehicles of historical ‘information’, 
limit the ‘liberation’ of the social individuals by presenting a sense of ‘reality’ about the 
‘past’ which is in parallel to the political discourse of nation-state. 
Emphasizing certain aspects of a nation’s history determines the identity of that 
nation (Kook 2002:109). Writing and rewriting history is therefore crucial. This is why 
public debates especially take place around new history textbooks. The fundamental issue 
in these debates is generally that of who is included in the nation’s history, and who is 
excluded. Controversies over textbook content often break out when prevailing domestic 
assumptions about national unity are challenged and when international relations change 
rapidly. People fight over textbook content because education is so obviously about the 
future, reaches so deeply into society and is directed by the state.       
 
2.3.2 Symbols of Tradition (flags, myths, public rituals and national anthems) 
 
Traditions give people a sense of continuity with what are believed to be precedents 
(Linstroth 2002). In the commonsense understanding, traditions are accepted as the 
‘wisdom’ of generations. Accordingly, they are seen as the outcome of experience and 
knowledge that is developed and accumulated through generations and sheds light on the 
present and the future; traditions are generally represented as guides to be followed. This 
understanding justifies and naturalizes the present way of life, since it gives it a sense of 
continuity: traditions provide ready building-blocks (Sztompka 1993:64) for justifying the 
national identity. One justification is to invoke the early source or the author of some 
doctrine or creed; for example, “the Bible says so”, “Aristotle claimed that”, etc. (ibid). In 
a similar vein, it is possible to talk about the importance of the sayings of charismatic 
political leaders in the reproduction of national identities. Traditions may also provide 
blueprints for action and shed light on the idea of how to be: they produce role models to 
be emulated, such as heroes and leaders.   
 Traditions enter into the lives of social individuals through social practices and 
they are embedded in their behaviors. They provide persuasive symbols of ‘identity’, 
loyalties to nations, communities and groups and strengthen rootedness.  Anthems, flags, 
mythology and public rituals are the primary symbols of national traditions (Sztompka 
1993:65). These symbols, within the scope of this research, are explored as the 
mechanisms that play a crucial role in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation, 
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construction and reproduction of national identities. Recalling common heritage and 
cultural kinship, they provide a sense of continuity and belonging; as Smith (1993:16-17) 
suggests, traditions are the repertoires provided by the nations to provide a social bond 
between the individuals. With increased social attachment between individuals, the nation 
becomes a ‘faith-achievement’ group, able to surmount hardships; thus the state promotes 
rituals such as flag-raising ceremonies (Fairbrother 2003:21) and singing national 
anthems.  
 Flags, employed to identify groups and territories, are used to differentiate 
communities from each other and to visualize the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
(Elgenius 2007: 26). According to Amienyi (2005:42), “national flags function as the 
representations of a country’s history, culture, geography and sometimes hope for the 
future. The symbols, colours and shapes of each flag tell a different story about a nation 
and its people”. However, most flags are used to legitimize sovereignty and to illustrate 
distinctiveness. Moreover, “national flags become an instrument of political action and 
symbols of ‘independence’, ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’. They are available to all citizens 
and not exclusively to a small privileged group, or on special occasions” (Elgenius 
2007:26), so they represent the unity of a nation in terms of a common heritage, cultural 
and historical kinship and the sense of comfort and belonging. According to Post and 
George (2004:163), “especially under stress, we cling more tightly to these symbols of 
our national, racial, ethnic or religious identity that have become psychologically 
incorporated as part of our self-concept. Thus, those who oppose the nation or desecrate 
the flag may threaten one’s sense of self”. 
 However, flags might also represent the divisiveness and oppressive policies of 
a ruling majority (Amienyi 2005:42) depending on the conceptions of different political 
groups in a society. As Kolsto (2006:679) points out, symbols that are rooted in a cultural 
past will more often than not be more divisive than unifying since different political 
groups often hark back to different pasts. Flags can communicate joy, sorrow, courage 
and bravery (Amienyi 2005:42); their interpretations can change according to ideas about 
the nation and its past. Furthermore, they can be subject to modification according to 
changing national goals or the means of achieving these altered goals (Elgenius 2007:26).  
      Flags can also be used as peaceful, banal and even childish displays (Eriksen 
2007:11). In his book ‘Banal Nationalism’, Billig (1995:8) makes a distinction between 
waved and unwaved flags. According to him, the metonymic image of banal nationalism 
is not the flag which is being consciously waved with great passion but the flag hanging 
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unnoticed on a public building. The unwaved flag, which is so forgettable, is at least as 
important as the memorable moments of flag waving (ibid: 10) because it becomes a part 
of our everyday lives as we see it regularly in our streets, public buildings and 
institutions. In this way, living with unwaved flags without even noticing them becomes a 
habit. And habits are powerful, as they transform into internalized attitudes about our 
identities. As Billig argues, an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life, 
which include thinking and using language (ibid: 8).  
  Like flags, national anthems as symbols of tradition are potent stimuli for 
national identification. However, they have the potential to generate strong feelings of 
patriotism as they express the feelings of pride in one’s country, especially on appropriate 
occasions (Llobera 2005:36) such as national days. They are thus particularly relevant as 
carriers of national sentiments. As Amienyi (2005:44) notes, ‘every country has patriotic 
hymns and they express people’s love for their country. Most of them are composed in 
times of war or revolution to express hope, salvation or future expectations’. Both flags 
and national anthems are produced to mobilize the emotions of sense of belonging to a 
common heritage, nationality and historical and cultural background; they also operate as 
social practices in the everyday lives of the social individuals. Cerulo (1995:17) argues 
that just as anthems bind via performance, flags unify via usage. While national anthems 
unite citizens every time they are performed in patriotic communion, flag displays can 
link citizens in common adoration to the nation. In many nations, school children pledge 
their allegiance to the flag before starting the day’s activities. Similarly adults often join 
in such pledges during festivals and public meetings. No matter the task in which 
individuals are engaged, the raising of the flag halts all activity. In this way, flags make 
the community focus on a tangible expression of their collective self. 
 National traditions can best be seen as myths (Holy 1996:84) that are produced 
by nations in order to create, substantiate, and preserve national identity (Geraghty 
2007:56). Holy (1996:84) explains that ‘a typical mythical narrative is a sequence of 
images which in their totality convey the meaning of the myth, a tradition condenses the 
narrative into a single simple and unambiguously meaningful image. What it shares with 
myth is that the truth of the meaning conveyed is taken as a dogma whether or not it 
corresponds to experienced reality’. In this way, myths present unquestionable ‘realities’ 
that in fact cannot be proved or disproved. According to Barton and Bowden (2005:129), 
a national myth is often the tradition of a small group which has been generalized and 
extended to cover the whole nation. As Geraghty (2007:56) notes, ‘myth serves as a mode 
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of national identity-making; a shared history common to those who have the power 
becomes myth when used to create a sense of ‘collective’ cultural capital’.        
  According to Sztompka (1993:64), traditions provide the selection of the 
fragments of the entire historical heritage that are found worthwhile. They thus serve to 
provide the fragments from the ‘past’ that are suitable to the conditions of the present. In 
this way, the past is constituted and constructed according to the uses of the present 
(Fentress and Wickham, 1992). Thelen (1989:1117) notes that cultures establish traditions 
from the past to guide the conduct of their members in the present. In this way, traditions 
function like a bridge between the ‘past’ and ‘present’. They sometimes prevent conflicts 
and struggles by presenting a ‘happier past’ that should be followed in present and even in 
the future. As they remove ambiguities and conflicts and seem like the best path to 
follow, traditions provide escape from the dissatisfactions and frustrations of life. The 
tradition of a ‘happier past’ promises it will be repeated in the future and provides the 
patience to endure the difficulties of the present; so traditions legitimize the existing ways 
of life by asserting that it has always been like that or that people have always believed so 
(Sztompka 1993:64). Hence, the idea of repetition of the past is the main source of 
tradition: repetition gives a sense of continuity and legitimizes the ‘past’ through ‘truth’ 
claims.  
However, it is not always possible to talk about traditions as the presentation of a 
‘happier past’. As Ballinger (2003:5) notes,  
Tradition understood as local rituals and practices, converges with the extensive 
literature on the politics of the past, yielding an account that illuminates both the 
(re) configurations of broad landscapes of memory shaped by war and other state-
sponsored violence and as refracted through individual and family narratives.       
 
Thus, traditions might involve the sorrows and pains of a war that are reproduced in 
relation to the politics of the ruling group and embedded in individual and family 
narratives. Whether the representations of a happier past or wars and sorrows, traditions 
endure for some time and may disappear when objects are abandoned and ideas are 
rejected or forgotten (ibid: 61) Hence they are not fixed and stagnant: they have been 
transformed and articulated because of disputes and negotiations arising from the 
meaning of the performance and changing discourses. According to Zerubavel 
(1994b:105-106), ‘when a society undergoes rapid developments that shatter its social 
and political order, its need to restructure the past is as great as its desire to set its future 
agenda’. These periods prompt the creation of new cultural forms that replace the 
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weakening older traditions. In this context, there is an ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm 
1983:1). According to Hobsbawm, traditions which appear or claim to be old are often 
quite recent in origin and sometimes invented. He defines ‘invented tradition’ as a 
[s]et of practices governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain rules and norms of behavior by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. They normally 
attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past (ibid)                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                      
Traditions are produced within cultural and political contexts and they are subject to 
change. Hence, although the traditional symbols are produced by the ruling groups to 
promote a sense of national unity and loyalty to the nation, even the meanings of the same 
symbols might change in changing power relations. Symbols only have meaning if they 
have resonance for a population (Stephans 2006:47); and traditions appear at certain 
moments, when people define certain fragments of the past heritage as tradition and 
ignore others (Sztompka 1993:61). 
 
2.3.3 Commemorations (national days, museums, monuments) 
 
Generic forms of commemorations − monuments, inscriptions, national holidays (Carrier 
2005:181), national days (Young 2003:237) and museums (Delanty and Rumford 
2005:95) − mobilize meaning for the construction and reproduction of memory in relation 
to national identity. However, mobilization of meaning can only be realized by its fixity 
in the present. In this sense, as Savage (1994:127) points out, ‘commemoration is an 
effort to fix the meaning and purpose....(of national or religious events) in an enduring 
form’. Commemorations enter into the daily lives of social individuals through social 
practices and bring individuals into connection with memory and its associated norms 
(Assmann 1992 cited in Kirk, 2005) and  narratives.  
Through commemorative rituals, groups create, articulate and negotiate their 
shared memories of particular events (Zerubavel 1995:5). Thus, commemorations are 
festivals of remembering (Redfield 1994:333) and meaningful actions that are historically 
based, idealizing and mythologizing the past in the present through their continued 
practice (Linstroth, 2002). They are constructed and narrated to make the public 
remember events according to national or religious ideals and the political agenda (Young 
1993; Kirk 2005). However, as Namer (1983 cited in Echabe and Castro 1998:96) argues, 
the most important aspect in commemorations is not the ‘event’ that happened as it was, 
 47 
 
but the emotional significance attached to this memory. Commemorations are therefore 
formed to provide the public a shared understanding of the past by constructing and 
evoking emotions regarding national and religious ideals. In this respect, Gillis (1994:5) 
defines ‘commemorative activity as social and political because it involves the 
coordination of individual and group memories, the results of which may appear 
consensual, when in fact they are the product of processes of intense contest and 
struggle’. In other words, although commemorations are formed in complex political and 
social struggles and contradictions, they are represented as the product of a consensus 
related to national or religious ideals.  
Commemorations are produced to create a ‘collective’ memory and a political 
consensus; however, as Lynn and McConkey (1998:337) point out, the influence of 
commemorations and rituals can only reach its full potential if it is approved by the 
surrounding, greater social, cultural and political context. Dominant discourses that are 
pervasive in the social context therefore play a crucial role in the creation of 
commemorations, the attachment of emotional significance to them and making 
commemorations influential in the social context. Similarly, commemorations contribute 
to the maintainance of dominant discourses, as they are constructed to mobilize meaning 
for the reproduction of memory that is in support of dominant discourses.   
In this respect, according to James Young (1993:xi) it is not possible to locate any 
memorial’s “collective memory” because memory is not ‘collective’ but ‘collected’ for 
the reproduction of dominant memory; he prefers to use the concept of ‘collected 
memory’ instead of ‘collective memory’. Young (ibid.) explains “collected memory” as 
the many discrete memories gathered into common memorial spaces and assigned a 
common meaning to reproduce the dominant memory. He addresses the importance of 
both the physical and metaphysical qualities of the memorial texts and he calls them ‘the 
texture of memory’. Thus, not the ‘collective memory’ but a collective meaning passes 
down from one generation to the next in societes’ rituals and commemorations. If 
societies remember, it is because of their institutions that organize, shape and inspire their 
memories. In a similar vein, Schwartz (1982:374) talks about the ‘recollection of the past 
as an active, constructive process, not a simple matter of retrieving information: to 
remember is to place a part of the past in the service of conceptions and needs of the 
present.’  
 Monuments and organized calendars are important components of 
commemorations. Monuments have pasts because human beings create narratives about 
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them; they function like signs placed in specific places in order to prevent forgetting 
regarding national or religious ‘events’. Similarly, calendars are organized according to 
commemorative concerns and activities (Kirk, 2005) such as national and religious days 
and holidays. Monuments and organized calendars bring body to the abstract national or 
religious events and make them concrete. They stand to prove that something happened in 
the past, it was ‘real’, important and should be remembered. However, similarly to 
traditions and history textbooks, commemorations are produced by the dominant 
discourses. They function to affirm and legitimize the nation and promote national 
integration. They are produced to increase people’s awareness and appreciation of the 
constructed ‘past’ and to lay a historical foundation for the future.  
 Commemorations are sites that carry abstract national ideas in a concrete 
structure. As Young (2003:237) points out, public monuments and shared calendars all 
work to create common loci around which a common national identity is forged. In this 
way, these mechanisms provide a naturalizing locus for memory, in which a state’s 
triumphs, martyrs, ideals and myths are cast as being as naturally true as the landscape in 
which they stand. 
 Periodic celebrations of national days and visits to public monuments and 
museums build new inter-cultural relationships, rekindle faded kinships and empower 
national awareness; they are ‘forms of concretisation of history’ (Augustin 2004:180) and 
children and adults use these moments to learn about their country’s history, founding 
fathers and patriots and the norms and values of the nation (Amienyi 2005:5-54). The 
ruling groups therefore try to put in place as many mechanisms as possible in order to 
mobilize the sentiments of social individuals about their national identities. As Bodnar 
points out (1994:78), ‘monuments would be placed in the centre of the city, where people 
would pass by it everyday and be reminded of ‘love of country’ and their duty to their 
‘native land’. However, as Young argues (2003:237) ‘neither the monuments nor their 
meaning is everlasting. Both monuments and their significance are constructed in 
particular times and places and contingent on the political and historical contexts of the 
moment’.  
 Museums, one of the most crucial forms of commemorations, are created to 
store objects for later observation in order to provide evidence to support the narratives of 
the constructed past. However, as Adorno (cited in Kattago 2001:27) points out, objects 
lose their cultural and historical relevance during the process of museumization. Once an 
object is taken out of its historical context, a vital link between the pastness of that object 
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and the present of the observer is altered and possibly lost. In other words, when objects 
are taken from their actual locations and put into a museum, they lose the meaning that 
was constructed in a specific context and gain a new meaning in a new context produced 
by the dominant discourse.  
 Duncan (1995, 2006) discusses the general ritual features of art museums: as a 
result of the achievement of a liminal zone of time and space, visitors are removed from 
the concerns of their daily, practical lives and thus move beyond the psychic constraints 
of mundane experience, opening themselves to a different quality of experience by 
attaining new perspectives. Furthermore, the organization of the museum setting as a kind 
of script which visitors perform is the ritual feature of the museums. Bouquet (2004:195), 
in her discussion of art museums, notes that Duncan is influenced by Victor Turner’s 
concept of liminality. Liminality in the museum entails being outside of or betwixt and 
between the normal world, just as it does in ritual. According to Duncan (cited in Bouquet 
2004:195), visitors directly experience values and beliefs related to social and political 
identity that are put on display for them by the museum.  
 Similarly to the museum visit, the commemoration of a national day can be 
conceived as a period of margin or ‘liminality’, as an interstructural situation. According 
to Turner (1967:97), transitional beings are neither here nor there; or may even be 
nowhere, and are at the very least “betwixt and between” all the recognized fixed points 
in space-time of structural classification. In this way, they withdraw from the structural 
positions and from the values, norms and sentiments that are associated with those 
positions. During the liminal period, they are alternatively encouraged to think about their 
society, their cosmos, and the powers that generate and sustain them (ibid: 105). When 
the social individuals participate in commemorative activities, they are remote from the 
day-to-day activities and worries of social life in the process of transition. They are also 
withdrawn from structural classifications such as age and social and economic status; and 
they act together by sharing a common feeling such as grief, enthusiasm or sorrow 
depending on the content of the national day, which might be a commemorative 
celebration or rite associated with death and mourning.  
 Both commemorative celebrations (i.e., the establishment of nations, national 
independence days) that are welcomed with joy, happiness and enthusiasm and rites 
associated with death and mourning (i.e., commemoration of national heroes, the day of 
remembrance for war deaths) are crucial in the construction of nationalistic values and 
sentiments among the members of a nation. According to Robert Hertz (1907 cited in 
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Strange 2005:16) the rites associated with death and mourning are characterized by 
moving the status of the dead from the realm of the living into an afterlife. However, the 
identity of the deceased is not lost, but rather, reconstituted into something meaningful for 
the group. For example, in Northern Cyprus and Turkey, on November 10, the death of 
Atatürk2, the primary symbol of Turkishness, patriotism, heroism and courage, is 
commemorated with one minute’s silence. In this liminal period, the public is encouraged 
to think about Atatürk and mourn for him. Social individuals are thus mobilized to act 
together by sharing common national sentiments during the liminal period. This situation 
helps to reproduce and sustain the dominant discourse, which is Turkish nationalism, 
through the symbol of Atatürk that represents Turkishness and patriotism.   
 
2.3.4 Media  
 
With today’s developing technology, mass media content serves as a store of memory 
(McQuail 2005:7). Thus, in modern times, the media play a significant role in the 
production of memory in relation to national identity. Media produce and create a huge 
amount of ‘information’, preserve and transmit that ‘information’ to the public. However, 
they are not merely the store of memory that contains row or pure ‘information’; they are 
the source of representations that are constructed by certain discourses. Thus the media do 
not function like a ‘mirror’ that reflects the memories of others in actual ‘space’ and 
‘time’ but by representing and constructing them. Hence, in this research, media are not 
conceived as a ‘neutral’ or an ‘objective’ source of ‘information’ because ‘meanings are 
constructed by using representational systems’ (Hall 1997:21) and as Nora (1989:11) 
points out, ‘representation proceeds by strategic highlighting, selecting samples and 
multiplying examples’. Thus, each medium might construct the ‘memory’ of an event by 
highlighting different aspects and support this ‘memory’ by showing a variety of 
evidence; it is more relevant to talk about the production and representation of 
‘memories’, instead of about the ‘factual’ memories allowed to come forth by the media.  
                                                 
2 ‘Atatürk’s name literally translates as the very father of Turks’ (Papadakis 1998:73). Atatürk (Mustafa 
Kemal) was a Turkish soldier and a statesman (1881-1938). He was the founder and the first President of 
the Turkish Republic. ‘Atatürk who was the Turkish nationalist leader’ (Pollis 1998:96) represents 
Turkishness and he is the symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. Atatürk undertook a series of reforms 
to raise Turkey to the level of modern civilization which can be grouped under five titles: political, social, 
legal and economic forms and reforms in the fields of education and culture (Yale 2005:36-37).   
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It is important to consider media representations and discourses within the 
historical and contextual framework of the production processes that have given shape to 
contemporary media institutions − including primarily but not exclusively, issues of 
ownership and control over the production process. As Bommes and Wright (1982:256) 
argue, ‘inattention to the conditions of production of discourse treats discourses as if they 
were written on the wind’. The agenda of ‘the things to be done’ by the media institution, 
is shaped by the political discourse of the institution and it determines what part of the 
past and what kind of future will be brought into play for the production of public 
memories (Lang &Lang, 1989:126). Thus, the political and cultural constraints are 
embedded in media representations and discourses. Media reinforce, reproduce or contest 
the existing social relations through these representations and discourses.  
The mass media − powerful contemporary tools for the production and circulation 
of ‘public memories’ − are constructed in historical, social and cultural constraints and 
cannot be evaluated as a separate entity. ‘Media is dependent on 'society', especially on 
the institutions of political and economic power’ (Mcquail 1994:2). There is an 
interrelationship amongst the economic, political and social factors as they constitute and 
are constituted by the media. As Garnham (2000:4) suggests, ‘Who can say what, in what 
form, to whom and for what purposes will be in part determined by and in part determine 
the structure of economic, political, and cultural power in a society’. Thus the media 
constrain or shape what should or should not be thought, said, written, remembered and 
forgotten according to certain social and political frameworks that are shaped in power 
relations.  
The different types of possible control of a variety of media is important because 
control can influence the content of the media messages, which is closely related to the 
articulation and construction of ‘public memories’. Ownership and control constrain the 
production process of the media, which is best understood as the result of a continuing 
struggle over who gets to speak and whose version of ‘reality’ − ‘the product of 
discourse’ (Fiske 1996:54) − is legitimized. The historical desire to control the ‘dominant 
public memory’ continues in societies in the form of state, private and concentrated 
ownership of media institutions. It is therefore essential to consider the political, 
economic and cultural factors behind the media production. 
The media function like a ‘memory machine’ and provide a great amount of 
‘information’ shaped in certain social and cultural constraints. According to certain 
constructionist arguments, individuals’ media use is also articulated in social and cultural 
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contexts; so it is not possible to talk about ‘personal’ readings, because conception is not 
‘privatized’. Individual differences in interpretation are caused not by ‘personal’ 
perception but by the social construction of remembering. Without the remembering and 
signification of certain cultural and social codes, one cannot interpret any situation.  
Social and cultural codes are critical, not only because of their capability to 
constrain what we remember and forget, but because of their normalization function. 
Normalization is the most powerful and influential factor in the partial closure of any 
social structure. Media play a crucial role in the realization of normalization through 
persuasion; the media’s persuasive role is therefore constantly used by the dominant 
discourses for the continuation of its dominance. According to Ruddock (2001:122), 
persuasion is achieved not only through information, but also through controlling how 
people make sense of information.  In this way, the mass media are persuasive in so far as 
they offer audiences seductive ‘knowledge positions’ that make sense of a chaotic world. 
In a similar vein, one can talk about the control of memory through its construction. 
With the development of mass communication technologies, we have begun to 
live as a result of media penetration (Sreberny and Mohammadi 1994). We have been 
surrounded by media messages starting from the first day of our lives. The media is 
everywhere. As Livingstone (1996:319) argues, ‘media have permeated most if not all 
aspects of everyday life, and sources of symbolic culture are ever less separable from one 
another’. In this respect, it is also impossible to locate ‘memory’ as separate from the 
influences of the media. According to Scannell (1996:6), listening to the radio and 
watching television are part of the natural and ordinary things that we do in our daily 
lives, so it is difficult to notice their function and intentionality. Scannell (ibid.) suggests 
that this ordinariness and obviousness is the intended, achieved and accomplished 
influence of broadcast output. The situation naturalizes the role of the media in our daily 
lives and makes it even more influential.  
The existence of media brings a different dimension to the analysis of human 
memory as we are different from our ancestors, who learned all they knew through face- 
to-face communication and social interaction. We cannot isolate the role of the media in 
culture, because the media are firmly anchored into the web of culture’ (Bird 2003:3). 
The development of mass communication technologies provides extensively mediated 
conditions of remembering through advances in the capture, preservation and 
transmission of ‘information’ and images (Hoskins 2001:334) in narrative stories. In this 
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way, memory is experienced, produced and conveyed through the media (Hodgkin and 
Radstone 2003:5).  
The media as the primary means of communication and transmission (Mcquail, 
1994) play a major role in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation of memories in 
relation to national identity (Ashuri 2007). Without the contribution of print and broadcast 
media, it is not possible to talk about the creation of a culture and identity in common 
(Morley and Robins 1995). As Zerubavel (1994a:73) notes, in today’s societies, 
journalists have more decisive roles than historians in shaping the popular images of the 
past, which are substantial in the construction of national identity as they enter into the 
daily lives of people through the media. In today’s societies, the media’s role is primal in 
the construction of self-other relationships; as Casalegno (2004:319-320) points out, 
‘communication can built barriers or favour an exchange. New technologies can 
participate in both the creation and the destruction of the social tie’. In this respect, media 
might play a crucial role in the construction of a social unity between the social 
individuals within a group or community − and it might also cause its destruction through 
its representations and narratives.  
Events gain and lose importance through the media; as Georgiou (2001:325) 
suggests, as soon as a story is not in the news anymore, the people stop caring. Thus, the 
media show us what is important and what is not and it functions to shape what we 
remember and forget relating to our national identities. The mass media invoke memory 
that reinforces political agendas serving particular ideas about the virtues of the nation, 
the family, or the current government (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003:5) through its 
narratives. According to Morley and Robins (1995:193), ‘media play a powerful role in 
the reproduction and reinforcement of the feelings of familiarity, security and unity by 
arousing fear, anxiety and violent emotions’. In this way, they help to provide the 
necessary context for the closure of community or nation by contextualizing our feelings 
and thoughts. Baer (2001:492) describes how television functions to reduce the world to 
an appearance, blocking all possible critical reflection and response; however, it is not 
only television which limits the ability to question. Print media also provide extensive 
‘information’ about events and construct our knowledge of them through written texts. 
News articles serve to reduce possible alternative thinking about events: according to 
Bion (1987 cited in Morley and Robins 1995: 194), thinking is discomforting and 
disturbing because in thinking, there is the risk of finding out something you don’t want 
to know and, consequently, ‘most people want to closure off what they don’t want to see 
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or hear’. In this way, media replace our ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ and provide what we should see, 
hear, know and believe without thinking and questioning. Our national identities are also 
constructed in this narrative framework. National identity is conceived as a kind of 
‘given’; it is part of our common sense as it flavours everyday life. As Alasuutari 
(1999a:87) notes, ‘[d]aily life is based on routinized, taken-for-granted lines of thought 
and action, and the media are part of this unquestioned environment’. Therefore, we 
hardly question or think of our national identities (Spillman 1977). 
New communication technologies have also collapsed the temporal distance 
between the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. Today, we can see, hear and feel something 
from the past, present and future with the images and texts provided by the media: the 
media bring the past and future to the present and make them seem to happen right now 
(Tomasulo cited in Hoskins 2004). In Peters’ (1999:138) words, “the far could now speak 
to the near, and the dead could now speak to the living”. In his book ‘Speaking into the 
air’, Peters (ibid.) discusses the revolution of ‘time binding’ and ‘space binding’. ‘Time 
binding’ is the capturing of lost time through new communication technologies. 
Simultaneity across distances, first in writing, then in speech, sound and image, provide 
‘space binding’. As Stier (2003) argues, through the media people can acquire memories 
of a past that have no geographical or biological connection. This is also the case for the 
memories of the present. The media show us how the past was, how the present is and 
what we should expect from the future. Almost everything we know about the past and 
present events is increasingly mediated through the media. Hence it can be claimed that 
most of our understanding of the past or present that is crucial in the construction and 
articulation of our national identities, is ‘manufactured’ rather than remembered (Hoskins 
2001). In this context, Peters (1999:139) notes that every new medium is a kind of 
machine for the production of ghosts. By using the term ‘ghost’, he implies the absence of 
the body that transcends limitations in time and space.  
In a similar vein, Scannell (1996:80) talks about the absence of the ‘event’: ‘in its 
own time and place any event creates and sustains its own being. In its extended, relayed, 
mediated form it simultaneously enters into other worlds and their ways of being’. Hence, 
according to Scannell, broadcasting does not create the event through transmission but 
when the broadcasting takes place, a new event − the event as broadcast − is created. The 
former is embedded in the latter and a new event is created that has its own conditions of 
existence. The event is ‘doubled’ when it is mediated and relayed through broadcasting; 
and the locales of the two events are radically different: each locale has its own 
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circumstances and involvements. In this sense, the media’s representation does not 
change the ‘events’ but manufactures new events through its articulations.  
 
2.4 Section three- Mediating mechanisms: Sites of memory as a single body 
 
Dominant mechanisms of memory are interconnected with each other and function 
together for a common goal, which is the mobilization of meaning for the reproduction 
and maintenance of the national identity. Although I examine the mechanisms of memory 
in the second section separately, the aim of this section is to explore how the mechanisms 
articulate and construct each other and what the parallelisms and interconnections are 
among them. In other words, this section looks at how the mechanisms function like a 
single body in the articulation and construction of national identity. 
The mechanisms (commemorations, symbols of tradition, history textbooks and 
media) operate as the sites of memory in relation to national identity. As Nora (1989:22) 
points out, ‘memory attaches itself to sites. Sites of memory, both actual and virtual 
locations, provide a maximum amount of meaning in a minimum number of signs’. 
Rigney (2005:19) explains this as a principle of economy in ‘cultural’ memory, helping to 
reduce the proliferation of disparate memories and providing common frameworks for 
appropriating the past. In this way, the importance of the ‘mechanisms of memory’ lies in 
their function in the ‘conflation of memories’ − bringing memories together and making 
them operate as one. For example, the monument of a Turkish ‘hero’ can provide 
common frameworks by bringing together disparate memories of Turkish Cypriots about 
‘how to be a Turk’. The stories told about certain events also provide a cultural 
framework for remembering and interpreting them, and just as actual locations serve to 
attract unrelated memories, so too certain narratives provide a cultural framework for 
other stories. For example, the narrations or stories that are told on 29th October about the 
founding of the Republic of Turkey have become an occasion for commemorating 
Turkish Cypriot casualties in various ways in Northern Cyprus.  
Depending on the occasion − such as seeing a monument or a flag in a street, 
singing the national anthem, celebration of a national day, visitation to a museum or 
commemorating a political leader − two or more mechanisms of memory might function 
together to mobilize the memories in relation to national identity. For example, the 
monument of Atatürk, which is the symbol of Turkishness, might be connected not only 
to the history textbooks and commemorations but also to symbol of tradition and media. 
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As was emphasized above, a monument is one of the generic forms of commemorations 
that function to promote national integration. However, it is also related to the history 
textbooks, because textbooks are the primary sources of written information about 
Atatürk. Without historical knowledge, it is not possible to develop any understanding 
about the monument that represents the Turkish hero; and in the meantime, the monument 
of Atatürk operates as a tradition in providing a Turkish role model for action. 
Furthermore, the monument might be shown live in the media on national days or appear 
in a documentary program. Hence, although the mechanisms of memory have different 
functions, they work together in the mobilization of the ideas of individuals about their 
national identity by pervading their daily lives. As Cerulo (1995:18) suggests, ‘national 
heroes function to bond citizens as these figures are like civil deities with the power to 
bring members closer to one another’. 
The narratives of the mechanisms of memory in relation to national identity are 
constructed in historical and political circumstances and shaped in power relations. 
According to Koresaar (2004:48), ‘the dominant narratives of a certain period play a 
crucial role in shaping what and how we experience’. The mechanisms are crucial in the 
construction of our experiences as they play a primal role in the dissemination of 
dominant narratives. As was emphasized in the first chapter, we ‘experience’ the world as 
we understand and interpret it according to certain discourses that are constructed by 
political and social circumstances. The mechanisms of memory play a functional role in 
the articulation and construction of our experiences in relation to our national identities. 
In fact, our interpretations of a national event may not be the outcome of what we lived, 
but of what we have experienced through social remembering, partly articulated through 
the mechanisms of memory. For example, in the case of Northern Cyprus, the 
interpretations by young Turkish Cypriots of the Cyprus war between the years 1960-
1974 are not the outcome of what they lived, but of what they have experienced through 
social remembering that is partly constructed through mechanisms such as history 
textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, national anthems, myths), commemorations 
(monuments, museums, national days, national holidays) and media.  
It should be noted here that mechanisms of memory function intentionally to 
construct experiences of the ‘past’ that are in harmony with the political discourses of the 
time. As Middleton (2002:79) argues, “monuments, memorials, historical narratives, 
commemorative ceremonies and traditions are the intentional representations of the past 
experience”. Dewey (1998:27) explains the principle of continuity of experience as being 
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related to the way every experience takes up something from those which have gone 
before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after. In modern 
societies, it is the narrations of the mechanisms of memory that construct our ‘past 
experience’ by making us remember some events when there is no possibility for us to 
physically have an access to them in specific time and space. In Casalegno’s (2004:318) 
terms, it is the narration that allows us to get the ‘experience’ back through overcoming 
‘space’ and ‘time’ barriers. In this way, narrations compensates for the lack of a “co-
presence in real time” and enable us to share a common ‘experience’ by being at the same 
place at the same time through overcoming limitations in ‘space’ and ‘time’.  
The media bring a different dimension to the official history that is disseminated 
by the mechanisms of history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations. As 
Baer (2001:491-492) argues, today, we are witnessing the proliferation of new forms 
shared outside official historical discourse and traditional institutions of socialization. 
These are linked to different cultural products such as films, books, newspapers, 
advertisements and television programs. According to Stier (2003:12), “the capacity of 
electronic mass communication to transcend time and space creates instability by 
disconnecting people from past traditions, but it also liberates people by making the past 
less determinate of experiences in the present”. The media do not disconnect people from 
the ‘past traditions’ or ‘official history’, but it might proliferate and transform their 
meanings: it is through the media that historical information, commemorations and 
symbols of tradition gain new cultural meanings. Furthermore, media do not liberate 
people by making the ‘past’ less determinate, but construct the ‘past’ in order to captivate 
people in present conditions. Thus the media might reproduce the dominant discourses in 
a society, but in the meantime, it might produce and disseminate alternative discourses, 
depending on the political standpoint of the media institution.  
In the construction of memories in relation to national identity by the mechanisms 
of memory, emotions and sentiments play the primary role. In his book Banal 
Nationalism, Billig (1995:44-46) looks at the ‘dramatic psychology of emotions’ that is 
related to the emotions evoked in nation-states to explain identity. On occasions of 
nation-states such as national days, Independence Day parades, thanksgiving days and 
coronations, the ordinary and banal routines of private life are suspended. On these days, 
participants expect to have special feelings such as joy, sorrow or inebriation; these are 
the days when normal routines are put into abeyance and extra emotions should be 
enacted. These emotions remove us from the activities (Giddens 1985 cited in Billig 
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1995:44) and general anxieties and worries of daily life. Thus it could be argued that 
nationalism liberates us from the monotony and boredom of ordinary life and brings 
feelings of belonging, excitement and passion into our lives.  
 Mechanisms of memory that appear as commemorative acts, historical and 
traditional occasions and the representations of them in the media, are thus organized to 
evoke the emotions of joy, passion, excitement and sorrow by removing individuals from 
the routines of daily life through celebrating and performing the commemorative acts and 
historical and traditional occasions. Billig (1995:45) evaluates these occasions as the brief 
moments of the nationalist emotion that functions for longer periods of settled calm when 
there is no ground for nationalist feelings to emerge: modern nation-states arrange a 
yearly calendar to put these occasions on stage and to provide the necessary partial 
closure for the continuity of their dominance.  
In modern nation-states, historical, commemorative and traditional occasions that 
are the crucial components of the official history mostly appear as ‘media events’. 
Understanding the function of ‘media events’ is therefore necessary for exploring the role 
of the media in the articulation of the official history. Dayan and Katz (1992:1-5) describe 
media events as historic occasions − mostly occasions of state − that are televised as they 
take place and transfix a nation. These events are specific events that are not routine. 
However, they intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and our lives. One of the 
most important features of media events is that they always occupy society’s “centre” for 
a while. No matter what has happened, the event has to go on. This situation brings with it 
a kind of protectiveness towards the event on the part of the media (ibid: 89); and it 
illustrates the role of media events in the formation of ‘dominant public memory’, 
because in any society, protectiveness causes the pervasiveness of the public memory that 
creates the necessary conditions for the construction of the ‘dominant public memory’.  
Media events are generally represented by the majority of media institutions and 
they are mostly supported by the ruling group in a society. As Crain (2001:292) argues, 
‘the domination proceeds through the appropriation of control of significations through 
the monopoly of the media code by the dominant elite groups’. Thus, it is crucial to note 
that, ‘media events’ are not only related to the political representations of the media 
institution but in a more general sense to the dominant discourse in any society: it is 
possible to talk about the parallelization of media events to the dominant discourse of the 
time which can be maintained through the fixity of the ‘dominant public memory’. The 
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domination of public memory can only be realized through the exercises of seduction; and 
thus media events play a crucial role in providing seductive ends.  
 These events are pre-planned, announced and advertised in advance. Although 
they are organized outside the media, this does not mean that the media’s role is merely 
functional in terms of transmission of media events; the media serve politically in 
providing the necessary framework for social integration through the representation of 
historical, traditional and commemorative events in parallel to the discourse of the nation-
state. As Dayan and Katz (1992:9) argue, “these broadcasts integrate societies in a 
collective heartbeat and evoke a renewal of loyalty to the society and its legitimate 
authority”. In this way, it is possible to talk about the role of these events in the 
continuation of the status quo. However, Couldry (2003:64) criticises Dayan and Katz’s 
arguments about the role of the media events in the ‘integration of society’. According to 
him, there are many potential media events which do not necessarily help integrate 
society; instead, they might even cause conflict. 
Couldry argues that, there is a myth about the role of the media in our daily lives 
(ibid: 2) that includes its assumed influence in the construction of our bonds with the 
society we live in (ibid: 65). According to this myth, there is a mediated ‘centre’ that 
media speaks for and thus we accept that centre’s position in our lives as legitimate. In 
this way, media events construct not only our sense of a social ‘centre’, but also the 
media’s privileged relation to that ‘centre’ (ibid: 56). Couldry claims that ‘media rituals’ 
are the key mechanisms that reproduce the assumed legitimacy, and explains the media 
rituals as follows (ibid.2), 
Any action organized around key media related categories and boundaries, whose 
performance reinforces and helps to legitimate, the underlying value expressed in 
the idea that the media is our access point to our social centre. 
 
The connection between media events and the ritual space of the media (ibid: 55) is 
described in his book ‘Media Rituals’: media rituals and media events work together to 
establish and maintain the social integration among society members. According to 
Couldry (ibid: 4) the term ‘media rituals’ has often been associated with claims that they 
produce and maintain social integration and ‘media events’ as large collections of actions 
across multiple locations, including the broadcast event, millions of viewing situations 
and the circulation of discourses around the broadcast event. In this respect, the 
connection between media events and media rituals is caused by the organization of the 
action-frame. Through the narrative frame of the media event, a social ‘collectivity’ is 
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affirmed, reinforced and maintained; and there is a close relationship between media 
events and a Durkheimian reading of media rituals in the affirmation of the social bond 
through the media (ibid:59-60). Although Couldry expresses his doubts regarding the role 
of the media events and rituals in the integration of society, the issue is not to measure the 
influence of the media events and rituals in the integration of society but to question the 
‘myth of the media’ that gives a privileged position to the media in our daily lives.     
According to Dayan and Katz (1992:17), the process of producing media events 
and telling their story is related to the arts of journalism and narration: the act of narration 
is fundamental to the negotiation, performance and celebration of media events. In their 
book ‘Media Events’, they emphasize the negotiation of the organizers, broadcasters and 
audiences, which they call the three partners of television events. These are free agents, 
independent from the others that negotiate over the meaning of media events from the 
beginning to the end (1992:55). Dayan and Katz (1992:19) reject the idea of political 
manipulation of media events because, according to them, broadcasters, journalists and 
audiences can sometimes say ‘no’ to the manipulative influence of media events. Thus, 
what we see and hear is the end product of political, aesthetic and financial interaction 
(ibid: 55). 
In the negotiating process, all partners negotiate on the meaning of the media 
events. Organizers and broadcasters may differ among themselves on scripting (ibid: 54-
55); and this situation might result in different representations of the official history. 
Every programme output has an intention because any programme that is transmitted has 
a complex prior history which makes the programme output deeply settled and ordered 
(Scannell 1996:1-8). This situation might even lead to contestation on the programme 
output and script. According to Hodgkin and Radstone (2003:1), ‘the focus of 
contestation is not a conflict on accounts of what actually happened in the past but the 
question of who or what is entitled to speak for the past in the present’. In this way, the 
different media institutions might produce alternative representations of the ‘past’. 
In the negotiating process, audiences might also produce different readings. 
According to Scannell (1996:12), there are no enforceable sanctions over the behaviour of 
viewers and listeners. This is the reason that power in this relationship rests more with 
those on the receiving end than on the production process. Scannell (ibid) thus 
emphasizes that broadcasters must organize their programs according to the interest of 
listeners and viewers in order to take their attention. The reason is the inability of the 
broadcasters to control the behaviour of the audiences. Furthermore, according to Dayan 
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and Katz (1992:78-89), media do not only provide the representation of ‘media events’ 
but also the ‘festive experience’ by performing them. The performance of the ceremonies 
enables them to define themselves. However, the self-defining feature of ceremonies can 
only be realized through the ‘active’ partners in the reading of the event. As Cottle 
(2006:428-429) suggests, 
It is often through the media performance that mediatized ritual can come into 
being. But ritual only comes alive experientially, emotionally, subjunctively, 
when actively read by audiences who are prepared to ‘participate’ within it as 
symbolically meaningful to them, and who are prepared to accept the imagined 
solidarities on offer. 
 
 Ceremonies that can be commemorative, historical or traditional invite interpretation and 
encourage ‘hermeneutic pleasure’ in the decoding of signs and symbols. Dayan and Katz 
(ibid: 78-118) argue that these performances must not be approached as additions to the 
original ‘event’, but should be conceived as the transformations of public events. In other 
words, media events are transformed through the articulation of performances. The 
communal nature of the experience is stressed; however, consensus is portrayed as a 
process, as an overcoming of differences. Therefore not only unanimity, but also 
unanimity within diversity is emphasized (ibid.). 
‘Celebrating’ media events also provides the opportunity to be actively involved 
in the incident presented by the media and to share a common spirit. While routine 
programs provide the opportunity to choose among a variety of programs by addressing 
the audience as a ‘family member’, ‘consumer’, ‘sensation seeker’ or ‘information user’, 
the ‘media events’ provide make it possible for the audience to actively be involved in the 
ritual ceremony. However, Dayan and Katz argue that television alone cannot provide this 
opportunity: it can be achieved through the national leaders, by social interaction with our 
friends and family members, by the newspapers, by the schools that declare a recess, by 
employers who permit viewing during work hours. In this way, celebrating media events 
is not only related to the television spectatorship but also to other aspects of social life 
(ibid: 119-120).  
Although Dayan and Katz emphasize the active role of three partners of media by 
highlighting the importance of the negotiation of media events that is also embedded in 
performing and celebrating them, this does not mean that broadcasters, audiences and 
organizers are completely free in terms of social and cultural constraints and limitations: 
there is always a ‘glass mirror’ that looks transparent but prevents the complete freedom 
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of broadcasters, organizers and audiences. However, the metaphor of the ‘glass mirror’ is 
not used to imply the limitations that prevent us from seeing the ‘realities’; it connotes our 
internalized emotions and sentiments that prevent us from conceiving the constraints that 
are constructed by the ‘dominant public memory’. This chapter, which is based on the 
function of the mechanisms of memory (media, commemorations, symbols of tradition, 
history textbooks) in the articulation of the dominant public memory, represents a 
starting-point for considering the construction of internalized emotions in relation to 
national identities.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I explain the theoretical and methodological framework adopted and 
ethnographic research conducted to examine how public memories are produced by the 
mechanisms of memory and how the respondents articulate the ‘information’ provided by 
the mechanisms. The concept of ‘memory’ is at the intersection point of the theoretical 
and empirical discussions and practices of the research. However, ‘memory’ is not simply 
deposited somewhere waiting for exploration, and it is not possible to locate a body of 
agreement about the memory of the past or the future. There is no common understanding 
of memory in relation to national identity; there are only different narratives, counter 
interpretations and discourses about it. It might therefore seem ironic to take memory, 
which is a ‘never-ending process’, as the basis of a research study, as though situating 
something at the centre of operations that in fact never stands there as it is constantly 
moving and changing its location, as though using something that that can never be found 
as a foundation. However, it is exactly this irony which motivated the curiosity about and 
interest in this research. 
The examination of the production and construction of public memories through 
the narratives of the mechanisms of memory is more explicit than the exploration of the 
construction and articulation of memories of social individuals. The explicitness of the 
discourse of the mechanisms of memory is not caused by its simplicity but by the 
possibility of its fixity in a specific time span. Hence it is possible to locate a partial 
closure in order to analyse the narratives of the mechanisms of memory. On the other 
hand, the narratives of the respondents are fluid and constantly changing through the 
never-ending articulations of memory. According to Middleton and Edwards (1990:11), 
‘people construct versions of events and their own mental processes within the practices 
of ordinary conversation’. Therefore, ‘the knowledge of the past and present is produced 
in the course of everyday life’ (Popular Memory Group 1982:.210), and the memories of 
respondents are constantly changing, being articulated and constructed through their 
narratives.  
‘Memory’ is constructed and articulated through its contestation, which prevents 
the durability of what individuals remember and forget; it is not possible to provide a 
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complete homogeneity among the memories of the individuals because remembering and 
forgetting are constantly changing through the articulation. Lang & Lang (1989) 
emphasise the importance of the mediation of events over time and the constant 
articulation of what respondents remember and forget. According to them (ibid: 124) 
“data from the study of a news event as-it happens cannot catch the influence of that 
event as reworked in ‘collective’ memory”. In other words, the interpretation of a news 
event by its audience is constantly changing according to the time lapse. This gradual 
redefinition and interpretation prevents observation of the influence of an event on the 
audience. Memories are contingent and changeable and this situation makes the cultural 
logic of ‘memory’ much harder and difficult to resolve. Although I seek to investigate the 
sources of memory, it is sometimes difficult to determine the source of ‘information’ in 
memory because the public and ontological narratives are highly intertwined. As Brown, 
Shevell, and Rips (1986:139) argue, ‘we experience the events disseminated by public 
narratives not only against a public backdrop but also within the compass of our own 
activities’.  
In this research, memory is investigated as a discursive construct; the narratives of 
the mechanisms of memory and the respondents’ understanding of memories in relation 
to national identity are evaluated as the products of discourses, not as reflections of 
‘truths’ and ‘realities’ that are fixed and stable. Discourse analysis approaches are key to 
studying the discourses on memories in relation to national identity because, as Jorgensen 
and Philips point out (2002:.8-9), these approaches share the understanding that our 
access to reality is always through language. In other words, ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ are 
embedded in language that is constructed through social and cultural contexts. The aim is 
not to reveal the ‘truths’ or to question the ‘objectivity’ or ‘reality’ of the narratives of the 
mechanisms of memory and respondents, but to examine the use of language and analyse 
the narratives as the products of discourses formed under historical, cultural and political 
constraints. 
The chapter mainly works in two dimensions. The first section is organized to 
present a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of the discourses on 
memory in relation to national identity through textual analysis, and in particular through 
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ which has mostly been developed in the studies of Wodak 
and Fairclough (Wodak: 2001b: 4). Furthermore, the discourse theories of Foucault, 
Laclau and Mouffe are used as the basis of the research. Foucault’s genealogical analysis 
and Laclau and Mouffe’s approaches on nodal points and master signifiers; the logics of 
 65 
 
equivalence, the logics of difference and antagonism (one of the concepts employed in 
conflict analysis) are the tools used for empirical analysis (Jorgensen and Philips 2002). 
Wodak’s notion of the ‘discursive construction of national identity’ (1999) serves as a 
useful aid for explaining which discursive strategies and linguistic devices are employed 
in the construction of national identity in discourse.  
The second section of this chapter looks at the ethnographic research that forms 
the basis of the fieldwork. It consists primarily of explanations of the in-depth interviews 
and how they were conducted; i.e., the techniques used in gathering information about the 
memories of the respondents. I also explain how the questionnaire was developed, the 
questions used in the in-depth interviews and my research sample. Finally, I talk about 
my personal experiences (i.e. the problems faced while on the fieldwork, possible 
solutions) and research methods.  
  
3.2 Section one: Analysis of the discourses on memory in relation to national identity 
  
This research relies on the assumption that history textbooks, symbols of tradition, 
commemorations and media, which are the mechanisms for the articulation of memories 
in relation to national identity, play a significant role in shaping the political ideas of the 
respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Memories in relation to 
national identity can be explained as the product of discourse that is changing, articulated 
and constructed in power relations shaped in historical, political and cultural 
circumstances. In the case of my research, the Annan Plan must be seen not as an 
individual, isolated occurrence, but as part of a broader corpus of memory and experience 
related to the identity of Turkish Cypriots. This assumption, and hence the necessary 
methodological framework, is supported by additional approaches from a variety of fields 
such as social psychology, sociology, history, politics and media studies.  
Bartlett’s (1932) book ‘Remembering: a study in experimental and social 
psychology’ and Halbwachs’s ‘The collective memory’ (1950) form the basis of a 
theoretical approach that conceives ‘memory’ as the product of social construction; thus, 
their theories of ‘memory’ underlie the research. Lowenthal (1985), Middleton & 
Edwards (1990) and Fentress & Wickham (1992) emphasize the communicative role of 
memory and provide the necessary framework connecting ‘memory’ with communication 
studies, which is of critical importance in the evaluation of memory as related to the 
mechanisms. The theoretical perspectives of Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig and 
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Homi Bhabba on the issues of nationalism and national identity also provide openings 
throughout the research. As was emphasized in detail in Chapter One, unification of the 
discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe provides the theoretical framework for 
defining ‘memory in relation to national identity’ as the product of discourse that is 
changing, articulated and constructed in power relations, which are themselves 
determined by historical, political and cultural circumstances. While Laclau and Mouffe 
focus on permanent articulation, Foucault highlights the power relations shaped in 
historical, political and cultural contexts in the construction of discourses.     
In this research, textual analysis, and in particular Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA), provides the methodological framework for the description and analysis of 
identity and nation that are incorporated with the approaches on ‘memory’. CDA, as a 
method of textual analysis, deals with the use of language in social contexts (Seale 
2004:368). According to Fairclough (2003:3), text analysis is seen as not only linguistic 
analysis; it also includes ‘interdiscursive analysis’ − that is, seeing texts in terms of the 
different discourses, genres and styles that they draw upon and articulate together. 
Interdiscursivity is a form of intertextuality (Jorgensen and Philips 2002:73). Fairclough 
(1992:84) explains intertextuality as basically the property texts have of being full of 
snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the 
text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth. According to Barker and 
Galasinski (2001:69), “intertextuality signals the accumulation and generation of meaning 
across texts, where all meanings depend on other meanings”.  
In this research, I consider memories as ‘texts’ and examine how the 
dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories depend on each other in the 
articulation and construction of national identity. As Fairclough (1995: 14-15) notes, “in 
the intertextual analysis of a text, the objective is to describe its ‘intertextual 
configuration’, showing how several text types may simultaneously be drawn upon and 
combined”. Thus I observe how the dominant/alternative public and autobiographical 
memories are intertwined and combined with each other.  
Power relations play a crucial role here, in the ways in which memories, that are 
the product of discourses, are combined and articulated; as was stated in Chapter One, 
discourses are in conflict with each other to maintain their dominance. CDA takes a 
particular interest in the relation between language and power (Wodak 2001b; Fairclough 
1989, 1995, 1998, 2001). As Wodak (2001b:11) notes, 
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A defining feature of CDA is its concern with power as a central condition in 
social life, and its efforts to develop a theory of language which incorporates this 
as a major premise. Not only the notion of struggles for power and control, but 
also the intertextuality of competing discourses are closely intended to.  
 
There is a close link between CDA and Foucault’s discourse theory in terms of their focus 
on power and knowledge. However, Foucault does not provide an analytical method for 
research. In this case, CDA plays the primary role in providing the necessary 
methodological framework for examining memories in relation to national identity as the 
product of discourses in power relations. Jager notes (2001:32-33) that 
 
Central to a CDA based on Foucault’s discourse theory are issues such as, what 
knowledge (valid at a certain place at a certain time) consists of, how this valid 
knowledge evolves, how it is passed on, what function it has for the constitution 
of subjects and the shaping of society and what impact this knowledge has on the 
overall development of society.  
 
Within the scope of my research, this understanding helps me to question how narratives 
are disseminated by the mechanisms of memory, how they function in the lives of the 
social individuals and what overall influence the narratives of the mechanisms have on 
Turkish Cypriot society. Narratives are realized through language that is embedded in 
power relations, and ‘Critical Discourse Analysis regards language as social practice. In 
this perspective, language is always a socially and historically situated mode of action’ 
(Scollon 2001). Wodak suggests (2001b:11) that ‘language is entwined in social power in 
a number of ways: language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is 
contention over and a challenge to power’. Thus, language can be used to change or 
maintain the power relations within a society.  
‘Discourse analysis pertains to everyday knowledge that is conveyed via the 
media, everyday communication, school and family’ (Jager 2001:33). It is therefore 
suitable for an analysis which encompasses the narratives of families, connections, school 
education, history textbooks, media, symbols of tradition and commemorations. In my 
analysis of respondents’ narratives on memory in relation to national identity, I follow 
theoretical approaches based on the idea of the discursive construction of identity. 
Identity is understood as processual and never completed: it takes place within and not 
outside of representation, hence it both produces and is produced through discourse 
practices (Miller 2003: 42). Similarly, ‘memory in relation to national identity’ is 
considered as discursively constructed and articulated. 
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 The analytical working model for the research combines social science 
methodologies of data collection and fieldwork with the ‘discourse-historical’ approach 
developed by the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis (Wodak 1999:3). According to 
Wodak (1999, 2001a), “in investigating political topics, the discourse historical approach 
always attempts to integrate as much available information as possible on the historical 
background and the original historical sources in which discursive ‘events’ are 
embedded”. In the following chapter, I provide information about ‘Cyprus history and the 
mechanisms of memory’ (the national anthem, history textbooks, flags, monuments, 
museums, national days, national holidays, myths and Turkish Cypriot media) in order to 
understand the historical, cultural and political conditions under which dominant/public 
and autobiographical memories in relation to national identity are constructed in Northern 
Cyprus. Without historical knowledge, it is not possible to analyse the narratives of the 
mechanisms of memory and respondents through critical discourse analysis; as Meyer 
(2001:15) notes, “one important characteristic arises from the assumption of CDA that all 
discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their 
context”. Hence the ‘discourse historical approach’ provides the opportunity to integrate 
the historical dimension with discourse analysis and so enable an exploration of complex 
historical, political and social constraints in the analysis of the discourses. 
Foucault’s genealogical approach (1977c) is also adopted in this research. 
Genealogy proceeds from the critical insight that history, which is constructed in power 
relations, is always written in the present; this why genealogy is also referred to as the 
history of the present (Kendall &Wickham 1999). In this research, I evaluate the 
mechanisms of memory and the narratives of respondents concerning history by 
considering the present historical, political and cultural contexts in which the narratives 
are embedded. This kind of analysis provides the opportunity to examine the role of 
changing power relations in the discourses of the mechanisms of memory and 
respondents; and helps us to see the dynamics among dominant/alternative public and 
autobiographical memories as they are all related to the narration of the ‘past’ and history 
at present. 
In their book ‘the Discursive Construction of National Identity’ Wodak, Cillia, 
Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:30) explain their methodological approach, which combines a 
plurality of methods. This approach distinguishes between three closely interwoven 
dimensions of analysis: 
 
 69 
 
 
• Thematic content 
• Strategies 
• Means and forms of realization 
 
The authors (ibid: 2) describe the ways in which they analyse the discursive construction 
of national identity with a primary focus on Austria. Although their theoretical and 
methodological approach is applicable to some research, it cannot be fully applicable to 
all because each type of research requires a re-evaluation of present theoretical and 
methodological frameworks according to its conditions of existence. In my research, I 
adopt Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s approach, considering the fact that it is not 
possible to follow exactly the same procedures in the analysis of my research. The three 
dimensions of analysis − ‘content’, ‘strategies’ and ‘means and forms of realization’ – are 
described below; I will then explain how I use them in my own research.  
In this research, thematic content, one of the dimensions of analysis, is organized 
on the basis of the particular ways in which interviewees choose to articulate/organize 
their own discourse. In the organization, I used Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s 
(1999:30) theoretical framework for thematic content, which is devised on the basis of a 
critical survey of the theoretical literature. The authors explain some of the major 
thematic areas, such as the linguistic construction of a common political past (founding 
myths, myths of origin, political successes, times of prosperity and stability, defeats and 
crises); a common present and future (citizenship, political achievements, current and 
future political problems, crisis and dangers, future political objectives and political 
virtues); and a common culture (language, religion, science and technology, everyday 
culture such as sport, eating and drinking habits and clothing; and art such as music, 
literature, theatre, architecture, painting). These topics are related to the discursive 
construction of ‘national’ identity which is based on the formation of sameness and 
difference (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:30-31). 
  Similarly, in this research I observe the linguistic construction of memories in 
relation to national identity through the articulation of a common and unshared political 
past, present, future and culture in the narratives of the respondents. However, I 
distinguish my thematic areas differently from Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 
according to the ways in which the respondents define themselves and the ‘others’ (Turks 
or Greek Cypriots). I analysed the narratives on the common and unshared past between 
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Turkish Cypriots and Turks under two different topics:  ‘origin’ and ‘Turks: 
saviours/occupiers’. Although some of the respondents believe in the racial similarities 
between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and emphasize their common origin, some of them 
reject this idea and legitimize their ideas with arguments on the racial commonalities 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots by showing a variety of evidence. 
Some of the respondents imply the common past between Turkish Cypriots and 
Turks by focusing on the Cyprus war. The Cyprus war is interpreted as the overcoming of 
a crisis by the Turks in the Happy Peace Operation in 1974; many respondents consider 
Turks as the ‘saviours’ who saved Turkish Cypriots from Greek cruelty in 1974. Their 
narrations about the role of Turks in the Happy Peace Operation are similar to those in the 
history textbooks that were used during the period of the President Denktaş and the 
government of UBP during 1974-2003. However, there are respondents who alternatively 
consider the operation as an occupation and the Turks as the occupiers. In these instances, 
it is not possible to talk about the common past of Turkish Cypriots and Turks. 
Furthermore, the thematic area of a common and unshared past with Greek Cypriots 
revolves around ‘peace with friends/conflict with enemies’. There are some respondents 
who talk about the good relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the past. 
They narrate how they lived happily together and thus, how they shared a common past. 
In these cases, the period when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together is 
narrated as the times of prosperity and stability. On the other hand, there are other 
respondents who talk about the eternal enmity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  
 The thematic content of ‘common/unshared present’ is also formed according to 
the ways in which the respondents locate the ‘others’ in the present context. I therefore 
specified the topics as ‘Turks: Turkish citizens (insiders)/ aliens (outsiders)’ (narrations 
about Turks) and ‘no/problem’ (narrations about Greek Cypriots). Both topics are related 
to different interpretations of the respondents about citizenship, political achievements, 
current political problems, crisis and dangers in Northern Cyprus that construct and are 
constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. Furthermore, the thematic 
content of ‘common/unshared future’ is explored in terms of different interpretations of 
the respondents of the current and future political problems, future political objectives and 
political virtues. It should be noted here that entry of Northern Cyprus into the European 
Union after a solution in the Cyprus problem is important for the transformation of the 
political present and future. I therefore specified the topics as ‘unification/separation’ in 
order to consider the future expectations of the respondents about the political 
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relationship between Turkey/Turks and the TRNC/Turkish Cypriots. Under the topic of 
‘participation in the EU/division’, I analyse the interpretations of the respondents 
concerning the entry of the Turkish Cypriots into the European Union with the Greek 
Cypriots following the solution of the Cyprus problem.     
In the construction of the thematic content of common/unshared culture, I consider 
the evaluations of the respondents regarding the concepts of religion, language, eating 
habits and life styles, in order to analyse their interpretations of the differences and 
similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. I also focus on the topics of language, 
clothing, traditions and life styles in the analysis of differences and similarities between 
Turkish Cypriots and Turks under the topic of migrants/settlers.  The approach of Wodak, 
Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart on different types of macro-strategies in the discursive 
formation of national identity helped me to specify how the dynamic strategies that are 
combined together articulate the national identity in Northern Cyprus. According to the 
authors, the strategies that are employed on the macro-level in the discursive formation of 
national identity are: 
 
• construction 
• perpetuation or justification 
• transformation  
• destructive or dismantling  
 
According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, although analytically distinguishable 
from one another, these strategies occur more or less simultaneously and are interwoven 
in discursive acts. Constructive strategies attempt to construct a certain national identity 
by promoting unification, identification and solidarity as well as differentiation. Emphasis 
on intra-national sameness/similarity, positive political continuity (at state/national level), 
national (positive) uniqueness, national autonomy and independence, international 
differences, difference between then and now, unifying common features/shared sorrows 
or worries, are some of the constructive strategies. Strategies of perpetuation attempt to 
maintain and reproduce a threatened national identity by preserving, supporting or 
protecting it. These strategies include positive self-presentation, portrayal in black and 
white, emphasis on positive political continuity, defence and avoidance. Moreover, the 
strategies of justification attempt to justify or relativise a societal status-quo by 
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emphasizing the legitimacy of past acts of the ‘own’ national ‘we’ group which have been 
put into question; that is, they restore, maintain and defend a common self-protection. 
Emphasis on the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, then and now, negative sameness or 
negative common features are some of the perpetuation strategies. On the other hand, 
strategies of transformation aim to transform a well-established national identity and its 
components into another identity. This is often affected by applying subtle rhetorical 
persuasion. Some of the strategies of transformation are: positive self-presentation; 
warning against the loss of national autonomy; emphasis on autonomy and independence; 
emphasis on a difference between then and now and emphasis on a necessary difference 
between now and the future; the negative connotation of political continuation and the 
positive connotation of gradual or abrupt change. Dismantling or destructive strategies 
aim at dismantling or disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct, but 
usually cannot provide a new model to replace the old one (ibid:33). Some of these 
strategies are: negative presentation (of self-others), emphasis on extra-national 
dependence and /or heteronomy, emphasis on inter-national 
sameness/similarity/communality, emphasis on intra-national differences, and emphasis 
on discontinuity/disruptions.     
During fieldwork, I observed the articulation of Turkish (cypriot) and (turkish) 
Cypriot identities with the dynamic combination of different strategies. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, memories in relation to national identity carry the traces of both 
‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’ because of the peculiar historical, political and cultural 
circumstances in Northern Cyprus. Therefore, the usage of the concepts of ‘Turkishness’ 
and ‘Cypriotness’ alone does not embrace the complex formation of the memories in 
relation to the national identity of Turkish Cypriots; I find necessary to use the terms 
‘(turkish) Cypriot identity/nationalism’ and ‘Turkish (cypriot) identity/ nationalism’ in 
this thesis. As explained in detail in the next chapter, in the term ‘Turkish (cypriot) 
identity/nationalism’, the capital ‘T’ of ‘Turkish’, and the small letter ‘c’ of the ‘Cypriot’ 
in the parenthesis are used to imply the emphasis on Turkish identity. In contrast, in the 
term ‘(turkish) Cypriot identity/nationalism’ the minuscule ‘t’ of ‘turkish’ in the 
parenthesis and the capital ‘C’ of ‘Cypriot’ point to the emphasis on Cypriot identity. 
These terms are used solely to express the political standpoints of the ruling groups and 
respondents; in order to maintain my neutrality, I prefer to use the term ‘Turkish Cypriot’ 
instead of Turkish (cypriot) or (turkish) Cypriot throughout the thesis. 
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In the analysis, I explored how the constructive strategies construct Turkish 
(cypriot) identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity between Turks 
and Turkish Cypriots, and differentiation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
In contrast, (turkish) Cypriot identity is constructed by promoting unification and 
solidarity between Turkish and Greek Cypriots as well as differentiation between Turkish 
Cypriots and Turks. Moreover, I observed that while the strategies of perpetuation 
attempt to maintain the threatened national identity that is sometimes Turkish (cypriot) 
and (turkish) Cypriot identity, the strategies of justification function to justify the status 
quo in order to maintain the established identity. I also observed how the strategies of 
transformation aim to transform the established national identity, which was Turkish 
(cypriot) identity − within the scope of this research − into (turkish) Cypriot identity. And 
I examined how the dismantling or destructive strategies aim to dismantle a national 
identity that can be Turkish (cypriot) identity or (turkish) Cypriot identity without 
providing a new model to replace it.  
In the strategies of means and forms of realisation Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart (1999:35) discuss lexical units and syntactic devices that serve to construct 
unification, unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt 
change, autonomy and heteronomy. The most important are: personal reference (such as 
personal pronouns), spatial reference (prepositional phrases such as with us, with them) 
and temporal reference (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, etc). These strategies are 
crucial in the analysis of the respondents’ narratives as they give clues as to how the 
respondents locate the self and others in their memories. Furthermore, the vagueness in 
referential or other expressions, euphemisms, linguistic hesitation and disruptions, 
linguistic slips, allusions and rhetorical questions are also useful clues in the analysis of 
the respondents’ narratives. Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (ibid: 35-45) also talk 
about the use of tropes of personification; I found the deictic ‘we’ to be useful for this 
particular research. The deictic expression ‘we’ is commonly used in the representation of 
the social actors as members of a national collectivity. The authors explain how linguistic 
studies distinguish between an addressee-inclusive and addressee-exclusive we, and 
between a speaker-inclusive and speaker exclusive ‘we’.        
Although Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) present a methodological 
approach for the analysis of the construction of national identity in discourse, Foucault, 
Laclau and Mouffe do not provide a ‘method’ for the empirical analysis. However, their 
theories provide some useful tools for the analysis (Jorgensen & Philips 2002; Kendall & 
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Wickham 1999). In this research, the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe 
are used in the examination of ‘memory’ and ‘national identity’ as the product of 
discourse. Laclau and Mouffe’s focus on ‘articulation’ and Foucault’s on ‘power 
relations’ shaped in historical, political and cultural contexts constitute the main 
foundation for the assumption that emphasizes the dynamism of memory and national 
identity.  
According to Laclau and Mouffe, as noted in Chapter One, the tension between 
interiority that is related to the partial fixity of discourses and exteriority which is related 
to the non-fixity of discourses, is the main source of the dynamism that plays the primary 
role in the formation of discourses through articulations. In parallel with their explanation 
of the relationship between interiority and exteriority, Laclau and Mouffe describe the 
interrelationship between elements and moments. Moments appear articulated to the 
discourse, while elements are differences that aren’t discursively articulated to the present 
discourse. In other words, elements are ‘free floating’ and thus they are unattached and 
non- articulated to the present discourse which is constructed by the power relations 
shaped in historical and cultural contexts. Within the scope of this research, moments can 
be defined as the memories that compose and sustain the discourse which can be defined 
either as Turkish (cypriot) or (turkish) Cypriot nationalism; and elements are the 
memories that function like surplus and threaten the present discourse. Moments and 
elements thus draw the boundaries between exteriority and interiority. However, it is 
important to know that discourses which are adopted by the respondents changing 
depending on power relations; it is therefore not possible to talk about the permanent 
fixity of discourses or memories. As noted in Chapter One, however, there have to be 
partial fixities − otherwise it would be impossible to talk about the existence of discourses 
and memories. It is in this context that Laclau and Mouffe talk about the nodal points and 
master signifiers as privileged signifiers, because they provide the partial fixity. In this 
research, ‘nodal points’ and ‘master signifiers’ are used as tools for exploring the partial 
fixities in the memories of the respondents. 
Laclau and Mouffe utilize a number of terms in order to make better sense of the 
organization of discourse. They introduce the notions of nodal points, master signifiers 
and myths as the key signifiers in the organization of discourse. All key signifiers are 
empty signs which mean nothing by themselves until, through chains of equivalence, they 
are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning. According to Laclau and 
Mouffe, nodal points organize discourses, master signifiers organize identity, and myths 
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organize a social space (Jorgensen and Philips 2002). Nodal points are the privileged 
discursive points (ibid.) and they may help to explore the main themes in the analysis of 
discourses more easily. According to Zizek (1989:87), ‘the multitude of floating signifiers 
is structured into a unified field through the intervention of a certain nodal point (The 
Lacanian point de capiton) which ‘quilts’ them, stops their sliding and fixes their 
meaning’. Similarly, Lacan does not subscribe to the postmodern idea of an unending 
fluidity of meaning; for him, although each signification refers to another one and so on 
and so forth, and both metaphoric substitution and metonymic combination can be 
described as infinite, this endless movement of signification is stopped by the prominent 
role attributed to certain signifiers. Lacan calls these signifiers ‘points de capiton’: the 
point de capiton is the signifier which stops the otherwise endless movement of the 
signification. These signifiers fix the meaning of whole chains of signifiers (Stavrakakis 
1999:60-61).  
Furthermore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, ‘master signifiers intervene and 
constitute their identity by fixing the floating signifiers within a paradigmatic chain of 
equivalence (Torfing 1999:90). However, in order to be equivalent in one respect, it is 
necessary for them to be different in other respects. As Torfing (1999: 125-126) suggests,  
 
All social identities are crossing-points between the logic of equivalence and the 
logic of difference. Neither the logic of equivalence nor the logic of difference 
will dominate completely. They mutually subvert each other. However the 
undecidable relation between the two logics can temporarily be fixed in a 
determinate hierarchy.  
                                                                                        
While the logic of equivalence functions by splitting a system of differences and 
instituting a political frontier between two antagonistic poles, the logic of difference 
consists in the expansion of a given system of differences by dissolving existing chains of 
equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated elements into an expanding order 
(Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000b :11; Howarth 1998). In other words, while the 
logics of equivalence highlight the common points by excluding differences, the logics of 
difference do exactly the opposite. Although the logic of equivalence seeks to divide into 
two opposed camps, the logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace a sharp 
antagonistic polarity.    
  Within the scope of this research, it is possible to examine how the logics of 
equivalence and difference function in the articulation of (turkish) Cypriot and Turkish 
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(cypriot) identities. In the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity the logics of 
difference operate to weaken the antagonistic polarity between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots and the logics of equivalence highlight the common points between them (i.e 
common past, life-styles, eating habits) by splitting a system of differences (i.e different 
accent, life-styles) between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. On the other hand, in the 
construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity, I observe how the logics of equivalence 
highlight the common points (i.e common language and religion) between Turkish 
Cypriots and Turks by composing a political frontier between Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
through the emphasis on differences (i.e language and religion) between them. In the 
meantime, the logics of difference operate in displacing the polarity between Turkish 
Cypriots and Turks.  
Identities are discursive articulations and constructions (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 
Hall 1996). They are descriptions of ourselves with which we identify and in which we 
are emotionally invested (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 87).The logics of equivalence and 
difference are connected with the discursive construction of identity. They are directly 
related to the self-other relationships, and they play a primary role in the examination of 
how the respondents describe themselves in terms of national identity and thus, how they 
define the ‘others’. Laclau and Mouffe describe the mechanisms of identity formation by 
introducing the concept of antagonism (Howarth 2000). The realm of discursive 
differences becomes homogenized into a chain of equivalence vis-à-vis a purely negative 
outside. In a situation of decreasing antagonism, the equivalential relation will be 
transformed step by step back into an array of differences (Critchley and Marchart 
2004:4). 
Similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical concepts of the logics of equivalence 
and difference are Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s (1999:33) strategies of emphasis 
or presupposition of sameness (strategies of assimilation), and strategies of emphasis or 
presupposition of difference (strategies of dissimilation) that serve as discursive macro-
strategies. Strategies of assimilation aim linguistically to create temporal, interpersonal or 
territorial similarity and homogeneity in reference to the various thematic dimensions. 
According to their social macrofunctions, they may be constructive, destructive, 
perpetuating or justifying. On the other hand, strategies of dissimilation create a temporal, 
interpersonal or territorial difference and heterogeneity in reference to these same 
dimensions. Like the strategies of assimilation, they may also be constructive, destructive, 
transformatory or justifying.  
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3.3 Section two- Ethnographic research: Conducting in-depth interviews 
 
In-depth interviews function to explore the memories of community residents on national 
identity issues in a way that textual analysis cannot. The aim is to gather information 
about interviewees’ autobiographical and public memories partly constructed through the 
mechanisms of memory. As one of the most-used methods of qualitative mass media 
research, in-depth interviewing (also known as unstructured, narrative and 
autobiographical interview) (Wimmer &Dominick 2003, Silverman 1997) serves to 
explore the thoughts, opinions and attitudes of the community residents.  
In these interviews, the researcher plays little directive role in the responses of the 
interviewee because the questions are open-ended; there is no guidance to the answers 
and the informant is entirely free to express his/her ideas and feelings (Arksey &Knight 
1999, Jones 1985). The main objective is to understand the ideas, feelings and behaviours 
of the interviewee without imposing any a priori categorization (Denzin &Lincoln 2003). 
According to Thompson (1988:199), 
 
The strongest argument for a free-flowing interview is when its main purpose is 
not to seek information or evidence of value in itself, but to make a ‘subjective’ 
record of how one man or woman looks back on their life as a whole, or part of it. 
Just how they speak about it, how they order it, what they emphasize, what they 
miss out, the words they choose, are important in understanding any interview; but 
for this purpose they became the essential text which will need to be examined.     
 
In depth interviews provide the opportunity to gather a large amount of information about 
interviewees’ autobiographical and public memories. As Schroder et al. (2003) argue, in-
depth interviews are excellent ways of eliciting people’s discursive repertoires about their 
media experiences because the one-to-one situation enables the researcher to ask much 
more detailed questions. Thus, through a series of in-depth interviews with respondents, 
this study explores how respondents articulate the ‘information’ they get in their everyday 
lives and examines the impact of the public and autobiographical memories on the 
political views of the respondents regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. 
Without in-depth interviews, it is not possible to explore the memories in relation to 
national identity that construct and are constructed by the respondents’ political ideas; in-
depth interviews enable me to examine the ways in which the respondents locate 
themselves in terms of political and national identity. 
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 However, there are also disadvantages and difficulties associated with in-depth 
interviews. As Stacks (2002:86) notes, the major disadvantages to in-depth interviewing 
include heavy time commitments and difficulties in gaining access to the interviewee. A 
vast amount of historical research is also necessary to conduct a good in-depth interview. 
Thus the researcher should know that conducting in-depth interviews might require much 
more time than other forms of research. Open-ended in-depth interviews may generate 
more information than is needed or can be processed (Smith and Albaum 2005:187); 
however, without a long interview it might not be possible to obtain the necessary 
knowledge about the respondents’ memories that compose the base of this research. 
 
3.3.1 The questionnaire and the selection of the sample  
 
A questionnaire was prepared for the purpose of gathering basic information about the 
people in order to find the 60 interviewees who would be appropriate for the base of the 
research. I started my fieldwork in 2007 and delivered the questionnaires to my 
respondents in that year, within a four-month period from July to October. Although it is 
not possible to talk about any specific importance of this date, one can describe the time 
after 2004 as a historical period which was dominated by political uncertainties and 
inconsistencies in Northern Cyprus, because of the outcomes of the two referenda that 
were held in Cyprus on the Annan Plan. As was mentioned in the introduction, the Annan 
Plan, proposing a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union 
following a solution of the Cyprus problem, was presented in 2002. However, in the 
referenda over the Annan Plan in 2004, most of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ and a 
great number of Greek Cypriots said ‘no’ to it. The Annan plan was therefore abolished 
and Turkish Cypriots could not be a part of the European Union until some unspecified 
time. Uncertainties about the future of Northern Cyprus are the reason that Turkish 
Cypriots are still discussing and thinking about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus 
that construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. Doing 
interviews with Turkish Cypriots within this historical period gave me the opportunity to 
examine how the recent political developments (i.e. Annan Plan, referendum) mobilized 
their memories of the ‘past’ and future expectations regarding the political situation in 
Northern Cyprus.  
I gave a questionnaire to every potential interviewee and then decided whether or 
not to do the in-depth interview with them according to their answers to the questionnaire. 
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The questionnaires thus played a substantial role in the selection of the sample of 60 
interviewees. At the beginning of the questionnaire there were some standard questions 
about the respondents’ name, age, sex, occupation, living situation, citizenship and 
education level. There were other questions relating to the special political situation in 
Northern Cyprus; here I asked how the respondents considered themselves in terms of 
national identity, if there were any martyrs3 in their families or close environment and 
whether they were refugees4 or not. Some other questions focussed on the respondents’ 
newspaper preferences and frequency of reading these newspapers. In the final question, I 
asked the respondent’s opinion about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union.  
It should be noted here that for this research 80 questionnaires were distributed to 
the respondents. I used a certain criteria for the selection of those to be interwieved. As 
can be understood from the questions, in the selection of the sample my primary focus 
was the interviewees’ demographic features, ideas on the Annan Plan, the newspaper 
preferences, frequency in reading; and some special features related to the political 
situation in Northern Cyprus. Through the questionnaire, my aim was to find respondents 
with different sexes, ages, occupations, education levels and ideas on the Annan Plan in 
order to form the conditions needed to have a variation for a proper research. In this 
sense, my questions were devised to elicit particular answers that would be useful in 
selecting my sample. I was interested in finding people with different occupations and 
educational backgrounds, in order to hear as many alternative voices about political and 
national issues as possible. Furthermore, in the selection of the interviewees, I drew out 
different views on the subject of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European 
Union: there were 30 respondents in favour of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem and 30 respondents against it. I 
formed the sample according to people’s political beliefs as I wanted to examine the 
impact of the interrelationship between dominant/alternative public and autobiographical 
memories on political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus.  
                                                 
3A ‘martyr’ is a person who is believed to have been killed by Greeks or Greek Cypriots in the Cyprus war. 
It is a common and legitimate term for Turkish Cypriots. Martrydom is a highy sacred position in the 
Muslim religion and it articulated into the discourse of Turkish nationalism. It is also a common practice in 
Turkey to call people who died for their motherland ‘martyrs’.  
 
  
4 After de-facto division of the island in 1974, Greek Cypriots living in the North and Turkish Cypriots 
living in the South forced to leave their homes, lands& properties and settle in ‘their’ respective parts of the 
island. 
 80 
 
 Because children and teenagers might not provide a sufficient evaluation of 
their political ideas and memories in relation to national identity as the research required, 
there were no children or teenage interviewees in this research; I excluded the age group 
1-19. I conducted interviews with 30 interviewees (15 men and 15 women) between the 
ages of 20-33; and with 30 interviewees (15 men and 15 women) between the ages of 40-
80. The interviewees between the ages of 20-33 were born after the division of the island 
in 1974; so they did not have any ‘personal’ memories with Greek Cypriots before the 
division of the island.  
I examined the correlations and discrepancies between public narratives mediated 
through the mechanisms of memory and autobiographical narratives of the respondents by 
conducting interviews with the respondents between the ages of 40-80, as those 
interviewees generally have autobiographical memories with Greek Cypriots. In the 
selection of the 40-80 age group, I considered the fact that younger people might not have 
‘personal’ memories with Greek Cypriots as they were under seven years old before the 
division of the island. I formed the sample with the people who bought and read at least 
one of the selected national newspapers (Kıbrıs or Volkan) every day. In the 
questionnaire, I also asked respondents if there were any martyrs in their families or close 
environment and whether they were immigrants or not, in order to learn if they had any 
traumatic autobiographical memory that played a role in their political ideas and/or 
definition of national identity before the in-depth interview.   
 Before starting to do the in-depth interviews, I decided on locations where I 
thought I could find the appropriate people for my interviews. My knowledge of the 
gendered public space in Northern Cyprus helped me to choose strategies in order to find 
the right sex and age group in different locations: I went to some of the main public 
spaces that are frequented by elderly men between the ages 60-90, such as coffee houses 
and the Turkish Cypriot public associations and unions – e.g., Kardeş Ocağı (The 
Brotherhood Hearth), Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı Derneği (The Association of the Turkish 
Resistance Organization), Mücahitler Derneği (The Turkish Cypriot Soldiers’ 
Association) and Çiftçiler Birliği (The Farmers’ Association). The elderly men who go to 
these organisations are retired and spend time seeing their friends and reading 
newspapers; the organisations subscribe to all the newspapers published in Northern 
Cyprus and have special rooms for this purpose. However, the people who go there are 
generally opponents of the Annan Plan because of the political standpoint of the 
associations; this gave me the opportunity to find the opponents of the Annan Plan. 
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However, I also found elderly men with alternative views in these places because 
sometimes people go to the association without considering its political standpoint. I also 
determined other locations frequented by the supporters of the Annan Plan such as 
Kırlangıç Kültür Evi (Swallow Cultural House). 
 In contrast to this group, in Northern Cyprus, housewives and elderly women 
between the ages 60-90 are associated with the domestic sphere; I therefore went to some 
old and popular settlement places like Belediye Evleri5 (municipality houses), public 
houses that were constructed by the government and labour or trade unions, and private 
houses, in order to find the housewives and elderly women; it is difficult to find them in 
the public sphere as one does men. There is no gendering of space for the age group 
around 20-59 in Northern Cyprus. The men and women around this age group are 
occasionally working during the day in public and private workplaces; for this group, I 
visited some private places of employment such as barbershops and clothing shops, and 
some public workplaces such as tourism agencies and hotels. To find the 20-25 age 
group, I went to the youth organizations of political parties, folk clubs, cafes and 
universities. I also found some of the interviewees in the 20-50 age group at a bookstore’s 
(Işık Kitabevi) book exhibition. During the in-depth interviews, I tried to create a relaxed 
social interaction and a friendly atmosphere with my interviewees: I did the interviews in 
familiar and natural settings where the respondents would feel more relaxed and free to 
talk. These settings were their homes, work places, or other locations such as coffee 
houses and universities where I had found them initially. 
  
3.3.2 Questions in the in-depth interviews  
 
In this research, in-depth interviews were conducted with 60 community residents of 
Northern Cyprus. In order to examine how the mechanisms of memory (history 
textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) influenced the respondents’ 
political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus that construct and are 
constructed by their memories in relation to national identity, I classified the questions of 
the in-depth interviews under three headlines. These headlines are ‘memories in relation 
to national identity’, ‘political ideas relating to the Cyprus Problem’ and ‘media’. As can 
                                                 
5 Belediye evleri (municipality houses) are owned by the Nicosia municipality in Northern Cyprus. These 
houses were constructed during the British colonial period in Cyprus, and homeless people and/or people 
with low incomes were settled in them.   
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be understood from the headings, the aim of this classification is to embrace the different 
but interrelated parts of the research that is determined in parallel to the hypothesis stated 
above. In the in-depth interviews, there were eight questions about memories in relation 
to national identity, six about the political ideas relating to the Cyprus Problem, and 
fifteen about the media (see Appendix 1). I used the list of questions as a guiding list 
during the interviews.       
 For the interviews, two different question lists were prepared for each age 
group in the sample. As noted above, although the 40-80 age group generally have 
‘personal’ memories with Greek Cypriots, the 20-33 age group do not have any 
autobiographical memory with them before the division of the island in 1974. Therefore 
the questions in the first part, about the ‘memories in relation to national identity’, were 
different in each list. In the question list prepared for the 40-80 age group, the questions 
were about the ‘personal’ memories of living with Greek Cypriots. However, in the 
question list for the 20-33 age group, the questions in the first part were mostly about 
public memories. In the second part, the questions were related to the political situation in 
Northern Cyprus; the focus was on the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and issues 
connected with the plan such as European Union membership, foreign powers and 
expectations regarding the future of Cyprus. Although most of the questions were related 
to the European Union membership of Northern Cyprus under the framework of the 
Annan Plan, the primary purpose of the research was not to get information about the 
Plan, but to explore the memories of the respondents concerning the Greek Cypriots 
(others). The questions were thus organized strategically to examine how the Annan Plan, 
which is about the possible future of Turkish Cypriots with Greek Cypriots, mobilized the 
memories of the respondents about the ‘others’. In the last section, my aim was to explore 
how the media (particularly newspapers) mobilized the memories of the respondents 
regarding their national identities and to observe how the respondents used the 
‘information’ they get in their everyday lives.    
  At the end of the interviews, four photographs and four news articles with their 
photographs were shown to the interviewees in order to learn their interpretations of 
them. The photographs and the news articles were selected according to their particular 
meanings associated with the core theme of the research − ‘self-other relationships’. By 
showing the photographs and the news articles, my aim was to explore what particular 
meanings and values respondents associated with their nation and their national identity, 
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what they thought about their national celebrations and what they said for the 
commemorations. 
 In two of the photographs, there are monuments that represent the political 
discourse of the period of President Denktaş and the government of the Ulusal Birlik 
Partisi (UBP). According to Bodnar (1994:78), ‘monuments would be placed in the center 
of the city where people would pass by it everyday and be reminded of their “love of their 
country” and their duty to their ‘native land’. During the Denktaş and UBP period, the 
Turkish (cypriot) Nationalist discourse was dominant. In the construction of the Turkish 
(cypriot) identity, which is articulated by Turkish (cypriot) nationalist discourse, 
sameness between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and differences between Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots are promoted. In this respect, one of my photographs depicts the 
monument of the founder of Turkey “Atatürk”, and there is a sentence below the 
sculpture that reads: “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene” (‘How happy to say I am a Turk’). I 
chose the photograph of the monument because Atatürk is one of the most crucial 
symbols of Turkishness that is used in the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. 
Furthermore, in the second photograph, there are flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ together; like the symbol of Atatürk, these two flags play 
an important role in the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity in Northern Cyprus. 
The third photograph is of a monument that symbolises a martyr (Turkish soldier) who 
was killed by Greeks and lies in his mother’s arms. The statement below the sculpture is: 
“Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget). The photograph of this monument was chosen 
as it articulates national identity through the representation of the ‘others’ (Greek 
Cypriots) as savage people who killed innocent Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus war. In 
this way, the monument was placed to remind people of the ‘past’ that was constructed 
during the period of President Denktaş and the UBP government. 
  On the other hand, in the CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) period, (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism was highlighted. Although Turkish (cypriot) nationalism is based on 
imagined ‘friends (Turks)’ and ‘enemies (Greek Cypriots)’, (turkish) Cypriot nationalism 
emphasizes the friendship and commonalities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots. For this reason, some symbols representing the commonalities between Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots were placed in the streets during the CTP period; in the last two 
photographs, there are symbols that represent the similar ways of life, traditions and 
political expectations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the fourth photograph, there are 
Sestas (flat baskets) placed in the street: these common,  traditional items are made with 
 84 
 
rushes and used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat food on; and this 
symbol represents the common ways of life of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Finally, in 
the fifth photograph, there is the peace cresset made by a famous Greek artist to 
symbolise the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum, as an 
affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan. Thus, the peace cresset represents the common 
expectations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots from the future − the unification of the island 
under European Union membership.      
I also analyse the narratives of the respondents about the representations of the 
event “the partial opening of the crossings between the two parts of the island” in the 
news stories of Kıbrıs and Volkan newspapers. The partial opening of the crossings in 
2003 was selected as a case study because it was the most radical development related to 
the Cyprus problem since 1974. After the division of the island in 1974, Greek Cypriots 
living in the North and Turkish Cypriots living in the South had to leave their homes; they 
were unable to see their former homes, Greek Cypriot acquaintances, friends and 
neighbours again till the opening of the crossings in 2003. After the partial opening of the 
crossings, Turkish and Greek Cypriots started to cross the boundaries for the first time 
after 1974 and they visited their former homes, places of employment or met those whom 
they had been apart from since 1974. The representation of this event through the media 
played a crucial role in the creation of dynamism for the articulation and construction of 
memories in relation to national identity; this particular case study enabled me to explore 
how the media mobilize Turkish Cypriots to focus on their memories in relation to 
national identity and to rethink the ‘others’.  
Case studies focus on a particular situation, event or phenomenon and provide 
detailed and specific information about it (Fiske 1994, Wimmer & Dominick 2003); they 
enable us to focus on certain special events and to analyse the news stories about them in 
a detailed way. In the examination of news stories, which are one of the sources of case 
study information (Tellis 1997), the cultural constraints that are embedded within the 
production process of news stories cannot be ignored. As Verschuren (2003:137) points 
out, “case study is suitable for studying phenomena that are embedded in their cultural 
context”. Thus, in the analysis of the narratives of the respondents, I also consider the 
cultural factors that play a role in the production of the news stories by the Kıbrıs and 
Volkan newspapers; and I explicate the ownership or/and control relationships of these 
two particular papers, their standpoints in the political spectrum within the period of the 
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analysis and the discourses that form their views about the participation of Northern 
Cyprus in the European Union.  
These newspapers do not have any organic relationships with any political parties 
in Northern Cyprus; however, their discourses are parallel to the political standpoints of 
certain political leaders or/ and political parties in Northern Cyprus. They allow access to 
a large readership as their circulation rates are high: Kibris newspaper has been chosen 
because it has the highest circulation among the national newspapers and it supports the 
participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union through a solution under the 
framework of the Annan Plan; thus it has a European Unionist discourse within the period 
covered by this research. Kıbrıs highlights (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and it can be 
roughly classified as on the Left6 of the political spectrum. The paper is a privately owned 
commercial newspaper that was established by its owner Asil Nadir, a famous 
businessman, on 11th July 1988. Within the period of this analysis, the discourse of the 
newspaper was parallel to the discourse of the CTP government that came to power in 
2003. As was stated in chapter four, the CTP government is highly in favour of the 
participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union.  
On the other hand, the newspaper Volkan has been chosen because it has the 
highest circulation among the newspapers that do not support the participation of 
Northern Cyprus in the European Union. Volkan underlines the Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalistic discourse and it can be classified as on the Right7 of the political spectrum. 
Although it belongs to no political party, it has supported the ideas of the first president, 
Denktaş, starting from its establishment. Hence, Kıbrıs and Volkan can be roughly 
                                                 
6Together with the ideals of peace and freedom, the different attitudes of people towards the ideal of 
equality are the commonest criterion used to differentiate the Right from the Left. The best element is the 
notion of equalization that defines the doctrines that are assumed as the Left. Namely, the notion of 
equality is not the illusion of being a member of a community, in which everybody is equal, but to elevate 
the elements that render people equals, rather than the elements that render people different (Bobbio 
1994:103). In a similar vein, Kıbrıs newspaper’s focus on (turkish) Cypriot nationalism is a kind of 
elevation of the elements that render Greek and Turkish Cypriots equals. Hence, the newspaper produces 
news stories that articulate the commonalities instead of the differences between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots.  
 
7 The Right is nothing as opposed to being within or without traditions and everything is within and for the 
traditions. If we are to specify different forms of the Right, this is closely related to various meanings of 
convention. According to Confrancesco, there are six different meanings of  convention: as a model, as the 
approval of an era determined within the history of humanity, as loyalty to national values, as a unity of 
fate, as historical memory and as the conscience of the complexity of the reality (Bobbio 1994:89). The 
Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse of Volkan newspaper is parallel to the different forms of the Right, 
which are related to the different meanings of the convention: as loyalty to Turkish nationalistic values, as 
a unity of fate and as historical memory.   
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classified as respectively Right and Left8 on the political spectrum. However, the 
discourses of these two newspapers are not static and thus are articulated and constructed 
through the changing historical and political circumstances. In this research, my objective 
is not to talk about the newspaper discourses that are permanently fixed and stable; 
however, it is possible to locate a partial closure to examine the media discourses that are 
produced and circulated within a specific time span.  
In the examination of the news stories of Kıbrıs and Volkan, I explored how each 
newspaper constructs the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots according to its 
present political discourse. Thus, the past is constructed according to the present political 
standpoints of the newspapers about the Annan Plan, which is based on a possible 
participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union in the future. In this way, after 
the opening of the crossings, each newspaper interprets an event about Greek Cypriots by 
referring to the past that they articulate in the present and for the future. Within the scope 
of this research, I chose three news stories with six photographs from Kıbrıs newspaper 
and one news story, also with six photographs, from Volkan newspaper. The partial 
opening of the crossings is represented as a way of going back to the ‘past’ (the period 
when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together) by both newspapers; however, 
depending on the political discourse of the newspaper, the ‘past’ is sometimes represented 
as a ‘happier past’ and sometimes as a period of time that is wished to have never existed. 
The ‘past’ and ‘present’ are articulated through the different representations of the 
newspapers about the ‘others’. In the news stories of Volkan, the others are represented as 
the eternal enemies who murdered many innocent Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus war and 
ruined the commemorative locations and sacred places of Turks after the division of the 
island in 1974. On the other hand, in the news stories of Kıbrıs, one sees how the others 
(Greek Cypriots) are transformed into Cypriots who share common experiences, sorrows 
and longings with Turkish Cypriots. The newspaper also emphasizes the present 
friendship, which is based on a common past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, since 
the opening of the crossings.           
 
                                                 
8 The ‘Right’ and the ‘Left’ are always represented as opposites in terms of their political standpoints, 
world-views and objectives. These two terms are popularly used to classify and define the political 
standpoints of the parties, groups, institutions, politicians and newspapers. The Right and the Left mutually 
exclude and weaken each other because none of the tenets or political movements can be the supporter of 
both the Right and the Left. However, the meaning of the ‘Right’ and the ‘Left’ is always in process and 
subject to change (Bobbio 1994:47). Their meanings are constantly articulated, renegotiated and re-
constructed. For this reason, it is not possible to locate a stable meaning either to the Left or to the Right. 
These two terms may carry different meanings in specific historical and political periods.  
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3.3.3 In depth interviews: Personal experiences and methods 
 
During the in-depth interviews, I tried to follow the order of the questions in the question 
list. However, I sometimes asked additional questions that were not on the list of the in-
depth interviews. This occurred depending on the course of the interview; the content of 
the answers of the interviewees was the main reason for further questions. Thus, I 
sometimes asked additional questions to clarify a subject, probe more and tease out 
information that was not provided by the respondents; a feeling that there was something 
more behind the given answers made me ask another question in order to learn more 
deeply about the related subject. Occasionally some questions were missed if the 
interviewee had given his or her answers in response to any former question; hence, I 
used the question list of the in-depth interviews in a flexible way.   
 Through the interviews, the respondents sometimes talked about unnecessary 
subjects that were not related to the nature of the research, such as one respondent’s 
detailed explanation of his educational background which was given while he was talking 
about the role of history teachers in providing information about the Cyprus Problem. In 
those instances, I preferred to let my respondents talk and finish their conversation in 
order to make them feel free and relaxed enough to express themselves; free expression 
constituted the essential part of this research as it is substantial in the narration of 
memories. It is sometimes difficult for people to talk about their past experiences, 
sorrows, worries, fears or happiness; and occasionally, it is not easy to remember 
immediately an event or a period of time like childhood. In such cases, a long 
conversation might help them remember. However, sometimes long conversations about 
unnecessary subjects caused digression from the main issue, and this created problems as 
the respondents lost their attention and interest in it. In these instances, it was difficult for 
me to take their attention back to the main issue again. I therefore generally asked the 
main question for the second time at the end of their explanation in order to get the 
answer to my question.  
The conduct of the interviews presented a few practical problems and I tried to 
solve them without losing patience. One of these was caused by the audio recording 
device that I used to record the voices of my respondents. Some of the interviewees 
started to talk very abruptly and in political terms after I had started to record their voice. 
For example, Salime, a 68-year-old female retired teacher, answered many questions 
about ‘political ideas relating to the Cyprus problem’ in the second part of the question 
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list of the in-depth interviews as follows: “political leaders know what’s best about 
everything. I haven’t got any idea”. She also didn’t want to talk about her memories of 
living with Greek Cypriots, and gave very short ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to my questions 
about ‘memories in relation to national identity’. However, after I had stopped recording 
her voice, she started to talk about some unpleasant memories of Greek Cypriots that 
represented her fears and worries about them. In these instances, I listened to my 
respondents very carefully and took notes immediately after the interview in order to 
preserve the information.  
Moreover, I faced problems with some of my respondents who focused more on 
my questions instead of their answers. For example, when I asked the question ‘do you   
think the island should remain divided or unified?’ Ahmet, a 60-year-old male barber, 
told me that this question was biased and continued: “Turkish Cypriots do not live in a 
divided country. Their country is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and they live 
in peace in their country with the support of their motherland Turkey”. Then he tried to 
learn about my own political ideas by asking questions and to convince me that his ideas 
reflected truths. In these instances, I tried to explain that what was important for me was 
to learn their opinions and my aim was not to support any ideas but to represent my 
respondents’ answers equally in my research.      
Some of my respondents got bored and became angry when I tried to go into their 
deeper feelings and learn more. In particular, the ones who had ‘martyrs’ in their families 
were very angry and aggressive while they were talking about their family member’s 
death in the Cyprus war. Some of the respondents were also very aggressive while they 
were narrating their memories with Greek Cypriots. In these instances, I tried to calm 
them down by explaining that I didn’t want to make them feel sad by reminding them of 
their painful memories, and that I shared their pains and sorrows.        
During my research, I adopted some specific ethical principles such as value 
awareness (Grinnell and Unrau 2008:451), informed consent and protection of 
confidentiality (Grinnell and Unrau 2008:451, Cievrzo and Keitel 1998:67, Brown 
2003:46-53). According to Grinnell and Unrau (2008), ‘due to the subjective nature of 
qualitative research, it is essential that researchers demonstrate some value awareness and 
thus they should report any potential biases and how they may have affected the study’. In 
considering the ethical issue of value awareness, I should therefore make it clear that as a 
Turkish Cypriot researcher, I am embedded in the historical, political and cultural 
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contexts which are peculiar to Northern Cyprus and that these circumstances might 
indirectly influence my conceptions and interpretations regarding the Cyprus issue.  
At the beginning of each in-depth interview, I gave my respondents brief 
information about the content of my PhD thesis and I obtained their informed consent. As 
Cievrzo and Keitel suggest (1998:67), ‘the principle of informed consent is that the 
researcher provides participants with sufficient information about the research so that they 
can make informed decisions regarding participation’. I therefore explained to my 
respondents the purpose of my research, my intention in doing interviews, what would be 
asked in the interview and why I wanted to record their voices. Cievrzo and Keitel (ibid) 
note that ‘informed consent indicates that participation is knowledgeable and voluntary 
and that participant can withdraw from the research at anytime’. Accordingly, at the 
beginning of the in-depth interviews, I explained to my respondents that I needed to 
record their voices as I would not be able to take notes of all they said, since generally in-
depth interviews take approximately more than an hour; and I obtained permission from 
each of interviewee to record their voice with a tape recording device. I also told them 
that they could withdraw from the interview at any time they wished. 
 Before starting the in-depth interviews, I encouraged my respondents to ask 
questions if there was anything that they were wondering or if they had any worries about 
the interview. They generally asked if I would use their surnames in my research and if I 
would use the information and/or their recorded voice for other purposes. I explained that 
I would use any kind of information solely for my research; my intention was not to use 
the data for any media institution or for any other purposes. According to Becker and 
Boore (2008:130), ‘when reporting the case study, real names and personal identifiers that 
are enough to identify a person should not be used unless the individual has given explicit 
(written) permission to be identified’. In order to protect the confidentiality of my 
respondents, I removed my respondents’ names and surnames from the interview booklet 
after assuring myself that I did not need to re-contact them for any further information. I 
also replaced the real names of my respondents with nicknames after I had finished the 
draft chapters that were based on the interview data. 
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CHAPTER 4: ‘CYPRUS HISTORY’ AND THE MECHANISMS OF 
MEMORY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In order to understand better the social-historical conditions in which public and 
autobiographical memories are constructed in Northern Cyprus, an overview of the 
‘history of Cyprus’ and of the function of the mechanisms of memory (media, history 
textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) within the society/culture of Turkish 
Cypriots is essential. This chapter provides historical information to lay the foundations 
of the necessary background knowledge and develop a better understanding regarding the 
mechanisms of memory and the narratives of the respondents that form the basis of the 
ethnographic research. Without such a background, a full understanding of the narratives 
of the respondents that are analysed in the following three chapters will not be possible. 
Beginning with an account of the Cyprus problem, understood as the problem of 
antagonistic Greek and Turkish nationalisms that have resulted in the division of the 
island since 1974, I examine the past and recent relations of Cyprus with the European 
Union and the influence of these relations on the developments around the Cyprus 
problem. However, the focus is on the presentation in 2002 of the Annan Plan by the 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the most critical development in the 
relations between Cyprus and the European Union. Situating Cyprus in the broader 
regional context, especially over the past 50 years or so and moving on to the island’s 
move towards European Union membership and final accession, the chapter will seek to 
identify a number of key parameters in Cypriot history such as the antagonistic 
relationship between Greek and Turkish nationalisms and the proposed solution of the 
problem of the island’s division through the recent United Nations process and the Annan 
Plan. 
 To provide a clear perspective on these issues, the history of Cyprus is examined 
through different periods under these headings; ‘the colonization between 750 BC-1960’, 
‘the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the Cyprus war 1960-1974’ and ‘the 
division of the island from 1974 onwards’. The last topic is examined in two different 
time periods: the period of the Denktaş presidency and the government of the National 
Unity Party (‘Ulusal Birlik Partisi’ or UBP) during 1974-2003; and the government of the 
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Republican Turkish Party (‘Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi’ or CTP) during 2003-2009. The 
content of this historical explanation has ben determined according to the key issues that 
were explored through the in-depth interviews with the respondents. In the last part of the 
chapter, the relations betwen Cyprus and the European Union and the influence of this 
relationship on the Cyprus problem will be explored, with a primary focus on the Annan 
Plan that was proposed by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2002. The aim is to 
examine the Cyprus problem within a broader political context that considers the role of 
external powers such as Turkey, Greece, the European Union and the United Nations in 
the Cyprus problem. 
 
4.2 The Colonization Period between 750 BC- 1960  
 
In the Mediterranean, Cyprus is the third largest island after Sicily and Sardinia, located 
40 miles to the south of Turkey and 600 miles to the south-east of Greece (Sözen 1998:6). 
Due to its geographical location, the island has always been the focus of power struggles 
since ancient times: it attracted many colonizers and was ruled successively by the 
Egyptians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, 
Franks, Venetians, Ottoman Turks and British (Joseph 1997:16). As a result, throughout 
history the identity of the residents of Cyprus has been rearticulated, reconstructed and 
represented within changing social, political and cultural circumstances. 
 Although many colonial powers have come and gone in Cyprus, the island is 
still a field of power relations, especially between Turkey and Greece. These two 
countries have had crucial influences on the island because of their political interests and 
historical and cultural connections with the natives of the island, the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots. Because of their connections, Turkey and Greece are accepted as motherland 
countries by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots respectively. In addition, the United States, 
European Union countries, and Russia are external powers that are closely interested in 
Cyprus for a variety of global, political and geographical reasons (Samani 1999). These 
conflicting interests over the island make Cyprus one of the most problematic areas of the 
world and create, reinforce and reproduce the Cyprus problem. 
  As these varieties of complex interests are intertwined with each other, it is not 
easy to explain the main reasons behind the Cyprus problem. According to Kızılyürek 
(2001:10), its causes can be classified on the basis of internal and external factors. The 
external factors are the interventions of colonial powers on the island, while the internal 
 92 
 
factors are the historical and political changes that have occurred on the island since its 
invasion by the Ottomans in 1571. The historical and political changes that make up the 
internal factors, Kızılyürek argues, create the necessary conditions for the interventions of 
colonial powers which are the external factors; the internal and external factors influence 
each other.  
 When the Ottomans invaded Cyprus, they settled a limited number of Moslem 
Turks from different parts of Anatolia on the island. Until the arrival of the Ottomans, the 
population of the island had been predominantly Greek-speaking and Christian Orthodox; 
Moslem Turks and Orthodox Greeks made up the traditional Ottoman society after this 
point. The Ottomans administered the island under the ‘millet’ system, whereby the 
communities were institutionalized, had specific rights and privileges and elected their 
own judicial and administrative officials (Necatigil 1993:1). According to Samani 
(1999:13), these two communities mostly lived together and established friendly 
relationships under the Ottoman administration approximately for three centuries. 
However, due to the Ottoman millet system of communal separation in areas such as 
culture, education and religion, the Christian and Muslim communities of Cyprus 
conducted their separate lives in parallel neighbourhoods of the towns and villages. As 
Joseph (1999:17) points out, the Ottoman millet administrative system distinguished the 
two communities on the basis of religion and ethnicity, and hence encouraged separate, 
private, social and political lives under different religious leaders. This was further 
encouraged during the period of British rule, when communal voting for separate councils 
was introduced in municipal elections; the British retained and developed the Ottoman 
system of separation (Tocci 2004:43). For this reason it is possible to talk about the 
transformation of the millet system into a system of ethnic differentiation that began with 
the influence of the politics of British colonization and with the entrance of Greek and 
Turkish nationalisms to the island.  
 One factor in the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was the 
influence of Turkish and Greek nationalisms.9 The projection of Greek nationalism in 
Cyprus was ‘Enosis’ − that is, the discourse of the unification of the island with the 
‘motherland’, Greece. Through this discourse, the elites that believed they had been 
politically second-class citizens during the Ottoman period began to feel they were part of 
                                                 
9 In many ways, Greek and Turkish nationalist projects are ‘parallel monologues’. Greece and Turkey have 
been historically posited as the ‘other’ in their respective nationalist imaginaries, each being seen, from the 
outset, as being at the antipodes of the survival of the other (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:2).    
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a privileged, ideal and powerful Greek nation (Samani 1999: 15). On the other hand, 
starting from the first years of British colonization, the local Ottoman intellectuals who 
were against the increasing desire of the Orthodox Greeks for Enosis, and were beginning 
to feel their social status was decreasing, were carrying the hope that the island would one 
day be given back to the previous owner, the Ottomans (ibid:22). Turkish nationalism in 
this sense mainly developed among Turkish intellectuals as a preventive measure against 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire when the empire started to lose its power and 
authority (ibid: 19). The politics of British colonization was another contributing factor in 
the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It had a substantial influence on the 
formation of the ethnic differentiation between the two communities. British politics 
focused primarily on the maintenance of British sovereignty in colonial countries; 
protection of Britain’s control and authority over colonized societies was based on its 
classic ‘divide and rule strategies’ (Young 1994:225-231). During the British period in 
1878, influenced by social, political and cultural contexts that were mostly formed as a 
result of these strategies, Greek and Turkish Cypriots10 began to fight with each other in 
order to gain dominance over the island.  
 In the beginning, the basis of their conflict was their focus on different 
religions; and later, differences in race, language, and cultural and historical backgrounds. 
Although the different religions of the two communities empowered the antagonistic 
relations between them, this situation was useful for the British as it facilitated the British 
administration’s rule on the island. The Turkish Cypriots, who identified themselves as a 
Moslem community, lived in peace with the British administration until the 1930s. At the 
beginning of the 1930s, with the influence of the currents of nationalism in the world and 
the empowerment of the Republic of Turkey11, Turkish Cypriots strove to establish a 
national identity (Erhürman 2007:14). This time the focus of the Turkish Cypriot 
community was diverted towards the putative racial, historical and cultural differences 
that distinguished them from Greek Cypriots. The language, religion and historical 
background of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, constructed differently from each other, make 
up the main stones in the formation of their national identities.  
                                                 
10 Greek Cypriots speak Greek and identify themselves with the Greek nation and Greek culture. Almost all 
of them are members of the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots, all of whom are 
Moslems, speak Turkish and identified themselves first with the Ottomans and later with the Turkish nation 
and Turkish culture (Joseph 1997). 
 
11 The Ottoman Empire was succeeded by the Republic of Turkey, which was officially proclaimed in 1923. 
The end of the Ottoman culture came with the secularization of Turkey after World War II along European 
models of government (Shaw and Shaw: 1987:373). 
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4.3 The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the Cyprus war 1960-1974 
 
The second half of the 1950’s witnessed the Greek Cypriot struggle to drive the British 
colonial rulers out of Cyprus and gain independence in order to fulfil Enosis, their 
national desire to unite Cyprus with Greece (Sözen 1998:6-7). Resistance towards British 
colonization came mainly from the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie (Kızılyürek 2001:40-41). 
Under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, EOKA, the (Greek) National Cypriot 
Fighters Organization, was established in 1952 and it began its actions for decolonization 
in 1955. The initial position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership was to support the 
continuation of British rule, which was viewed as better than Enosis by the Turkish 
Cypriots at that time. As EOKA hit harder and harder on British military personnel, more 
and more British jobs were taken away from Greeks and given to Turks. An auxiliary 
police force was formed whose task was to control Greek riots and help the British army 
fight EOKA. In this way, British policy served to polarize the two communities 
(Stavrinides 1999:29). The function of the Legislative Council12 was also crucial in the 
promotion of the antagonism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots: Greek members used 
the council as a platform for making pro-Enosis demands and this drove the Turkish 
members to side with the British. Thus the system created a feeling that the task of Greek 
and Turkish politicians was to promote the interests of opposing groups of people (ibid:  
19).   
 However, when the Turkish Cypriots understood that the British would 
eventually withdraw from the island, the leadership supported the idea of ‘Taksim’, the 
partition of the island between Turkey and Greece (Sözen 1998:7). Thus TMT, the 
Turkish Defence Organization, was established in opposition to EOKA in 1957 and tried 
to spread the thesis that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not live together (Kızılyürek 
2001:54). EOKA and TMT struggled to reach different goals regarding their respective 
communities; while EOKA worked for the realization of Enosis, TMT worked for 
Taksim. Thus it is possible to talk about the polarization of the Cypriot society into two 
camps (ibid: 2001:53): on the one hand, there were Taksim and TMT and on the other, 
Enosis and EOKA; and the continuing interests of the Greek and Turkish bourgeoisies 
were formed as two contradictory opinions and world-views (Kızılyürek 2001:53).  
                                                 
12 The Legislative Council was established in 1882. The council consisted of six British colonial officials 
and twelve elected Cypriot members, three ‘Moslems’ and nine ‘non-Moslems’ (Stravrinides 1999). 
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By the end of the 1950s, Britain had to end its colonization in Cyprus and the 
island was granted its independence with the agreements signed at London and Zurich in 
1959. US policy played a crucial role in the formation of the necessary conditions on the 
way to the independence of the island. During this period, the United States supported the 
end of colonization in the international field, claiming that colonization was increasing 
communist developments (Kızılyürek 2001:58). The Republic of Cyprus as an 
independent, bi-communal state was finally established in 1960 under the guarantorship 
of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. According to its Constitution, “the State of 
Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the 
President being a Greek and the Vice President being a Turk elected by the Greek and 
Turkish Communities of Cyprus” (Stavrinides 1999:3). In the first elections, Archbishop 
Makarios was elected President, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected Vice President.  
When the Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960, it acquired a flag but not a 
national anthem (Papadakis 2005:162). Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük 
welcomed the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus with the discourses of ‘peace’ and 
‘friendship’ (Kızılyürek 2005:15). At that time, their political standpoint was 
strengthened by the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus. The flag was chosen jointly 
by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. According to the constitution, the 
Republic of Cyprus had to have its own flag of neutral design and colour. Thus, the flag 
could not have on it blue or red, the colours of Greece and Turkey (Hart 1990:144). A 
flag was selected with no cultural allusion to either community, drawing its symbolism 
from nature instead: yellow for copper, the shape of Cyprus and olive branches that 
symbolized the two communities coexisting peacefully, intertwined in the management of 
the new state (Papadakis 2005:162).  
The Turkish Cypriot newspapers published during this period also supported the 
Republic. The weekly Cumhuriyet (The Republic) started its publication on 16 August 
1960, the very day of the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus (Azgın 1998:652). As 
Azgın (1998:652-653) notes, the main policy of Cumhuriyet newspaper was to help 
preserve the new Republic, to encourage harmonious relations between the Turkish and 
Greek communities, and to avoid inter-communal conflicts. The owner of the newspaper 
was Ayhan Hikmet, a lawyer. The newspaper was privately owned, and because of its 
policy, Cumhuriyet quite often came into confrontation with the newspaper Nacak (1959) 
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that was owned by Rauf Denktaş13 (on behalf of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot 
Associations); Nacak was supporting the nationalist discourse (Evre 2004:151). 
Cumhuriyet kept accusing Nacak of being chauvinistic and claiming that such an attitude 
might harm the whole island. In general, Nacak defended Dr. Küçük’s policies, but it 
stressed the tactical differences between the policies of Küçük and Denktaş (Azgın 1998: 
652). Similarly, the newspaper Akın (The Pioneer; 1962), which had no relations with 
any political party, struggled to defend the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus (ibid: 
653). During this period, Dr. Fazıl Küçük established Halkın Sesi newspaper, which he 
owned, and it became his voice. The newspaper, which he used to attack his political 
opponents, played a crucial role in Küçük’s leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community 
and during his time as the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus (Azgın 1998:649-
650). Apart from the newspapers, Turkish Cypriots made use of the Cyprus Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) for their radio and TV14 needs until the 1963 conflicts (Azgın 
1998:657). CBC was under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus; 
however, there were only a few hours of Turkish programming every day on the radio, 
and once a week a TV programme was broadcast in Turkish (Azgın 1998:657). This 
situation made the newspapers the primary source of ‘information’ during this period. 
The partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots lasted for only three years; a 
short time from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus disagreements began 
between Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük. On 30th November 1963, President Makarios put 
forward a set of 13 proposals for amending the Republic’s Constitution (Oberling 
1982:82-83). These are famously known as the “thirteen amendments” or “thirteen 
points” of the constitution of the 1960 Republic (Sözen 1998:9). According to Makarios, 
the constitution was unworkable and it was necessary to make some amendments to it for 
the proper function of the state (Kızılyürek 2001:73). He proposed that the vice-president 
of the Republic was to stand in for the president in case of the latter’s temporary absence, 
unified municipalities were to be established (according to the constitution, separate 
municipalities had to be created in the five largest towns of the Republic), the 
administration of justice was to be unified (according to the constitution, Turkish Cypriots 
were to be judged by Turkish judge and Greek Cypriots by Greek judge). These demands 
                                                 
13Rauf.R Denktaş, a Turkish nationalist, was the founder of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975 
and the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 1983.  
14 Cyprus Radio was established in 1951 and Cyprus Television was established in 1957 (Dedeçay 
1989:25). 
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can be interpreted as reasonable and contributing to unity and confidence between the two 
communities.  
Furthermore, according to the proposed amendments, the president and vice-
president of the Republic were both to lose their veto power, the proportion of Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the civil service, the security forces and the army was to 
be modified in order to reflect the actual ethnic ratio of the Cypriot population, and all 
decisions of the Public Service Commission were to be taken by simple majority vote 
(Oberling 1982:82-83). As Greek Cypriots were the majority in the Cypriot community, 
these items were intensively criticised by Turkish politicians. According to them, the 
amendments would deprive the Turkish Cypriots of the status of ‘equal partner of the 
Republic’ and they would give the complete control over the administration to the Greek 
Cypriots, who were the majority. 
The conflicting interpretations of the purpose of the proposed amendments by the 
political leaders of the two communities are highly significant, as they formed the basis of 
the contested narrations that are disseminated by the ‘mechanisms of memory’ of the two 
communities especially after the division of the island in 1974. These conflicting 
interpretations are mostly related to the fear of the ‘other’. In the case of the Greek 
Cypriots’ politics, the constitution favoured the Turkish minority. They supported this 
claim by arguing that the constitution had never been put to the test of popular opinion, 
but had been imposed by foreign powers on the Greek Cypriots; and therefore Greek 
Cypriots could not be bound to accept all its provisions. On the other hand, according to 
the Turkish/Cypriots’ politics, the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) were trying to usurp the 
rights of Turkish Cypriots and render them  ‘minorities’; the main objective of the 
amendments was to reduce the Turkish Cypriots to the status of a minority, from the 
status of co-founder and politically equal partner of the Republic (Stavrinides 1999:42).               
For this reason, the government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
rejected the Greek move. This was put forward as one of the primary reasons why, five 
days later, EOKA started the communal struggle and the two communities started fighting 
with each other. The Cyprus war had started. As Joseph (1999:30) explains, 
‘constitutional crisis, political immobilization, ethnic passion, mutual mistrust, suspicion, 
fear, uncertainty and limited bicommunal interaction all paved the way for an open 
communal confrontation’. During the Cyprus war, TMT and EOKA played an active role. 
Soon afterwards, thousands of Turks left their homes in Greek or mixed areas and 
retreated into enclaves (Stavrinides 1999:5). During this period, the absence of direct 
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contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots caused their alienation from each other and 
empowered the role of EOKA and TMT. The lack of direct contact meant that nationalist 
speech-makers, many of whom were former EOKA and TMT members, and the mass 
media which reported the speeches and spread the propaganda of the ruling groups in 
their communities, had a substantial influence on the formation of popular attitudes and 
beliefs with regard to the other community (ibid:70).  
The media were accusing the opposite side, especially the opposite side’s leaders. 
The conception of the Turks which the Greek side cultivated was that they were a 
minority of greedy people who owed their status to an Anglo-Turkish conspiracy. They 
had obtained a constitution that gave them super-privileges at the expense of the Greek 
majority and they resorted to armed rebellion when the Greeks made a firm stand on their 
legitimate democratic rights. On the Turkish side, the Greeks were represented as an 
unscrupulous and violent people, a part of the Greek nation that had long been the 
opponents of the Turkish nation, and who in their pursuit of Enosis, had used force to 
break up the established constitutional arrangements that implied co-operation and 
peaceful co-existence (Stavrinides 1999:57-58). In this way, Bayrak (Flag) radio15, which 
was established during this period by the Turkish leadership, was conceived as the voice 
of Turkish Cypriots because it had a special importance as the symbol of the struggle of 
Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots. In 1966 Radio- 2 was put into service (Azgın 
1998: 657). The political standpoint of both Bayrak Radio and Radio 2 was extreme 
Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, as an indication of Turkish nationalistic sentiments, the 
first Atatürk16 monument was placed at the centre of the capital city Nicosia and it was 
opened to the public in 1963 on the national day of ‘29 October, the Founding of the 
Republic of Turkey’. The monument was a present from İş Bank, which had been 
established in 1924 by a directive of Atatürk (Shaw and Shaw 1994:390). Additional 
monuments for the commemoration of the martyrs, such as the Boğaz martyrs’ 
monument, were placed in various public spaces. 
                                                 
15 On 25 December 1963 the voice of Bayrak (Flag) radio was heard for the first time. It was a primitive 
station and its broadcasting could be heard only from within a few kilometres (Azgın 1998:652). 
 
16 ‘Atatürk’s name literally translates as the very father of Turks’ (Papadakis 1998:73). Atatürk (Mustafa 
Kemal) was a Turkish soldier and statesman (1881-1938). The founder and first President of the Turkish 
Republic. ‘Atatürk who is the Turkish nationalist leader’ (Pollis 1998:96) represents Turkishness and is the 
symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. Atatürk undertook a series of reforms to raise Turkey to the 
level of modern civilization which can be grouped in five areas: political, social, legal and economic forms 
and reforms in the fields of education and culture (Yale, 2005:36-37).   
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However, the leaders of each community were also criticised by their own 
communities and vice versa because of their policies. These criticisms were also 
represented in the Turkish Cypriot print media. Zafer (Victory; established 1965) was one 
of those newspapers that took on itself the duty of elevating Denktaş and criticised the 
policies of Küçük (Azgın 1998:653). Later, Savaş (Struggle; established 1968), published 
by the well-known poet Özker Yaşın, joined in the struggle against Küçük, and polemics 
commenced between Savaş and Halkın Sesi − the voice of Dr. Fazıl Küçük (ibid: 654). 
Later, the intellectuals who had gathered around Savaş founded a new political party, the 
CTP (Republican Turkish Party), on 27th December 1970 under the leadership of Ahmet 
Mithat Berberoğlu. Although Özker Yaşın was one of the founders of CTP, he supported 
Rauf Denktaş instead of Berberoğlu, at the vice presidential election in 1973. The last 
issue of Savaş newspaper carried the headline news that Denktaş had been elected vice-
president. In these political conditions, a new newspaper Zaman (The Times) was 
published in 1973 and took over the role of Savaş. Zaman (1973) was under the 
ownership of Raif Denktaş, the son of Rauf Denktaş, and its political line was extreme 
nationalistic (Azgın 1998:654). Zaman newspaper was like the forerunner of the 
increased antagonistic Turkish and Greek nationalisms that caused the division of the 
island in 1974. 
The Republic of Cyprus did not unite the residents of Cyprus and did not bring 
peace to the island. However, as Sözen (1998:8) points out, “it is very difficult to find the 
real story of what really happened after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Each 
side has its own version of history and the events in these two separate histories have 
internal coherence that makes them logical within each version”. The years between 
1963-1974 can be defined as the ‘dark years’ of Cyprus for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
term ‘dark’ connotes the terrible war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during this 
period. Secondly, it points to the hidden and mysterious side of the period; it is not 
possible to locate a clear explanation about what really happened during this period of 
time. The mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, media, symbols of tradition and 
commemorations) of each community function to narrate this period strongly in an 
oppositional way. The opposition generally lies in each party’s accusations about the 
creators of the problems that caused the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus; it is also 
difficult to explain this specific historical period by using the main sources of 
information, which are the history books of the two communities.  
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Following a military coup that sought to depose president Makarios,17 encouraged 
and executed by Greek army officers loyal to the Athens military junta, on 20 July 1974 
Turkey sent troops into the island (Mavratsas 2000:12). Makarios had had always 
problems with the governments of Greece during his political life; he had been criticised 
by the Greek government of the period when he tried to change the constitution of 1960 
Republic (Kızılyürek 2005:110-111). This indicates that the “Greek-Cypriots” did not 
share one objective, one “identity” and one understanding of the Cyprus problem, neither 
did the Turkish Cypriots.     
When Turkey sent troops into the island it claimed that it was trying to stop the 
bloodshed and the union of the island with Greece; in this way, the Turkish Cypriot 
community would regain their rights: “Turkey legitimised its move with reference to its 
rights as one of the three guarantor powers of the Cypriot constitution” (Diez 2002:1). 
However, the Greek Cypriots evaluated Turkey’s action as an invasion which they 
claimed it had been planning to actualize for a long time (Mavratsas 2000:12). Since then, 
in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have been living in completely 
separate zones (North and South) divided by the Green line. It should be noted here that 
the ‘Green line’ is interpreted differently by the ruling groups in Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot communities: although it signifies the salvation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek 
Cypriots for the Turkish Cypriot authorities, it means the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey 
for the Greek Cypriot authorities.    
In 1974, Cyprus was de facto divided into North and South as a result of the 
increased nationalistic discourses on both sides. Greek Cypriots living in the North and 
Turkish Cypriots living in the South had to leave their homes, lands/properties and settle 
in ‘their’ respective parts of the island. After the division of the island, Turkish Cypriots 
first established the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975 and then the “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 1983 under the leadership of Rauf R. Denktaş 
(Kızılyürek 2009:46). Although “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is 
universally considered as illegal, this does not prevent Turkish Cypriots from living in 
                                                 
17 In 1971, President Makarios threatened to arrest the former head of EOKA, General Grivas, who took his 
orders from Greece for setting up armed bands and declared his opposition to the achievement of Enosis by 
violent means. On the other hand, Grivas denounced the President in an article in an Athens newspaper, 
calling for his resignation on the grounds that, by abandoning Enosis, the President had betrayed EOKA’s 
struggle for freedom (Day 2004:252-253). ‘The political disputes between Makarios and Greek 
governments increased day after day and caused the Greek military coup on 15 July 1974 that sought to 
depose President Makarios (Kızılyürek 2005: 131). 
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their "imagined" state, as their unrecognized state is their home (land). The physical 
boundaries of the “imagined” state played a crucial role in the construction of the idea of 
‘homeland’ by the ruling group. As Heidegger (cited in Bhabba 1994:1) points out “a 
boundary is not that at which something stops but, the boundary is that from which 
something begins its presenceing”. However, the boundary is not the line on the map but 
the ensemble of the military and it points to the restrictions on crossing to the 
‘other’/others’ side. Hence, the boundaries have reinforced and reproduced the idea that 
Turks were and are different from Greeks. Therefore, as long as the boundaries remain, 
Turkish Cypriots will be secure because the boundaries protect them from the ‘others’. In 
this way, the boundary that separates Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots has been 
represented as a means of protecting Turkish Cypriots from the 'others'. 
 Although Turkish Cypriots do not have any private remembrance regarding the 
existence of the boundary as it is forbidden to go near it, ‘it’ is out there and they already 
know that the boundary exists because of the ‘dominant public memory’ established by 
public narratives. However, not only physical boundaries but also mental boundaries play 
a role in the process of exclusion and identity construction of Turkish Cypriots; memory 
of the past is crucial in boundary maintenance. Turkish Cypriots’ memory of Greeks is as 
potent as their previous presence. Thus the boundary separating the North from the South 
does not merely separate the two communities. Memory erects boundaries more 
significant than the Green line; and in order to reproduce the memory of the ‘past’, the 
‘mechanisms of memory’ (history textbooks, media, symbols of tradition, and 
commemorations) have been constructed and used to great effect since the division of the 
island.        
 
4.4 The division of the island (1974-onwards) 
 
In this section, I will explain the ways in which the memories of the ‘past’ are articulated 
by the ruling parties according to their different discourses on national 
identity/nationalism. The section is divided into two main parts that explain two different 
periods: the period of the Denktaş presidency and the government of the Ulusal Birlik 
Partisi (UBP) during 1974-2003 and the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) period during 
2003-2009. I explain how the ruling groups constructed the mechanisms of memory 
(history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations, media) to mobilize and 
articulate their discourses on national identity/nationalism.   
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 When I examined the narratives of the mechanisms of memory (history 
textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) of these two periods, I 
observed abrupt changes in the dominant discourse on national identity/nationalism in 
Northern Cyprus. Thus, in the Denktaş-UBP period, the dominant discourse was Turkish 
(cypriot) nationalism. However, this situation changed when the CTP government came 
to power in 2003. In the CTP period, (turkish) Cypriot nationalism became the dominant 
discourse. However, it should be noted here that there were always alternative voices and 
narratives in the two periods; this distinction unavoidably simplifies a more complex 
reality in which there are different discourses functioning simultaneously. Although there 
is no literature supporting my distinction between the (turkish) Cypriot and Turkish 
(cypriot) nationalisms, this division will serve as a strategy to analyse the narratives in 
more detail. 
 The discourses of the ruling groups carry traces of both ‘Turkishness’ and 
‘Cypriotness’ because of the peculiar historical, political and cultural circumstances in 
Northern Cyprus. However, while the UBP highlights Turkishness, the CTP focuses on 
Cypriotness. In the term ‘Turkish (cypriot) nationalism’ my parenthesis is used to specify 
the emphasis on Turkish identity in the Denktaş-UBP period. Thus the ‘T’ is capitalised 
to imply the emphasis and the ‘c’ is small to imply the de-emphasis. The focus of the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity is on the similarities between Turkish (cypriots) and Turks and 
the differences between Turkish (cypriots) and Greek Cypriots. The discourse of 
motherland Turkey and babyland TRNC, which represents the cultural kinship and 
heritage between Turkish (cypriots) and Turks, is popularly used in the narratives of the 
mechanisms of memory. (It should be noted here that the EU was mostly represented as 
the supporter of Greek Cypriots and the union of Christianity by the ruling group during 
this period). On the other hand, in the term ‘(turkish) Cypriot nationalism’ the parenthesis 
is used to depict the focus on Cypriot identity by the CTP government. In a similar vein, 
the capital ‘C’ of ‘Cypriot’ and minuscule ‘t’ of ‘turkish’ point to CTP’s emphasis and de-
emphasis. The Cypriot identity is based on stressing the similarities between Greek 
Cypriots and (turkish) Cypriots. Parallel to their discourse of (turkish) Cypriot 
nationalism, CTP supported the entry of (turkish) Cypriots and Greek Cypriots into the 
European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan. In this way, ‘Europe was 
represented as a ‘real mother country’ (İlter and Alankuş 2009:67) where Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would live together as “Cypriots”.  
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4.4.1 The period of President Denktaş and the government of UBP (Ulusal Birlik 
Partisi) during 1974-2003 
 
The discourse of President Denktaş and the UBP government constructed the ‘dominant 
public memory’ between the years 1974-2003. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus was established by under the leadership of Denktaş with the purpose of getting 
recognition so that Turkish Cypriots could represent themselves in the international 
platforms’ (Sözen 1998:37). However, it has been branded as an illegal state by UN 
Security Council Resolutions and is currently recognized as an independent state only by 
Turkey" (Alasya 1988). The official discourse of this period accused the other countries 
of supporting Greeks and Greek Cypriots because of their evaluation of the “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus” as illegal. This situation helped the ruling group to 
empower their Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse. 
 In order to spread and maintain the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism 
and reproduce the memory of the constructed ‘past’, the ‘mechanisms of memory’ – 
symbols of tradition, history textbooks, commemorations and media − were used very 
effectively by the ruling group. As the education system in schools is organized in parallel 
to the dominant discourse, the state intervened in the social life of the residents of 
Northern Cyprus. Like the arms of the octopus, the mechanisms surrounded the field of 
everyday lives of Turkish Cypriots. Monuments in the streets and squares, the flags of 
Turkey and of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in all formal institutions and 
schools, the national anthem, the celebrations of national days in the streets and some in 
schools, national holidays, museums, mass graves, martyrdoms, Turkish and Cyprus 
history textbooks, and the media, are some of the key forms and symbols of the 
mechanisms of memory explored through the in-depth interviews.  
During this period, the mechanisms of memory were used by the ruling group to 
legitimize the discourse of the nation-state by improving solidarity and unity among the 
members of the TRNC. The state was conceived as a part of the great Turkish nation; and 
in the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", Turkish Cypriots had used the flag of Turkey 
as the symbol of their community. As noted in Chapter Two, flags as the symbols of 
traditions represent common heritage and cultural and historical kinship: Turkish 
Cypriots’ use of the Turkish flag indicates that they conceive themselves as part of the 
Turkish culture and heritage, and the use of the Turkish flag in the ‘TRNC’ represents the 
Turkish Cypriots’ commitment to the Turkish nation.  
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However, with the establishment of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, a 
flag competition was organized in Northern Cyprus to find a new representative flag. The 
selected flag was the same as the Turkish flag18 except that the colours of the objects and 
background were reversed. The white background of the flag of the TRNC also has two 
red stripes at the top and bottom (Minahan 2002: 1394). The close similarity between the 
two flags depicts the new state’s Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse, that was shaped 
by the narratives based on the putative common heritage and cultural kinship between 
Turkish (cypriots) and Turks. In line with the discourse of the ruling group, the selected 
flag is officially regarded as the state flag, and the flag of Turkey as the national flag, of 
the ‘TRNC’. Similarly, the Greek Cypriots have flown the national flag of Greece along 
with the flag of the Republic of Cyprus (Mavratsas 2000: 88). As Anastasiou (2008:161) 
notes, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms have traditionally identified with 
the Greek and Turkish flags, since it was in relationship with their motherlands that the 
concept of national unity evolved historically in each community.  
In addition, Turkish Cypriots have used the national anthem19 of the ‘motherland’ 
Turkey since the 1960s. The theme of the national anthem is affection for the Turkish 
homeland, freedom, and faith, of sacrifice for liberty, and of hope and devotion, explored 
through visual and tactile imagery as they relate to the flag, the human spirit and the soil 
of the homeland (DiPiazza 2005: 69). Thus, like the flags, the national anthem functions 
to reproduce feelings of commitment and a sense of belonging to the Turkish nation and 
identity. Since the establishment of the ‘TRNC’, the anthem has been heard regularly 
during state and military events and national days, sporting events and school ceremonies 
in Northern Cyprus. Similarly, after 1963, Greek Cypriots started to use the national 
anthem of their motherland Greece (Mavratsas 2000:88). Thus both Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots have in the recent past mostly relied on the anthems of their respective 
‘motherlands’ (Papadakis 1995:55).    
                                                 
18  A white crescent and a five-pointed star are placed on a red background on the Turkish flag. There are 
several claims about the symbolic meaning of the Turkish flag. According to one idea the crescent 
represents the Islamic religion, the star represents Turkishness and the red colour represents blood (Lafferty 
2008). According to another idea, the flag symbolises the reflection of the crescent and a star in a pool of a 
dying fighter’s blood (Papadakis 1995).    
 
19 The İstiklal Marşı, or ‘Independence March’, is the Turkish national anthem. It was written by Mehmet 
Akif Ersoy and officially adopted on March 12, 1921. A nationwide competition was held to select the 
national anthem of the new-born Turkish Republic after the Turkish war of independence (DiPiazza 2005: 
69) 
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The forms of commemorations (museums, monuments, martyrdoms, mass graves, 
national days, national holidays) played an important part in the construction of the new 
nation-state in Northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot administration accepted all Turkish 
national days as public national days and public holidays of Northern Cyprus. These 
national days include: 23 April, National Sovereignty and Children's day20 (23 Nisan 
Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı); 19 May, Commemoration of Atatürk and Youth 
and Sports Day21 (19 Mayıs Atatürk'ü Anma Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı); 30 August, 
Victory Celebration22 (30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı); 29 October, the Founding of the 
Republic of Turkey23 (29 Ekim Cumhuriyet Bayramı); and 10 November, 
Commemoration of Atatürk24 (10 Kasım Atatürk’ü Anma Günü). Certain days − 20 July, 
Happy Peace Operation25 (20 Temmuz Mutlu Barış Harekatı); 15 November, Founding of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus26 (15 Kasım Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk 
Cumhuriyeti’nin Kuruluşu); and 21 December, the Week of Struggle and Remembrance 
                                                 
20 The founder of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk, dedicated April 23 to the children of the country to 
emphasize that they were the future of the new nation. It was on April 23, 1920 during the Turkish War of 
Independence, that the Grand National Assembly met in Ankara and laid down the foundations of a new, 
independent, secular and modern republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire (Atillasoy 2002:7). 
 
21 Atatürk dedicated May 19 to the youth of the country (Gregory 1983:67). The national day marks the 81st 
anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s landing in Anatolia from İstanbul to launch the Turkish War of 
Independence (Jung and Piccoli 2001: 65). 
 
22 The victory on August 30, 1922, over the Greek military was the last major engagement between the two 
armies. The war began with the Greek invasion of İzmir in May 1919 after the end of the first World War 
with support from the allies, especially Great Britain. The defeated Ottoman Empire was too weak to resist 
the Greek forces, with initial resistance provided by irregular Turkish units called Kuvay-i Milliye. The 
invasion generated a huge reaction in Anatolia and resulted in an independence movement led by officers of 
the disbanded Ottoman military. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who came to lead the officers, succeeded in 
stemming the Greek invasion and in August 1922 launched a strong counterattack. Victory in the 
Dumlupınar Battle on August 30 in the central Anatolian province of Kütahya destroyed the Greek army 
and Turkish forces entered İzmir. The battle brought an end to the war between Turkey and Greece, with 
Turkey declaring independence on October 29, 1923, after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. The date of 
August 30 has since been celebrated as “Victory Day”, with military marches and other official celebrations 
marking the Turkish victory (Zurcher 2005:155). 
           
23 Commemoration of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Ayliffe 2003: 66).  
 
24 Turks and Turkish Cypriots observe on each 10th November a minute’s silence to commemorate the 
death of Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first president (Yale 2005:36). 
 
25 Each year celebrations are held in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 20th July, which was the 
day of  the “Happy Peace Operation”. Turkish Cypriot communities throughout the world organize 
festivities to commemorate the day. According to the dominant discourse, on 20th July, Turkish Cypriots 
gained their independence and survived ultimate extermination at the hand of Greek and Greek Cypriot 
armies determined to achieve Enosis (Mütercimler 1998: 137-142).   
     
26Turkish Cypriots commemorate 15th November 1983 as Independence Day, when they declared 
themselves as a state.    
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of the Martyrs27 (21 Aralık Milli Mücadele ve Şehitler Haftası) − are national days that 
are commemorated solely in the ‘TRNC’.     
During 1974-2003, approximately fourteen national monuments that symbolize 
either Atatürk or martyrs of Northern Cyprus, and four martyrs’ cemeteries28 were set up; 
two mass graves29 and four museums were opened to the public. The museums are the 
Museum of Barbarism30 (Barbarlık Müzesi), National Struggle Museum31 (Milli 
Mücadele Müzesi), Peace and Freedom Museum32 (Barış ve Özgürlük Müzesi) and Dr. 
Fazıl Küçük Museum33. The museums, mass graves, monuments and martyrdoms were 
produced as the sites of memory by the ruling group to perpetuate the dominance of the 
discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism through the construction of ‘self’ and ‘others’. 
While the monuments of Atatürk were set up to mobilize emotions attached to the sense 
of belonging to the Turkish nation and Turkish identity; the mass graves, martyrdoms, 
                                                 
27 During December, a week is devoted to the period spanning 1963 to 1967, mourning those who died and 
became ‘martyrs’ in the Cyprus war that erupted around Christmas 1963 (Denktaş 1999:491).  
  
28 Buried in the Boğaz and Karaoğlanoğlu Martyrs Cemeteries are the Turkish soldiers who died during  the 
20 July 1974 operation; in the Ortaköy Martyrs Cemetery, there are 1960 and 1964-65 martyrs; people who 
became martyrs during the 1963-1974 period are buried in the Lefkoşa Tekke Bahçesi Martyrs  Cemetery 
(Altan 1998).         
 
29 In the villages that are known as Muratağa, Sandallar-Atlılar there are mass graves of the Turkish 
Cypriots that were reported to have been murdered and buried by Greeks (Altan 1998:266).      
  
30The house of Dr. Nihat İlhan, who was a major serving in the Cyprus Turkish Contingent in 1963, has 
been converted into a museum. During the inter-communal troubles of December that year, the house was 
attacked by Greek Cypriot terrorists. Dr. İlhan’s wife and three children were murdered in the bathroom, 
where they had tried to hide (Rüstem, Duffy and Connell 1987:160). However, there are counter arguments 
about the event. According to these arguments, it was not Greek Cypriots but Turkish Cypriot soldiers who 
murdered the three children and their mother. The aim was to increase the nationalistic feelings of Turkish 
Cypriots.     
 
31 The museum was opened to document the national struggle of the Cyprus Turkish community that started 
in 1955 and continues to today and to explain the reasons behind the struggle. In the museum, the historical 
events are exhibited under four different sections: 1955-1958, 1958-1963, 1963-1974 and 1974-onwards 
(Altan 1998:178). 
      
32 The location where Turkish soldiers landed on the island on 20 July 1974 has been converted into a 
museum displaying pictures of the martyrs and the guns that were taken from Greeks. The building is 
preserved as it was, destroyed in the war. The armoured vehicles and guns that were used in the war are 
exhibited in the garden of the museum. 
  
33 The museum of Dr. Fazıl Küçük was the first private museum of the TRNC. In the museum, there are 
gifts from Germany, India and Turkey that were given to Küçük, who was the first vice-president of the 
1960 Republic of Cyprus. After qualifying as a general medical practitioner in Switzerland, he returned to 
work in Cyprus in 1938; thus, in the museum there are medicines that were produced in 1940 and the 
equipment that was used for inspection and for an operation by Küçük. There are also different objects that 
belonged to him on display, such as a Cyprus map with a crescent and star that was drawn with human 
blood,  and Marshal Kazım Karabekir’s gift symbolising the salvation of Erzurum and Erzincan, two 
different cities in Turkey (Altan 1998:163-164). 
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monuments of the martyrs and some of the museums function to represent the others 
(Greek Cypriots) as barbarians and violent people.  
School education is one of the most effective vehicles of the discourse of the 
ruling group, operating especially through history textbooks and extracurricular and ritual 
activities such as the ceremonies and celebrations of national days in schools. The 
education system of the Turkish Cypriots was run in parallel first, with the Ottoman 
Empire, and then with the Republic of Turkey (Feridun 2001:5). More than one 
mechanism can function in the school education of a student, and this situation makes the 
‘dominant public memory’ more influential; as Bryant (1998:66) points out, ‘methods of 
education have helped define the relation of individuals and state’. For example, every 
Turkish Cypriot student who goes to the primary school sings the national anthem of 
Turkey at the beginning and end of the week in front of the monument of Atatürk and 
under the flags of Turkey and of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Students do 
not go to school on some national days, as they are national holidays. However, on some 
national days like ‘23 April, National Sovereignty and Children's Day’, they celebrate 
with various activities and dances at school. In secondary and high school, they celebrate 
another national day, the ‘19 May Commemoration of Atatürk and Youth and Sport Day’. 
The students also visit the Museum of Barbarism and the graveyards of the martyrs twice 
a year during school time without pre-announcement by the teacher. These visits are 
arranged by the Ministry of Education.  
High-school students’ Turkish and Cyprus history lessons and national security 
lessons are taught by an officer from the Turkish army. In these lessons, they get a 
selective interpretation of history shaped by the official discourse. In the narratives of the 
history textbooks, Greeks and Greek Cypriots are described as the enemies of Turks; 
Greeks ruined the ‘Republic of Cyprus’34 in 1963 three years after its establishment. 
During these three years, they treated Turks as minority and tried to usurp all the rights 
they had under the agreements of the Republic. EOKA, a Greek terrorist organization, 
tried to use the Republic of Cyprus as a step on the way to ENOSIS; however, after they 
                                                 
34 In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was established with the agreement of Turkey, Greece and Britain 
(Kizilyurek, 2002).The new state’s constitution, as defined by the Zurich and London agreements, explicitly 
recognized the two ethnic communities in Cyprus: the Greek Cypriot Community and the Turkish Cypriot 
Community. According to the constitution, Cyprus was to be bilingual, the two official languages being 
Greek and Turkish (Oberling, 1982). During the period from independence in 1960 to 1963 a series of 
disputes arose between the two communities over the implementation and interpretation of the agreements 
and constitution. Intercommunal fighting broke out in December 1963, thus bringing about the collapse of 
the unitary Greek-Turkish State of Cyprus (Stavrinides 1999:55).   
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understood that it would not be easy to reach their goals through the Republic of Cyprus, 
they ruined the Republic and decided to murder all the Turks in order to reach their 
ultimate aims quickly. In consequence, a lot of Turkish women and/or children were 
killed indiscriminately by Greeks in a barbarous way until the ‘1974 Happy Peace 
Operation’. During this period, TMT, which was established as a counter organization to 
EOKA, fought bravely against Greek cruelty (Serter 1979:106-110). According to the 
history textbooks, with the 1974 Happy Peace Operation, Turkish Cypriots were saved 
from being killed by the barbarian Greeks by the Turkish army (Serter 1982, Hasgüler 
1998, Öymen 2002). In the textbooks as a whole, Greeks are represented as barbarians 
and Turks as the saviours and heroes of Turkish Cypriots (see Appendix 3). 
Following the division of the island, nationalism functioned by creating an 
imagined enemy which could not be seen or communicated directly. Communication, 
mediated between the two communities through the mass media, was in support of the 
official discourse. During this period, the media as one of the mechanisms of memory 
was used effectively by the ruling group in order to establish and disseminate the Turkish 
official discourse; the official discourse about the ‘past’ entered the home, a primary 
symbol of everyday life, and politics was rooted and domesticated (Killoran 1998). In 
1976, Bayrak TV (Bayrak Television) was put into service as a public TV channel run by 
the government. As it served to spread the discourses of the government, it was not 
possible to hear alternative voices or any negative reports about the Turkish Cypriot 
government through public television; and many people who wanted to hear alternative 
voices preferred to read the national newspapers35 (Dedeçay 1989:26). Another reason 
why people preferred to read national newspapers was that until 1997, Bayrak was the 
only TV station to broadcast only for a couple of hours in the evenings each day (Azgın 
1998:657); people who were unable to watch television in this specific time span 
preferred to read newspapers to follow the daily news (Dedeçay 1989:26).   
                                                 
35Twenty six national newspapers were published after the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus" till 2002. However, most of these newspapers were short lived because of economic reasons and 
political pressures in Cyprus (İrvan 2006: 7). Thus, only nine national newspapers managed to survive till 
2002. These were the commercial newspapers Kıbrıs (Cyprus), Kıbrıslı (Cypriot), Vatan (Motherland) 
Volkan (Volcano), Avrupa (Europe) and Halkın Sesi (The voice of the Public) and party political 
newspapers Yenidüzen (New Order), Ortam (The Medium) and Birlik (The Unity). These newspapers 
represent the views of their political parties in their news (Erhürman 2003).  
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During this period, Bayrak television’s and most of the national newspapers’ 
discourse about the ‘past’ ran parallel to the official discourse; the media reproduced the 
dominant discourse. The newspapers Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı, Vatan, Volkan and Halkın Sesi can 
be classified as being on the ‘right’ of the political spectrum; they supported the politics 
of the ruling group in their discourses during this period. There were only three papers, 
Yenidüzen, Ortam and Avrupa, on the ‘left’ of the political spectrum, and they presented 
alternative views that most of the time were against the politics of the ruling group 
(Hançer 2006). In general, however, “the Turkish Cypriot media tried to give the message 
to the world that Turkish Cypriots would continue to exist protected by the boundaries of 
their state; they strongly supported the ‘national case’, the struggle in the international 
arena to make the Turkish Cypriots live within their national boundaries as a separate and 
independent society” (Hançer 2006: 2). In 1994, another government radio channel, 
Bayrak FM36 was put into service (Azgın 1998:657). Bayrak FM also supported the 
Turkish official discourse.    
Parallel to their Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse, the ruling group 
encouraged migration from Turkey to the ‘TRNC’. The aim was to increase the Turkish 
population on the island with a settlement policy that was pursued by both Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities. As a result, since 1974 a substantial number of Turkish 
immigrants have settled in Northern Cyprus and been granted citizenship of the ‘TRNC’ 
(Hatay 2005:1). In order to encourage immigration, the government provided homes and 
employment to these people (Canefe 2007:282-283). Most of the Turks who settled in the 
TRNC were housed in the homes of Greek Cypriots who had had to leave their homes 
after the division of the island. In this way, the abandoned villages and towns were 
populated by Turkish settlers after the division of the island. There are also those, more 
substantial in number, who immigrated on an individual basis later or were born on the 
island to families in which either both parents are from mainland Turkey or one is from 
Turkey and the other is a Turkish Cypriot (Hatay 2005:5). Furthermore, there are non-
citizen residents such as workers with/without work permits, students and lecturers, 
Turkish army personnel with families and conscripts (ibid:6). With the establishment of a 
new law at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkish people had the opportunity to come to 
Northern Cyprus using only their identity cards. According to the most recent TRNC 
                                                 
36 Bayrak FM transmits its programmes mainly in Turkish, but there are also special programmes mainly in 
Greek and English (Azgın 1998:657).  
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census (conducted in 1996) there were 55,000 permanent and temporary residents of 
Turkish origin in the TRNC (ibid: 14).    
There are some claims that by encouraging immigration from Turkey, the Turkish  
Cypriot authorities and Turkey aimed to change the demographic balance on the island, to 
distort the demographic will of the ‘indigenous’ Turkish Cypriots and to strengthen the 
position of parties supporting the regime of Rauf Denktaş, who had no problems with 
sustained dependence on Turkey (ibid:1). As an unrecognized state, the ‘Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus’ depends on Turkey in many areas, especially politically and 
economically;  it is therefore not possible to talk about the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” as an independent and autonomous state, because it is directly connected to 
Turkey. Beginning with the first elections that took place in 1976, political life in the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has always been shaped in parallel with the 
politics of Turkey. Thus, in the “1976 Turkish Cypriot Elections”, UBP, the National 
Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) that supported the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism came to power and stayed in government until 2003. Compared to the other 
political parties, its political discourse was the closest discourse to Turkey’s politics at 
that time. Apart from UBP, the other political parties that competed with each other in the 
elections were the Halkçı Party or Popular Party (HP), the Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi or 
Communal Liberation Party (TKP), and the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi or Republican 
Turkish Party (CTP) (Azgın 1998:655). Although CTP and TKP were the parties that 
supported (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and the re-unification of the island, HP’s political 
discourse was close to that of UBP’s.  
 The political parties found that the best way to disseminate their ideas to the 
public was to set up and own newspapers: political party newspapers have played an 
important role in the Turkish Cypriot print media since the establishment of the ‘Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus’37. Yenidüzen, the first party political newspaper in Northern 
Cyprus, began publishing in 1975, reflecting the policies of CTP. On the other hand, 
when the owner of Zaman newspaper (1973), Raif Denktaş, became a parliamentary 
deputy for UBP in the 1976 Turkish Cypriot elections, Zaman (The Times) became the 
organ of this party (Azgın 1998:654). Later, Ulus (Nation, established 1976) and Birlik 
                                                 
37 When the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ was established in 1975, there officially existed only one 
political party, the CTP (Republican Turkish Party). However, after the declaration of the ‘Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus’, new political parties were founded in the Northern part of the island. These 
parties were UBP (the National Unity Party), TKP (the Communal Liberation Party) and Halkçı Party (the 
Popular Party) (Azgın 1998:655).    
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(Unity, 1980) began publication for UBP. Three other papers, Kurtuluş (Liberation, 
1978), Yarın (Tomorrow, 1976) and Ortam (Environment, 1980), were published for 
TKP. Then Yeni Demokrat (New Democrat, 1993) appeared for the Demokrat Parti (DP) 
and Yeniçağ (New Era, 1990) for Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi (YKP) (Azgın 1998, İrvan 2006). 
 The newspapers of the opposition parties provided an opportunity for the 
citizens to hear the alternative voices and counter discourses that challenged the official 
discourse. Thus, although the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism was dominant, 
there were always counter memories narrated by supporters of the discourse of (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism during this period. As a matter of fact, these alternative voices were 
raised day by day, and they became the signs of the beginning of the new period that is 
examined below.            
 
4.4.2 The period of the government of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) 2003-2009   
 
Since the separation of the island in 1974, living in an unrecognized state possessing the 
last divided capital city in the world, and not being able to participate independently in 
the European Union negotiations for Cyprus, has created physical, social and mental 
boundaries and problems for the Turkish Cypriots, who live isolated and marginalized 
from the world. The economic and cultural embargoes and exclusion from direct 
international trade caused an inexorable and exclusive dependency-relation to Turkey 
(Anastasiou 2008:6) both economically and politically. However, in Northern Cyprus, 
European Union membership was debated vigorously during the years 2002-2004 
because of the presentation of the Annan Plan and the possible solution to the Cyprus 
problem. Parallel to these political and cultural circumstances in Northern Cyprus, a new 
government (CTP) came to power in the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ in 2003 
and the crossings that divide the island into south and north were partially opened in the 
same year. These historical circumstances and political and economic problems played a 
crucial role in the formation of a dynamic discussion process about the Annan Plan, the 
Cyprus Problem and the European Union. 
 With the policy change in Northern Cyprus, the dominant discourse has also 
changed. Before CTP came to power, the dominant discourse was Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism. However, since the policy change, a (turkish) Cypriot nationalistic discourse 
has become dominant. Unlike the Turkish (cypriot) nationalist discourse, (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism highlights the ‘similarities’ between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
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Cypriots instead of emphasizing the ‘differences’. The changing socio-political and 
historical circumstances since the presentation of the Annan Plan have raised new 
questions and made Turkish Cypriots focus on their memories relating to national identity 
and the ‘past’.  
During this period, the ruling group has not focussed on the ‘past’ that was 
constructed by the former government, but prefers instead to focus on the ‘future’. In the 
meantime, an alternative ‘past’ is being constructed by the new government: they 
highlight the common features of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in order to 
promote the dominant discourse, which is ‘(turkish) Cypriot nationalism’. Parallel to the 
dominant discourse of the period, the mechanisms of memory − history textbooks, media, 
commemorations and symbols of tradition − are being re-articulated and re-constructed. 
The new government has changed the Cyprus history textbook used in the schools: in the 
new textbook that was published and became a part of the curriculum in 2004, there are 
new subjects that emphasize the social life of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (see 
Appendix 4), and also much more emphasis on British colonial rule between 1878 and 
1960.  
According to the textbook, in this period Cyprus became the problem of two 
antagonistic nationalisms born of two different ethnic and religious communities. British 
rule played a crucial role in the construction of the two nationalisms on the island, and the 
British colonial administration applied ‘divide and rule’ strategies to maintain its control 
and authority over the island. This reinforced the ethnic and religious differences between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the period (Uludağ and Billuroğlu 2004:59). The new 
textbook thus explains the reasons behind the two nationalisms, instead of creating a self-
other relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (see Appendix 5).    
There is not so much emphasis on the periods of 1963-1974, and there are no 
photographs of Turks murdered by Greeks. The conflicts between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots and the reason for the division of the island are explained as caused by the 
increased nationalistic discourses between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The new 
government has also placed new sculptures in the streets that are not related to the 1963-
1974 period. Some of these are the peace cresset, traditional jugs, sestas, tulips and folk 
dancers that are all peculiar to ‘Cypriots’. However, it should be noted here that it is not 
easy to deploy this new discourse as there are always alternative voices, mostly those of 
the supporters of the Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse who were once dominant 
and now want to regain their political power. Moreover, the new leadership is not totally 
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free to develop a completely new discourse as their discourse is always articulated in 
parallel to the policy in Turkey. And there is also inertia from the previous period, such as 
the idea that there are two peoples in Cyprus. The new ruling group emphasizes the 
differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, such as religion and language; its 
administration especially highlights the cultural and social differences that have been 
constructed since the division of the island, such as the different national days and 
symbols of tradition of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. For example, although the Turkish 
military offensive on 20th July 1974 is celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as the ‘20 July 
Happy Peace Operation’, it is a day of mourning for Greek Cypriots, who know it as the 
“anniversaries of the Treacherous Coup and the Barbaric Turkish invasion”. This 
situation is explained as indicating the differing political and cultural motivations and 
interests of the ‘two peoples’.  
 During this period, the media (especially the newspapers) were mobilized to 
enter the debate on European Union membership. Since the presentation of the Annan 
Plan, the subject of the European Union has been high-profile in the media of Northern 
Cyprus. However, it is difficult to separate the subject of the European Union from the 
Cyprus problem as they are closely related to each other. As mentioned earlier, without a 
solution to the Cyprus issue it is not possible for Northern Cyprus to participate in the 
European Union. Therefore, Turkish Cypriot media tend to present a strong relationship 
between the Cyprus problem and possible entry into the European Union.  
At that time, there were eight daily national newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, 
Kıbrıslı, Ortam, Afrika, Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Güneş and Vatan. However, it was not 
possible to see that variety in the television industry. In Northern Cyprus, there was only 
one national television channel (BRTK), run by the government, and there were five 
private regional television channels: Avrasya TV, Genç TV, Kıbrıs TV, Akdeniz TV and 
Kanal T. (The regional television channels do not broadcast to the whole country). There 
were also twenty four radio channels: five of them were under state control, five were the 
radio stations of the universities, two were under the control of the military and the others 
were private radio channels (Çatal 2006:1). 
The Annan Plan precipitated an intense contradiction and struggle between the 
newspaper discourses relating to European Union. National newspapers were the most 
popular media of the referendum period, as there was an increase in the number of voices 
that were competing with one another in the newspaper industry. During this period, each 
national newspaper produced different and sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’; 
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the newspapers played a crucial role in the construction and articulation of memories in 
relation to national identity, as their variety created a dynamic process which was 
necessary for the articulation of discourses. 
Although each newspaper represented a different understanding about the Annan 
Plan and the European Union, it is possible to classify them roughly as supporters of the 
Annan Plan that produced a European Unionist discourse, and opponents of the Annan 
Plan that produced a Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse. Most of the newspapers, 
like Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Kıbrıslı, Ortam and Afrika, were in support of the participation of 
Northern Cyprus in the European Union. These newspapers started to bring in the 
memories of coexistence with Greek Cypriots as a possible new citizenship of the 
European Union. However, only Volkan, Vatan and Güneş newspapers opposed the 
Annan Plan and they mostly brought in the memories of separation between Turks and 
Greeks. Apart from these newspapers, Halkın Sesi newspaper represented itself as being 
‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ regarding the Annan Plan (İrvan 2006:14).  
In the 2004 referenda, residents of Northern Cyprus made a decision as to whether 
or not to participate in the European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan; the 
Plan forced them to make a decision about their future. However, this decision was not 
about the future but also about the ‘past’. In order to make a decision for the future, the 
memories of the ‘past’ were reconstructed and rearticulated. In the referenda, the majority 
of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ and a greater number of the Greek Cypriots said ‘no’. 
Most of the Turkish Cypriots evaluated this political and cultural development as 
disappointing, and this situation caused the re-articulation of their memories in relation to 
national identity.     
 
4.5 The Annan Plan and relations of Cyprus with the European Union  
 
Relations between Cyprus and the European Union began with the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The Republic of Cyprus obtained international legal standing 
and took its seat at the United Nations in 1960. Although the majority of Greek Cypriots 
wished for the union of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis) and the majority of Turkish Cypriots 
desired the partition of the island between Turks and Greeks (Taksim), a settlement 
orchestrated by the governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, the 
‘guarantor powers’, brought this result (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002:75). However, 
when the physical violence started between Greek and Turkish Cypriots soon after 1960, 
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the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to Cyprus. The situation grew 
even worse in 1974 and the Turkish government decided to send the Turkish army to the 
Northern part of the island. Turkey legitimized its move with reference to its rights as one 
of the three guarantor powers of the Cypriot constitution (Diez 2002:1)        
Turkey and Northern Cyprus therefore have a direct relationship regarding the 
European Union. Relations between Turkey and the European Union began in earnest 
with the Ankara agreement in 1963. However, Turkey’s relation with the European Union 
is directly connected with the Cyprus problem because of its position on the Northern part 
of the island. With the participation of England in the European Economic Community in 
1973 and Greece in 1981, the Cyprus problem became an important issue for the 
European Union and a basic handicap for Turkey's participation in the European Union. 
When Turkey was accepted as an EU candidate country in Helsinki by the European 
Council in December 1999, it was stated: ‘the European Council underlines that Turkey 
should solve the Cyprus and the Aegean problems in four years in order to be a part of the 
European Union’ (Hasgüler 2000:128). This situation also played a crucial role in the 
political developments about the Cyprus problem.  
 It has to be reiterated here that “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is 
an unrecognized state which has no direct relationship with the European Union. The 
issue of recognition is a serious obstacle for official inter-communal dialogue 
(Constantinou and Papadakis 2002:73); the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union can only be possible after the Cyprus problem is resolved. However, the 
solution of the Cyprus problem is closely connected with the relations between Turkey 
and the European Union, because Northern Cyprus depends on Turkey both economically 
and politically. In the meantime, Northern Cyprus is a handicap to Turkey's participation 
in the European Union.  
On the other hand, the Republic of Cyprus applied independently for membership 
on behalf of the whole of Cyprus in July 1990 (Tamçelik 2001: 173). After the 
application of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, Northern Cyprus and 
Turkey signed an agreement, according to which Turkey would prevent any potential 
threat to the security and protect the interests of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus’. The political and economic cooperation between these two countries would also 
be increased (Pericleous 2009:71-72). These are the political and economic connections 
that make Turkish Cypriots even more dependent on Turkey; However, Turkish politics 
regarding Cyprus shifted over the following years with the change of government in 
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Turkey. In 2002, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
came to power in Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of AKP, became the Prime 
Minister of Turkey in 2003. Erdoğan gave the message to the EU policy makers that 
giving Turkey a date for the commencement of accession negotiations would open the 
way to a settlement in Cyprus. His repeated declaration that ‘non-solution is no solution’ 
(Pericleous 2009:72) was the signal of a radical change in Turkish policy towards the 
Cyprus Problem. Up until the integration of Cyprus into the EU, the full potential of 
Greek-Turkish relations was dependent on the progress toward a resolution of the Cyprus 
problem (Anastasiou 2008:255); as a result, AKP’s initial attempts to revise the Cyprus 
policy were welcomed in Athens (Altunişik and Tür: 2005: 123).  
 Furthermore, according to the United Nations, an agreement had to be reached 
between the two communities and Cyprus as a whole would become a part of the 
European Union; as a result the island would become more secure and wealthier, 
especially benefiting the north side of the island which is economically underdeveloped 
and the Turkish Cypriots would have better economic conditions (Tamçelik 1997: 72). 
 The Annan Plan was the most serious step on the way to unification of the 
island after its division as it was the first plan which proposed a possible participation of 
Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem. The Plan 
was presented on 11th November 2002 and two referenda were held in Cyprus over it on 
24th April 2004. In the referenda, the members of two communities made a decision about 
the participation of the whole of Cyprus in the European Union under the framework of 
the Annan Plan. Although 65% of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’, 76% of Greek Cypriots 
said ‘no’ to a possible solution under the framework of the Annan Plan (Kızılyürek 
2005:371). Therefore, the Annan Plan was abolished and Turkish Cypriots could not be a 
part of the European Union until some unspecified time. Meanwhile, the Republic of 
Cyprus became a member of the European Union in May 2004. As mentioned above, the 
rejection of the Annan Plan caused disappointment amongst the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities and the members of the Turkish Cypriot society. The Turkish Cypriots who 
had started to evaluate the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots more positively 
have now lost this new vision. However, it should be noted that the re-evaluation of the 
‘past’ is never complete, as the cultural and political contexts are permanently changing.      
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CHAPTER 5: THE OFFICIAL MECHANISMS OF MEMORY – 
HISTORY TEXTBOOKS, SYMBOLS OF TRADITION AND 
COMMEMORATIONS AND THE DOMINANT/ALTERNATIVE 
PUBLIC MEMORIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the various mechanisms of construction, maintenance and 
contestation of memory. As explained in the methodological chapter, for the analysis I 
adopt the approach of Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) on different types of 
macro-strategies in the discursive formation of national identity. I examine how the 
constructive and destructive strategies and strategies of justification, perpetuation and 
transformation function through the mechanisms of memory to justify, construct, 
perpetuate, destruct and transform the identity of the Turkish Cypriots. Flags, museums, 
martyrs’ cemeteries, mass graves, public rituals, myths, national days, monuments, 
history textbooks and the national anthem were used as constructive mechanisms in the 
period of President Denktaş and the government of UBP. These mechanisms functioned 
to mobilize and articulate the Turkish (cypriot) identity38 by promoting unification, 
identification and solidarity between ‘Turks’ from Turkey and the residents of Northern 
Cyprus, and differentiation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, 
during the period of the CTP government between 2003-2009, the strategies of 
transformation functioned to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) 
Cypriot identity39. New history textbooks and public arts are the primary mechanisms that 
play a role as transformative mechanisms. Although the national anthem, flags, museums, 
monuments, public rituals or national days do not changed, the discourses carried through 
them are different in the period of the government of CTP. Thus, their meanings are 
articulated, renegotiated and re-constructed in the changing historical, political and 
cultural contexts.  
                                                 
38 In the term Turkish (cypriot) identity, the parenthesis, the capital ‘T’ and the small letter ‘c’ are written to 
specify the emphasis of the respondents and the ruling group (President Denktaş and the government of 
UBP between 1974-2003) on Turkish identity.  
  
39In the term (turkish) Cypriot identity, the parenthesis, the capital letter ‘C’ and the small letter ‘t’ are 
written to imply the emphasis of the respondents and the ruling group (the government of CTP between 
2003-2009) on the Cypriot identity.   
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 In this chapter, I examine how the official history that includes the history 
textbooks, commemorations and symbols of tradition, mobilize the Turkish Cypriots 
memories in relation to identity in changing power relations. Power relations do not 
provide a total stability or fixity for identity, but produce antagonism, resistance and 
conflict in any period. The official history might be challenged by alternative narratives 
of the ‘past’; these narratives that are about the memories and past experiences of the 
respondents are hidden from the official history and thus, they contribute to 
historiographical knowledge. Consideration of the correlations, differences, parallelisms 
and oppositions between dominant/alternative public memories allows me to examine the 
articulation and thus, dynamism of memories in relation to identity. Public memories in 
relation to identity are explored through the ontological narratives embedded and woven 
in historical, political and social constraints shaped by power relations. The role of the 
schools and respondents’ families (as the sources of public memories) in the signification 
of the history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations as related to a 
particular ‘past’ is also explored in the ontological narratives of the respondents. 
Although the focus here is on the dominant/alternative public memories, it is not possible 
to clearly separate them from the autobiographical memories, as they are closely 
intertwined with each other. This chapter thus also provides the opportunity to examine 
the complex relationship amongst dominant/ alternative public and autobiographical 
memories.  
 The narratives of the respondents are analysed in three interlinked chapters; this 
chapter is designed to provide the necessary ground for the analysis in the following two, 
as it brings out clues about the mobilization of respondents’ memories in relation to 
identity by the official mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, symbols of tradition 
and commemorations) that are produced by the ruling groups in changing power relations. 
Although media are another mechanism examined within the scope of this research, the 
focus here is only on the official mechanisms that are produced by the ruling groups. In 
the following chapter, I examine the function of the media as a mechanism in the 
mobilization of meaning for the articulation of memories, and analyse the narratives on 
political views that include the Cyprus problem, the European Union and the Annan Plan. 
The chapter also includes, in its second section, a consideration of the function of all the 
mechanisms together. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I examine the articulation of public and 
autobiographical memories that followed the presentation of the Annan Plan. Some 
narratives of the respondents can be used in the explanation of more than one subject; 
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however, in order to manage to focus on a particular issue, I had to limit my 
interpretations related to the content of the titles of the chapters, otherwise, it would not 
have been possible to explain any issue in detail. This does not mean, of course, that 
particular narratives can only be used in the explanation of particular issues.             
  The first section functions as a guide in the exploration of the ways in which the 
ruling groups have produced the history textbooks, commemorations and symbols of 
tradition to construct moral values, emotions and beliefs in relation to identity in Northern 
Cyprus. In the second section, I follow the traces of the mechanisms of memory in the 
everyday lives of the respondents and explore how they mobilize identity and thus, 
“otherness”.  
  
5.2 Section one: Articulation of the dominant/alternative public memories in the 
historical and political contexts    
 
After almost 30 years of a near monopoly of power by President Rauf Denktaş (1974-
2003) and the political forces that supported him, politics in Northern Cyprus started to 
change. New parties, a new popular leader reflecting new social attitudes emerged and 
managed to break the Denktaş monopoly. During the monopoly of Denktaş, the 
‘dominant public memory’ was anchored with the narratives that define Greek Cypriots 
as ‘others’. The ruling group strongly supported Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. In order to 
perpetuate the dominant public memory, it produced the mechanisms of memory − 
history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations. The existence of the 
boundaries that divide the island into North and South and the lack of face to face 
communication between Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not stop the negative narratives 
about the Greek Cypriots, but on the contrary, caused their reproduction and perpetuation 
in a more powerful and subtle way through these mechanisms. After the presentation of 
the Annan Plan a new government, whose discourse was (turkish) Cypriot nationalism, 
came into power within the changing political, cultural and social contexts. In this period, 
the official mechanisms were re-constructed in parallel to the discourse of the new 
government. Thus, two powerful opposing discourses became highly prominent in 
Northern Cyprus after the presentation of the Annan Plan.  
  These opposing discourses became dominant amongst other discourses and 
conflicted with each other in order to obtain the control of the ‘dominant public memory’. 
The life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the ‘past’ and the present is narrated by these 
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discourses in different ways in order to re-articulate memories in relation to identity. The 
‘past’ is reconstructed in the conditions of the present, for the future, through the 
mechanisms of memory. Thus, after the presentation of the plan, most of the doubts of 
Turkish Cypriots were not about the Annan Plan but the ‘other’. As the Annan Plan was 
about a possible future of Turkish Cypriots with Greek Cypriots, it precipitated an intense 
contradiction and negotiation between the discourses in relation to identity. In this way, 
the presentation of the Plan allowed existing, marginal, different, resistant or even 
oppositional discourses to be articulated and synthesized and enter into a struggle over the 
‘dominant public memory’. Hence, in 2004 when separate referenda were held in the 
south and north of Cyprus, the memory of the ‘past’ provided the context for a decision 
about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. The decision in the referenda meant a lot 
for the people living in Northern Cyprus as it involved re-evaluating their national 
identities and historical and cultural backgrounds connected with their ‘past’. 
The presentation of the Annan Plan had major political and social significance, as 
it was the first plan that proposed a possible participation of the whole of Cyprus in the 
European Union after a solution to the Cyprus problem. It would be an oversimplication 
to evaluate the presentation of the Annan Plan either as the reason for the alternative 
voices or as the basis for the social and political changes in Northern Cyprus. As was 
stated in Chapter Four, before the presentation of the Plan a variety of complex social, 
political and historical factors prepared the necessary conditions for the re-evaluation of 
memories in relation to national identity in Northern Cyprus. These factors are numerous, 
with the most significant being the existence of a Turkish government that had seen the 
solution of the Cyprus problem as removing an obstacle towards its eventual European 
membership and the United Nations process that culminated in the Annan Plan. Thus, the 
political and cultural changes were not caused because of the presentation of the Annan 
Plan but were expressed with it.  
The Annan Plan in itself provided an opportunity for visible changes in Turkish 
Cypriot society as it linked a reunification of the island and European Union membership. 
The prospect of membership (and of economic development) appealed to a large 
proportion of the Turkish Cypriot society that had experienced decades of isolation, and it 
gave new impetus to voices that had been challenging the existing official discourse. 
These historical, political and cultural circumstances caused a social dynamism that 
created a suitable environment for the re-articulation and a possible re-construction of 
memories in relation to national identity. In this way, the Annan Plan functioned as a 
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breaking point and caused the re-articulation of memories. Thus, the main importance of 
the Plan lies in its function as a catalyst in the process of the re-articulation of memories 
in relation to national identity. The issues surrounding the Annan Plan and the 
respondents’ interpretations regarding the plan are examined in detail in Chapters Six and 
Seven.   
 
5.3 Section two: The official ‘mechanisms of memory’ in everyday life 
 
In this section of the analysis, I follow the traces of the official mechanisms of memory − 
history textbooks, commemorations (monuments, public arts, museums, martyrs’ 
cemeteries, mass graves and national days) and symbols of tradition (national anthem, 
flags, public rituals and myths) − in the everyday lives of the respondents. As was noted 
earlier, the mechanisms are constructed and produced to fix the ‘past’ that is articulated in 
different ways in the Denktaş-UBP period during 1974-2003 and the CTP government 
period, 2003-2009. Some of the mechanisms are located as dominant and some others as 
alternative in changing power relations. The mechanisms are constructed through the 
narratives about the ‘self’ and ‘other’ that are articulated in power relations. They enter 
into the everyday lives of social individuals through social practices and bring the 
meanings of the constructed ‘past’ into the conditions of the present. They are the 
monuments, public arts and flags the respondents see in the streets, national days they 
celebrate, museums, martyrs’ cemeteries and mass graves they visit, the history textbooks 
they read and the national anthem they sing.  
 The respondents’ answers to the questions about memories in relation to 
national identity (see the questions in Appendix 1) and their interpretations of the five 
photographs shown in the last part of the in-depth interviews form the basis of this 
section. These photographs depict the flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’, the monument of Atatürk, the monument of the martyr and the public 
arts − the sestas and the peace cresset. Detailed information on the reasons behind the 
selection of these particular symbols was provided in Chapter Three. In the interview, I 
asked the respondents what they could say about the photographs or/and what the first 
thing was that came to their minds when they looked at the photographs. 
  I examine the mechanisms of memory under four different titles: the “flags of 
Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ ”, “museums, martyrs’ cemeteries 
and mass graves”, “old monuments and new public arts” and “history textbooks and the 
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others/changing history textbooks changing the others”. However, when the respondents 
narrate their memories they sometimes talk about more than one mechanism; thus, 
‘mechanisms of memory’ are generally not separated, but interwoven and interconnected 
with each other. For example, flags and national days can be used together to explain a 
particular memory.  
 This section includes the opposing narratives of the respondents about the 
mechanisms of memory. Their interpretations give clues as to how they consider 
themselves in terms of national identity, mostly whether as a Turkish (cypriot) or as a 
(turkish) Cypriot; and thus, how they define who is the other and who is not. In this way, 
it is possible to examine how the mechanisms mobilize the respondents’ memories about 
their identity. The ‘mobilization’ does not always bring the result that serves the interests 
of the ruling groups, but it may also cause the production of counter memories. 
Depending on the adopted discourse, whether Turkish (Cypriot) nationalism or (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism, the meanings of the official mechanisms (history textbooks, symbols 
of tradition, commemorations) are understood in different ways by the respondents. Thus, 
it is possible to argue that the discourses of Turkish (Cypriot) nationalism or (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism are constructed in power relations and that they function as nodal 
points around which other signs, such as flags, national days, and monuments, acquire 
their meanings from their relationship to the nodal points in particular ways. As noted in 
Chapter One, nodal points are the privileged discursive points (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985:112) and other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point 
(Jorgensen and Philips 2002:26). Nodal points thus operate as the ‘base’ of the 
respondents’ different interpretations about the mechanisms of memory in this particular 
historical and political context. The meaning of the flags, monuments and history 
textbooks may therefore change according to the nodal point that is adopted by the 
respondent; however, as was emphasized in Chapter One, memories are constantly 
changing through articulations, so it is not possible to locate the nodal points as 
permanent and constant.  
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5.3.1 The flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 
                                                               
 
Figure 5.1 
 
The photograph40 above depicts the flags of Turkey (left) and the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’ (right). These are the crucial symbols of tradition, and were especially 
prominent during the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003). The two flags can easily be seen 
outside on an ordinary day if one travels even for a few miles in Northern Cyprus. They 
appear together in the courtyards of the public and private schools, near the institutional 
and public buildings, near the monuments and even on the mountains; and their existence 
in many places provided a continual background for the ruling group in sustaining their 
discourse which was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. 
 As was mentioned in chapter two, flags as the symbols of tradition represent a 
common identity and the concepts of unity, independence, liberation and freedom of a 
nation promoted by the dominant groups. According to the official history that was 
produced in the Denktaş-UBP period, the flag of the TRNC represents the freedom and 
independence of Turkish Cypriots gained with Turkey’s Happy Peace Operation in 1974; 
the existence of the flag of Turkey in Northern Cyprus represents the liberation of Turkish 
                                                 
40 The photograph was taken near a monument at the crossroads of Gönyeli that separates the capital city 
Nicosia from Kyrenia, the most touristic city of Northern Cyprus. 
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Cypriots from Greek cruelty by Turkey. Furthermore, the Turkish flag symbolises the 
unity and common identity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots). The official history 
thus addressed the flag of Turkey as the flag of the motherland, and the flag of the 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as the flag of the babyland.  
 The motherland/babyland argument functions as a moment articulated to the 
discourse of Turkish (Cypriot) nationalism. The argument signifies the common cultural 
kinship and heritage of Turkish (cypriots) and Turks. The discourse of motherland also 
provides a sense of continuity, as it locates Turks as the ancestors and protectors of 
Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). During the Denktaş-UBP period, the 
official history maintained the argument that since the division of the island in 1974, 
Turks and the Turkish soldiers have been the most crucial guarantee of the security of the 
Turkish (cypriots) on the island. On the other hand, the motherland/babyland dichotomy 
is always criticised by supporters of the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that 
articulates (turkish) Cypriot identity. The narratives of the official history play the 
primary role in the articulation of the memories of the respondents about the flags; 
however, in many interpretations, I also examined how the official history is challenged 
by the alternative narratives of the respondents. In actual fact, the flags remind different 
people of different relationships between the TRNC/Turkish Cypriots and Turkey/Turks. 
 Parallel to the narratives of the official history, I observed the traces of the 
discourse of motherland/babyland in the interpretations of many respondents about the 
flags. For many respondents, the flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus’ complete each other as they represent the unity between Turks and the Turkish 
(cypriots):  
 
 Our flags…The flags of Turkey and the TRNC together prove the proverb that  
 ‘A fingernail cannot be separated from the finger’41 (Alican, male, aged 49,  
 farmer) 
 
 I am proud of them [i.e. the flags]. This is the flag of this country [points to the  
flag of the TRNC] and this is our Turkish flag42 (Sevim, female, aged 70, 
housewife) 
 
The majority of the respondents, like Alican and Sevim, define the flag of Turkey 
(representing the Turks and Turkishness) and the flag of the TRNC (representing the 
                                                 
41 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
42 In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007 
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Turkish Cypriots) as ‘our flags’. The expression ‘our flags’ creates a ’we group’ that is 
based on emphasising the sameness between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. As Wodak, 
Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:37) note, the emphasis on sameness and similarity 
function as a strategy of ‘inclusion, assimilation and continuation’ that is included in the 
constructive strategies. In this sense, the respondents construct a Turkish (cypriot) identity 
that is based on the sameness and unity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots). Many 
other respondents express their demand for the existence of Turks on the island as the 
defender of the Turkish (cypriots) from Greek Cypriots; they interpret the existence of the 
Turkish flag in Northern Cyprus as the representation of the security of Turkish 
(cypriots). This emphasis on the positive political continuity also functions as a strategy 
of ‘assimilation, inclusion and continuation’ (ibid) that constructs the Turkish (cypriot) 
identity based on the unity of Turkish Cypriots and Turks:  
 
Their [the Turkish and TRNC flags’] separation creates problems. Turkey is the 
defender of the TRNC and as far as this flag continues to wave, Turkey will 
defend the TRNC43 (Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter) 
 
For me, both flags are ours. If the Turkish flag does not exist here the flag of the 
TRNC does not either44 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official) 
 
We will be able to exist as long as Turkey exists in here45. (Makbule, female, aged 
61, journalist) 
 
On the other hand, there are many respondents who emphasize the differences between 
the two flags. Their ideas about the flags give crucial clues as to how they consider 
themselves different from Turks and Turkish identity:  
 
Our flag [the flag of the TRNC] is more beautiful… Do you know why? Because 
it is the flag of our country46 (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer) 
 
These flags should not stand together. There should be either the Turkish flag or 
the flag of the TRNC. I mean, if the TRNC exists…for example; you cannot see 
the French flag in Italy. Thus, this situation presents a contradiction47 (Mustafa, 
male, aged 29, warehouseman) 
 
                                                 
43 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs TV, 15/8/2007 
44 In depth -interview, Lefkoşa:Domestic Parlour 30/7/2007  
45 In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Volkan Newspaper, 1/10/2007 
46 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007 
47 In depth-interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic Parlour, 16/8/2007 
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Such comments depict the focus of the respondents on the (turkish) Cypriot identity by 
raising the issues of “uniqueness and superiority” ‘common heritage’, ‘cultural kinship’ 
and ‘sense of belonging’. For example, Doğa distinguishes between the two flags by 
asking a rhetorical question:  ‘the flag of the TRNC is more beautiful…Do you know 
why?’ This indicates that he conceives the flag of the TRNC (representing Turkish 
Cypriots) as superior in comparison to the Turkish flag (the flag of Turkey represents 
Turks). As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:38) note, the emphasis on the 
national (positive) uniqueness that is supported with the argument of superiority functions 
as a strategy for the construction of identity. In this sense, Doğa’s argument on superiority 
that stems from his idea about the uniqueness of the TRNC flag functions as a 
constructive strategy for the construction of his (turkish) Cypriot identity. He also 
distinguishes the two flags as ‘our flag’ and ‘their flag’ and thus places Turks outside the 
system of convention to which (turkish) Cypriots belong. Moreover, Doğa’s argument, “it 
[the flag of the TRNC] is the flag of our country” is a very common comment and shows 
how the flag of the TRNC mobilizes the sense of belonging for these respondents. 
 On the other hand, like many respondents, Mustafa raises questions about 
‘common heritage’ and ‘cultural kinship’ between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in his 
interpretation of the flags in his comparison of Italy and France with Turkey and the 
‘TRNC’. With this example, he tries to explain that the similarity between Turkey and the 
‘TRNC’ is like that between France and Italy; he implies that there is no common cultural 
heritage and kinship between Turks and the (turkish) Cypriots, in the same way that there 
is no such kinship between the French and Italians. The emphasis of the respondents on 
differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots functions as a strategy for dismantling 
that aims to disparage parts of the Turkish (cypriot) identity.  
   The opposing discourses about the flags as the representations of victory and 
violence become obvious in Ayten and Duyal’s interpretations, in which one can see how 
the narratives of the official history function to sustain the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism and how it is challenged by the alternative narratives:  
 
The flags represent the victories that we gained with our blood48 (Duyal, female, 
aged 21, student).  
 
I love neither of them… and for this reason I set aside these colours (red and 
white). Borders, fights and wars, the flags erected after the wars…The Turkish 
                                                 
48 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
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flag is said to have been inspired by the reflection of the crescent moon and star on 
the pool of the blood of the martyrs....it reminds me of violence49.(Ayten, female, 
aged 23, student) 
 
The majority of respondents interpret the flags as the indication of a ‘victory’ that 
connotes the struggle, courage, sacrifice and power of Turks and Turkish (cypriots). Such 
responses depict the role of the official history in the articulation of the ideas of the 
respondents about the heroism and victories of Turks. Duyal’s interpretation for example, 
shows how flags mobilize the memories about a mythologized ‘past’ that is partly 
constructed through the narratives of the official history. In the mythologized ‘past’, 
terms such as ‘our victory’ which point to a common past and achievement, and ‘our 
blood’, which implies the common origin of Turkish Cypriots and Turks, are used 
frequently. The ‘blood of the martyrs’ is generally accepted as sacred and valuable. These 
terms function strategically to construct the unity and similarity between Turks and 
Turkish (cypriots). 
 On the other hand, for many respondents flags represent borders, wars and 
violence. As in Ayten’s comment above, in these interpretations the ‘blood of the 
martyrs’ is commonly seen as a representation of violence. Ayten also says that the 
Turkish flag reminds her of violence. In this way, like many respondents, she brings out 
some negative stereotypes about Turks as well. These stereotypes, which are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Seven,  locate Turks as dangerous and savage people and thus, as 
the others. The negative stereotypes of Turks thus operate as a strategy to dissolve the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity that is constructed through the putative similarities between 
Turkish Cypriots and Turks. 
 Sovereignty and dependency are the other discourses that become obvious in 
the narratives of the respondents about the flags. These discourses point to one of the 
most crucial political issues, the position of Turkey in Northern Cyprus: 
 
The flags represent the sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots50 (Erdal, male, aged 67, 
civil engineer) 
 
 We have never had a single flag… In fact, we are definitely dependent on Turkey. 
Therefore, the flags of Turkey and the TRNC are always together51 (Mine, female, 
aged 28, customs and immigration officer) 
                                                 
49 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007 
50 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/8/2007 
51 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour ,4/9/2007 
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Most of the respondents evaluate the flag of Turkey in Northern Cyprus as an indication 
of Turkish Cypriots’ undesired dependency on Turkey. This evaluation suggests the loss 
of ‘national autonomy’ that operates as one of the strategies for transformation (Wodak, 
Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999: 40) of the dominant discourse of Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism into the (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that emphasizes differences between 
Turks and (turkish) Cypriots . For example, when Mine says ‘we have never had a single 
flag…’ it is possible to hear her silent reproach for the absence of ‘a single flag’ that 
represents the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation of (turkish) Cypriots, who  are 
different from Turks. In her and many other respondents’ understanding, the flag of 
Turkey that represents the Turkish nation and identity is conceived as a threat to the unity 
of (turkish) Cypriots who share a common identity, heritage, cultural and historical 
background. Mine’s desire to have a ‘single flag’ is one example of many that show 
respondents’ struggle to possess their (turkish) Cypriot identity by differentiating 
(turkish) Cypriots (a single flag) from the others (Turks/Turkish flag). These respondents 
place Turks outside the ‘nation’ to which (turkish) Cypriots belong.  
  On the other hand, Erdal says that “flags represent the sovereignty of Turkish 
Cypriots”. This response is very common and shows the evaluation of the two flags as 
equal in representing the sovereignty /independency of the Turkish (cypriots). The 
interpretations also depict the positive attitude of the respondents towards the political 
position of Turkey in Northern Cyprus. Here the emphasis on the positive political 
continuity (at state/national level) functions as a strategy (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 
1999: 37) for the construction of the Turkish (cypriot) identity based on the unity between 
Turks and Turkish (cypriots). Thus, these kinds of conceptions about the two flags 
provide important clues about the respondents’ consideration of themselves as part of the 
Turkish nation and identity. In these cases, Turks are conceived as the members of the 
national collectivity.  
In many interpretations of the flags, I observed how they mobilize different and 
sometimes opposing feelings (i.e. happiness, anger) according to the changing 
conceptions of the respondents about the sovereignty and dependency of the TRNC. In 
the most radical sense, the reason for the dependency is expressed by the respondents as 
Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus:  
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This makes me very happy [points to the TRNC flag]. It shows that my state is 
sovereign52 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher) 
 
Makes me angry! [Laughs]. As for me, the presence of the Turkish flag makes me 
angry. If Turkey says that she hasn’t occupied this place, what is the Turkish flag 
doing here? If she claims that this is an independent country, if they say so, what 
is the Turkish flag doing here? If they call the TRNC a republic [points to the 
TRNC flag], it needs a flag.... may it have one... no objection!  No!53 (Ezgi, male, 
aged 20, student) 
 
As was emphasized below, the flags are produced by the ruling groups to represent 
freedom and liberty. However, the interpretations of the individuals about the flags as 
representations of freedom and liberty vary according to their different conceptions of the 
nation and their national identity: 
 
They remind me of myself as an entity. Seeing it waving makes me recall 
freedom54 (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor). 
 
Flags represent the borders and Turkish soldiers on the island55 (Berk, male aged 
27, instructor) 
 
Melek, for example, interprets the flags as a reminder of herself as an ‘entity’, which 
implies her national identity. In this sense, when she states that ‘waving flags’ recalls 
freedom, she means the ‘freedom’ to possess her ‘own’ identity as a Turkish (cypriot) in 
Northern Cyprus. For Berk on the other hand, flags represent ‘borders’ and ‘Turkish 
soldiers’ on the island; this brings out two important elements that are used strategically 
in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism. In the most radical sense, Turkish 
soldiers are considered as a threat to the reunification of the island in the discourse of 
(turkish) Cypriot nationalism. Soldiers are also conceived as the indication of and reason 
for the conflict and thus, for the ‘borders’ that prevent ‘Cypriots’ from living together. As 
with most of the respondents, the negative attitude of Berk towards ‘Turkish soldiers’ 
gives important clues as to  how ‘Turks’ might be rendered as outside a (turkish) Cypriot 
identity.   
 On the other hand, many respondents who see themselves as part of the Turkish 
nation support Turkey’s position in the TRNC. They generally draw a positive picture of 
                                                 
52 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007 
53 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa, 1/9/2007 
54 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
55 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
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the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC and the political situation in Northern 
Cyprus. Their commitment to the Turkish nation and identity, and their positive attitude 
towards the status quo, function as a strategy to justify the present situation. Their desire 
for the continuation of the status quo also provides clues about their negative attitude 
towards the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the EU with Greek Cypriots: 
 
The flags show that the TRNC and Turkey are hand in hand56 (Ahmet, male, aged 
60, barber) 
 
The flags represent the freedom, democracy, struggle, power and confidence of 
Turks57 (Memduh, male, aged 23, student)  
 
Such comments are very common and show how the flags have mobilized the political 
ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Ahmet for 
example, evaluates the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC in terms of 
cooperation and solidarity by saying that Turkey and the TRNC are hand in hand. 
Furthermore, according to Arif, flags represent the power, freedom, democracy and 
confidence of the Turks, and he suggests that ‘Turks’ are capable of surmounting 
obstacles and hardships on their own in the present situation; thus there is no need for 
Turkish (cypriots) to join the European Union.  
 The flags may also mobilize negative ideas about the status quo. Many 
respondents criticise the political and economic situation in Northern Cyprus when they 
talk about the flags, and therefore point to the need for a difference. As Wodak, Cillia, 
Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) note, ‘the emphasis on a necessary difference between 
then and now operates as a transformative strategy’. 
 
What happened to us is because of this flag. After the establishment of the TRNC 
in 1983, we put the embargo on ourselves. We were not able to sell our products 
to Europe. Europe didn’t recognize us. The flags make me remember this 
situation58 (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher).   
 
We see the flags everywhere. They represent weakness…  I mean, people 
sometimes exaggerate themselves when they have complexes and we are doing the 
same thing by putting flags everywhere. No country has any idea about this flag 
                                                 
56 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  24/07/2007 
57 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party , 24/7/2007 
58 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth , 23/7/2007 
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[points to the TRNC flag]. Even Turkish Cypriots do not care so much about it. 
That is why we put flags everywhere59 (Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).   
 
Like many respondents, Ergin criticises the status quo and even the establishment of the 
TRNC by pointing out the economic and political problems in Northern Cyprus. Deniz 
interprets the flagging as an indication of the complexes caused because of the weakness 
and incapability of the state. When she says “no country has any idea of this flag” she is 
pointing to the political problem that the TRNC is an ‘unrecognized state’, and this 
connotes the TRNC’s weakness and incapability in her understanding. Many respondents, 
like Deniz and Ergin, bring out elements such as political and economic problems that 
play a role in the articulation of the European Unionist discourse that is sustained by the 
(turkish) Cypriot nationalism, and was especially during the period of the CTP 
government. The interpretations of the respondents give important clues to their positive 
attitude towards the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union for the 
solution of the economic and political problems.     
On the other hand, many respondents are against the participation of Northern 
Cyprus in the European Union; they conceive this situation as a threat for the Turkish 
(cypriot) identity and nationality. According to them, in the case of participation, Turkish 
Cypriots will live together with their ‘eternal enemies’ (Greek Cypriots). Ülkü’s 
interpretation of the flags shows how they have mobilized the respondents’ memories 
about their identity and the “others’”:           
 
The flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is our flag. It represents our 
freedom and our nationality. If we joined the EU, our flag would change. That 
[new] flag would never be my flag. That flag does not express anything for me. 
When I was in primary school, our teachers made us hold the English flag but 
when I came back home from school, my father showed me the Turkish flag and 
said, "This is your flag”60 (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official). 
 
Like the memories of many respondents, Ülkü’s memory constructs and is constructed by 
her political idea about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. For example, when she 
sees the photograph of the flags, she remembers what her father told her when she was a 
little girl. This particular ‘past’ moment seems to be one of the elements that are 
articulated to each other and form a consistent whole in her memories, constructing and 
constructed by her ideas about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU. She 
                                                 
59 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
60 In depth-interview, Famagusta, 30/9/2007 
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therefore interprets this participation as a threat towards the identity and freedom of 
Turkish Cypriots because, in the case of participation, the national flag that represents the 
identity of the Turkish (cypriots) will change. However, like many other respondents, 
Ülkü’s political ideas about the EU and the Turkish flag are constructed by the fear of the 
others, who are Greek Cypriots in their case. As was noted above, in the case of the 
participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union, Turkish Cypriots will share a 
common future with Greek Cypriots. The respondents’ arguments about the negative 
consequences of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU function as a strategy for 
perpetuating and maintaining the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the others 
− Greek Cypriots − in this event. 
Many respondents also conceive the flags of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus as two ‘Turkish’ flags and they say that Cyprus should have its ‘own’ 
flag. In these cases, it is the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is conceived as under threat. As 
Kemal a 51 year-old male tyre dealer expert says,  
 
Our flags…..for me, there are two Turkish flags here....only one of them has a 
different colour. For me, there is no Cyprus flag here; there are two Turkish flags. 
This [points to the TRNC flag] is simply and totally another version of the Turkish 
flag. I mean we don’t have to deceive ourselves. In what shape could the Cyprus 
flag be… it [Cyprus] could have had its own flag if ever it were an independent 
state 61.  
 
As for other respondents, ‘flag’ represents identity for Kemal. When he says that Cyprus 
should have its ‘own’ flag, he is expressing his desire to have an identity that is other than 
a Turkish identity (represented as Turkish flags). He believes these two flags do not 
represent his ‘real’ identity, which is (turkish) Cypriot in his case. When Kemal says “it 
[Cyprus] could have had its own flag if ever it were an independent state” he also means 
that the TRNC is not an independent state, and that is why it does not have a different 
flag. There is a silent criticism here about Turkish dominance and the status quo in 
Northern Cyprus. The negative connotation of political continuation and positive 
connotation of change function as a strategy for transformation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl 
and Liebhart 1999:41) in Kemal’s narrative like in many others. Hence, it is also possible 
to argue that Kemal and Ülkü’s ideas on flags show their different political standpoints 
regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Although Kemal’s ideas show his 
                                                 
61 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
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willingness towards the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU, Ülkü clearly states 
that she is against it.   
Some words that were used by the respondents when they were talking about the 
flags are depict in the table below. These specific words give crucial clues about what the 
flags represent for the respondents. The table includes the conflicting discourses of the 
respondents about the flags that have already been discussed. As noted earlier, the ideas 
of the respondents about the flags change according to the nodal points they adopt.  
 
                                                                 Flags 
 
(NodalPoints):      Turkish (cypriot) nationalism    (turkish) Cypriot nationalism 
                             Our flag(s)                                   Their flag(s)  
                             Freedom                                       Borders 
                             Independency/sovereignty           Dependency/occupation 
                             Confidence                                   Complexities/weakness 
                             Victory                                         Violence 
                             Unity                                            Difference 
                             Cooperation                                 Economic problems/embargoes 
                                                         
                                                             
5.3.2 Old monuments and new public arts 
 
Monuments are the crucial forms of commemorations in the Denktaş-UBP period. 
Photograph 1 shows the monument of Atatürk, the founder of Turkey. There is a 
statement below the monument as follows: “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene” (‘How happy to 
say I am a Turk’). In Photograph 2 there is the monument that symbolises a martyr 
(Turkish soldier) who was killed by Greeks and is lying in his mother’s arms. The 
statement below the monument is: “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget).  In contrast, 
public artworks appeared during the period of the CTP government. Photograph 3 shows 
Sestas placed on the street. These are common, traditional items made from rushes and 
used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat food on. Photograph 4 depicts 
the peace cresset that was made by a famous Greek artist, Polyxene Kasda. The cresset 
symbolises the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum as an 
affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan.  
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5.3.2.1 The monument of Atatürk                                                                                     
 
Figure 5.2  
 
The monument above has particular importance as it was the first Atatürk monument 
placed at the centre of the capital, in the northern part of Nicosia in 1963 during the 
period of the Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish communal assembly. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, it was a present from the İş Bank, which was established in 1924 by a 
directive of Atatürk’s (Shaw and Shaw 1994:390). The monument was opened to the 
public on the national day of ‘29 October, The Founding Day of the Republic of Turkey’ 
and it has become the primary symbolic public place of the state authorities for laying 
wreathes on national days, since 1963. As in the case of flags, it is very common to see 
the monuments of Atatürk in many places, including streets, squares and the courtyards of 
schools. Atatürk is one of the main symbols of ‘Turkishness’, which is also used in the 
construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. He is represented as a ‘hero’ who is powerful, 
intelligent, brave, patriotic and diligent by the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. 
However, it should be noted that Atatürk has no connection with the Cyprus problem, as 
he died in 1938. His one statement regarding Cyprus was that “the island would need 
watching” (Karakoç and Kılıçoğlu 2003:4).      
 History textbooks, as one of the official mechanisms, play the primary role in 
the articulation of the ideas of the respondents about Atatürk. Nearly all of the 
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respondents said that they got their information about Atatürk from the history textbooks.  
As Yusuf and Alican comment,        
 
Turkish Cypriots start to love Ataturk through the education they receive 
beginning in primary school. There are very few people who think contrarily and 
say, “I don’t like Atatürk”, because we were not told anything negative about 
Atatürk62 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official). 
 
I have never thought about what Atatürk means to me…These questions are really 
difficult. Really hard.  What we read from our history textbooks…The principles 
of Atatürk, Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk is the man 
who saved Turks from extinction. Our ideas of Atatürk are formed with this 
information. So, Atatürk expresses Turkishness63 (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer). 
 
As can be understood from the statement below the statue, “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene” 
(How happy to say I am a Turk), the monument was set up to evoke the feelings of 
gratification and pride in being Turkish, and thus reinforce the commitment to the Turkish 
nation and identity. The symbol of Atatürk functions as a tradition in providing guidance 
about how to be a Turk, and thus, how a Turkish (cypriot) should be. The official history 
represents Atatürk as a ‘hero’ who is powerful, intelligent, brave, patriotic and diligent; 
parallel to the narratives of the official history, one can see how the symbol that operates 
as a Turkish role model mobilizes values and feelings such as bravery, courage, strength 
and self-confidence:  
 
Atatürk is a great leader whom everybody should take as a model64 (Alp, male, 
aged 29, optician) 
 
This is it…When I look at the monument of Atatürk, I think that we [Turks and 
Turkish (cypriots)] are brave and courageous. I understand that we should trust 
ourselves65 (Yusuf, male, aged 21, student). 
 
He is a leader who sheds light and shows guidance with his principles. We [Turks 
and Turkish (cypriots)] still get power from him66 (Nurten, female, aged 60, 
history teacher). 
 
As the common symbol of the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot state, Atatürk played the primary 
role in the struggle for the survival of the Turkish nation. He is represented as the saviour 
                                                 
62 In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007 
63 In-depth interview, Arabahment:Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
64 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
65 In -depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 30/07/2007 
66 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
 136 
 
of Turkey from the hand of ‘enemies’ by the official history. Although he has no 
connection with the Cyprus problem and thus, with the Cyprus war in 1974, many 
respondents conceive him as the defender and the symbol of survival of the Turkish 
Cypriots as well; it is interesting to observe that most of the respondents talk about 
Atatürk as if he had a significant role in Cyprus when they see the photograph of the 
monument. This situation depicts how the symbol of Atatürk leaks into everyday life and 
attaches to the political lives of the respondents through the monuments and other 
mechanisms. The monument which carries the symbol of Atatürk becomes ‘familiar, 
continual and thus, a habit’ (Billig 1995) as it enters into the social lives of the 
respondents. Moreover, the other mechanisms that carry the symbol of Atatürk enter into 
the social lives through social practices and narrations (i.e celebrating national days, 
hearing and singing the national anthem, seeing flags in the streets). In this sense, the 
mechanisms of memory mobilize meaning that articulates the idea that Atatürk has a 
strong connection with the Cyprus issue and the Turkish Cypriots. As noted in Chapter 
Two, habits are highly powerful as they transform into internalized attitudes about our 
identities. Below are the interpretations of the respondents that show how they relate 
Atatürk to the Cyprus issue: 
 
He is our defender. I respect him. I am grateful to him. If it hadn’t been for him, 
we would hardly have been able to live these days67. (Sevim, female, aged 70, 
housewife)   
 
We get our power from Atatürk and have resisted the Greeks since 1955. We 
didn’t have any weapons. We resisted Greeks with sticks and shotguns. We get all 
our power from Atatürk68 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).     
 
The greatness, the leader, our past, our history69 (Memduh, male, aged 23, 
student) 
 
The monument of Atatürk shows that Turkish Cypriots are part of the Turkish 
nation. The monument shows the Turkish Cypriots’ love of Atatürk70 (Erdal, 
male, aged 67, civil engineer). 
 
He saved Turks. If he hadn’t made the revolutions, we would not be here now71 
(Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer). 
 
                                                 
67 In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007 
68 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007  
69 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branchof Ulusal Birlik Party, 24/07/2007  
70In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/07/2007 
71 In depth-interview, Girne: Domestic Parlour, 31/08/2007   
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If Atatürk were alive, the TRNC would never be like this. We would never live 
through these problems72 (Duyal, female, aged 21). 
 
When they made this monument, Turkish Cypriots went and saluted Atatürk. But 
the British administration prohibited this. Atatürk enable us to reflect on our 
emotions of Turkishness and our spirit of belligerence73 (Tuna, male, aged 26, 
student). 
 
The monument of Atatürk represents our loyalty and devotion to Atatürk74 
(Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor)    
 
Well, here in question is our Ata [i.e. father], Atatürk... umm, as for me…  his 
arms crossed [points to the posture of Atatürk in the photograph] … of course, 
those were the years of the war of independence. It was rather impossible to act in 
any way concerning Cyprus. His arms crossed... that is, so I think ... He was 
contemplating Cyprus’s future …he had some thoughts about Cyprus. As a matter 
of fact, his saying which begins and continues with, “keep an eye on Cyprus” is 
analogous with his posture.  That is, this posture is absolutely meaningful [points 
to the posture of Atatürk in the photograph] … you can also interpret it in another 
way... we can also say that Atatürk had concerns for the security of Turkish 
Cypriot people75 (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist)   
 
As can be understood from the interpretations of the respondents, Atatürk as the symbol 
of Turkishness appears articulated into the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. 
Thus the symbol plays a crucial role in the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity that 
is based on Turkish nationalism. However, there are also a variety of alternative 
narratives about Atatürk. These can be approached as different degrees of reworking the 
myth of Atatürk. In the narratives of some of the respondents, the symbol of Atatürk 
functions as a signifier in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity instead of Turkish 
(cypriot) identity. Hence, it is possible to explore the differences between the alternative 
narratives and the narratives of the official history (commemorations, history textbooks 
and symbols of tradition) about the signification of Atatürk in terms of identity. Although 
some of the respondents’ ideas about Atatürk as a ‘hero’ seem parallel to the official 
history (1974-2003), these respondents do not evaluate Atatürk as the symbol of 
Turkishness and thus they locate him as different from Turks. Furthermore, they establish 
a relationship between Atatürk and (turkish) Cypriot identity. In their view, Turkish 
Cypriots are more eager to adopt Atatürk’s principles of modernity than Turks are. This 
                                                 
72 In depth-interview, Girne: Girne Amerikan Universitesi, 15/08/2007 
73 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
74 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007 
75 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 1/10/2007 
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situation makes (turkish) Cypriots closer to Atatürk than Turks; although the monument 
of Atatürk was put in place to strengthen the unity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots), 
it can function to mobilize the ideas on differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots:  
 
He is the greatest Turk. He saved Turkey. Turkish Cypriots are also influenced by 
his revolutions. He abolished the çarşaf [the wrap or outer garment formerly worn 
by Turkish women]. He introduced the Latin letters [of the alphabet]. However, 
nobody told Turkish Cypriots to abolish the çarşaf  or to use the Latin letters. 
Turkish Cypriots applied his principles in Cyprus on their own. But in Turkey, 
Atatürk struggled a lot to make Turkish people apply his principles. He even 
sentenced a number of people to death... This means that Turkish Cypriots love 
Atatürk. I love him as well. He created Turkey from nothing. When I see the 
picture of Atatürk, I remember this76 (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher) 
 
İsmet: A worthy person, whom I respect.  
Interviewer: How can you evaluate him from the point of view of the Turkish 
Cypriots?  
İsmet: I think Turkish Cypriots are the members of a people who adopted his 
principles before the people of his native land did77 (male, aged 47, TV producer).  
 
These responses indicate how the respondents adopt Atatürk’s principles of modernity 
and apply them as a sign of their closeness to him. Thus they claim that they are ‘the real 
sons and daughters’ of Atatürk. Their comparison of Turks and (turkish) Cypriots shows 
how they conceive (turkish) Cypriots as superior compared to Turks in that they adopted 
Atatürk’s principles before the Turks did. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 
(1999:40) note, the positive self-presentation functions as a strategy for dissimilation. In 
this sense, the positive self-conception of the respondents about (turkish) Cypriots 
functions as a strategy to locate Turks as ‘them’ by composing a frontier between Turks 
and (turkish) Cypriots (us).  
There are also respondents who completely reject establishing a connection 
between Atatürk and Cyprus or/and (turkish) Cypriots. In this way, they refuse the 
dominant public memory that locates Atatürk as the hero of (turkish) Cypriots. However, 
although these respondents do not take Atatürk as the hero of Turkish Cypriots, the myth 
still functions silently in preventing questioning of Atatürk. As Ezgi and Mustafa say in 
continuing,      
 
                                                 
76 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 23/07/2007 
77 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Bayrak Radio Television , 23/09/2007 
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This errm... comes as a bit strange to me…because Atatürk  err.. is not our own 
hero. Atatürk was a good leader but um… but he has nothing to do with Cyprus… 
completely irrelevant for me… It doesn’t get on my nerves but [laughs]… He has 
nothing to do with us. At least, I suppose so78 (Ezgi, male, aged 20, student).   
 
It reminds me of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. It doesn’t mean much 
for the Turkish Cypriots. When the Cyprus problem started to be in the interests of 
Turkey, Atatürk was no longer alive. The politician who was interested in Cyprus 
was Bülent Ecevit. When we were at school, we learned everything that the 
Turkish people had learned. Atatürk means a lot for Turks, the Turkish citizens, 
but it doesn’t have to have meaning for the Cypriots. Of course, I don’t intend to 
be disrespectful or exclude Atatürk79 (Mustafa, male, aged 68, accountant) 
 
When Ezgi says ironically that Atatürk doesn’t get on his ‘nerves’ by referring to his 
previous interpretation about the Turkish flag, he expresses his hidden respect for 
Atatürk, who is mythologized through the narratives of the official history. His tactical re-
interpretation makes Atatürk’s respectability unquestionable. In a similar vein, when 
Mustafa says “I don’t intend to be disrespectful or exclude Atatürk” after his explanation 
that Atatürk has no relation to Cyprus, this points to the indisputability of the symbol of 
Atatürk. It should also be noted here that in the counter narratives of a few respondents, 
Atatürk, the symbol of Turkishness, functions as an element that is not discursively 
articulated to their identity. Thus, these respondents approach Turkishness as a threat for 
their identity that is defined as (turkish) Cypriot. The concepts of ‘Atatürk’ and 
‘Turkishness’ are not defined in positive terms like the interpretations of most of the 
respondents above. In the interpretations of these respondents, I examined how they label 
the symbol of Turkishness with negative terms such as the representation of militarism, 
violence and war. This shows how they exclude Turkishness in the construction of their 
identities. 
 
I think the monument of Atatürk represents militarism80 (Berk, male, aged 27, 
instructor). 
 
Ayten: If he (Atatürk) hadn’t been dead he would be the one to be killed. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Ayten: Um... I watched a movie related to the right of being elected for the 
Republican assembly....... when he was talking to a man, he said, “a lot of the 
people will lose their heads.”  Rejecting war, he was trying to reach someplace 
                                                 
78 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007 
79 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 16 August 2007 
80 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
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through war....his approach was violence. I think Turkish people, namely Turkey, 
believes in violence and they are aggressive people (female, aged 23, student)81... 
 
In the in-depth interviews, I explored how the conception of most of the respondents 
about Atatürk parallels the narratives of the official history that were produced especially 
during the Denktaş-UBP period. The history textbooks have a special importance in the 
construction of the memories of the respondents about Atatürk; the majority of the 
respondents said that they got their information about him from the history textbooks. 
Nearly all of the respondents conceive Atatürk as an idol, and the history textbooks play 
the main part in promoting the idolization of Atatürk. The symbol operates as a myth in 
the representation of an extraordinary human being − a kind of demigod. Thus, except for 
a few respondents, all of them interpreted Atatürk as a role model to be followed as a 
guide. The monument mobilizes feelings such as bravery, courage and self-confidence in 
the respondents, and these feelings play an important role in sustaining the Turkishness 
that supports the discourse of official history.  
The monument of Atatürk and the Monument of the Martyr (below) can be read as 
two different texts that mobilize different discourses that articulate together. Although the 
Atatürk monument mobilizes meaning for the articulation of the ideas about ‘who the 
Turkish Cypriots are’, the monument of the martyr functions to construct the idea about 
‘who the others are’. In this sense, the monuments operate as two different sides of the 
same coin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 In- depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 3/09/2007 
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5.3.2.2 The monument of the martyr 
                                                              
 
Figure 5.3 
 
There are contested interpretations about the monument that symbolises a martyr (a 
Turkish soldier) who was killed by Greeks and is depicted lying in his mother’s arms in 
the Cyprus war. The monument was put in place to construct the ideas of Turkish 
Cypriots about Greeks, who are represented as the ‘others’ who mercilessly killed Turks. 
The statement below the monument, “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget), recalls the 
‘past’ of the Cyprus war and thus, the Turkish people who died and/or suffered at that 
time. However, the term implies not only the ‘past’ but also the future, as it includes the 
promise of remembrance. 
Many respondents interpret the monument as the true reflection of ‘past’ events. 
They believe that the monument is useful as it reminds them of the ‘past’; thus their 
interpretations are parallel to the narratives of the official history that was produced about 
the Greek Cypriots during the Denktaş-UBP period during 1974-2003 (see Chapter Four). 
In this context, this particular monument functions as a mechanism that reproduces and 
rearticulates the constructed ‘past’:  
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It [the monument of the martyr] was erected in commemoration of the martyrs 
who fell during the 1963 struggles in the Kaymaklı area82 (Erdal, male, aged 67, 
civil engineer). 
 
These very beautiful pictures tell us about the past83 (Ahmet, male, aged 60, 
barber). 
 
Right, it represents the 1950’s and 1960’s84 (Alp, male, aged 29, optician). 
 
The martyrs killed ruthlessly by the Greeks in 196385 (Duyal, female, aged 21, 
student). 
 
These are images that reflect those days effectively86 (Tuna, male, aged 26, 
student). 
 
At least 2000 to 3000 Turkish soldiers lie in our cemetery. Well, we don’t forget 
what they have done87 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher). 
 
It [the monument of the martyr] was erected after the Happy Peace Operation. It 
was put in place for us not to forget88 (Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor) 
 
They tell me: “live today but do not forget the past89” (Melek, female, aged 28, 
instructor). 
 
This is the reflection of something that has happened. Please do remember that 
such events have taken place and whenever you see this, remember the past. 
Events like this have happened. What else might it mean… They try to tell this to 
people. Or when someone comes (a tourist) or if a child asks his father or mother 
what it is about, the mother or father may be able to tell them that some events 
have occurred like this90 (Göktan, aged 41, male machine engineer). 
 
For most of the respondents, remembering the ‘past’ is a way to know their enemies and 
to protect themselves from them in the present and in the future; in order to defend 
themselves and their identity from the ‘others’ they ‘should’ not forget the past. 
According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) defence and avoidance are 
strategies that function to perpetuate a threatened identity. In this case, it is the Turkish 
(cypriots) and their identity that are conceived as threatened by the others (Greek 
Cypriots):  
                                                 
82 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/8/2007 
83 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  24/07/2007 
84 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
85 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
86 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
87 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007 
88 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007 
89 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
90 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 14/10/2007 
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These are true. We will not forget them. The nations that do not learn from the 
lesson of the past are destined to extinction91 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, 
warehouseman). 
 
A dead soldier, of course…. we shouldn’t forget whatever was done to us92 
(Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife). 
 
We’ll never forget, in order not to be in a situation like this and not to experience 
these things again. We should not forget in order not to let new monuments be 
erected alongside these ones. Not to experience them again93 (Makbule, female, 
aged 61, journalist). 
 
It recalls the 1974 intervention so that we don’t forget. Quite right! The days 
which were lived should not be forgotten. Our history is this, and we should set up 
the building on this foundation94 (Ayşe, female, aged 31, instructor). 
 
Comments such as ‘we shouldn’t forget whatever was done to us’, ‘we’ll never forget in 
order not to be in a situation like this and not to experience these things again’, ‘The 
nations that do not learn from the lesson of the past are destined to extinction’, ‘The days 
which were lived should not be forgotten’, ‘things have happened like this and we should 
act so that similar things won’t happen again’ show that it is necessary for the Turkish 
Cypriots to remember their ‘past’ in order to defend themselves and their identity from 
the ‘others’. Thus the normative-deontic modals (must, should) and constructions (it is 
necessary) that are included in the strategies of means of realization (Wodak, Cillia, 
Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:40) function in the narratives of the respondents to support the 
strategies of defence and avoidance that operate to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) 
identity.    
 There are, on the other hand, many respondents who believe that the monument 
reflects events that happened in the ‘past’ but this should not be placed in a public space, 
because they would like to forget the offensive events of the ‘past’ in order to manage to 
achieve peace with Greek Cypriots in the future. Their desire to not remember the ‘past’ 
also shows their negative attitude towards the politics of the previous official discourse 
that produced its mechanisms such as the monument of the martyr to reinforce the 
constructed ‘past’ and the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism:  
 
                                                 
91 In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House cafe, 26/07/2007 
92 In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007 
93 In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Volkan Newspaper, 1/10/2007 
94 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007 
 144 
 
Of course what we have lived shouldn’t be forgotten, but it isn’t all right to 
declare these things by poking them into people’s eyes either. Take France and 
Germany for example. The wars between them… if they had kept this logic all the 
time, how would they have solved the problem? (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV 
producer). 
 
Bad memories, of course…but they represent reality, because a war happened and 
this was experienced. But this didn’t happen only to our side, it happened to their 
[Greek Cypriots’] side as well. Bad things were experienced by both [Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots]. But the expression “we won’t forget” is so nasty… if no one’s 
going to forget, how we are going to achieve peace?95 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, 
female beautician). 
 
We won’t forget… (Sighs) bringing the fears of the past to the present….  The 
picture of not forgetting.  That means unhappiness96 (Ayça, male, aged 50, 
tourism employee). 
 
The monument of the martyr: We won’t forget? I don’t like statues like this that 
remind us of the offensive events of the past97 (Emine, aged 52, female retired 
official). 
 
Interpretations such as ‘if no one’s going to forget, how we are going to achieve peace’, 
‘the picture [the photograph of the martyr] of not forgetting. That means unhappiness’ 
and ‘I don’t like statues like this that remind us of the offensive events of the past’, bring 
criticisms to the official discourse (1974-2003) that sustains Turkish (cypriot) nationalism 
through these kinds of monuments. These comments also point to the desire for a possible 
political transformation in Northern Cyprus; most of the respondents emphasize that they 
want peace in Northern Cyprus. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) point 
out, emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future functions as a 
strategy that aims to transform a well established identity into another identity. The 
transformative strategies function in the narratives of the respondents to transform the 
dominant Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. Nevruz’s argument 
that “bad things were experienced by both [Turkish and Greek Cypriots]” points to the 
‘shared sorrow’ that functions as a constructive strategy (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 
1999:38). As noted above, (turkish) Cypriot identity is based on the discourse of (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism that emphasizes the commonalities between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots and points to the necessity of their unification.  
                                                 
95 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
96 In depth-interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic parlour, 18/09/2007 
97 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
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The monument also mobilizes the alternative memories of the respondents that are 
completely against the official history: 
 
The monument tells… let it go on like this; let someone else die in your lap. Or 
rather, you always remember. Similar to the vendetta cases in Turkey. Like 
waging vendettas98 (Ayten, female, aged 23, student). 
 
I don’t think that it [the monument of the martyr] reflects the past self-righteously. 
They [Greek Cypriots] treated us badly and we retaliated. They also have similar 
pictures at the Ledra Palace Crossing. If you hit me, I hit you back; it is something 
like that99 (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).  
 
In some interpretations, Turks are criticised in different aspects; this shows that some of 
the respondents dissolve the existing chains of equivalence between Turks and (turkish) 
Cypriots in their memories. Ayten, for example, sees a similarity between the monument 
of the martyr and vendetta cases in Turkey. In this way, she expresses her negative 
attitude towards Turks and the monument of martyr which is one of the symbols of the 
official history (1974-2003) that sustains Turkish (cypriot) nationalism, and she 
constructs (turkish) Cypriot identity by excluding Turkishness. It is also sometimes 
possible to observe how the strategies of sameness function to create similarity between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the narratives of the respondents. For example, when 
Eylem says ‘They have similar pictures at the Ledra Palace crossing’ she implies that 
Greek Cypriots also have martyrs and they display them in the same way as Turkish 
Cypriots do through the monuments. Such comments show that the monument of the 
martyr also mobilizes memories that are completely different from the discourse of the 
official history. However, most of the time the monument mobilizes negative emotions 
about the Greek Cypriots. The monument of the martyr also constructs the idea that the 
‘others’ have negative feelings towards ‘us’: 
 
This [the monument] reflects the hatred of the Greeks for me100 (Doğa, male, aged 
27, lawyer). 
 
It [the monument] reflects the murdering of the people during the wars and the 
agony of the families of the people murdered101 (Selen, female, aged 29, TV 
presenter). 
                                                 
98 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007 
99 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007 
100 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: domestic parlour, 31/088/2007 
101 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007 
 146 
 
We will never forget. I am affected like all Turks when I watch documentaries 
about the massacres102 (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee). 
 
I feel very close to the one who is buried there. I feel the sorrow. And the one who 
is standing is strong, powerful and someone noble; sad, but keeps his sorrow 
buried deep in his heart103 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official). 
 
Well, they remind us of the massacres committed towards us. It [the monument] 
reminds us of the old and bitter past. I hope we do not go through those things 
again104 (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher). 
 
Although the symbol of Atatürk operates as a Turkish role model and brings together 
feelings such as courage, pride, self-confidence and bravery about the ‘self’, the 
monument of the martyr is highly influential in mobilizing emotions such as sorrow, pain 
and agony that have a crucial role in the construction of negative feelings such as hate, 
anger and grudge towards the ‘others’, who are supposed to have murdered so many 
innocent Turkish people. In this way, these two monuments sustain the discourse of the 
official history (1974-2003) in the construction of ‘who the Turkish (cypriots) are’ and 
who ‘the others are’. However, the monument of the ‘martyr’ and the ‘sestas’ that are 
analysed below operate to articulate the ‘others’ in a different way. These two symbols 
present different and sometimes opposing ‘pasts’ for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: office, 7/08/2007 
103 In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007 
104 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
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5.3.2.3  Sestas                                                                  
 
Figure 5.4 
Some of the alternative memories and narratives that opposed the discourse of Turkish 
(cypriot) nationalism during the Denktaş-UBP period became dominant for a short time in 
the period of the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP). Although the previous official 
discourse had constructed Turkish (cypriot) identity by producing a sharp antagonistic 
relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the subsequent government highlighted 
the (turkish) Cypriot identity and thus emphasized the similarities between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. In order to disseminate its political discourse, the CTP government 
placed public artworks in the streets and squares to symbolize the items that are used in 
the common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. One of these public artworks is 
Sestas, common, traditional items used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and 
eat food on.  
Sestas signify the similar ways of life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they 
used to live together, especially in the 1950’s. Sestas is thus a public artwork that 
represents the ‘others’ from a different perspective for the first time since the division of 
the island. As was stated in Chapter Four, during the Denktaş-UBP period, a great number 
of monuments were placed in streets and squares, all representing the heroism of the 
Turks and Turkish martyrs of the Cyprus war. These monuments were a way of telling 
who the other was and was not.  However, Sestas and public artworks similar to them 
bring an alternative ‘past’, which was about the common daily lives of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, into the present. The narratives of the respondents show that Sestas mobilize the 
alternative past, based on a united Cyprus and Cypriotness: 
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When I see Sestas, I remember Cyprus and stories I heard from my 
grandfather....Biddalar [thin layers of dough cooked on an iron plate], fasıllar 
[short music performances] and entertainment105...( Ayten, female, aged 23, 
student). 
 
Sestas represent Cypriotness. They remind me of my grandmother106 (Berk, male, 
aged 27, instructor). 
 
They represent our [Turkish/Greek Cypriot] culture and Cypriotism so I like them 
a lot107 (Emine, female, aged 52, retired official). 
 
For me, they are warm, nice items that remind me of our [Turkish/Greek Cypriot] 
culture. The sestas that my grandmother made pies on... erm... that warm family 
environment... well, my grandmothers were from villages; they make me feel 
this108 (Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter). 
 
On the other hand, according to some other interviewees, Sestas belong only to the 
Turkish Cypriot culture; these respondents reject establishing any similarities between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as they conceive Greek Cypriots as ‘others’. In the words of 
Alp, a 29- year- old male optician and Yusuf, a 30 year- old male official:  
 
Alp: Turkish Cypriots used to dry molehiya [a kind of plant that grows in Cyprus] 
on them. They would dry tarhana [a preparation of yogurt and flour dried in the 
sun]. [laughs]… they reflect Cyprus culture.  
Interviewer: When you talk about Cyprus culture, does it comprise Greek Cypriots 
or only Turkish Cypriot culture?  
Alp: Cyprus Turkish Culture109.  
 
Yusuf: Our customs and mores, I see our past in them. 
Interviewer: Are there Greek Cypriots in them as well?  
Yusuf: No. We inherited them from our grannies.  
 
Most of the respondents, especially the ones opposed to the politics of the CTP 
government, evaluate Sestas as meaningless and artificial symbols. According to the 
respondents, it is not possible to talk about the common ‘past’ and common daily lives of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots; they argue that the symbol of Sestas does not represent the 
realities and actual feelings of the Turkish Cypriot community. In this way, they criticise 
the politics of the new government as they believe that it is trying to misrepresent the 
                                                 
105 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007 
106 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of of CTP, 7/8/2007 
107 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
108 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 15/08/2007 
109 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
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‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for political ends (i.e., for getting people’s 
votes, to impose its European Unionist discourse):  
  
It is made of plaster and it is artificial. It has no meaning. They were used in 
homes as trays for drying molehiya, tarhana or nane [peppermint]. They were all 
made during the same period [the CTP period]. We look at them with respect to 
the modern city design. There are also similar handicrafts. I don’t approve of any 
of them. They have been completely artificial facets and they do not represent the 
feelings of the community. There’s a Bekri110 monument at Asmaaltı, there’s a 
vine tree111 and tulips112 covered in plastic at Dereboyu113 (Erdal, male, aged 67, 
civil engineer).  
 
Sestas were placed there as a result of a political view. All these are the intrigues 
of the EU. As Turks and Greeks used to live together peacefully and would make 
sestas together; all these are meaningless114 (Ahmet, male, aged 60, barber).  
 
In my opinion, it doesn’t have any meaning (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism 
employer). 
 
The sesta and the torch of peace: for me it means nothing….. Visual objects just to 
hunt for people’s votes115…(Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer) 
 
On the other hand, there are some respondents who think that the Sestas that symbolise 
the common way of lives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots represent the ‘past’ in a correct 
way. They also support the politics of the CTP government as they believe that it reflects 
the truths about the ‘past’. The respondents’ criticisms towards the monuments that were 
set up during the Denktaş-UBP period indicate that for them these monuments represent 
the war and death:  
 
Blood, life and death… (points to the photographs of the monuments). Rather than 
saying “Greeks killed this or that” today’s government, by putting up such 
artefacts, is trying to put aside enmity towards Greeks and they are talking about 
the truths. We can do this even with the modifications in the history curriculum116 
(Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert). 
 
                                                 
110 Public artwork that represents Bekri Mustafa, a famous drinker. ‘Bekri’ is also the name of one of the 
folk dances of Cyprus. The dance symbolizes the famous drinker Bekri and is usually performed by young 
men. 
111 Public artwork that represents the vine tree, one of the most popular trees in Cyprus.   
112 Public artwork that represents a kind of tulip that is peculiar to Cyprus.  
113 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/8/2007 
114 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  24/07/2007 
115 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007 
116 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
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Sestas make us remember the friendship and peace between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. It is better to remember these good memories, instead of the negative 
things such as the war and the martyrs. I think the new government is trying to 
make us remember our past as Cypriots117 (Deniz, female, aged 23, public 
relations). 
 
It should be noted here that the respondents’ different conceptions about the ‘past’ of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots play the main role in their interpretations about Sestas. In 
other words, the memories about the ‘past’ functions as a nodal point around which Sestas 
that symbolises the common ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots acquire their 
meaning from their relationship to the ‘past’.   
 
5.3.2.4 The peace cresset 
 
                                                                   
 
Figure 5.5 
 
The peace cresset that was made by the Greek artist Polyxene Kasda was placed at the 
road junction at Metehan118  in the CTP period before the referenda. The peace cresset 
symbolises the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum as an 
                                                 
117 In depth-interview, Kyrenia:Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
118 In the Metehan area, there is a border gate that was opened after the partial opening of the crossings. 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots use the Metehan road to cross to the ‘other’ side of the island by car. 
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affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan; and I examined how it mobilizes meaning which 
articulates the ‘peace’. Below are different evaluations of the respondents about the 
meaning of ‘peace’ and their expectations from the future regarding the political situation 
in Cyprus. Although some respondents evaluate ‘peace’ as the unification of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, others believe that ‘peace’ means the separation of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots:  
 
The peace cresset shows the necessity of peace between the two communities,  
that can be realized with their common life119 (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor). 
 
The Peace Cresset represents the expected peace between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots in Cyprus120 (Emine, female, aged 52, retired official). 
The Peace Cresset is just another sculpture. It doesn’t mean much to me. Some 
people say that there is no peace. Is there a war? There isn’t a war either, because 
there’s a ceasefire. They say they are striving for peace in Cyprus, but I believe 
there is already peace in Cyprus and the 1974 peace operation brought peace for 
Turks as well as Greeks by preventing war… It brought an end to the clashes 
amongst the Greeks against EOKA; and transformed the war into peace even 
amongst them. These are the impacts of the peace operation121 (Kemal, male, aged 
51, tyre dealer expert).   
Peace [stress] should be made like this; separate [stresses, angry] but let’s 
reconcile. I mean… Let them come to this side, and let’s go to the other side, but 
we had better live in two distinct states. Let’s make peace. There are also borders 
between Turkey and Greece. Why not between them and us? Let it be. Let it be, 
but in two separate parts. We’ll govern ourselves and they will govern 
themselves122 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).  
 
It should be noted here that these responses were given after the results of the two 
referenda on the Annan Plan that proposed a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in 
the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem; the interpretations of the 
respondents about the peace cresset might have been different before the referenda. Thus 
the past was evaluated in the present context. The majority of Greek Cypriots said ‘no’ to 
the Annan Plan and most of the Turkish Cypriots evaluated this situation as 
disappointing; many respondents interpret the peace cresset as directly related to the 
outcome of the referenda that were held in North and South Cyprus. These respondents 
believe that, especially after the referenda, the peace cresset has lost its meaning because 
                                                 
119 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  The local of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
120 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
121 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
122 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007 
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of the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan. The peace cresset thus mobilizes the 
negative attitude of some of the respondents towards the Greek Cypriots:   
 
After the referenda, I believe that we will see peace in such works, I am afraid not 
anywhere else123 (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).  
 
This was placed here to give the message of a prospective future to both sides but 
I think it is impossible. If it had been possible, it would have been realized by 
now, but there’s neither peace nor any hope for it124 (Duyal, female, aged 21, 
student). 
 
After the referenda, this sculpture doesn’t have any more meaning than an image 
of a tasteless vase for me (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV producer). 
 
The cresset, in which light was burning, later went ‘out of order’, in parallel with 
the reality in Cyprus125 (Mehmet, male, aged 20, student). 
 
It represents tranquillity and peace. It was placed there before the referendum. 
When you look at it now, you don’t get the same message as at that time. Now you 
don’t even notice it. To tell you frankly, it’s lost its meaning. It was important 
then; it meant something, but not any more126 (Selda, female, aged 49, radio 
reporter). 
 
However, some others still believe in the necessity of an agreement between the two 
communities after the referenda. Thus, the existence of the peace cresset represents their 
expectation, hope and desire for the peace, but at the same time, their silent fears of the 
future in the case of not achieving an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:  
 
As we haven’t reached an agreement, the monument preserves its validity there 
and our desire for peace still persists127 (Sevinc, female, aged 48, news speaker). 
 
There must be peace [stress]. And this is one of the symbols of it128 (Ayşe, female, 
aged 31, instructor). 
 
The peace cresset represents the need for peace and tranquillity. The need to 
pursue our life without living the same things, by taking lessons from our past 
history129 (Mustafa, male, aged 68, accountant). 
 
                                                 
123 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007 
124 In-depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
125 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House café, 30/08/2007 
126 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007 
127 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007 
128 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007 
129 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 16 August 2007 
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There are also respondents who criticise the politics of the new government (CTP) 
regarding the Cyprus issue and the reunification of the island; according to them, the 
politics of the new government does not represent the ideas of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Many respondents criticise the government for erecting a public artwork 
made by a Greek artist and evaluate the peace cresset with negative expressions, such as 
‘it doesn’t have a meaning’, ‘disgraceful’, ‘strange’ and ‘non-sensical’:  
 
Completely disgraceful [points to the peace cresset]. While there are lots of 
Turkish artists around, they had a Greek artist make it. This is trying to achieve 
unrest in the community rather than tranquillity. The expression is vague. Being at 
the road junction where the Turks and Greeks have been getting in touch after 
1974, intended to make people recall re-uniting of the island, but it means nothing 
at all. Artificial works of art130 (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).   
 
The peace cresset doesn’t have a meaning. I don’t believe that it will bring any 
result. They are similar to the bi-communal activities, and the festivals only 
represent a few people from both sides who are put together by CTP. They don’t 
represent the public131 (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee). 
I don’t know what it means…. They [the new government] have erected some 
strange things lately. There are things like this in Famagusta, the meaning of 
which I do not understand. Is it modern art? I don’t know132… (Alp, male, aged 
29, optician). 
There cannot be such nonsensical things in life. What has been done? It represents 
another political view. It won’t reflect the view of the whole of the people133 
(Tuna, male, aged 26, student). 
 
The peace cresset and sestas are the two transformative mechanisms of the government of 
CTP that highlight (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and support the Annan Plan. The 
interpretations of the respondents about the transformative strategies of CTP give crucial 
clues about how they locate themselves in terms of national identity and what their 
political ideas are in terms of future prospects of Northern Cyprus. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Unity, 20/8/2007 
131 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: office, 7/08/2007 
132 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
133 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
 154 
 
5.3.3 Museums, mass graves and martyrs’ cemeteries  
 
Museums, mass graves and martyrs’ cemeteries are forms of commemorations that play a 
substantial role in the fixity of the constructed ‘past’. Like the other forms of 
mechanisms, these places carry the memory of the ‘past’. When I interviewed the 
respondents, nearly all of them talked about the museum of Barbarism that school 
teachers had taken them to when they were studying in the third year of the primary 
school. These experiences of the respondents are structured through a kind of ritual and 
they experience liminality when they visit this place. As was stated in Chapter Two, 
liminality in the museum entails being outside of or betwixt and between the normal 
world. Duncan (1995) who borrows the concept of liminality from Turner has analysed 
the art museum as a ‘ritual site’: she argues that the combination of place and objects has 
to be seen in its totality as a script or dramatic field (Bouquet 2004:195). In a similar vein, 
in this part of the thesis, I analyse how the Museum of Barbarism can be seen as a script 
written by the dominant discourse (1974-2003).  
 The house of Dr. Nihat İlhan, a major serving in the Cyprus Turkish Contingent 
in 1963, was converted into the museum of Barbarism in 1966. The museum was repaired 
in 1975 in the Denktaş-UBP period. It is argued by the official discourse that the house 
was attacked by the Greek Cypriot terrorists; İlhan’s wife and three children were 
murdered in the bathroom and the landlady in the toilet, where they had tried to hide 
during the inter-communal troubles in 1963. Below are some photographs that I took in 
the museum of barbarism to show how the objects were collected together to articulate 
the visitors’ ideas about the others (Greek Cypriots).  
                                                             
        
Photograph 1                          Photograph 2                 Photograph 3 
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Photograph 4                               Photograph 5                             Photograph 6 
Figure 5.6 
The first photograph depicts the house that was converted into a museum. This is an 
ordinary Turkish Cypriot house in Nicosia on Martyr Mürüvvet İlhan Street; the name of 
İlhan’s wife was later given to the street as ‘Martyr’ Mürüvvet İlhan. At the entrance 
there is a broken door (Photograph 2). On the door is written: ‘the door that was broken 
that night and has been kept in its original form since then’. Photograph 3 shows shoes 
and clothes that are supposed to have been worn that night by the children, their mother 
and the landlady. On the photos there is a text: ‘properties belonging to Mürüvvet İlhan, 
her children and landlady Feride (The stains on the clothes are blood)’. These are 
exhibited in the hall. The fourth photograph depicts the painted picture of the mother and 
her three children who were murdered, lying in the bathroom. The painted picture is on 
the wall next to their ‘properties’. Photograph 5 shows the actual bathroom of the house 
with the blood of the dead still kept on it for exhibition purposes. Finally, the photograph 
6 shows the ceiling of the bathroom, covered with glass for protection and preservation. It 
is believed that there are pieces of the brains of the children and their mother stuck on the 
ceiling. 
  The museum being the actual house of the family, its sequenced spaces and 
arrangements, the objects (i.e., properties, the bathroom, the supposed pieces of brain, the 
broken door) and photographs (i.e., murdered young and old people and soldiers) on the 
walls of the house, provide both the stage set and script as in the ritual sites. It is 
organized to create the atmosphere that the visitors are actually in the house that night, 
although in fact they are not. This situation makes visitors experience liminality when 
they visit the museum. As was noted in Chapter Two, according to Turner, ‘transitional 
beings are neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere, and are at the very least 
‘betwixt and between’” all the recognized fixed points in space-time”. The Museum of 
Barbarism is organized to carry the visitors to the constructed ‘past’ about the Greek 
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Cypriots, and it mobilizes their emotions, such as fear and agony, during the liminal 
period. As Bouquet (2004:195) points out, visitors directly or vividly experience values 
and beliefs (about political identity) put on display for them by the museum.  
 The liminal period becomes associated with the idea of ambiguity; that is, the 
liminal position is uncertain, as it lies outside any possible social categorization (Gallego 
2002:146). Thus, when individuals go to the museum they might become remote from 
their daily lives for a while and experience the values of political identity/otherness. 
Furthermore, the museum, as one of the mechanisms of memory, mobilizes their feelings 
and emotions ‘when the individual, having completed the transition to his new status, 
returns to a relatively stable state’ (Kaplan 2002:160) with the ideas about the self (Turks) 
and others (Greeks). However, as Duncan (1995:13) argues, ‘people continually ‘misread’ 
or scramble or resist the museum’s cues to some extent. But then, the same is true of any 
situation in which a cultural product is performed or interpreted’.   
 When the respondents talk about the museum, it is interesting to see how the 
images of the ‘house’, ‘bathroom’, ‘brain pieces and the blood’ ‘photographs on the 
walls’, ‘properties of the children’ and ‘broken door’ appear in their narratives about the 
‘others’. This situation shows how the objects that lose their historical relevance during 
the process of museumization gain a new meaning in the memories of the respondents 
about Greek Cypriots. In the childhood memories of some of the respondents, Greek 
Cypriots are sometimes represented as ‘monstrous’ and ‘bad guys’. Thus Haluk, a 33 
year-old male secondary school English teacher, Zehra, a 26 year-old female shop 
assistant and Selen, a 29 year-old female TV presenter express their feelings after they 
went to this particular museum:  
 
In relation to the Museum of Barbarism, I mostly remember the pictures on the 
wall. They were the pictures of Turkish Cypriots who were shot and killed 
savagely. At that time, I don’t remember that I consciously thought about 
anything. I remember that I was terrified and shivered. Later, I created a monster 
in my imagination. I was in the third year [of school] and I didn’t know very much 
about Greeks. Moreover, as I hadn’t met any Greek people, I used to believe that 
they weren’t human beings but rather monstrous entities that were doing 
disastrous things and killing us. History textbooks also played a crucial role in 
forming my ideas about Greeks 134  
 
I was influenced by the Museum of Barbarism very badly. I remember the terrible 
pictures on the wall, the brain pieces of the children on the ceiling of the bathroom 
                                                 
134 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007 
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and the blood… I was 10 years old and after I went there, it’s funny, but I was 
thinking that all the bad guys are Greek Cypriots in the war films135  
 
When I was a child, I used to dream that the Greeks broke into our home. I sort of 
thought that the things that we read in the history book would take place again. 
Suddenly a war would break out again. The fighter planes would fly over our 
heads again and soon after this the Greeks would assault us. They would break 
open our doors and would shoot at us. Occasionally, when I entered the 
bathroom136, I would shudder. I didn’t want to close my eyes, I sort of had a 
feeling that the Greeks would arrive and kill me in the bathroom. Sometimes, I 
would dream about the people I disliked as Greek attackers. For example, I would 
dream about one of my teachers whom I disliked as a Greek soldier who came to 
our home to kill us137. 
 
The respondents narrated their memories of the ‘past’ in the present; in other words, they 
explained how they felt when they were 9 or 10 years old in the present contexts. The 
history textbook and the museum, which are the two mechanisms, work like a single body 
in the construction of negative feelings regarding Greek Cypriots; there is a consistent 
continuation of the narratives about Greek Cypriots from mechanism to mechanism. In 
this way, although these respondents never communicated with a Greek Cypriot before 
the division of the island, they had negative ideas and fears about them. Furthermore, 
some respondents talked about the martyrs’ cemeteries and mass graves that school 
teachers had taken them to. Like the museum of Barbarism, these places function to 
mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ by arousing their fears. This is 
illustrated when a 28 year- old female instructor, Melek, narrates her feelings on going to 
the Karaoğlanoğlu martyrs’ cemetery, and Ayşe explains what she thought when she went 
to the mass graves:  
 
When I went to the cemetery of the martyrs at the beach where the Turkish troops 
landed, I saw the marks of the bullets here and there and this took me drifting back 
to those days; I felt like I was living those days. I was horrified and agonised138 
(Melek, female, aged 28, instructor). 
 
When I went to the Muratağa, Sandallar-Atlılar mass graves… actually there isn’t 
so much to tell about those places. I remember the white stones and the names of 
the martyrs were written on them. However, there were a lot of names…I cannot 
imagine how a human being can kill so many innocent people and bury them in 
                                                 
135 In depth-interview, Alsancak: Domestic parlour, 28/08/2007 
 
137 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007 
138 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
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the same place. At least, I know that Greeks can do that139…(Ayşe, female, aged 
31, instructor)       
 
I also examined the oppositions between the narratives that are disseminated by the 
official history and the alternative public memories that encompass the family and the 
media (especially the newspapers). The official discourse is often challenged by the 
alternative media and family narratives; according to some of the interviewees, the 
narrations of their families and/or the media about the Greek Cypriots are more influential 
than the experiences that they get through the official history. This shows that the official 
mechanisms do not always speak the language of the respondents, as the responses of 
Berk, a 27- year-old male university instructor and Emine, a 52-year-old female retired 
official illustrate:  
 
Berk: I remember that when I was 10 years old, they took all third-year classes to 
the Museum of Barbarism. Girls were crying and I felt irritated by the pictures on 
the wall. However, I never thought that Greeks were bad because I always heard 
about the good memories of my family members with Greek Cypriots140 .  
 
Emine: After the 1963 event; the thing I remembered most was the slaughter of 
the children in the bath tub. They appeared on the newspapers in big pictures. But 
in our family conversations, I heard that such things had been over exaggerated. 
Furthermore, as students, they took us to the house which was converted into the 
Museum of Barbarism. They told us that the children’s brains were stuck on the 
ceiling. In fact there was something on the ceiling. I felt very sorry. For many 
years, when I heard the word brain, I felt as if I was going to vomit. I was affected 
very deeply. Later, I found out that all these were made-up stories because at the 
entrance, they showed us something supposed to be the brains, but the children 
were in the bathroom, so how could the brains be stuck on the ceiling of the living 
room?  
 
Interviewer: How did you find out that they were made-up stories? 
 
Emine: Later some news appeared in the newspapers. They wrote that it would be 
contrary to the facts, because the children were covered with a bed-cover, so how 
could the brains stick to the ceiling passing through the thick cloth?141.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007 
140 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
141 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
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5.3.4 History textbooks and the ‘others’/changing history textbooks, changing the 
‘others’ 
 
 In this part, I will consider the respondents’ interpretations of history, especially of the 
different history textbooks used in the schools during the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-
2003) and the period of the CTP government (2003-2008). Although the history 
textbooks, as one of the mechanisms, are produced to fix the ‘past’, neither the ‘past’ nor 
the history textbooks are permanent. The textbooks that narrate the ‘other’ are constantly 
rewritten in changing power relations. In this way, the narrations about the ‘others’ are 
also articulated and constructed. However, as only six years have elapsed since the 
introduction of the new history textbook in the schools, it is not possible to examine how 
the new textbook mobilizes meaning that articulates the respondents’ definition of their 
identity (self) and the ‘other’ in their everyday lives.  
School education is one of the critical factors in the formation of public memories 
in relation to identity. As Kearney points out (2003:91), ‘community schools are regarded 
as an important resource for many communities in terms of maintaining identity’. 
Generally, the respondent’s knowledge about the history comes from their school 
education. However, most of the respondents internalised the history-‘constructed past’ as 
the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. Thus, as Todorova (2004:5) states, “learning 
history itself is lived ‘experience’ that becomes part of memory”.  
Through the interviews, it became clear that starting with the primary schools, the 
discourse of the ruling group during the years 1974-2003 became highly influential in the 
articulation of memories about the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) through the official history 
(i.e history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition). As explained in Chapter 
Four, Greek Cypriots are mostly represented by the previous official history as the 
barbarians and murderers of a lot of Turks without any mercy in the 1963-1974 events; 
while Turks are represented as the saviours of Turkish Cypriots from their enemies, 
Greek Cypriots, in the ‘1974 Happy Peace Operation’: 
 
When people speak of the 20th of July, it reminds me of the Turkish Cypriots 
attainment of peace. And that we are an independent country… that we live 
independently of the Greeks. That the motherland Turkey saved us142… (Duyal, 
female, aged 21, student). 
 
                                                 
142 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
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When we look in the history textbooks, we can see that if they [the Turks] hadn’t 
arrived, we would have been killed one by one.  May be no one would be left 
behind143 (Ayşe, female, aged 31, instructor). 
 
We were saved as a result of the peace operation in 1974; therefore, 1974 is a 
turning point for the Turkish Cypriots144 (Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter) 
 
If we are alive today, we owe this to our motherland. If Turkey hadn’t come, we 
would have been in graves now like the people in the Muratağa and Sandallar 
graveyards. But fortunately we are alive and we have good life standards and 
salaries145 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).  
 
 The change of the ruling groups and the political system often bring with them the 
revision of textbook narratives. Sometimes history textbooks are revised to combat 
nationalism. In Northern Cyprus, the new government that came to power in 2003 
changed the history textbooks to reconstruct the ‘past’ in parallel with their political 
standpoint. The CTP government supports the re-unification of the island and so the 
official history textbook is revised according to this political understanding. In this way, 
the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is represented more positively than in the 
previous history textbook, in order to prepare the ground for a possible reunification. As 
mentioned earlier, in the new Cyprus history textbook, there is not so much emphasis on 
the periods of 1963-1974 and there are no photographs of Turks murdered by Greeks. The 
respondents’ ideas about the old and new history textbooks depict how they conceive the 
‘truths’ about the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots: 
 
I bought and read the current history books; I also read our history books when I 
was at high school. The history textbooks of today have nothing in common with 
the history books we used to read in our high-school years. In the previous history 
textbooks, there were things that you were really required to know and learn. My 
ideas can be different if I know the misconduct of the Greek Cypriots in 1963 or in 
1974 towards my people, who are from my blood, my race and my nation. The 
past events were explained in a more detailed way in the previous history books. 
In the present history textbooks, they cover topics related to what Cypriots ate and 
drank before 1974 instead of the events that were lived by Turkish Cypriots. 
Ancient wedding ceremonies etc. are narrated. Of course these can be reflected, 
but the present history books are completely biased146 (Memduh, male, aged 23, 
student). 
 
                                                 
143 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007 
144 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007  
145 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007 
146 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of the Ulusal Birlik Party , 24/7/2007 
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Our present minister of Education used the Greek History books as a resource for 
the new history books and did not use the information of our historians. They 
teach our youth a lot of incorrect things147 (Nurten, female, aged 60, retired 
history teacher).   
 
In the new history textbook there is information about the common life of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, such as their lifestyles; there is also geographical information about the 
island of Cyprus: 
 
The new history books…Well they treat the Cyprus issue through mentioning the 
Second World War, the process of de-colonization, self-determination, India such 
and such… I mean, the new history book deals with the Cyprus issue with a broad 
perspective. In this way, the new history books are very good in giving us 
information about what really happened in Cyprus. They also give importance to 
the social and cultural history of Cyprus148 (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).   
 
Our previous history books were really bad. The new books are better. They 
include the subjects about which we can say that they are part of the history of 
Cyprus. Such as the flowers that grow in Cyprus, the plants, the geography of 
Cyprus…I think this is the history of Cyprus149 (Ayten, female, aged 23, student).  
    
Furthermore, it is possible to examine the influence of the memories of the ‘past’ that 
comes through the autobiographical and/or public memories partly constructed by the 
official history in the narration of a single social individual. This situation depicts the 
complex functioning of memory as a contested territory that includes the ‘contested 
pasts’. The dialogue with Berk who is a 27-year old male instructor illustrates: 
 
Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did your family have 
any fears?  
 
Berk: Not at all. In their village, some Turkish and Greek Cypriots went on sentry 
duty together to prevent some people (belonging to EOKA or TMT) from 
attacking them. Besides, my grandmother used to say that the reason why they left 
their village before 1963 was the attack of some people belonging to TMT.  
 
Interviewer: Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears? 
 
Berk: Of course they had. For a while; think about a group of people who were 
more than your population and shouting for ‘ENOSIS’ 150. 
 
                                                 
147 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 21/09/2007 
148 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
149 In -depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007 
150 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of CTP, 7/08/2007 
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As Berk was born after the division of the island, it is not possible for him to answer these 
questions by using his autobiographical memory. Therefore, his memory of the ‘past’ is 
constructed through the official history and/or other public narratives (i.e close 
environment, family, media). In Berk’s answers to the first and second questions it is 
possible to see the contradictions in his memory about the ‘past’ of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots that is articulated through different narratives. In his answer to the first question, 
the alternative public narratives (i.e family as one of the source of public memories) play 
a role in the articulation of his ideas about the ‘past’ of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thus 
he says that his family had not had any fears of living with Greek Cypriots before 1974. 
However, when he answers the second question he says that Turkish Cypriots had fears as 
a community. Emine, a 52-year retired official, answers the question as follows:   
 
Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family 
have any fears? 
 
Emine: After 1963, we left Kaymaklı and settled in municipality houses. After 
that, we didn’t meet with the Greeks any more but when the barricades were lifted 
in 1967, my friend and I would go to the Greek sector of the city and do some 
shopping. Two girls, by ourselves, we didn’t feel any fear at all and went 
shopping. When I was 16 we would sometimes go to the disco with my fiancé. We 
thought we could always be friends with them, we could dance with them. 
 
Interviewer: Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears? 
 
Emine: The majority was afraid; I remember this from the newspapers. We also 
followed the Denktas–Makarios negotiations in the newspapers. After the 1963 
event, the thing I remembered most was the slaughter of the children in the 
bathtub. They appeared in the newspapers in big pictures. But, in our family 
conversations, I heard that such things had been over exaggerated. Later some 
news appeared in the newspapers151.  
 
In Emine’s narrative, a particular newspaper that was parallel to the official discourse in 
the period (1974-2003) articulates the memory of the past about Turkish Cypriots as a 
community. Also, her autobiographical memories and her family’s alternative narratives 
present a different version of the past. Tezcan, a 30 year-old male who works in a tourism 
agency, comments:         
 
Tezcan: I used to view events as in the history books I read at middle school and 
high school. In addition my grandmother and grandfather would consider Greeks 
                                                 
151 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri:Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
 163 
 
as inhumane. The elderly who survived the clashes and worried about their lives 
and future look at the Greeks through different glasses. When I grew up, I started 
to believe that it was not only the Greeks who were to blame but Turks as well. 
Media have played a crucial role in the transformation of my ideas152. 
 
In Tezcan’s case, it is possible to see the parallel discourse of his family and the official 
history about the ‘past’ that narrates Greeks as ‘enemies’. However, Tezcan talks about 
his changing views about Greeks, which might show how the alternative public narratives 
can cause the articulation and transformation of his ideas about them. The dialogue with 
Hasan, a 60- year- old male retired teacher provides an additional perspective: 
 
Interviewer: Is there any martyr in your family or close environment? 
 
Hasan:  Yes. My father.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think about this situation? 
 
Hasan: When my father died in the 1963 war and became a martyr, I never 
accused Greeks. I had evaluated this situation as a kind of job accident, and I said 
‘yes’ in the referendum as I want peace in my country153. 
 
Interviewer: Well…What about your family members…Your parents… What 
were they telling you about Greek Cypriots? 
 
Hasan: My mother was a poet. She wrote love poems. In her poems, she generally 
depicted the Greek and Turkish lovers who weren’t able to come together as a 
result of the death of one of them154.  
 
Although Hasan says that his father is a ‘martyr’155 he also says that he conceives his 
father’s death in the Cyprus war as a kind of job accident. Thus, he fills the meaning of 
‘martyrdom’ in a completely different way from the official discourse. One can observe 
                                                 
152 In-depth interview, Saray Önü: Tourism office, 07/08/2007  
153 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 23/09/2007 
154 In-depth interview, Girne: Domestic parlour, 23/09/2007 
155 A ‘martyr’ is a person who is believed to have been killed by Greeks or Greek Cypriots in the Cyprus 
war. It is a common and legitimate term for Turkish Cypriots and it is frequently used in history textbooks, 
especially during the 1974-2003 period of the official discourse. Martrydom is a highy sacred position in 
the Muslim religion and it is articulated into the discourse of Turkish nationalism.  
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the role of the alternative public memories (i.e narratives of his family members) in the 
articulation of his ideas about Greek Cypriots.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines how the official history, which includes the official mechanisms 
(history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations) mobilizes, articulates and 
constructs the memories of the respondents in relation to national identity. The official 
mechanisms are articulated differently according to the dominant discourses in the 
Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003) and in the period of the CTP government (2003-2009) 
in Northern Cyprus. In the Denktaş-UBP period, the dominant discourse was Turkish 
(cypriot) nationalism/identity. On the other hand, in the period of the CTP government, 
the dominant discourse was (turkish) Cypriot nationalism.    
 The interpretations of the respondents about the official mechanisms that were 
produced differently in two different periods depict how the official history sustains the 
discourses of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism/identity and (turkish) Cypriot 
nationalism/identity. However, I also show that the official histories are highly negotiated 
and challenged by the alternative narratives that are crucial for the historiographical 
knowledge; the official mechanisms do not always speak the language of the respondents. 
In this chapter, the approach of Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) on different 
types of macro-strategies (constructive and destructive strategies and strategies of 
justification, perpetuation and transformation) in the discursive formation of national 
identity played the main role in my analysis of the narratives of the respondents.  
 I also explored how the history textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, myths, 
national anthem) and commemorations (monuments, museums, public arts, national days, 
martyrs cemeteries, mass graves) that were produced in the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-
2003) function to mobilize, articulate and construct the memories of the respondents 
about Turkish (cypriot) identity. The flags of Turkey and the TRNC are the main symbols 
of tradition that sustain Turkish (cypriot) nationalism; they reproduce the argument of 
motherland (Turkey)/babyland (TRNC) that supports the similarity, unity and cooperation 
between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. According to the argument, Turkey as the 
motherland defends the TRNC, its babyland, from the others (Greek Cypriots). However, 
the interpretations of the respondents about the flags vary according to the nodal points 
they adopt.  
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 The respondents who adopt the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism 
evaluate the flags as our ‘flags’ and conceive them as representations of the victory and 
confidence of Turks. According to these respondents, the flag of the TRNC represents the 
‘freedom’ and independency/sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots that was gained with the 
support of the motherland Turkey; the two flags together represent the unity and 
cooperation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. In these expressions, the strategies of 
construction function to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity which is based on the 
similarities and unity between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, so the respondents support the 
argument that the continuation of the political unity of Turks and Turkish Cypriots is 
necessary for the security, freedom, independency and sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots. 
The respondents’ commitment to the Turkish nation and identity and their positive 
attitude towards the status quo function as a strategy to justify the present situation (the 
position of Turkey in Northern Cyprus).    
 On the other hand, the respondents who adopted the discourse of (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism exclude the flags as ‘their’ (Turks) flags and conceive them as the 
representation of borders and thus, the division of the island, political and economic 
dependency on Turkey and Turkey’s occupation of the island, complexities/weakness 
(i.e., the TRNC’s being an unrecognized country, its isolation from the world), violence 
(i.e., flags were erected after the Cyprus war) and the economic problems /embargoes 
caused by the political situation in Northern Cyprus. The respondents’ emphasis on the 
problems in the TRNC points to their desire for a necessary difference between now and 
the future, that operates as a transformative strategy. This strategy functions to transform 
the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity based on the participation of 
the Turkish Cypriots in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem. The 
flags also mobilize the ideas on the differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks (i.e., 
differences on the common cultural heritage and kinship). The respondents’ emphasis on 
these differences is one of the strategies that operate to dismantle the Turkish (cypriot) 
identity based on the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. 
 Moreover, monuments that symbolize either Atatürk or martyrs of Northern 
Cyprus are the crucial forms of commemorations in the Denktaş-UBP period. According 
to the official history of this period, Atatürk, the founder and the first President of the 
Turkish Republic, represents Turkishness and is the symbol of courage, patriotism and 
heroism. The symbol of Atatürk plays a major role in the reproduction of Turkish 
(cypriot) identity. The statement below the monument is ‘How happy to say I am a Turk’; 
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parallel to this statement and the narratives of the official history, the symbol operates as 
a Turkish role model and mobilizes the respondents’ feelings of bravery, courage, 
strength and self-confidence. Hence the symbol of Atatürk functions as a tradition 
providing guidance about how to be a Turk and thus, how a Turkish (cypriot) should be. 
The other mechanisms also play a role in carrying the symbol of Atatürk by entering into 
social lives through social practices and narrations (i.e., celebrating national days, hearing 
and singing the national anthem, seeing flags in the streets). Although Atatürk has no 
connection with the Cyprus problem, many respondents conceive him as the defender and 
the symbol of survival of Turkish Cypriots. This shows how the symbol of Atatürk leaks 
into everyday lives and attaches itself to the political lives of the respondents through the 
mechanisms. However, there are also a variety of alternative narratives about Atatürk; 
except for a few narratives, these are different degrees of reworking of the myth of 
Atatürk. 
  Although the monument of Atatürk mobilizes ideas about ‘who the Turkish 
Cypriots are’, the monument of the martyr functions to construct the idea about ‘who the 
others are’. The statement below the monument, ‘we will never forget’, recalls the past 
that was about the Cyprus war and the people who died in the war. Many respondents 
interpret the monument as a true reflection of the past; according to them, remembering 
the ‘past’ is a way of knowing their enemies and protecting themselves. These 
interpretations show how this monument reproduces the ‘past’ that was constructed by the 
official history. In the narratives of the respondents, the strategies of defence and 
avoidance function to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the 
‘others’. However, the monument also mobilizes counter memories: many respondents 
said that they want to forget these events that are reflected through the monuments, in 
order to achieve peace with Greek Cypriots. In these cases, the transformative strategies 
function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that 
focuses on the common future of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU. Furthermore, 
some of the respondents criticised Turks in relation to the martyrs. Their criticisms 
function as a strategy that dissolves the existing chains of equivalence between Turks and 
Turkish Cypriots for the articulation of (turkish) Cypriot identity that highlights the 
differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Similarly, in some of the narratives, the 
strategies of sameness function to create similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
(i.e., the respondents’ emphasis on the common monuments and pictures of the two 
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communities about the martyrs). This strategy also functions to construct (turkish) 
Cypriot identity that focuses on the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.   
 The official discourse (1974-2003) constructed Turkish (cypriot) identity by 
producing a sharply antagonistic relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 
However, the government of CTP highlighted the (turkish) Cypriot identity and thus 
emphasized the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Sestas and the Peace 
Cresset are the public artworks that were placed in the CTP period. Sestas, symbolising 
common traditional items used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat on, 
represent the similar ways of life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they used to live 
together. In the narratives of the respondents, I showed that Sestas mobilize the 
alternative ‘past’ which is based on a united Cyprus and Cypriotness. However, there are 
some respondents who oppose the politics of the CTP government and evaluate Sestas as 
meaningless and artificial symbols. According to them, the government is trying to 
misrepresent the ‘past’, as it is not possible to talk about the common ‘past’ and common 
daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the interpretations of the respondents, the 
memories about the ‘past’ function as a nodal point around which Sestas acquire their 
meaning from their relationship to the ‘past’. 
 Similarly, the peace cresset symbolises the lighting of fires in the villages at the 
time of the referendum as an affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan. I illustrated how the 
peace cresset mobilizes the ideas of the respondents about the peace and how it articulates 
their expectations about the future regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus. 
Many respondents evaluate ‘peace’ as the unification of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. On 
the other hand, there are alternative narratives of the respondents about the ‘peace’; peace 
can mean the separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The peace cresset and sestas that 
are the transformative mechanisms of the CTP government operate to transform the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that focuses on the similarities 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. While Sestas signify the common past of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots and thus the commonalities between them, the peace cresset mobilizes 
the ideas about a common future of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU under the 
framework of the Annan Plan.   
 Museums, mass graves and martyrs’ cemeteries are the other forms of 
commemorations that mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ by arousing 
their fears. Nearly all of the respondents talked about the museum of Barbarism that 
school teachers had taken them to. The museum can be seen as a script which is written 
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by the dominant discourse (1974-2003). In this part of the chapter, I examined how the 
objects in the museum lose their historical relevance during the process of museumisation 
and gain a new meaning in the memories of the respondents about Greek Cypriots. I 
explored how the museum mobilizes the negative ideas and fears of the respondents who 
never communicated with a Greek Cypriot before the division of the island. However, the 
official discourse about the museum is often challenged by the alternative media and 
family narratives.  
 The history textbook is the other mechanism that narrates the ‘others’. History 
textbooks were rewritten in the period of the CTP government that supported the 
reunification of the island. In the subsequent textbook, the past between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots was represented more positively than in the previous history textbook in 
order to prepare the ground for a possible reunification. Hence, the narrations about the 
‘others’ were articulated and constructed in changing power relations. The respondents’ 
ideas about the old and new history textbooks show how they conceive the ‘truths’ about 
the past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. I showed that most of the respondents 
internalize the official history (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) 
that was produced between 1974-2003, as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. Parallel 
to the official history, they narrate Greek Cypriots as the murderers of a lot of Turks 
without any mercy in the 1963-1974 events. At the same time, they narrate Turks as the 
saviours of Turkish Cypriots from their enemies (Greek Cypriots) in the ‘1974 Happy 
Peace Operation’. However, as only six years have elapsed since the introduction of the 
new history textbook, it is not possible to consider how the new textbook mobilises 
meaning that articulates the definitions of the respondents about the ‘others’. In this 
chapter, I also explored the inconsistencies in the memories of single social individuals 
about the same period of time in history. This situation shows that memory is a contested 
territory of autobiographical and public memories, partly constructed by the official 
history.       
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CHAPTER 6: SITES OF MEMORY − MEDIA, HISTORY 
TEXTBOOKS, SYMBOLS OF TRADITION AND 
COMMEMORATIONS  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The primary focus of this chapter is on the function of the media in the articulation and 
construction of memories in relation to national identity. Media as one of the mechanisms 
of memory was not included in the previous chapter, which dealt with the official 
mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations and symbols of tradition). 
Thus, this chapter takes further the arguments developed in Chapter Five. The reason for 
my division of the examination of the mechanisms of memory into two separate chapters 
is the different role of the media from the official mechanisms analysed in the previous 
chapter. It is possible to differentiate the media’s function from the official mechanisms 
in two main aspects. Firstly, although history textbooks, symbols of tradition and 
commemorations are produced by the ruling groups and it is not possible to talk about 
their alternatives within the period of the dominance of the ruling group, media are more 
independent in terms of their organic relationship with the ruling groups. However, this 
does not mean that media do not represent the dominant discourses within a society. As 
was stated in Chapter Two, most of the time media play a substantial role in the 
dissemination of the discourses of the ruling groups. Thus, they can be used by the ruling 
groups for their political ends. Another aspect which differentiates media from the official 
mechanisms is that they have a peculiar function in representing the official mechanisms 
− history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations. The representation of the 
media adds a different dimension to the function of these mechanisms. Generally, the 
mechanisms are represented in parallel with the political standpoints of the media 
institutions.   
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, I examine how 
the media (particularly the newspapers) as one of the mechanisms mobilize the political 
ideas of the respondents that construct and are constructed by their memories in relation 
to national identity. My aim is to explore how respondents use the ‘information’ provided 
by the media (particularly the newspapers) in their everyday lives. The media was the 
main source of information of the Turkish Cypriots about the Cyprus problem after the 
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division of the island in 1974, as there was no possibility of communicating with Greek 
Cypriots; communication between the two communities was established through the 
media after 1974. In the first part of this section, I observe the interrelationship between 
the newspaper reading habits and political views of the respondents; and in the second 
part I examine the interpretations of the respondents regarding the news stories in Kıbrıs 
and Volkan. As was noted in Chapter Three, I formed the sample with the individuals 
who buy and read at least one of the selected national newspapers (Kıbrıs or Volkan) 
every day. I explained the reasons behind my selection of these particular newspapers in 
Chapter Three. In the third part of this section I explore how the media mobilize the 
political ideas of the respondents about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan. When the Annan Plan was 
presented by Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2002, it was the media that provided 
information to the public about the Plan and the European Union as there was no 
possibility for the majority of the respondents to read the original English version, which 
runs to thousands of pages. Because of this situation, the majority of the respondents got 
their information about the Annan Plan through the media. It should be noted here that 
without the solution of the Cyprus problem, it is not possible for Northern Cyprus to join 
the European Union; the subjects of the Annan Plan, the European Union and the Cyprus 
problem are closely related to each other and therefore they are not analysed separately in 
the narratives of the respondents.  
In the second section of the chapter, I explore the different functions of the 
mechanisms of memory − media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition and 
commemorations − in the memories of the respondents. Thus, in the first part, I observe 
how the mechanisms operate as a single body through the social practices and media 
events. In the second part, I examine how the narratives of the ‘past’ that are disseminated 
by the ‘mechanisms of memory’ are adapted to the uses of the present in the memories of 
the respondents. I observe the respondents’ struggle to overcome the inconsistencies that 
threaten the partial fixity of their memories which are parallel to the dominant public 
memory between 1974-2003; and I scrutinize the myths (one of the symbols of tradition) 
that are reproduced in the ontological narratives of the respondents in order to serve like a 
‘shield’ for the total fixity of their memories.  
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6.2 Section one: Media and the ‘others’ − Narratives on the Cyprus problem, the 
Annan Plan and the European Union  
 
Narratives of the official mechanisms of memory, families, close environment and school 
education were the sources of knowledge/memory of the Turkish Cypriots about the 
‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) from the division of the island in 1974 till the partial opening of 
the crossings in 2003. However, the media was the only mechanism through which the 
individuals got ‘present’ information about the Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem, the 
Annan Plan and the European Union. In the first part, I explore the interrelationship 
amongst the reading habits, past experiences and political ideas of the respondents. In the 
second part, I examine how particular newspapers represent Greek Cypriots after the 
partial opening of the crossings; I observe how the newspapers articulate and construct 
the present information about Greek Cypriots through their representations of the ‘past’ 
for the future. In these two parts of the chapter, I focus on newspaper discourses. Because 
of their variety, newspapers were the most popular media of the period within the scope 
of this research. However, it was not possible to see that variety in the television industry. 
In Northern Cyprus, there is only one national television channel, run by the government, 
and there are five regional television channels. The regional television channels do not 
broadcast to the whole country. During the referendum period, each national newspaper 
produced different and sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’. Hence, the 
newspapers played a crucial role in the construction and articulation of memories in 
relation to national identity, as their variety caused the creation of a dynamic process, 
which is necessary for the articulation of discourses. In the third part, I focus on the 
narratives of the respondents about the Cyprus Problem, the Annan Plan and the 
European Union.  
 
6.2.1 Part one: Reading habits, past experiences and political ideas 
 
At the beginning of this part of the analysis, I examine how respondents use and evaluate 
the newspaper information in their daily lives and what their reading habits are. 
Furthermore, I explore the role of their ‘past experiences’ in their decisions about the 
truthfulness of the ‘information’ given by the newspapers. Then I focus on the media’s 
function in bringing the ‘past’ and present information to the agenda according to their 
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political discourse and I examine how they mobilize the ideas of the respondents about 
the others (Greek Cypriots and/or Turks) through their representations. 
  When I asked the respondents what their favourite newspapers were and why they 
preferred to read these particular newspapers, most of them said that they preferred to buy 
and read the newspapers that were close to their political ideas. In this sense, most of the 
respondents define the newspapers that they prefer to read as more objective when 
compared to the other national newspapers. On the other hand, the respondents evaluate 
the newspapers that are not close to their political ideas as subjective and biased; these 
newspapers mostly ‘do not tell the truths’:   
 
Nevruz: I don’t read Volkan newspaper because it looks biased to me. It is 
obvious what it is trying to achieve.   
Interviewer: In your view, what is it trying to do?  
Nevruz: well….ummm…it’s trying to impede the peace process. It tries to 
convince us that the Greeks are harmful. I mean, let there be no peace and let us 
not expand to the rest of the world. They stick to the philosophy that the ultimate 
friend of a Turk is another fellow Turkish man. I believe that anyone can be 
anyone’s friend. I don’t discriminate a Greek from a Turk. As my thoughts are in 
this direction, I get irritated when I read this newspaper.  
Interviewer: Are there newspapers that offer distorted accounts of past and 
present; and disorient Turkish Cypriots? 
Nevruz: Yes. Volkan newspaper is one of them156 (female, aged 22, female 
beautician). 
 
 
I believe what the Volkan newspaper writes because it writes exactly parallel to 
what I hear in my close environment157 (Duyal, female, aged 21, student). 
 
The newspapers like Volkan, Vatan or Güneş distort the facts about the past. They 
all write to inflame enmity. In the end, the past remains in the past. It will bring no 
gains to anyone who tries to keep the past alive and instil enmity in people158 
(Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter).  
 
I prefer to read Kıbrıs and Yenidüzen newspapers, as they are more close to my 
political ideas. Also, I believe that these newspapers are more objective159 (Berk, 
male, aged 27, instructor). 
 
For me, Kıbrıs newspaper is biased. If we take the assumption that the Turks were 
attacked by the Greek side, I am sure that the newspaper does not publish this kind 
                                                 
156 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
157 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
158 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007 
159 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
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of news as it might harm the political party that it supports160 (Yusuf, male, aged 
30, official). 
 
Kıbrıs newspaper reflects the past as what it is. I mean as objective161 (Mustafa, 
male, aged 29, Warehouseman).  
 
Some events are published in newspapers intentionally to distort the truth. For 
example, Kıbrıs newspaper published a statement that during the Turkish 
invasions some Turks were killed by their fellow fighters. They might have been 
killed by mistake. But to publish this in the newspapers on purpose is a big 
mistake. In all wars you can kill your own friend by mistake. But to reflect this 
wrongly or to say that this happened on purpose is quite erroneous162 (Makbule, 
female, aged 61, journalist). 
 
When I asked the respondents if they trusted the news media and how they determined if 
a news story represented truths or lies, most of them answered that they generally didn’t 
trust the news media and they determined if a news story represented truths or lies by 
reading as many newspapers as possible and/or comparing the information given by the 
news story with their ‘past experiences’:  
 
I can’t say that I trust the newspapers. There are paraphrased pieces of news. 
Every newspaper writes according to its publishing policy. The newspapers that I 
read most are Kibris and Yenidüzen. I read them as these newspapers reflect two 
distinct views of the Turkish Cypriot community and I synthesize to reach the 
correct information163 (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism employee). 
 
Newspapers comment on events according to their publishing policies. I evaluate 
whether they write the truths or lies by the experience I have gone through164 
(Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).  
 
I decide upon the truth of a piece of news by listening to other channels and 
comparing with previous experiences of mine165 (Arif, male, aged 86, retired 
counsellor). 
 
To decide if a piece of news is right or wrong, I take into consideration the events 
I experienced. If a newspaper publishes the events differently than I lived them, I 
lose faith in that newspaper166 (Emete, female, aged 54, retired official). 
 
                                                 
160 In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007 
161 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 26/07/2007 
162 In-depth interview, Göçmenköy: Domestic parlour, 1/01/2007   
163In depth-interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic parlour, 18/09/2007  
164 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007 
165 In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007 
166 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 25.July 2007 
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Most of the time the respondents interpret what they read according to their ‘past 
experiences’. However, what is important here is to examine how the media narratives 
function and play the main role in the mobilization of memories as they bring up the ‘past 
experience’ that is selected according to the political discourse of the medium. These 
narratives allow the respondents to get the ‘experience’ back through overcoming ‘space’ 
and ‘time’ barriers. Thus the media play a functional role in bringing out the ‘past’ into 
the present and making it be remembered in parallel with its discourse that is shaped in 
power relations. In this process, the media empowers its discourse through the 
representation of the official history (i.e commemorations, symbols of tradition) 
paralleling its political standpoint. Media try to control the way respondents make sense 
of information through their selected representation of an event; they fill the gap between 
what is forgotten and what is remembered in parallel with their discourse. Thus, although 
the respondents interpret what is true and what is wrong according to their own memories 
and ‘past experiences’, the media they regularly follow provide the necessary elements 
for them to reproduce, strengthen or transform their memories. Thus for Esra, a 62- year-
old female retired primary school teacher,  
 
The Greeks try to convert everything to suit their own benefits. The other day, a 
man from Murataga village was in the Volkan newspaper mourning for his 
beloved ones. The event was reflected in a Greek newspaper in Greece as ‘The 
Greeks slaughtered by Turks’. They are distorting the facts. The man, in fact, was 
my uncle. I heard that about 23 days later, they apologised and said that it was the 
the Greeks that killed the Turks … in short, the Greeks try to distort facts to meet 
their needs167.  
 
The news story in Volkan about the Muratağa village,168 one of the commemorative 
locations, sustains the negative stereotypes about Greeks as untrustworthy and 
treacherous in Esra’s memories. Thus, although the Greek newspaper apologises for 
publishing the wrong news, Esra interprets that news story as the effort of Greeks to use 
everything for their advantage because of the selected ‘information’ provided by Volkan 
newspaper. However, in the memory of another respondent whose name is Sevinç, one 
can see how a particular newspaper provides an alternative narrative about the ‘Museum 
of Barbarism’, another commemorative location. This alternative narrative plays a role in 
                                                 
167 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007 
168 In Muratağa village there is one of the mass graves of Turkish Cypriots who are reported to have been 
murdered and buried by Greeks.  
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the transformation of Sevinç’s memory about Greek Cypriots that comes from her school 
education. According to Sevinç, a 48-year-old female news reader,  
 
Sevinç: I remember we went to the Museum of Barbarism when we were at 
school. Then, I thought this was an evil act committed by the Greeks. But later I 
found out the reality. The event was acted out as a scenario. When I learned that 
the organised display of the corpses of the children in the bathtub was made by the 
Turkish fanatics, I felt no sentiment. 
 
Interviewer: Where did you get this information? 
 
Sevinç: I got this information from Afrika newspaper. However, in the history 
textbooks, we had learned that they were Turks that were killed by Greeks without 
any mercy169.  
           
It would be an oversimplification to claim that a sole news story changed Sevinç’s or any 
other respondent’s memory about Greek Cypriots or Turks. However, what is important 
here is to know that while the news story does not change Sevinç’s ideas about the Greek 
Cypriots, it might help in the formation of the elements that are necessary for dissolving 
the existing chains of equivalence between Turkish Cypriots and Turks that institute a 
political frontier between two antagonistic poles (Greek and Turkish Cypriots). In this 
respect, media narratives can play a crucial role in the construction of the social tie or 
antagonistic relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turks and Turkish 
Cypriots. 
Media narratives may arouse fear about Greek Cypriots or Turks by shaping the 
experiences of the respondents about the present events. Thus it can be claimed that most 
of the time, the respondents’ interpretations of the ‘others’ or a particular event are not the 
outcome of what the respondents personally lived, but what they experience through the 
social remembering that is partly constructed by the media:  
 
We wouldn’t lock our doors even in the period when we lived together with the 
Greeks. On summer nights, we would sleep on the rooftops. But now, we take 
every possible precaution; there isn’t any single day or night without theft. The 
other day I read in the newspaper… That the majority of the prisoners are the 
Turkish citizens. Cypriots are about 80 people. The rest are Turkish Citizens. 
Cypriots’ offences are different in nature: petty crimes. But amongst the Turks, 
it’s killing, rape, and such... they irritate us more than the Greeks used to. They 
prevent us from moving freely in our homes or gardens170 (Kemal, male, aged 51, 
tyre dealer expert). 
                                                 
169 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007 
170 In depth-interview, Yenişehir: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
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Most of the Turks who came from Turkey are the people who couldn’t even 
manage to live in their own country. They come here and work in the building 
sites; they do the robberies and kill people for money. We read such events in the 
newspapers every day171 (Ozen, female, aged 29, TV presenter).     
 
 
Media mobilize meaning that articulates the discourse about Turks from Turkey as 
‘others’ through its representations. The news stories about Turks as thieves and killers 
construct negative stereotypes about Turks as dangerous and savage people and thus 
locate them as a ‘threat’ to the security of Turkish Cypriots. Thus the media provide 
elements that function to divide Turks and Turkish Cypriots into two opposed camps. In a 
similar way, media function to mobilize meaning that articulates Greek Cypriots as a 
‘threat’ for the security of Turkish Cypriots. However, this time the threat to security 
comes from the outside, not the inside of the society:  
 
It is now well known that Greece keeps most of its military weapons on the Greek 
side of the island. The Greek side own very deadly weapons. We often read about 
these in the news. So long as these weapons are not cleaned out, it is not right for 
us to join the EU together with the Greeks172 (Ayşe, female, aged 31, university 
instructor). 
 
If we join the EU, we can still have clashes between the Greek and the Turkish 
individuals. We watch these in the news anyway. For example, when it is 20th 
July we witness that the Greeks always go out on provocations. These things 
might happen again because the ground is not suitable for a lasting solution173 
(Meltem, aged 22, housewife).    
 
We always hear from the media that the Greeks want no agreement174 (Emine, 
female, aged 63, retired teacher). 
         
 
Ezgi: The Greeks’ enmity towards Turks surpasses our enmity towards them. In 
other words, there are more people among them that hate the Turks.  
Interviewer: How you know this? 
Ezgi: From the media175 (male, aged 20, student).  
 
 
In the interpretations of the respondents above, it can be seen how the media reproduce 
the discourse of the public memory about Greeks/Greek Cypriots that was dominant in 
the Denktaş-UBP period. In this way, media mobilize meaning that sustains the 
                                                 
171 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs TV, 15/8/2007 
172 In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Kyrenia American University, 28/07/2007 
173 In-depth interview, Magusa: domestic parlour, 31/07/2007 
174 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 30 September 2007 
175 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa, 1/9/2007 
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‘constructed past’ about Greeks/Greek Cypriots through its selective representation of the 
present situation. When Ayşe says “The Greek side own very deadly weapons”, Emine 
Says “We always hear from the media that the Greeks want no agreement”, Meltem says 
“the Greeks always go out on provocations” and Ezgi says “there are more people among 
them (Greeks) that hate the Turks” one can hear the voice of the ‘constructed past’ that 
represents Greeks/Greek Cypriots as the enemies who pose a threat to the security of 
Turks. In this way, media representations arouse anxiety and fear about a possible 
recurrence of the Cyprus war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the news stories 
are framed to stimulate associations for remembering the constructed ‘past’ in the present. 
Thus it can be argued that most of the time, the ideas of the respondents about the future 
prospects of Northern Cyprus are shaped in the light of the present information; the 
‘present information’ can function as an element in the articulation and construction of 
the political ideas of the respondents.  
As the media play a role in providing elements that construct the ideas of the 
respondents about Greeks/Greek Cypriots, in the following part of this chapter my aim is 
to focus on particular news stories, in order to examine how they provide the elements 
that mobilize the emotions and ideas of the respondents about their national identity and 
thus, about the ‘others’. 
 
6.2.2 Part two: Representation of memories in relation to national identity: The 
articulation of the ‘past’ in the present for the future 
  
In this section, I analyse the narratives of the respondents about the news stories that were 
published in Kıbrıs176 and Volkan177 newspapers after the partial opening of the crossings 
on 23rd April 2003. The partial opening of the crossings was the first radical development 
on the way of unification of the island after the division in 1974. After the opening of the 
                                                 
176Kıbrıs newspaper supports the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union through a 
solution under the framework of the Annan Plan. The newspaper highlights the (turkish) Cypriot 
nationalism and it can be roughly classified as on the left of the political spectrum. Within the period of this 
analysis, the discourse of the newspaper was parallel to the discourse of the CTP government that came to 
power in 2003. The CTP government is strongly in favour of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union.  
 
177Volkan newspaper does not support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union. The 
newspaper underlines the Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse and it can be classified as on the right of 
the political spectrum. Although the newspaper belongs to no political party, it has supported the ideas of 
the first president, Denktaş, starting from the establishment of the newspaper. 
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crossings, Turkish and Greek Cypriots obtained permission to cross the boundaries for the 
first time after 1974 and people had the chance to visit their former homes, places of 
employment, and commemorative locations or meet those from whom they had been 
apart since 1974. This radical development was represented in the newspapers to mobilize 
the memories of coexistence or/and separation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The 
event of the ‘opening of the crossings’ did not only remove physical boundaries but raised 
crucial questions about memories in relation to national identity and thus, the ‘others’. 
Bhabba’s (1990:7) questions are useful for explaining the various questions in Turkish 
Cypriots’ memories during this period: “When did we become ‘a people’? When did we 
stop being one? Or are we in the process of becoming one? What do these big questions 
have to do with our intimate relationships with each other and with others?”  
  The event of the ‘opening of the crossings’ plays a key role between the past and 
present in that they both shed light on the future. Depending on the political discourse of 
the newspapers, the ‘past’ could be represented as a period of time that is longed for or a 
period that it is wished one never lived. As was stated in Chapter Two, media have a 
peculiar function in bringing the past and future to the present. Hence, they have the 
capacity to provide information about the ‘present’ by articulating the ‘past’ and ‘future’. 
The media appeal to the official and alternative histories in the construction of news 
stories; thus my aim here is to examine how the news stories and/ or news photographs 
mobilize meaning that construct and articulate ideas about the past, present and future.  
In this section I analyse the respondents interpretations about the three news 
stories with six photographs from Kıbrıs newspaper and one news story with six 
photographs from Volkan newspaper. The selected news stories were published within 
two months after the opening of the crossings on 23rd April 2003. The news stories are 
about the visits of Turkish Cypriots to the South and Greek Cypriots to the North of 
Cyprus after the opening of the crossings. The newspapers do not cover the same events 
about the visits, because each newspaper tries to construct the past and present in parallel 
to its political discourse; each publishes a news story about a different event after the 
opening of the crossings.     
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6.2.2.1 Interpretations of the respondents about the news stories of Kıbrıs 
newspaper 
                                                        
                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          Figure 6.1             (25 April 2003 p.2) 
 
The image above shows three short news stories and photographs on the same page in 
Kıbrıs newspaper that were published on the second and third days after the partial 
opening of the crossings. The headlines of the news stories are as follows: Headline one: 
“Kuzey’den Güney’e aile fotoğraflarıyla döndüler” (They returned from the North to the 
South with their family photographs); Headline two: “74 sonrası doğan Kullos ailesinin 
evini ziyaret etti” (Kullos who was born after 1974 visited her family’s home); Headline 
three: “Rum hemşire, 29 yıl sonra eski işyerinde” (The Greek nurse in her former place of 
employment after 29 years). In these news stories and photographs, Kıbrıs newspaper 
presents a nostalgic atmosphere following the ‘opening of the crossings’. The past is 
represented as a period of time that is longed for and the ‘opening of the crossings’ is a 
way back to the ‘past’. Kıbrıs thus supports its discourse towards the reunification of the 
island through its representation. 
 This newspaper prefers to represent the autobiographical memories of Greek 
Cypriots in the story through the signs of ‘private’ lives such as family photographs, 
former homes and work places. Thus, it is interesting to examine the focus of Kıbrıs on 
the autobiographical memories of Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots have been represented 
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as ‘others’ by the dominant discourse for a long period of time, especially starting from 
the division of the island in 1974; as a result, Turkish Cypriots generally do not know 
about the autobiographical memories of Greek Cypriots. Through the representation of 
autobiographical memories of ‘them’, Kıbrıs newspaper strives to transform the ‘others’ 
into Cypriots who share common experiences, sorrows and remembrance with Turkish 
Cypriots. This presentation functions as a strategy to establish empathy towards Greek 
Cypriots; the formation of empathy is one of the steps in the transformation of ‘others’ 
into ‘selves’. The news stories mobilize the emotions that help the formation of empathy 
towards the ‘others’. The respondents’ narratives about the first, second and third 
photographs and news stories are as follows: 
 
Selen: When I see this news story, I imagine the moment that these people left 
their homes. I mean the time of war...  to flee from their home to safety, unaware 
of the fact that they will never return to their homes again. Leaving that home in a 
hurry… stories are told about how they had to leave their homes while they were 
trying to prepare food for supper… well, they remind me of these kinds of stories.   
 
Interviewer: well, the characters in the stories that you heard were Turkish 
Cypriots. However, in these news stories the characters are Greek Cypriots. What 
would you say in relation to this?  
 
Selen: Umm... of being Greek... oh, no, it won’t mean anything different. Those 
people also experienced these sorts of events. What they experienced is not so 
different from what we lived and experienced here [Northern Cyprus]. They are 
pretty much the same human stories. In short, these sorts of things come to my 
mind when I see these [photos]178 (female, aged 29, TV presenter).  
 
 
When Turkish Cypriots entered the Greek houses, there were wedding pictures on 
the walls of some Greek houses. For example, a friend of mine entered a Greek 
house. On the walls of the house, there were the photos of the owner of that house. 
My friend would say “I am sure one day I will meet this Greek fellow and give 
him these photos.  I wonder how much he was upset when he left these photos of 
his”. And I would retort “where will you find him?”. After the opening of the 
crossings, he telephoned me. He told me that the Greeks had come and got the 
photos and thanked him. Just imagine, to be forced to leave everything behind and 
go away and not to be able to show your child a wedding picture of yours. How 
agonizing it is. How sorrowful it is. I kept this photo because “you should 
experience just a little of a similar pain to be able to understand how much the 
others feel of the same feeling in bulk” my friend would say179 (Emete, female, 
aged 54, retired official). 
 
 
                                                 
178 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007 
179 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: domestic parlour, 25.July 2007 
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I wished I had photos of the owners of the house and could give their photos to 
them but I didn’t have any. Those who entered the house looted everything in it. 
Everywhere there was debris. Maybe if I had looked around for pictures, I would 
have been able to find a few. And now I regret that I didn’t look around and keep 
them for today and hand them in to the previous owners. How nice it would have 
been! When the owners of the house arrived, I gave them the vase which I had 
kept in case they returned one day. They were very delighted to receive the vase 
because it was a present from her mother when they first moved to the house180 
(Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).   
 
Even we feel touched when we pass by the house where our childhood passed. As 
for me, for people who have never been able to see their homes or work places for 
such a long time, it must revive deep emotional moments181 (Deniz, female, aged 
23, public relations).   
 
Oh, just consider... still when I see the homes of the municipality where I was born 
and grown up, I become fully affected. I remember my childhood; I remember all 
that I experienced in that period. [A deep sigh.] Is it that simple? Of course not!182 
(Sevinç, female, aged 48, news speaker). 
 
Most of the respondents talked about how Greek Cypriots went to their houses and took 
their properties (i.e., photographs and a vase) after the opening of the crossings. In this 
way, the memories which are narrated in the news stories play a crucial role in the 
mobilization and legitimization of the personal memories of the respondents about Greek 
Cypriots. This situation operates in the construction of the memories of the respondents 
about the ‘others’. Furthermore, comments such as “just imagine, to be forced to leave 
everything behind and go away and not to be able to show your child a wedding picture of 
yours. How sorrowful it is”, “even we feel touched when we pass by the house where our 
childhood passed. As for me, for people who have never been able to see their homes, it 
must revive deep emotional moments” and  “What they experienced is not so different 
from what we lived and experienced here” show how Kıbrıs newspaper mobilizes the 
feelings of empathy towards Greek Cypriots that function to transform the ‘others’ into 
‘selves’. Furthermore, the news stories mobilize the positive feelings and memories of the 
respondents about Greek Cypriots:  
 
If I looked through their glasses, I would be startled. It must be very difficult for 
them.  People who lived together… who were happy and who got along well with 
                                                 
180 In -depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007 
181 In- depth interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
182 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23 September 2007 
 
 182 
 
one another… I would very often listen to stories of [Turkish and Greek Cypriots’] 
friendship from my grandfather. Unfortunately, these people who didn’t have any 
problems before were forced to be enemies and long for one another. Not only 
could they not see their home but they also lost their long-held friendships. When I 
see this news story, I remember these things and I feel sorry183 (Ayten, female, 
aged 23, student).   
 
It is nice for people to socialize. Willingly or unwillingly you get touched. I wish 
the entire border would be abolished completely. What inexplicable feelings they 
are… for example, this woman is not someone I know (the Greek nurse in the 
news story) but when I see her, I visualize my aunt; she was also a nurse. One 
might say, there were people whom they dined and shared shifts with for years. 
That’s your colleague. Either a Turk or a Greek, it won’t make a difference. When 
you look at these pictures you revive those days. You go back…You 
miss184…(Nahide, female, aged 49, bookseller). 
 
This news story tells us about the nurses. This is right. Because during British rule, 
Turks and Greeks, as usual, were living and working together. There was no 
turmoil in that period. Because there were both Greek and Turkish staff in the 
constabulary forces185 (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).    
 
 
Comments such as “I would very often listen to stories of (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) 
friendship from my grandfather”, “there were people whom they dined and shared shifts 
with for years. When you look at these pictures you revive those days. You go 
back…You miss…” and “during the British rule, Turks and Greeks, as usual, were living 
and working together. There was no turmoil in that period” show how the news stories 
mobilize peculiar memories of the respondents about the past. However, all of the 
memories are about the ‘happier past’ that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live 
together.  
In this respect, the signs of private lives such as family photographs, former homes 
and work places, function as elements in the construction of the discourse of (turkish) 
Cypriot nationalism that is based on the commonalities between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. These signs operate as the crucial factors in the articulation of the ‘others’ as 
‘human beings’ and Cypriots who have family photographs, happy or sad memories about 
their former homes and work places similar to those of Turkish Cypriots. The news 
stories also mobilize the memories of a ‘happier past’ through their selective information 
about the ‘past’: Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together peacefully and freely in 
                                                 
183 In- depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 3/09/2007 
184 In-depth interview, 23 July 2007, place of employment, Lefkoşa 
185In-depth interview, Kumsal:Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007 
 
 183 
 
the ‘past’. In this respect, family photographs, former homes and work places function as 
evidence of a common life that was about a ‘happier past’. As was stated in Chapter One, 
traditions present a ‘happier past’ that should be followed in the present and even in the 
future. One can see how the news stories operate to keep the tradition of coexistence alive 
in order to mobilize the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of 
Northern Cyprus.  
Although most of the respondents evaluate the news stories in parallel with the 
newspaper’s political discourse, there are also some alternative narratives about the news 
stories; the news stories can also mobilize the memories that oppose the political 
discourse of the newspaper. In these cases, it might be possible to talk about the 
dominance of the alternative autobiographical and/or public memories of the respondents: 
  
This is a humanitarian issue. Anyone would act the same way. I wish I had found 
their pictures; they would rejoice a lot [ironical expression]... but no one has 
brought my brother’s pictures to me. They all burnt them. Everything turned to 
ashes. He has nothing left. They razed everything he owned, and that includes his 
house186 (Veli, male, aged 69, retired teacher).   
 
We, the Turks, are very well intentioned and friendly. Although we are from a 
martyr’s family, when they came to see their home, we gave them all the pictures 
in an envelope.  When in peace, we neither swear nor give any harm. We want 
peace but unfortunately the Greeks do not. For example, they knew that my 
brother was a member of TMT [the Turkish Defence Organization]. Therefore, as 
soon as they left their homes, the houses were set on fire by spilling petrol on 
them. In short, they are so vengeful187 (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).    
                           
In the narratives of Veli and Nurten, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are represented at two 
antagonistic poles: Turks are represented as kind, compassionate and peace-loving, while 
Greek Cypriots are represented as revengeful and dangerous. The ideas of the respondents 
about the ‘present’ situation are articulated according to their ‘past experiences’ about 
Greek Cypriots; in other words, their views about Greek Cypriots are mediated through 
their ‘past’ autobiographical and public memories.          
 
                                                                                                                                     
                                                 
186 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri:Domestic parlour, 24/07/2007 
187 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
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Figure 6.2            5 May 2003 p.1                            Figure 6.3                 1 May 2003 p.11                                 
 
Kıbrıs newspaper also emphasizes the old and new friendships between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots after the opening of the crossings. The two news stories above stress the 
friendships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The headline of the second news story 
is “Karpaz’da ilk vaftiz: Larnaka’da nostalji” (The first baptism in Karpaz: Nostalgia in 
Larnaka). In the news story, there are two photographs that depict the baptism in the 
Karpaz and the Turkish Cypriot family’s visit to Larnaka to see their former homes. The 
headline of the third news story is “Ayaküstü tanıştılar, 40 yıllık dost gibi oldular” (They 
just met and became friends as of 40 years). The lead is “Kuzey Kıbrıs ile Güney Kıbrıs’a 
geçişlerin serbest bırakılmasıyla her iki tarafta da birbirlerini hiç görmemiş insanlar 
arasında bile kısa sürede dostluklar kuruluyor” (After the opening of the crossings, on 
both sides of the island even the people who have never seen one another are becoming 
friends in a short time). These news stories mobilize meaning that reinforces the putative 
similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:  
 
Nostalgic moments have been witnessed after the opening of the crossings. This is 
fine. The Greeks who came to the north have also experienced the same feelings 
because we also received them warm heartedly. These photos show us that 
language, religion and race are of no importance. Some people do not attach 
importance to such differences. They attract electricity from the opposite side and 
they make friends with those people. I wish it were true in all circumstances. How 
nice it would be!188 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman). 
 
As a matter of fact we are all Cypriots so we share similar feelings. It is a kind of 
electricity. You receive that current. Besides, they look similar to us. Now there 
                                                 
188 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Cafe, 26/07/2007 
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are a lot of common activities between the Greeks and the Turks. Bicommunal 
activities, choruses, songs etc. the youngsters…. Both sides constantly organize 
such activities. How nice!.... why not here [Cyprus]? In London, they go to the 
same schools, they are always together, why won’t it happen in Cyprus?189 
(Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert). 
 
 
As can be understood from the interpretations, some of the respondents emphasize the 
similarities and friendship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Kemal talks about the 
cultural and physical similarities, blood ties and chemistry between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. The emphasis of the respondents on the putative similarities between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots operates as the ‘strategies of inclusion and assimilation’ (Wodak, Cillia, 
Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:37) and constructs their identity as (turkish) Cypriot. Although 
Mustafa talks about the existence of differences such as language, religion and race, these 
differences function as differential positions in his memories, and thus they do not attach 
to his discourse that can be defined as (turkish) Cypriot nationalism in his case. Like 
Kemal, Mustafa also emphasizes similarities, such as the common feelings of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots.  
On the other hand, there are respondents who stress the putative differences such 
as origin, race, religion, language, feelings, personal attitudes, and cultural and historical 
backgrounds between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The respondents’ emphasis on 
national differences functions as the strategy of exclusion that is included in the 
constructive strategies. The emphasis on the differences between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots plays a crucial role in establishing their Turkish (cypriot) identity that is 
constructed through the exclusion of Greek Cypriots.        
  
Christening is a Greek religious ritual. Turkish Cypriots are not very devoted to 
their religion but unfortunately the Greeks are as faithful to their beliefs as 
Catholics. Although Akel is a communist party, even Akel members do not refrain 
from baptism or other rituals related to Christianity. There’s pressure on them and 
even though they are communists, they attend rituals at the churches190 (Mahmut, 
male, aged 41, doctor).  
 
After the opening of the crossing, both parties displayed friendship for a short time 
but if war breaks out, they are the ones who will first intend to kill us. But the 
Turks will liberate their Greek friends if they are held captive. I mean, our feelings 
are completely different. In the first place, our roots are different; that’s why it is 
                                                 
189 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
190 In depth-interview,  Mağusa: Office, 23/07/2007 
 186 
 
impossible to share the same feelings. With the Greeks you can never make 
friends191 (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).   
 
Even the people who are the same race and share the same language and religion 
cannot become like friends of 40 years. So it is nonsense to talk about the 
friendship of Turks and Greeks who do not share any commonalities and who are 
also the eternal enemies192 (Fatoş, female, aged 25, shop assistant). 
 
It is interesting to see that these news stories and photographs evoke the counter 
autobiographical and public memories about the ‘past’ that was constructed in the 
Denktaş-UBP period:  
 
These [photos], try to give the message that these were the facts in Cyprus. And 
similar things were lived in the past. And now we are going through such events: 
by looking at these photos, this means we can live together but this is not true. We 
cannot live intermingled. I cannot remember how many times the Turkish cars 
were damaged and Turkish Cypriots were mistreated. This is impossible. But we, 
Turks have a very bad attitude. We soon forget all the bad memories. How much 
we suffered! Turks were killed ruthlessly, they were forced to leave their vehicles 
and fired on. What a pity; even their children have forgotten all about these things. 
This is not possible; this is just for show193 (Sevinç, female, aged 48, news 
speaker). 
 
It is rather difficult for people who do not know each other to make friends at first 
sight. Besides, the aim of the Greeks is to rule over Turks. They view themselves 
as the sole owners of the island and they regard the Turks here as a minority194 
(Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).    
 
When Sevinç says, “How much we suffered! Turks were killed ruthlessly, they were 
forced to leave their vehicles and fired on” and Erdal says, “The aim of the Greeks is to 
rule over Turks. They view themselves the sole owners of the island and they regard the 
Turks here as a minority” one can observe the dominance in their memories of the public 
memory that was disseminated in the Denktaş- UBP period. Since the respondents 
evaluate the present relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in parallel with 
their interpretations of the ‘past’, although Kıbrıs newspaper presents an alternative 
discourse about Greek Cypriots, the resistance of the respondents towards the discourse of 
the newspaper indirectly functions to sustain their memories. Contestation produces 
antagonisms which cause the articulation of memories; and in this respect, Sevinç and 
Erdal’s resistance to the political discourse of the newspaper functions to form the 
                                                 
191 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 21/09/2007 
192 In-depth interview, Girne: Domestic parlour, 17/08/2007 
193 In-depth nterview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007 
194In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Kardeş Ocağı (Brotherhood Hearth), 20/07/2007 
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elements that reinforce their memories that are parallel to the discourse of the Denktaş-
UBP period.   
Although the news stories also mobilize the alternative autobiographical 
memories, the memories that are narrated as autobiographical are indistinct, indefinite and 
based on generalizations about Greek Cypriots; the respondents did not talk about any 
particular events that were lived with Greek Cypriots. The weakness of their 
autobiographical memories might be an indication of the dominance of the Denktaş-UBP 
public memory. Their memories function selectively in bringing out the ‘memories’ that 
were legitimized and confirmed by the public memory that was reinforced by the 
mechanisms of memory between 1974-2003: 
 
We lived together with them. If you keep a social distance with the Greeks they 
are good friends, but if you mingle together, the friendship ends. They do not like 
us at all195 (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer).                                                                                              
 
This photo does not reflect the reality. I lived with the Greeks when we used to 
live together with them. We had never been close friends. Since the 1958s … and 
now I go to the Greek side and see the Greeks there. But we have never had such 
closeness. We didn’t have it then, either. And I suppose these [points to the photo] 
are also fictitious.  These visits… meetings… They cannot live together with us. 
They have been brainwashed since their childhood. Turks are their enemies. They 
cannot come together with the Turks. I have witnessed this for fifty years. And 
this will go on like this196 (Salime, female, aged 68, retired teacher).      
 
After the division of the island, the official mechanisms of memory played the primary 
function in the dissemination of the narratives about Greek Cypriots. Because of this 
situation, the respondents’ autobiographical memories are indistinct and indefinite, as 
they stayed in the shadow of the public memory after 1974 and thus lost their peculiarity. 
As was noted in Chapter Two, shared memories become sharpened as they are constantly 
repeated by the mechanisms of memory. When Alican says, “If you keep a social distance 
with the Greeks, they are good friends but if you mingle together, the friendship ends. 
They do not like us at all” and Salime says, “They have been brainwashed since their 
childhood. Turks are their enemies. They cannot come together with the Turks” one can 
hear the stereotypes about Greek Cypriots based on the generalizations: Greek Cypriots 
perceive Turks as their enemies. Therefore, they don’t like Turks. These stereotypes were 
disseminated through the narratives of the official mechanisms of memory that were 
                                                 
195 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
196 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic Labour, 12 July 2007 
 188 
 
produced during the Denktaş-UBP period: in this way the respondents attribute the 
impossibility of co-existence to the “other” and for them, the news stories of Kıbrıs do not 
represent the ‘truths’ about the ‘past’ and/or present.    
 
6.2.2.2 Interpretations of the respondents about the news story of Volkan newspaper 
 
                                                                                
                                    
                  Figure 6.4                                                         16 May, 2003 
 
In contrast, there is the Volkan news story shown above, in which there are six small 
photographs and their interpretations below the photographs made by newspaper’s 
reporter. The headline is “Güney’de bir gün…” (A day in the south…). These 
photographs were taken at different places in the South. From left to the right, the English 
translations of the original Turkish captions below the photographs are as follows:   
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Photograph 1: “The wall pictures197 that display hatred and enmity towards Turks are still 
kept on the walls of Ledra Palace Gate”;  
 
Photograph 2: “The monument of Atatürk in the courtyard of the Limassol Turkish 
Hospital was destroyed and the base of the bust was there to reflect the monument of 
shame and Greek Barbarism;  
 
Photograph 3: The quarter of Ayandon, which lies on the eastern side of the church, and 
where the Turks used to live was levelled, the road was widened and the area was 
converted into a car park.  
 
Photograph 4: The marble coating of the monument of the martyrs at the Turkish Martyrs 
Cemetery was dislocated and heavily damaged.  
 
Photograph 5: On the building at the entrance to the Limassol Park, there is a billboard 
which depicts the island of Cyprus being divided by a dagger and blood running all over 
and the expression follows “den xehno” “we haven’t forgotten”. On the other side of the 
building, a Greek flag is waving. Here’s an image from the Greek side that is accepted as 
the member of the EU and an example which reflects the false image that it seeks peace.  
 
Photograph 6: After the opening of the crossings, when the Turkish martyrs’ cemetery 
was flocked to by the Turkish Cypriot visitors, the Greek side hastily repaired the 
cemetery and gave it a facelift. However, the other side of the cemetery, which cannot be 
seen at the first instance, still remains untouched. 
  
All of the photographs and their interpretations function as a single body in the 
construction of Turkishness and thus, the “others” (Greek Cypriots). However, the news 
stories and photographs of Volkan newspaper also mobilize the alternative public 
narratives. This suggests that news stories do not always mobilize meaning that is parallel 
to the discourse of the newspaper; they also evoke counter memories. This section also 
includes the counter narratives of the respondents.  
                                                 
197 On the notice board there are photographs of the Greek Cypriot who was murdered by the Turkish 
Security Forces as he tried to pull down the Turkish flag from the mast  in a Derinya border action in 1996. 
Two of the photographs are wedding photos of the Greek Cypriot, whose name is Solomos Solomu, with 
his wife. The other photos depict the event when he was murdered.      
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The statements under the first and fifth photographs are about the Greek Cypriots’ 
perception of Turks; Greek Cypriots feel resentment and hatred towards Turks, and  the 
newspaper reinforces the discourse that Greek Cypriots are the ‘others’: 
 
I never go to the Greek side, but they told me this [points to Photograph 1]. It is 
said that at Ledra Palace, there are pictures of the Greeks who died in 1974 and 
they show these pictures to the foreigners who want to cross the border and they 
reflect us as barbarous to them. I do not believe that the Greeks have changed in 
any way. The Greeks are instilled with Turkish enmity by their families as soon as 
they are born198 (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official).                                  
 
It is not a nice thing that the Greeks show these kinds of photos. These are real-life 
events, but it is not nice to display them year after year. We feel depressed when 
we see these pictures while passing through the border. Then we start to wonder if 
it is possible to build a joint future with Greeks?199 (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism 
employee). 
 
In photographs 2, 4 and 6, the newspaper represents the commemorative places that were 
ruined by the Greek Cypriots in the South of Cyprus: Greek Cypriots destroyed the 
monument of Atatürk which is the symbol of Turkishness, and ruined the monument of 
the martyrs and the Turkish martyrs’ cemetery, which are seen as sacred in Turkish 
(cypriot) nationalism. In this way, through the depiction of the ruined commemorative 
places, Greek Cypriots are represented as barbarians and vandals who harm Turkish 
Cypriots, their values and sacred locations to take revenge:  
 
I saw these [points to Photograph 6] on TV. They are completely destroyed. Our 
village is in the Paphos district and they flattened all the Turkish cemeteries there 
as well. When we went there we witnessed this. My brothers are buried there. On 
the 14th of July, the Greeks entered the Turkish sector of Paphos, massacred some 
of the Turks and fired on my brothers200 (Nurten, female, aged 60, retired history 
teacher).     
 
All these things are true. Vandalising, etc… they kind of seem to take revenge on 
us by damaging the statues or the martyrs’ cemeteries. They reflect their hatred or 
enmity towards Turks by acting this way. I am completely opposed to such 
vandalising of the cemeteries or martyrs’ cemeteries201 (Emine, female, aged 63, 
retired geography teacher). 
 
                                                 
198 In-depth interview, Girne: Domestic Labour, 12/08/ 2007 
199 In-depth interview, Kermiya: domestic parlour, 18/09/2007 
200 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
201 In-depth interview, Kermiya:Domestic Parlour, 30/09/2007 
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Atatürk is our leader; that’s why the Greeks want to pull the statues of Atatürk into 
pieces, for revenge202 (İclal, female, aged 81, retired nurse). 
 
 
In the fifth photograph, there is the statement ‘we haven’t forgotten’, and it is stressed that 
a Greek flag is waving on a building. The statement continues with a reminder that the 
Greek side has been accepted in the EU. The newspaper’s stress on the Greek side’s 
acceptance into the EU mobilizes the ideas of the respondents about the EU as supporting 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots: 
  
They shouldn’t have accepted the Greek side into the EU as the Republic of 
Cyprus, because there is no such entity as the Republic of Cyprus. Although the 
Annan plan was not approved by the Greek side, they were accepted into the EU 
and now both Greece and the Greek side, hand-in-hand are trying to block the 
Turkish membership in the EU by drawing attention to the Cyprus issue. This 
shows how the EU supports Greeks instead of us203 (Ali, male, aged 69, 
Restaurant manager)   
 
The newspaper’s emphasis on a Greek flag waving on a building mobilizes meaning that 
articulates this flag as a ‘threat’ towards the Turkish (cypriot) identity on the island. As 
was noted in the previous chapter, for many respondents the flags of Turkey and the 
TRNC represent the freedom and sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots on the island. The flags 
are also the symbols of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism constructed through narratives 
based on the existence of the others (Greek Cypriots). The existence of the Greek flag that 
represents Greek identity and nationalism mobilizes the fears of many respondents about 
the ‘others’; according to most of the respondents, it connotes the Greek Cypriot’s rule 
over the island and the captivity of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots:  
 
When the Greeks say ‘we haven’t forgotten’, they do not mean the war or the 
massacres committed to them. They are the ones who committed massacres in 
Limassol and Paphos. And now, they keep saying ‘we haven’t forgotten.’ What 
they haven’t forgotten is an Eternal Ideal! They aim to materialize it one day. 
Already, the Greek Commander of Greece who has a mandate in South Cyprus 
has said, ‘Surely, one day we will fly the Greek flag in Girne.’204 (Nurten, female, 
aged 60, history teacher) 
 
When I look at these pictures and read the explanations below.... for example, a 
Greek flag is waving on a building, for example, the expression “we have never 
                                                 
202 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007 
203 In-depth interview, Girne: Office, 12/07/2007 
204 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
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forgotten”: hatred towards Turks… all these prove that the Turks and the Greeks 
are distinct and dissimilar entities. If you live together with the Greeks this is what 
you will experience. You will be ruled by the Greek Cypriots or you will be a 
captive under the Greek flag205 (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official).  
 
The third photograph depicts a car park in the South in Ayandon, an old Turkish 
neighbourhood; the newspaper implies that Greek Cypriots destroyed the homes, 
settlements and everything left by Turkish Cypriots, as they are against the existence of 
Turks on the island:  
 
Unfortunately, all the Greeks have done up to this point is to wipe away whatever 
has been left by the Turks. They kind of want to display that Turks have never 
existed on this island206 (Arif, male, 86, retired counsellor). 
 
We invested a lot in Greek properties. We renovated. We added value to them. 
However, they nullified the value of the Turkish properties by demolishing 
them207. (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).   
 
It is not nice for someone not to go and visit her place of birth. While someone 
coming from the south experienced nostalgia, the people [from the north] could 
not experience that nostalgia when they went and saw their homes demolished or 
converted into car parks208 (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher).  
 
Although most of the respondents’ interpretations are parallel to the political discourse of 
the newspaper, one can also talk about the mobilization of counter memories and 
narratives by the news stories. Some of the respondents talk about the properties and 
cemeteries of Greek Cypriots that were ruined by the Turkish Cypriots in Northern 
Cyprus, supporting an alternative idea that Turkish Cypriots also damaged the properties 
of Greek Cypriots. The respondents also talk about the common attitudes of Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots (i.e they both wave the flag of their motherland country and committed 
massacres). These interpretations oppose the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism 
that locates Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’ who are different from the Turkish Cypriots:   
 
At least we found the place of the martyrs’ cemeteries in the Greek side only 
missing the marble. We, here, can’t show a single Greek cemetery. Is there 
anything of this kind here? No, there isn’t…209 (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer 
expert)  
 
                                                 
205 In-depth interview, Girne: Office, 12/08/ 2007 
206 In-depth interview, Kumsal:Domestic parlour, 20/07/2007 
207 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007 
208 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Kardeş Ocağı (Brotherhood Hearth), 23/07/2007 
209 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
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In picture 2, it says the statue of Atatürk was broken into pieces. All right, have we 
left a single Greek cemetery undamaged in the North? How dare we get angry 
with them when we didn’t leave anything as it used to be?. We demolished more 
then they did210 (Mehmet, male, aged 20, student).  
 
They say that the Greeks flattened the Ayandon quarter; well on whose property 
have we constructed the Nicosia bus terminal? Hasn’t it been built on the land of a 
Greek owner?211 (Hasan, male, aged 60, retired teacher). 
 
With respect to massacres, we did some and so did they. I don’t put the blame on 
the committers of the massacres but on the ones who gave the orders to commit 
them212 (Hasan, male, aged 60, retired teacher).  
 
That’s true. Although the Greek side has joined the EU, they still wave the Greek 
flag alongside the Cyprus flag. The same thing is done on this side as well. The 
Turkish flag flies beside the TRNC flag. We have flags on the mountains as 
well213 (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).  
 
 
The respondents’ counter memories − about the common features and attitudes of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots (i.e. they both did massacres, gave harm to each others’ properties, 
wave their motherland’s flag) − function as a strategy of unification. As Wodak, Cillia, 
Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:38) note, emphasis on the unifying common features (i.e., 
shared sorrows, attitudes) is included in the strategies of unification, one of the 
constructive strategies. Thus, these respondents construct (turkish) Cypriot identity that 
focuses on the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.          
 
6.2.3 Part three: Narratives on the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and European 
Union  
 
In this part, I focus on the narratives of the respondents about the Cyprus Problem, Annan 
Plan and European Union. My aim is to explore how the political ideas of the respondents 
about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus construct and are constructed by their 
memories in relation to their national identity. As was noted above, the knowledge of the 
respondents about the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the EU are mostly articulated 
by the media. However, the respondents interpret this knowledge according to their 
memories of the ‘past’ and their conception of the ‘others’. Therefore, their 
                                                 
210 In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik:Green House Cafe, 30/08/2007 
211 In-depth interview, Öğretmen evleri: Domestic parlour, 23 September 2007 
212 In-depth interview, Öğretmen evleri: Domestic parlour, 23 September 2007 
213 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
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interpretations about the Annan Plan and the EU cannot be based on the information that 
comes solely through the media. As pointed out in Chapter One, memory is articulated 
through the complex combination of autobiographical and alternative/dominant public 
memories in power relations. Below are opposing interpretations of the respondents 
regarding some of the issues in the Annan Plan. These issues are related to the provisions 
in the Annan Plan; however, as mentioned earlier, there was no possibility for the 
majority of the respondents to read the original version of the Plan, which has thousands 
of pages. The respondents therefore do not know the exact details of the Plan or its 
provisions; their interpretations are based on abstract knowledge that is articulated by the 
public narratives partly constructed by the media: 
 
6.2.3.1 Security: Safety/Threat 
 
The Annan Plan was interpreted by many respondents as being full of objectionable 
arrangements that might cause danger and threats, such as the reduction of the number of 
Turkish soldiers on the island and deportation of some of the Turkish population that was 
settled in Northern Cyprus by its previous government. According to this assumption, 
Turkey would not be able to prevent a possible attack of Greek Cypriots if the number of 
Turkish soldiers on the island were reduced:  
 
What makes us feel most relieved is knowing of the existence of 40 -50 thousand 
Turkish soldiers on this island. But if the Turkish army is withdrawn from the 
island, no one can foresee what will happen next214 (Alican, male, aged 49, 
farmer). 
 
If we joined the EU, there would be a security problem because the Turkish armed 
forces would have to leave the island, or just a small number would be left behind 
within the framework of guarantorship and this would jeopardize the peace on the 
island215 (Tuna, male, aged 26, student). 
 
The Turkish guarantee should definitely continue. The Turkish army and our 
Turkish citizens should stay here. For the existence of the Turkish Cypriots; this is 
a must. Otherwise we will be wiped off the island. Already this is the fundamental 
aim of the Greeks and the Greek Church. To eventually forget Turkish identity 
and gradually annex Cyprus to Greece216 (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).   
 
                                                 
214 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
215 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local banch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
216 In-depth interview, Kumsal:Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007 
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Even if we joined the EU together with the Greeks, the Greeks would still 
continue attacking the Turkish Cypriots. They never forget the past. The Akritas217 
plan was engraved into their brains. They are very keen to re-establish the Great 
Hellenic Empire. After capturing Cyprus, their next target is İstanbul218 (Esra, 
female, aged 62, retired teacher). 
 
Such interpretations sustain the argument of motherland/babyland that attaches to the 
discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism which is based on the unity of Turkish 
(cypriots) and Turks for the continuation of the Turkish (cypriot) identity and the survival 
of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. As was explained in the previous chapter, the 
motherland/babyland argument was constructed by the official discourse in the Denktaş-
UBP period. The argument is based on the idea that Turkey and the Turkish army are the 
defenders of the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots; thus most of the respondents 
see the reduction of the Turkish soldiers on the island as a possible threat to the security 
of Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, a majority of them believe that Turkey and Turks are 
the guarantee of the Turkish (cypriot) identity on the island. When Arif says, “already this 
is the fundamental aim of the Greeks and the Greek Church. To eventually forget Turkish 
identity and gradually annex Cyprus to Greece” and Esra says “The Akritas plan was 
engraved into their (Greek Cypriots) brains. They are very keen to re-establish the Great 
Hellenic Empire”, one can hear the voice of the official history in their narrations. The 
official history that was produced in the Denktaş-UBP period represents Greek Cypriots 
as a threat to Turkish identity. According to this history, Greek Cypriots can harm 
Turkish Cypriots in order to reach their ultimate aim, which is the unification of Cyprus 
with their motherland Greece. The official history plays a crucial role in the memories of 
the respondents about the past: the majority evaluate the unification of the island under 
the framework of the Annan Plan as a threat towards the safety of Turkish Cypriots 
because they see this situation as leaving them open to a potential attack by the Greek 
Cypriots. This shows how the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ (Greek 
Cypriots) construct their political ideas about the Annan Plan and the European Union. 
For many respondents, the European Union is seen as the supporter of Greek Cypriots; 
they do not believe that the EU will protect them in the event of a possible threat: 
 
                                                 
217 The Akritas Plan was formulated in 1963 and first revealed in 1966 in the Greek newspaper Patris. Its 
aim was to attain Enosis either through constitutional means as an independent state or through unilateral 
action accompanied by the forceful suppression of Turkish Cypriot resistance if necessary. However, the 
government never officially adopted the plan (Tocci 2004:51).      
218 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007 
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Even if there were clashes, I don’t think that the EU would be able to keep us safe. 
Because they didn’t protect us in the past219 (Salime, female, aged 68, retired 
teacher). 
 
Even if we joined the EU, the Greeks would have pretexts to abolish the peace 
agreement. The Greeks would play tricks again. They would treat us like dirt. The 
EU would not intervene anyway. They don’t want to intervene. They always want 
to dominate the Turks220 (Nurten, female, aged 60, history teacher).       
 
According to the Annan Plan, a number of Turkish soldiers would be withdrawn. 
We don’t have a counterpart to take an initiative for peace. I hear on the news that 
they spend great sums of money on weaponry. We have settlers from Turkey and 
they also have settlers from Greece. What has the EU managed to stop so far? 
What has the UN done in Bosnia or Iraq, that we can expect it to take action in 
other places in the world?221 (Memduh, male, aged 23, student)   
 
If we joined the EU within the principles of the Annan plan, the EU would not be 
able to ward off a probable clash between the Greeks and the Turks. If it were able 
to, it would prevent the atrocities in Bosnia. It would prevent the ill-treatment of 
the Turkish minority in Western Thrace in Greece. It would also prevent the 
events happening in Iraq, if they are such fiery human rights activists. They would 
manage these things. But they gain benefits from such things, so they don’t take 
any action222 (Alp, male, aged 29, optician).  
 
 
For many respondents, the EU did not protect the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek 
Cypriots in the past. They also support their arguments about the attitude of EU by 
showing other examples from different places of the world such as Bosnia and Western 
Thrace in Greece. This is the strategy of ‘transference of experiences’: the respondents 
transfer experiences belonging to the other parts of the world to themselves. In the 
narratives of these respondents, the EU and the Greek Cypriots are conceived as the 
‘others’.  
On the other hand, some Turkish Cypriots evaluate the European Union as the 
union of peace, justice and equality. These respondents interpret the participation of 
Turkish Cypriots in the European Union as a way of saving themselves from the unjust 
Turkish rule on the island. Their emphasis on a necessary difference between then and 
now functions as a strategy of transformation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:40) 
from Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. As was mentioned in 
Chapter Four, in the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism the real mother country is 
                                                 
219 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic Labour, 12 July 2007 
220 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
221 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party , 24/07/2007 
222 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
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not the motherland Turkey, as it is in the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism; it is 
Europe that represents the place where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will live 
together in peace as “Cypriots”. In these instances, it is the Turks who are represented as 
‘them’ and the Greek Cypriots as ‘we’:  
 
Interviewer: How would EU membership for North Cyprus affect the security of 
the Turkish Cypriots? 
İclal: If we joined the EU, the other European Union countries would have to take 
responsibility. Then there wouldn’t be any threat concerning the Greeks. We 
[Greek and Turkish Cypriots] can live in peace like in the past”. Now we can rely 
neither on our army nor on our police. We are not in the EU. No country 
recognises us. Whom should we rely on?  
Interviewer: Don’t you trust the Turkish army? 
İclal: How should I trust them? I am not sure what their course of action is.   
Interviewer: Do you know what the EU does? 
İclal: They have laws to secure human rights. For example, you go to Great 
Britain and live there freely because their government offers them equal rights. 
Here, the Turkish citizens do not let us have any rights223 (İclal, female, aged 81, 
retired nurse).             
 
So far, there hasn’t been a war amongst European countries. So I don’t believe 
that there will be a conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after we join the 
EU. For this reason, I didn’t have the slightest worry about the Annan Plan. As I 
said at the very beginning, we, the Cypriots, could live together peacefully but 
they, the Turks, have messed up everything224 (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer 
expert). 
 
If we joined the EU we would lead a better life. They would recognize us as well. 
Then I believe there wouldn’t be any problems between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots because we could live together like we used to live. In any case, the EU 
would ward off the problems225 (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife). 
 
I am in favour of the de-confrontation of the forces. As for me, when we join the 
EU, I do not believe that any problems will arise. I have confidence in the EU226 
(Emine, female, aged 52, retired official). 
 
If we join the EU, we will not be scared of wars any more because both sides will 
be disarmed. The EU represents peace227 (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife).   
  
In the narratives of the respondents the logics of equivalence and difference function to 
construct the (turkish) Cypriot identity. While the logics of equivalence function to set up 
                                                 
223 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007 
224 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
225 In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007 
226 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
227 In depth-interview, domestic parlour, 25/09/2007  
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a political frontier between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, the logics of difference operate to 
emphasize the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. For example, İclal 
locates Greek Cypriots as “we” when she says “we (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) can live 
in peace like in the past” and Turks as “them” when she says, “Here, the Turkish citizens 
do not let us have any rights”, “How should I trust them [Turks and the Turkish army]? I 
am not sure what their course of action is?” Similarly, when Kemal says “we, the 
Cypriots, could live together peacefully but they, the Turks, have messed up everything”, 
he emphasizes the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by labelling them 
as ‘we, the Cypriots’ and he differentiates Turks by accusing them for messing up 
everything. The conceptions of the respondents about the ‘others’ construct their political 
ideas about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after the solution 
of the Cyprus problem. Thus in Europe, according to these respondents, Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots could live together in peace as ‘Cypriots’. Most of the time the 
respondents interpret the European Union in positive terms: “they have laws to secure 
human rights”, “when we join the EU, I do not believe that problems will arise”, “So far, 
there hasn’t been a war amongst European countries. So I don’t believe that there will be 
a conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after we join the EU.” and “the EU 
represents peace”.  
 
6.2.3.2 Land and Properties: Regaining the land and properties, better conditions/losing 
of land and properties ,worse conditions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
The articles about land and properties in the Annan Plan are related to one of the most 
complex issues of the Cyprus problem. The articles can be interpreted as regaining the 
land and properties lost after the division of the island, or as losing the land and 
properties, depending on the complex settlement procedures in Northern Cyprus. 
 After the division in 1974, most of the Turkish Cypriots had to leave their homes, 
lands and properties in the southern part of the island and moved to Northern Cyprus. The 
Annan Plan is therefore sometimes interpreted by the respondents as a way of regaining 
the land and properties. Furthermore, many respondents believe that Turkish Cypriots 
would be in better economic and social conditions in the EU. Most of the time, they 
criticise the present political and economic system by referring to Turkey’s wrong 
policies in Northern Cyprus. Thus, in the narratives of many respondents, Europe is 
represented as the real mother country that will save Turkish Cypriots from the existing 
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economic and political problems. The interpretations of the respondents about Turkey 
give clues to their conceptions of ‘others’, who are the Turks in these instances:   
 
If we joined the EU, everyone would take possession of his property. Everyone 
would return to his home. New jobs would be provided. The European countries 
are well organized. Their police force is regular. Their army is regular. Everyone 
gets his own fair share228 (İclal, female, aged 81, retired nurse). 
 
If we joined the EU, we would be able to find an easier market for our products. 
Today, Turkish Cypriots’ production has been cut off. For me, this situation was 
realised intentionally by Turkey. Turkish Cypriots are conditioned, on purpose, 
not to produce but to consume. Therefore, joining the EU will make us improve 
economically229 (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV programmer). 
 
If we joined the EU, this would affect our economy tremendously. This is clear 
from the economic stability of the Greek side. Turkey couldn’t manage to improve 
our life standards in Northern Cyprus230 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female 
beautician). 
 
If we joined the EU, we would be better off because of the EU aid, and we would 
be integrated with the rest of the world. It is not easy to live depending on Turkey 
both economically and politically in today’s world231 (Selda, female, aged 49, 
radio reporter). 
 
However, some of the items in the Annan Plan were interpreted as losing the land and 
properties allocated to the Turkish Cypriots which once belonged to the Greek Cypriots. 
Because of the arrangements about the settlements in the Annan Plan, there are 
respondents who think that they will lose their land and properties, as some of the Greek 
Cypriots will return to their homes in the northern part of the island. There are also 
respondents who think that Greek Cypriots will also own the settlement places such as the 
town of Güzelyurt and thus, Turkish Cypriots will be displaced from their villages once 
again:                  
 
How many more times does the Turkish Community have to move? As for me, 
coming to a point after thirty years when you have to move your home again is 
dreadful. We do not want the inhabitants of 52 to 55 villages to be displaced again. 
In this plan 75% of the agricultural fields would be left to the Greeks232 (Alican, 
male, aged 49, farmer).    
 
                                                 
228 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007 
229 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007 
230 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
231 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007 
232 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
 200 
 
The Greeks always had overwhelming expectations. For example, they also 
wanted Güzelyurt back. Already most of the island belongs to them. Decreasing 
the number of soldiers on the island would also put us in an unsecured position233 
(Duyal, female, aged 21, student). 
 
If we joined the EU, there would be a problem concerning ownership. The Turks 
would lose their properties and they would start from scratch again234 (Zehra, 
female, aged 26, shop assistant).   
 
 
In the narratives of the respondents above, the strategies of justification function to justify 
the status quo that operates to maintain the Turkish (cypriot) identity that locates Greek 
Cypriots as the external threats. These respondents are against the participation of 
Northern Cyprus in the EU as they believe that in the event of participation, Greek 
Cypriots will pose a threat to their life standards and land and properties. They articulate 
the ‘past’ and create threatening scenarios for the future in order to rationalize their 
political ideas. These threatening scenarios are about the Turkish Cypriots’ displacement, 
and losing their land and properties after the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union. Such fictitious (threatening) scenarios, which operate as the strategies of 
means of realisation, support the argument of the external threat to rationalise the status 
quo (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:36).  
 
6.2.3.3 Administration: Human rights, equality/Minority rights, inequality   
 
Administration is another controversial issue in the Annan Plan. Most of the time the 
political ideas of the respondents about the administration are constructed according to 
their memories of the period when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together in the 
Republic of Cyprus. As was stated in Chapter Four, the Republic of Cyprus was 
established in 1960 as an independent, bi-communal state. Thus the respondents’ political 
ideas are articulated through their different conceptions of the ‘past’: 
 
If we joined the EU, we would be the citizens of a recognized country. Turkish 
and Greeks Cypriots would be equal. But now the Greeks are recognized as an 
independent state. But we aren’t. We were equal to Greeks in the 1960 Republic 
Of Cyprus; we were already equal from the point of view of human rights or 
citizens or individuals. And the Annan Plan was more fulfilling than the 1960 
constitution235 (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife). 
                                                 
233 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
234 In depth-interview, Alsancak: Domestic parlour, 28/08/2007 
235 In depth-interview, domestic parlour, 25/09/2007  
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If we joined the EU, we would have a connection with the world and we would be 
recognized. When foreigners asked us our nationality, we would say Cypriots and 
they would not think as if we are Greeks. They would know that Turkish Cypriots 
have a state as well. After the 1960 constitution, the Annan Plan is our last chance 
for being recognized236 (Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).   
 
For many respondents the Annan Plan provides equal opportunities for Turkish Cypriots 
to have a position in the administration of the island. Interpretations such as “if we joined 
the EU, we would be the citizens of a recognized country. Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
would be equal” and “if we joined the EU, we would have a connection with the world 
and we would be recognized” indicate how the respondents emphasize the necessary 
difference between now and the future, which is one of the strategies of transformation 
(Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:36) from Turkish (cypriot) identity into 
(turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the common life of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 
 On the other hand, there are many respondents who are intensely against the 
Annan Plan as they believe that it is unjust in not giving equal rights to Turkish Cypriots. 
According to them, the Plan takes away the autonomy of Turkish Cypriots and renders 
them minorities. They rationalise their political ideas by creating threatening scenarios in 
the event of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU; and as noted earlier, 
‘threatening scenarios that are based on an external threat function to maintain the status 
quo (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:36). In creating such scenarios about the 
possible future of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the respondents refer to the ‘Republic of 
Cyprus’:           
 
The Turks of Western Thrace are in Europe but we know how they are treated. 
Turkish Cypriots have a disadvantage because of their population and in Europe 
they will be treated as a minority. There are similar examples of this in Europe. 
We also know how the Turkish Cypriots were treated as minorities in the Republic 
of Cyprus. We don’t want to live those days again237 (Alican, male, aged 49, 
farmer).   
 
The Greeks do not intend to give us even the benefits of the 1960 republic. If we 
joined the EU, we would be second-class citizens. Today, even EU citizens are not 
happy about living in the EU238 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher). 
 
According to many respondents, Turkish Cypriots were treated as minorities in the 
Republic of Cyprus and if they start to live with Greek Cypriots again under the 
                                                 
236 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
237 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
238 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007 
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framework of the Annan Plan, they will be treated as second-class citizens again in the 
EU; the respondents’ political ideas in this way construct and are constructed by their 
memories of the ‘past’. 
 
6.2.3.4 European Union:  Impartial / Discriminative                                                                       
 
The Annan Plan is a document made up of proposals for a resolution to the Cyprus 
Problem, and it includes proposals regarding relations with the European Union following 
accession of the whole of Cyprus to the EU. It is therefore difficult to separate the subject 
of the European Union from the Annan Plan. This is why in Cyprus, relations with the 
European Union are mostly defined in the light of the Plan; ideas about it play a 
significant role in evaluations of relations with the EU. Some of the respondents describe 
the EU as the Union of Christianity; they believe that in every situation the EU will 
support the Greek Cypriots because of their religion. In such interpretations, the 
respondents use the strategies of dissimilation through their emphasis on heterogeneity 
and the religious differences between Greeks/EU and Turks. Their memories about the 
‘others’ (Greek Cypriots and the EU in this case) sustain their political ideas about the 
EU; and they do not believe that there is democracy and impartiality in it. The strategies 
of dissimilation and sameness work together through comparisons: thus, while the 
strategies of dissimilation highlight the religious differences between Turks and the 
EU/Greeks, the strategies of sameness emphasize that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are 
both Moslem and not Christians in contrast to the Greek Cypriots, who are in the EU. In 
this way the strategies of sameness, like the strategies of dissimilation, work through the 
articulation of the ‘other’; they also equate Turks and Turkish Cypriots through 
expressions such as “we, the Turks”:  
 
As the European Union is a community of Christians, I believe that when a 
problem arises the Union will be on the side of the Greeks; because of the 
church... if we [Turks and Turkish Cypriots] had a cross on the neck and went to 
church, we would have security of life; but as long as the mosques are here, I 
don’t believe that we will have security of life239 (Melek, female, aged 28, 
instructor). 
 
The EU is a community of Christianity, so the Muslims and Turks will be 
regarded from a different viewpoint. For example, for France or Germany the 
Hellenes are in the foreground because their roots go back to ancient Greeks. 
                                                 
239 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
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Besides, the EU has added such problematic members that it can dissolve 
anytime240 (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).   
 
All the European countries treat Greece as if she were a real daughter, and Turkey 
like a step-daughter, because of its religion241 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired 
teacher). 
 
On the other hand, there are some respondents who believe there is democracy and 
impartiality in the EU, as they support the idea that there, there is no discrimination on the 
basis of economic status, race, religion or language. These respondents use the strategies 
of sameness to create homogeneity by supporting the idea that in the EU everybody is 
equal; the EU is represented as the place where Greek and Turkish Cypriots can live in 
peace without considering any differences between them:  
  
In the EU cultural and economic differences are minimized and the effects of the 
concept of the other are diminished because it is a union; there is no 
discrimination ideologically242 (Haluk, male, aged 33, English teacher).    
 
In the EU neither languages or religions nor flags of the nations have any 
importance. You join the EU through digesting these differences. Therefore, I do 
not think that in the EU there will be any problems between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots243 (Sevinç, female, aged 48, news speaker).    
 
As can be understood from the opposing interpretations of the Annan Plan and the 
European Union, different respondents define the outcome of the Plan differently; it can 
thus be seen as a nodal point around which a variety of interpretations can be produced. 
These interpretations are linked to particular ways of understanding the Cyprus problem: 
different conceptions about the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are the reasons behind the different 
representations of the past, present and future that find their explanations with the Annan 
Plan. However, the worries are not openly diverted towards the ‘other’ but masked under 
the key issues of the Plan. The Plan is mainly about the future prospects of Northern 
Cyprus; however, the expectations of the respondents from the future are highly 
dependent on the memories of the ‘past’ and the conception of the ‘other’. 
 Respondents who adopt the discourse of a ‘happier past’ with Greek Cypriots 
favour the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the respondents’ views about Turks and Turkey’s position in Northern 
                                                 
240 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
241 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007 
242 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007 
243 In depth-interview, Göçmenköy: BRT institution, 23/09/2007 
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Cyprus influence their political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. The 
Annan Plan is conceived as full of articles which are positive (for those who want 
Northern Cyprus’s EU participation) or negative (for those who want the status quo − 
Turkey’s rule on the island – to continue) depending on the memories of people about the 
‘others’ and the ‘past’. The table below shows the opposing interpretations of the 
respondents regarding the Annan Plan.  
                                                         
                                           
                                                                     ANNAN PLAN 
 
                                           Supporters                                          Opponents  
 
SECURITY                        Safety, protection                                                         Danger, threat                                                                                      
 
LAND&PROPERTIES    Regaining the land and properties,                          Losing of land and properties,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                             Better conditions                                                          Worse conditions             
 
ADMINISTRATION        Human rights, equality                                                 Minority rights, inequality   
 
EUROPEAN UNION        Democratic, impartial                                          Anti-democratic, discriminatory                                                                                                            
 
 
6.3 Section Two: Different functions of the mechanisms of memory 
 
6.3.1 Part One: Mechanisms as a Single Body: Social Practices and Media Events 
 
In this section, I examine how the mechanisms enter into the daily lives of social 
individuals through social practices and media events, and explore the different 
interactions of the respondents with particular mechanisms that are intertwined with each 
other. Through my interviews, I observe how the mechanisms are embedded in the 
behaviours of the respondents and how they are put into practice physically and 
emotionally. The military salutation, raising the flag, singing the national anthem, a 
minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, standing before the monuments, 
and celebrating national days, are the social practices that are physically and/or 
emotionally practiced by the respondents. These practices remind them of the ‘past’ that 
is constructed by the ruling groups. The national days, as forms of commemorations, 
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sometimes also appear as media events. Melek a 28-year old female instructor explains 
her ‘memories in relation to national identity’ as follows,   
     
Melek: In our youth, we were taught to embrace our own identity rather than 
enmity towards the other side. I mean, in our home. 
 
Interviewer: How, for example?  
 
Melek: For example, when a military vehicle passed by, my brother and I would 
give the soldiers a military salute. Or at least wave to them. But usually we gave 
them a military salute. When these things were talked about, we were not told that 
the Greeks were not bad, but rather, told that the Turks were good. In fact, we 
were not told that the Turks were good, but it was stressed that respect should be 
shown towards the soldiers. We were taught to respect the soldiers. Or rather...  
my mother would put up the Turkish flag on national days... but never, ever talked 
about the Greeks as enemies244.  
 
In Melek’s narration, the ‘soldier’s salute’ is practiced in her daily life, especially on 
national days. The ‘mechanisms of memory’ (national days and flags as intertwined) 
construct her ideas about the others (Greek Cypriots) through her family, which does not 
openly give the message that Greek Cypriots are the ‘others’: this is implied tacitly 
through the mechanisms of memory that construct ‘what should be remembered’ through 
social practices. In this case, the military vehicle, the Turkish soldiers and the Turkish 
flag are the moments articulated within the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. 
These moments bring individuals into connection with the ‘constructed past’, which is the 
memory of the Turkish Cypriots’ salvation from their ‘enemies’ in 1974 by the Turkish 
soldiers. The repetition of the salute provides continuity with this constructed ‘past’. 
Thus, it might not be Melek’s family but the moments of discourse, that tell who the 
enemy is and who is not through the mechanisms of memory.  
 In another example, provided by Nurten, a 60-year old female retired history 
teacher, putting up the Turkish flag is practiced to express aggressive reaction towards the 
‘other’: 
 
Nurten: Our memories with the Greeks have always been full of misfortune. Even 
before 1963, we would receive threats as my elder brothers were members of the 
TMT [Turkish Resistance Organisation]. At night they would be at our home. 
Once or twice, we witnessed them installing bombs; in short all the bad memories 
still remain. Or when we put up the flag on national days…. My mother was a 
nationalist….  We would put up the flag on Friday evenings and take it down on 
                                                 
244 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
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Sunday evenings. On a Saturday evening a few infidels [Greek Cypriots] came to 
our home to quietly pull down the Turkish flag in our garden. We all rushed out 
and ran after them. In retaliation, this time we left the flag on the pole for fifteen 
days. Our relations with the Greeks have always been like this245…  
 
Putting up the Turkish flag and leaving it on the pole is understood by Nurten as an 
expression of their loyalty towards the Turkish nation/identity; they reacted to the ‘others’ 
when they tried to pull down the flag, because this attempt was seen as a threat towards 
the Turkish nation/identity. The act of putting up the flag and leaving it flying for fifteen 
days can thus be interpreted as a kind of aggressive reaction towards the ‘others’ who 
‘attacked’ the Turkish flag, the symbol of the Turkish nation/identity in Cyprus. One can 
see the naturalization of Turkish nationalism in Nurten’s narrative when she talks about 
her family’s obsession with the Turkish flag and her mother’s being a nationalist as good 
and positive things. At the same time, she identifies Greek Cypriots as infidels and 
exceptionalizes their nationalism.     
 In the following example, the different forms of mechanisms appear in the 
narrative of Tezcan, when he explains his ideas about the monument of Atatürk:  
 
As we also read in our history books, he is the greatest Turk. The founder of 
Turkey. I am affected a lot when I hear our national anthem on national days246 
(Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee). 
 
The mechanisms of the traditional form of the national anthem, the national days and the 
monument of Atatürk, that are included in the commemorations and history textbooks, 
mobilize Tezcan’s memories about Atatürk, showing the intertextual relationship amongst 
the official mechanisms of memory. In this particular case, the mechanisms function like 
a single body for the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity through the symbol of 
Atatürk. Similarly, in the following narration, different forms of mechanisms (the 
monument of Atatürk, the national anthem, national days and history textbooks) are 
intertwined with each other and work to inculcate by repetition certain norms of 
behaviour that automatically imply continuity with the constructed ‘past’. Selen, a 29-
year old female TV presenter, narrates the first things that come to her mind on seeing the 
photograph of the monument of Atatürk:  
 
                                                 
245 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
246 In depth-interview, Surlariçi: Tourism agency, 7/08/2007 
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Selen: The symbol of Turkishness... I am not sure...The things that we read in the 
history text book. He saved Turkey from the enemies. The principles and 
revolutions of Atatürk...He is also adopted by the Turkish Cypriots. We shouldn’t 
stray from his path. If we digress from Atatürk’s path we will lose our way. I think 
these things underlie the symbol of Atatürk. Whenever I see the bust of Atatürk, I 
remember the national days because on those days, we always stood before the 
busts of Atatürk and observed one minute’s silence as respect for Atatürk. We 
sang the national anthem. As you know, wreaths were laid and parades were held 
and so forth. Throughout our education in elementary school, we stood before the 
bust of Atatürk and sang the national anthem out of respect for him and the 
martyrs. That was the first thing every Monday morning. And the last thing at the 
end of a week of education was the same. These are all the things that come to my 
mind247.  
 
It is interesting to observe that although Emine says she does not conceive the national 
anthem (one of the mechanisms) as a national event, the anthem still functions to mobilize 
her emotions about her identity. For Emine, a 52-year old retired official, 
 
Emine: When we were children, we would be excited when the national anthem 
was sung but I wouldn’t see it as much of a national event. Because the national 
anthem was sung at the beginning of each week, I would regard it as an indicator 
of the beginning of the new week. When I was a young girl, I liked to hear the 
national anthem while we were on parade. I would walk better. I would feel 
excited. 
 
Interviewer: Why did you feel excited?  
 
Emine: We wouldn’t go so deeply into national emotions, but we would see it as a 
ceremony248. 
 
Although Emine says that she does not regard the national anthem as related to national 
sentiments, it still functions in her life as an internalized attitude about her identity. The 
reason why Emine liked to hear the national anthem, would walk better and would feel 
excited when she heard the national anthem, is that the national anthem carries the 
meaning of national sentiments. As Llobera (2005:37) notes, ‘music particularly in the 
form of songs is a powerful source of patriotic sentiment and the national anthem is a 
potent stimulus for national identification as it expresses the feelings of pride in one’s 
country’. The national anthem operates to fix certain norms of attitude by repetition; for 
example, when Emine says ‘I would regard it [the national anthem] as an indicator of the 
beginning of the new week’ she is approaching it as a habit. As Billig (1995:6) notes, 
‘habits are highly crucial as they enable the nations to be reproduced’. Thus, although 
                                                 
247 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007 
248 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
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Emine argues that she wouldn’t see the national anthem as much of a national event, she 
is continually reminded of her nation and national identity through the anthem, which is 
one of the mechanisms of memory.  
 One can also look at how the respondents practice singing the national anthem 
physically and emotionally with the media. Most of the respondents say that when they 
hear the national anthem being played in the media, they stand up and accompany the 
singing, and in doing so they feel themselves to be members of the Turkish nation. The 
media thus play a crucial role in carrying the official mechanisms into the homes and 
everyday lives of people. Media, as one of the mechanisms, sustains the dominant 
discourse through its representations of official mechanisms such as the national anthem. 
This can be seen in the cases of Ayşe, a 31-year old female instructor and Cemre, 22 
years old and unemployed:  
 
Ayşe: When we were at primary school, my elder brother and I did not have to go 
to bed early on weekends. That’s why we waited till midnight. At that hour, the 
national anthem was sung. We would accompany the singing and went to bed after 
that.  
Interviewer: How do you feel when you hear the national anthem on the radio or 
TV? 
Ayşe: When I sang it at home my nationalistic feelings increased. One of the 
reasons for it was that the singing on TV was performed by professional 
musicians. When I was singing the national anthem, I regarded myself as a 
member of the great Turkish nation. When we sang it at school, we wouldn’t sing 
it so seriously, as we sang it with our friends249.  
 
Interviewer: How do you feel when you hear the national anthem on the radio or 
TV? 
Cemre: It reminds me that I should stand up when the music starts. ..  
Interviewer: why?  
Cemre: Because we learned it like that. As you know, the national anthem is 
sacred. You must stand still when it is sung. If you move, it is regarded as 
irreverence. For everything... like betraying national values. We were taught it that 
way250.  
  
In the following two examples, seeing the monument of Atatürk in the street functions as 
a social practice in the everyday lives of the respondents. The monument leaks into the 
autobiographical memories of the respondents and provides continuity with the 
constructed ‘past’. Kemal, a 51 year-old male, tyre marketing expert and Arif, a 86 year-
                                                 
249 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007 
250 In-depth interview, Göçmenköy: Domestic parlour, 27 August 2007 
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old retired counsellor narrate their memories after seeing the photograph that depicts the 
monument of Atatürk as follows:  
 
Kemal: Atatürk is very valuable, not only for Turkish Cypriots and Turks but for 
the rest of the world. When I see this monument, I remember that the EOKA men 
had fired bullets at it; when I see it I remember this. Later, in the years 1973-1976, 
I remember the days when we were present before the monument of Atatürk, 
when we were soldiers...  we were in the national days’ ceremony squad; it 
reminds me of those years251. 
  
 Arif: When this statue was going to be erected, there were a lot of objections from 
the Greeks… a very beautiful statue... this one… It is the sign of our continuity. 
Kyrenia gate is a historical place. The existence of the statue, there is something 
very nice and beautiful… and holding the ceremonies there… National days used 
to be held there before… Later it moved to the fair area252.    
 
To observe the function of the ‘media events’ in the everyday lives of the respondents, I 
asked them what difference it made when they performed and celebrated the 
commemorative activities, either as personally involved or through the media. Most of the 
respondents say that there is not too much of a difference, as in any case they experience 
the feelings of enthusiasm, happiness, excitement, sorrow or pain depending on the 
content of the activity (i.e., celebration of the national days, commemoration of the 
martyrs). However, most of the respondents point to the fact that when they participate 
personally in the activities, they are more enthusiastic and emotional:  
 
Sure, if you go to the live ceremonies, you get more impressed; but if you can’t, 
watching TV also lets you get the same feelings253 (Duyal, female, aged 21, 
student). 
 
I definitely feel more excited when I go to see the ceremonies, especially with my 
grandchild. I do feel deep enthusiasm in the ceremonies. However, sometimes I 
can’t go and I like to watch the ceremonies on TV. Media also provide the 
opportunity to follow the ceremonies at home254 (Ahmet, male, aged 50, farmer). 
 
Thus, although media provide the opportunity for individuals to perform and celebrate the 
national events, it is not possible to give the media a privileged position. However, media 
as part of our daily lives provide us with an opportunity to follow the events that we 
might normally not be able to pursue; in the event that we cannot participate in national 
                                                 
251 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
252 In-depth interview, Kumsal:Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007 
253 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
254 In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic Parlour, 17 July 2007 
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celebrations, the media function to carry the event and its associated norms and values 
into our homes. Thus, media serve politically in providing the necessary framework for 
the reproduction of the Turkish (cypriot) nationalism through the representation of the 
media events. As was suggested in Chapter Two, media events intervene in the normal 
flow of broadcasting and our lives and occupy society’s ‘centre’ for a while. Media events 
provide social integration by mobilizing emotions such as happiness, pride, sorrow and 
excitement:  
 
When I watch the national days on TV, I feel that I am celebrating the event as a 
nation. I mean, I feel myself as a part of my nation. I am proud of being Turkish255 
(Meltem, female, aged 22, housewife).    
 
When I watch programs on national days I boil up; I feel the sorrows of that 
period. Have you ever been to Çanakkale?...If you went to Çanakkale you would 
get exhausted from crying. There are not only Turkish graves there, but also 
British and Anzac graves. The epitaphs on the gravestones make me deeply 
emotional and such days remind me of it256 (Emine, female, aged 63, retired 
teacher).  
 
On the commemoration day of the martyrs, I feel rather gloomy and it lasts for 
days, because we have had martyrs in the family257 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired 
teacher) 
 
On the national days, I feel very proud, happy and excited. As it is is our 
motherland, I feel very proud and excited on the 29th October on the foundation 
day of the Republic of Turkey. On 15th November I remember how we survived 
the 1958s, 1963s and 1974s and become happy when I watch the ceremonies. The 
day of the declaration of the TRNC makes me happy because we become aware 
that our soldiers haven’t fallen in vain. Having a separate state is wonderful, 
because the Greek statesmen ousted the Turks from the partnership state in 
1963258 (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist)  
 
Responses such as ‘the epitaphs on the gravestones make me deeply emotional and such 
days (national days) remind me of it (Çanakkale)”, ‘on the commemoration day of the 
martyrs, I feel rather gloomy and it lasts for days, because we have had martyrs in the 
family’ and ‘on 15th November, I remember how we survived the 1958s, 1963s and 
1974s’, show how media events mobilize the respondents’ different memories and bring 
them together to operate as one in the reproduction of the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism.  
                                                 
255 In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic parlour, 31/07/2007 
256 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 30 September 2007 
257 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007 
258 In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Volkan Newspaper, 1/10/2007 
 211 
 
6.3.2 Part two: Dominant public memory: Threat and safety  
 
While the ‘mechanisms of memory’ are produced to fix the ‘past’ for the justification of 
the ‘dominant public memory’, this does not mean that they provide a total fixity in the 
memories of individuals. Memories are constantly articulated and negotiated through the 
discourses shaped in power relations; memories of the social individuals are like a 
battlefield of antagonistic discourses. However, most of the time, social individuals try to 
prevent antagonisms by ignoring the alternative memories, which function like a ‘surplus’ 
that threatens the partial fixity of their memories. The surplus creates the necessary 
conditions for the articulation of memories. In the first section below, I focus on 
particular themes that function like ‘surpluses’ and threaten the perpetuation of the 
dominant public memory. In the second section, I explore how the respondents 
mythologize the past in order to provide safety for their memories that are parallel to the 
dominant public memory. 
 
6.3.2.1 Threat to the “dominant public memory”: Internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies   
 
6.3.2.1.1 Hatred, Resentment and Enmity  
 
The memories of the social individuals involve internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies. Most of the time, the respondents overcome these contradictions through 
their intense support of the dominant public memory; in this way, they represent the 
truthfulness and consistency of their memories that are parallel to the dominant public 
memory by excluding alternative memories. However, the exclusion, rejection, ignorance 
or forgetting show their struggle for the total fixity of their memories. For instance, when 
we cross out a word (which implies the alternative memories in this example), this 
generally shows that we think the word is wrong, unnecessary and/or insignificant; thus, 
we exclude, reject or ignore the word. However, sometimes the word that is crossed out is 
not insignificant but the most important one − it might be the one that we want to ignore 
or forget as we don’t want to face it, because we need the total fixity of our memories. 
Total fixity is necessary for our peace of mind. It erases and prevents the possible 
questions, confusions, inconsistencies and ambiguities that make us uncomfortable.  In 
this sense, the crossing out implies presence, not absence; it is the presence of the 
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inconsistencies. In this instance, the word (the alternative memories) is the ‘surplus’ that 
is excluded by the memory as it is a threat to the structured totality.      
 In his narration, a 29 year-old male optician, Alp, talks about his memories about 
Greek Cypriots. One can identify, in his narrated memory, the internal/ inherent 
complexities that are caused because of the antagonistic relationship between 
dominant/alternative public memories. One can also see traces of the official history and 
the media’s function in mediating it: 
 
Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots, and how did 
you obtain this information?  
 
Alp: I learned about Greek Cypriots especially in school, from our teachers. But 
their narratives never instilled hatred or resentment. They only said that Greek 
Cypriots did this and that. As a result, neither my friends nor I have felt hatred 
towards Greek Cypriots. Our teachers just narrated what Greek Cypriots did in 
order to make us conscious and make us think more logically for our nation and 
state.  
 
Interviewer: Did you go to the Museum of Barbarism with your teachers as well?  
 
Alp: Yes. I went there for the first time when I was 12.   
 
Interviewer: How did you feel when you went there? 
 
Alp: When I went to the Museum of Barbarism, I felt sad when I saw what they 
[Greek Cypriots] did to us. But I always think with common sense and I have 
never felt hatred. But I always tell people about their [Greek Cypriots’] intentions. 
Although we are pro-peace, they have negative feelings about us. For example, 
they recently celebrated their liberation from the Ottomans.  
 
Interviewer: How did you get the information about their celebration? 
 
Alp:I read in Volkan and I saw it on TV as well. 
 
Interviewer: How did you feel about their celebration when you watched it on TV?  
 
Alp: Their celebration shows that they don’t like us… that’s why they celebrated 
their liberation from the Ottomans259. 
 
On the surface, Alp’s memory of Greek Cypriots carries traces of the ‘dominant public 
memory’ constructed through the official history (his school education and history 
teachers, a particular museum and the mediation of a national day on TV mobilized Alp’s 
memories) that articulates Greek Cypriots as ‘them’ and Turks as ‘us’ during 1974-2003. 
                                                 
259 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
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Cağrı identifies the Turkish Cypriots and Ottomans as ‘us’ and Greek Cypriots as ‘them’ 
when he says “Their celebration shows that they (Greek Cypriots) don’t like us… that’s 
why they celebrated their liberation from the Ottomans”. 
Closer analysis enables us to hear a very low voice coming from the alternative 
public memories that criticise the ‘dominant public memory’ as full of ‘hatred’ and 
‘resentment’ towards Greek Cypriots. This alternative public memory says that the 
feelings of hatred and resentment are negative feelings. This alternative public memory is 
hidden in Alp’s effort to ‘cross out’ the words ‘hatred’ and ‘resentment’. When he says 
“their (the history teachers’) narratives never instilled hatred or resentment. They only 
said that Greek Cypriots did this and that. Neither my friends nor I have felt hatred 
towards Greek Cypriots”, one can hear the voice of the alternative public memory which 
comes from behind and says the opposite. This low voice coming from behind functions 
as surplus and threatens the total fixity of Cağrı’s memory, which is mobilized through 
the mechanisms of memory. This is why he reacts to this threat with an intense and 
emphatic support of the ‘dominant public memory’ that is constructed by the mechanisms 
of memory. Another example appears in the response of Melek, a 28 year-old female: 
 
Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots? 
 
Melek: I know as much as our elders told us. At times there was friendship, and at 
other times there were eternal enmities. For example, my family’s neighbours 
were Greeks. They seemed friendly when we met them face-to- face, but in our 
absence they would talk about us as ‘the beasts, the Turks’.  My mother told me 
all about this. My mother overheard this once. When my mother turned her back, 
they said this. But in our family, we were not taught to feel any enmity in any 
way.   
 
Interviewer: What do you remember about the Greeks from the education you got 
when you were at school? 
 
Melek: At school, in the Turkish history book, there was a lot of information. In 
Turkish Cypriot history, mostly we were taught that we were a minority in Cyprus 
and that we had suffered because of the Greek Cypriot atrocities. There weren’t 
any fascist expressions in the books, or I didn’t se it that way260.  
 
In Melek’s narrative, the public narratives (i.e., narratives of the mother, teachers, history 
textbook) work as a single body in the construction of her ideas about the Greek Cypriots 
as the ‘others’ who are untrustworthy (Melek’s mother says that Greek Cypriots seemed 
                                                 
260 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
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friendly when they met them face-to-face but they were not) and vicious (Melek 
remembers learning in school that Turkish Cypriots had suffered because of the Greek 
Cypriot atrocities). However, like Alp, Melek says that she was never taught to feel 
enmity/hatred by her family or in her school education; she crosses out the terms 
enmity/hatred as they threaten the total fixity of her memory. These terms represent 
negative feelings, and so Melek and Alp reject the belief that they have been taught to feel 
hatred by their close environment.          
 
6.3.2.2 Safety for the “dominant public memory”: The partial fixity   
 
6.3.2.2.1 ‘Myths’ as the shield for the dominant public memory 
 
In the memories of some respondents, the elements of hatred, enmity and grudge function 
as a surplus and threaten the partial fixity of their memories; however, in the memories of 
others, they function not as elements but as moments that appear articulated within the 
discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. In these instances, their mythologizing past 
functions like a ‘shield’ for the consistency of their memories and for the justification of 
the dominant public memory (1974-2003). In the mythologizing past, Greeks are 
transformed into ‘mythical beasts’ and Turks into ‘heroes’. This situation functions to 
naturalize and legitimize the feelings of hatred, resentment and enmity towards the Greek 
Cypriots; thus Greeks and Turks are like the good and evil in tales. Greek 
Cypriots/Greeks261 are mostly narrated as tyrannical, merciless, cowardly, treacherous, 
unjust, oppressive and selfish. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots/Turks carry the 
personal features of heroes as they are powerful, kind, clever, courageous and protective. 
In the narratives below, one can see the exaggeration and the deeply rooted oppositions 
that carry the features of the mythologies; for example, in the narration of Nurten, a 60 
year-old female history teacher: 
 
Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family 
have any fears?  
                                                 
261 The respondents use the terms ‘Greek’ (Rum) and ‘Greek Cypriot’ (Kıbrıslı Rum) with the same 
meaning. Thus, the term ‘Greek’ does not refer to the Greek people in Greece (Yunan) in the narratives of 
the respondents. The respondents might prefer to use the term ‘Greek’ instead of ‘Greek Cypriot’ in order to 
emphasize the differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Hence, the term ‘Cypriot’ might 
not be used intentionally to ignore the ‘similarities’ between the two communities. It should be noted here 
that there are no questions in the in-depth interviews about the people in Greece. 
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Nurten: Of course we did. We always thought that we would be killed by the 
Greeks… I also have a terrible memory of when I was a student. I would go to 
school by bike and as I was the sister of the Çakırs (the members of TMT), they 
intercepted my road and took away my bicycle by force. They tore apart the tyres, 
broke it into pieces and threw away the bicycle. Their families were watching the 
situation but they took no notice of it, they didn’t interrupt. They pushed me down 
on the ground. They insulted me. They insulted the Turks using terrible slang 
terms. I told my brothers all about them. Later on, we went to that Greek area. My 
elder brother called those Greek boys and they all gathered and stood in a line 
before us. They were so cowardly that they didn’t run away and they stood in line 
obediently. I described who did what. And my brother beat the children in front of 
their father and mother just because they misbehaved. He also told them to get my 
bicycle fixed. Later on, we went to pick up our bicycle, fixed and ready to ride262.  
 
 
Nurten’s narrative dramatises her explanation of her and her brother’s relationship with 
Greek Cypriots in the ‘past’; she brings her childhood memory into the present in order to 
sustain her political views and her identity as a Turk, and her strict division between 
Turks and Greeks depicts how Turkish (cypriot) nationalism functions in her memory as a 
nodal point. The antagonistic poles between Greeks and Turks are very deeply rooted in 
Nurten’s memory: she uses rigid bipolar oppositions such as courageous/cowardly, 
good/evil, strong/weak and kind/rude to define ‘Turks as ‘we’ and ‘Greeks as ‘they’. Her 
narration of her experiences with Greek Cypriots has very clear implications: “They 
intercepted my road and took away my bicycle by force” (implies that Greek Cypriots are 
tyrannical); “They tore apart the tyres, broke it into pieces and threw away the bicycle”, 
“They pushed me to the ground” (implies their being merciless, pitiless and evil); “They 
insulted me. They insulted the Turks using terrible slang terms” (implies that Greek 
Cypriots don’t like Turks and they are rude and ill-mannered); “their families were 
watching the case but they took no notice of it, they didn’t interrupt” (represents the 
families of Greek Cypriots as accomplices; thus she  implies that young or elderly, all 
Greek Cypriots are the same); “My elder brother called those Greek boys” (implies that 
Turks are fearless and courageous); “and they all gathered and stood in line before us. 
They were so cowardly that they didn’t run away and they stood in line obediently” 
(implies that Greek Cypriots are cowardly);. “And my brother beat the children in front of 
their father and mother” (implies that Turks are powerful and strong and Greek Cypriots 
are weak); so even their parents couldn’t do anything to save them just because they 
mistreated his sister (implies that Turks are protective and kind).  
 
                                                 
262 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
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Nurten continues:   
 
Interviewer:  What do you think the future will bring regarding the political 
situation in Northern Cyprus? 
 
Nurten: Like ours, I believe that one day, the dreams of the defenders of this 
nation will come true. And the sun will rise for our sake. I don’t want wars or 
bloodshed, but I am afraid the Greeks’ attitude will bring us to the brink of war 
again and then the sun will rise for our [Turkish Cypriots’] sake and we will no 
longer live through such dark days.  
 
When Nurten narrates what the future will bring regarding the political situation in 
Northern Cyprus, she dramatises the political situation in Northern Cyprus by using 
sentences such as “the sun will rise for our [Turkish Cypriots] sake”, “we will no longer 
live through such dark days”. Her exaggerated style of explanation is similar to that of 
mythological narrations; and in her narrative, the differences between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots are based on personal attitudes.  
Yusuf, a 21 year-old male student, also focuses on the different political positions 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island:  
 
Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots?  
 
Yusuf: Our elderly would always tell us that we were right. They would tell us 
that as a common peaceful agreement seemed impossible, bloodshed was 
inevitable. Well, I think they were right. My grandfather said they had always 
been under oppression and when he heard that there would be clashes, he felt 
proud. He served in the army for eight years. A solution for such events would 
only be by bloodshed. My grandmother did not want my grandfather to stay in the 
army because they had nine children and they were all depended on him, but after 
worse came to worst, they agreed with his views. They said that the Greeks only 
thought about their benefits and claimed that they were the sole owners of the 
island. They said that the Greeks always believed that they were superior to the 
Turks.  
 
Interviewer: What do you remember about Greeks Cypriots from your school 
education? 
 
Yusuf: ...that in the 1960 republic, the Greeks were the majority and that the 
Turks’ voice was so feeble in the republican assembly. I remember that they were 
unjust towards the Turks. We witnessed that the Greeks held more rights than the 
Turks. We saw a lot of martyrs during the years of inter-communal clashes. They 
would show us the martyrs’ cemetery and massacres at Güzelyurt at the time of 
the Turkish intervention. They took us to the ‘Murataga and Sandallar’ mass 
graves twice. The man there, I mean the guide, was the father of some of the 
slaughtered children. I feel the same hatred even when I go there now. It is 
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impossible not to feel hatred when you see how those people can be so merciless 
and savage263.   
 
In Yusuf’s ontological narrative, parallels emerge between the narratives of his 
grandfather/mother (family members) in the first part; and the mechanisms of memory 
(history textbook, martyrs’ cemetery, mass graves, media) in the second part. These 
become clear when one focuses on the similar views and/or implications in his 
ontological narrative. In the first part, he says that his grandfather said that, ‘Greeks only 
thought about their benefits’ (implies that they are selfish); ‘they [Turkish Cypriots] had 
always been under oppression’; ‘they [Greek Cypriots] claimed that they were the sole 
owners of the island’ and ‘Greeks always believed that they were superior to the Turks’ 
(implies that they are unjust). These ideas function as moments that appear articulated to 
Turkish (cypriot) nationalism in Yusuf’s memory. Yusuf’s selective memory brings out 
the ideas from the history textbooks as follows: “Greeks were the majority and ... the 
Turks’ voice was so feeble in the republican assembly” (Turks were oppressed by 
Greeks); “They were unjust towards the Turks. We witnessed that the Greeks held more 
rights than the Turks” (implies that they are selfish). Yusuf implies that Greek Cypriots 
are oppressive, unjust and selfish; there might be different and opposing views that Yusuf 
knows regarding Greek Cypriots, but his selective memory does not bring this 
‘information’ out as it is not in harmony with his political ideas about the Cyprus problem 
at this particular moment.  
The ‘mechanisms of memory’ (history textbook, martyrs’ cemetery, mass graves 
and media) function to provide the necessary elements to sustain Yusuf’s memories in 
relation to identity. When he says, “I feel the same hatred even when I go there now. It is 
impossible not to feel hatred when you see how those people can be so merciless and 
savage”, he implies that it is natural, legitimate and even necessary for Turkish Cypriots 
to feel hatred, enmity and resentment towards Greeks because they are merciless and 
savage. Thus, in Yusuf’s narrative, the commemorative locations, the martyrs’ cemetery 
and mass graves in this case, function to mobilize his feelings of hatred and resentment 
towards Greek Cypriots. The representation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Turkish 
movies also provides elements that sustain his ideas of self and others. According to 
Yusuf, Greek Cypriots are represented as tyrannical, cowardly, weak and merciless and 
Turks as protective, kind and fearless, in the Turkish movies:     
                                                 
263 In -depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 30/07/2007 
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Interviewer: Have you ever watched the movies that narrate the war between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots?  
 
Yusuf: Yes. When I was a small child, on national days they would broadcast 
Turkish films based on the Turkish Cypriot liberation struggle. 
 
Interviewer: Do you remember how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were 
represented in the movies?  
 
Yusuf: Well… in these films, we saw the Greek soldiers breaking into Turkish 
homes and killing defenceless elderly people, women or children. So Turkish 
Cypriots were depicted as aggrieved and helpless, and as victims who were killed 
ruthlessly; and the Turkish soldiers were depicted as heroes and saviours. 
 
Interviewer: How did you feel when you watched these movies? 
Yusuf: When I saw these films, I was deeply affected.  The image of the Greek 
breaking into homes and killing defenceless people, would become reinforced in 
my mind. Turkish forces came here and liberated the Turkish Cypriots. Everyone 
would clap hands waving Turkish flags at the road sides. When I saw these things, 
my hair would stand on end. I would feel excited. I sort of felt I lived that 
moment.        
 
 
When Yusuf says “in these films, we saw the Greek soldiers breaking into Turkish homes 
and killing defenceless elderly people, women or children”, he signifies the Greek 
Cypriots as tyrannical, merciless people who attack the weak. He further implies that 
because Greek Cypriots do not have the courage and power to fight against Turkish 
soldiers, who are represented as strong and courageous, they attack women and children. 
When Yusuf says, “When I saw these things, my hair would stand on end. I would feel 
excited”, the media are mobilizing his emotions about his identity. His saying “I sort of 
felt I lived that moment” shows how he experiences a kind of liminal period as he 
becomes remote from his daily life and experiences those days, and with them, the 
political view of the self and others behind the movie.  The interview continues: 
 
Interviewer: What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? What do you think 
about them?  
 
Yusuf: I know that a member of my family (my grandad is a ghazi264) has suffered 
from the Greeks, and this is the primary reason why I dislike Greeks. In short, I do 
not need to know more about them.  
 
                                                 
264 According to the dominant discourse, a Ghazi is a man who has fought successfully against infidels.  
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It can be seen from Yusuf’s interpretation that his ideas about Greek Cypriots prevent the 
antagonisms and conflicts in his memories and provide a partial fixity, as for him, there is 
no need to question or know more about the ‘others’. In parallel with his ideas about 
Greek Cypriots, Yusuf brings in his grandfather’s words: “as a common peaceful 
agreement seemed impossible, bloodshed was inevitable”; in his memory, fighting against 
the ‘others’ and bloodshed are conceived as natural and necessary. Nurten and Yusuf’s 
mythologized past plays a crucial role in the naturalization and legitimization of feelings 
of hatred and enmity, and thus is necessary for the partial fixity of their memories.    
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown the function of the media in the articulation and construction of 
memories in relation to national identity. The media was the only mechanism from which 
the individuals got ‘present’ information about the Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem, 
the Annan Plan and the EU after the division of the island. The focus of the chapter has 
been on newspaper discourses, because the variety of newspapers made them the most 
popular media in the period that are within the scope of this research. During the 
referendum period, each national newspaper produced different and sometimes opposing 
‘truths’ about the ‘past’ that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together. However, 
it was not possible to see that variety in the television industry.  
Most of the respondents prefer to buy and read the newspapers that are close to 
their political ideas and they define these newspapers as more objective when compared 
to the other newspapers. The respondents determine if a news story represents truths or 
lies by comparing the information given by the news story with their ‘past experiences’. 
In this chapter, I explored how media narratives mobilize memories by bringing the ‘past’ 
which is articulated according to the political discourse of the media institution, into the 
present. In this way, the media play a crucial role in the construction of the social tie or 
antagonistic relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turks and Turkish 
Cypriots. My analysis shows that most of the time, the respondents’ interpretations about 
the ‘others’ are not the outcome of what they personally lived but of what they experience 
through the social remembering that is partly constructed by the media. The news stories 
about Turks as ‘thieves’ and ‘killers’ construct negative stereotypes of Turks as 
‘dangerous’ and ‘savage’ people, and thus identify and locate them as a ‘threat’ to the 
security of Turkish Cypriots. In this way, the media provide elements that function to 
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divide Turks and Turkish Cypriots into two opposing camps. Similarly, media function to 
mobilize meaning that articulates Greek Cypriots as a threat to the security of Turkish 
Cypriots, by publishing negative news stories (i.e., Greeks want no agreement, they own 
deadly weapons) about Greek Cypriots.         
In this chapter, I analysed the narratives of the respondents about the news stories 
that were published in Kıbrıs (supporting the Annan Plan) and Volkan (rejecting the 
Annan Plan) newspapers after the partial opening of the crossings. Depending on the 
political discourse of Kıbrıs newspaper, the ‘past’ with Greek Cypriots was represented as 
a period of time that is longed for and the opening of the crossings as a way back to the 
past. Kıbrıs newspaper supports the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that is 
based on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their common life; it 
therefore publishes news stories that are about the commonalities and friendships between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots following the opening of the crossings. I also examined how 
news stories mobilize meaning that reinforces the putative similarities between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. The emphasis of the respondents on these similarities operates as 
strategies of ‘inclusion and assimilation’ and constructs their identities as (turkish) 
Cypriots. On the other hand, the same news stories also mobilize alternative memories 
based on the differences (i.e., language, feelings, personal attitudes) between Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots. The respondents’ focus on the differences functions as the strategy of 
exclusion that constructs the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is articulated through the 
exclusion of Greek Cypriots.  
In contrast, Volkan newspaper supports the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism. In the Volkan news story there are six photographs, together with 
interpretations of them. The news story is in general about the ruined commemorative 
locations (i.e., the monument of Atatürk, the Turkish martyrs’ cemetery) by the Greek 
Cypriots. The interpretations of the photographs function as a single body in the 
representation of Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’. Although most of the respondents’ 
interpretations parallel the political discourse of the newspaper, the news story also 
mobilizes counter memories (i.e., similar attitudes of Turkish and Greek Cypriots). 
Emphasis on the unifying common features is a part of the strategies of unification that 
function to construct the (turkish) Cypriot identity which focusses on the commonalities 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.               
This chapter also focuses on the political ideas of the respondents. Their 
knowledge of the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the European Union is mostly 
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articulated by the media. However, their memories about the ‘past’ and the ‘others’ play a 
crucial role in their interpretations of ‘information’ about the Annan Plan and the EU. 
There are opposing interpretations regarding the provisions of the Annan Plan; however, 
the respondents’ interpretations of its provisions, which include the issues on security, 
land and properties, administration and the relationship with the European Union, are 
based on their abstract knowledge of the Plan. According to the opponents of the Annan 
Plan, the arrangements in the plan might cause danger/threat (i.e., reduction of the 
Turkish soldiers on the island) and loss of land and properties, minority rights and 
inequality. These respondents interpret the European Union as anti-democratic and 
discriminatory; in their narratives, the strategies of justification function to justify the 
status quo (i.e., the Turkish rule and division of the island) that operates to maintain the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity which locates or identifies Greek Cypriots as eternal threats. 
They are against the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU, as they believe that in 
the event of participation, Greek Cypriots will pose a threat to their life standards, land 
and properties, and political rights, as was the case in the 1960s when Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots used to live together. In the narratives of the se respondents, the strategies of 
dissimilation function through emphasis on heterogeneity and religious differences 
between Greeks/the EU and Turks. Their memories about the ‘others’ sustain their 
political ideas about the EU; hence according to these opponents of the Plan, the EU will 
support the Greek Cypriots in every situation because of their common religion. These 
threatening scenarios that are based on the external threat (Greek Cypriots and Europe) 
function to maintain the status quo. The respondents’ comments reveal the traces of the 
official history (i.e., the argument of motherland/babyland, the discourse about the 
Republic of Cyprus) in their interpretations ofthe Annan Plan.    
On the other hand, the supporters of the Annan Plan believe that it will bring 
safety/protection, human rights and equality; Turkish Cypriots will also regain their lost 
land and properties after the unification of the island. According to these respondents, the 
European Union is democratic and impartial; they see the participation of Turkish 
Cypriots in the European Union as a way of saving themselves from the unjust Turkish 
rule on the island. Their emphasis on a necessary difference between then and now 
functions as a strategy of transformation from Turkish (cypriot) identity into the (turkish) 
Cypriot identity that is based on the common life of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the 
EU. The Annan Plan can be seen as a nodal point around which a variety of 
interpretations can be produced. The Plan, which proposes a possible participation of 
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Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem, is mainly 
about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus; however, the expectations of the 
respondents from the future are highly dependent on their memories of the ‘past’ and their 
conception of the ‘other’. 
In the last part of this chapter, I examined how the mechanisms enter into the daily 
lives of individuals through social practices and media events and thus are embedded in 
the respondents’ behaviours. The military salute, raising the flag, singing the national 
anthem, a minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, standing before the 
monuments and celebrating the national days, are the social practices that are physically 
and/or emotionally practiced by the respondents. These social practices recall the ‘past’ 
that is articulated by the ruling groups. This chapter has also considered the intertextual 
relationship amongst the mechanisms of memory. Most of the time, the mechanisms 
function as a single body in the construction of discourses on national identity. The 
different forms of mechanisms (i.e., the monument of Atatürk, the national anthem, 
national days, history textbooks) are intertwined with each other and work to inculcate, by 
repetition, norms of behaviour that imply continuity with the constructed past. 
Furthermore, the media carry the official mechanisms (i.e., the national anthem, national 
days) into the homes and everyday lives of people. Most of the time the media events 
(celebration of national days, commemoration of the martyrs) provide social integration 
by mobilizing emotions such as happiness, pride, sorrow and excitement. Thus the media, 
as one of the mechanisms, can sustain the dominant discourse. Media as part of our daily 
lives provide the opportunity to follow events that we might not normally be able to 
pursue. 
Although the mechanisms are produced to fix the ‘past’ for the justification of the 
dominant public memory, they do not always provide a total fixity in the memories of the 
individuals. Memories are constantly articulated through the discourses constructed in 
power relations; the respondents’ memories thus resemble a battlefield of different 
discourses. However, individuals generally prevent antagonisms by ignoring alternative 
memories (i.e., negative feelings such as hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots). 
These alternative memories function like a surplus and threaten the partial fixity of the 
respondents’ memories about the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, there are many 
respondents who naturalize and legitimize their memories through mythologizing the 
past. In the mythologized past, Greeks/Greek Cypriots are transformed into ‘mythical 
beasts’ and Turks into ‘heroes’; Greeks/Greek Cypriots are narrated as tyrannical, 
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merciless, cowardly, treacherous, unjust, oppressive and selfish; while Turks/Turkish 
Cypriots are narrated as powerful, kind, clever, courageous and protective.  This situation 
functions to naturalize the feelings of hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots. At 
the end of this chapter, I examined the exaggeration and the deeply rooted oppositions 
that carry the features of myths in the narratives of the respondents.                  
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CHAPTER 7: ARTICULATION OF PUBLIC AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES AFTER THE PRESENTATION 
OF THE ANNAN PLAN 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters, I examined how the mechanisms of memory (history 
textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) mobilize, articulate and 
construct memories in relation to national identity in changing power relations. Although 
the mechanisms of memory play a crucial role in the articulation of memories, there have 
always been oppositional, alternative and conflicting public and autobiographical 
memories. In the present chapter, my focus is on the complex functioning of the 
dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories in the articulation of political 
ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. In the examination of memories, I 
use intertextual analysis to show how dominant/alternative public and autobiographical 
memories are simultaneously drawn upon and combined together.  
In the Denktaş-UBP period, the dominant discourse was Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism constructed through narratives that emphasize the sameness between Turkish 
Cypriots and Turks and difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, this 
situation changed when a new government came to power in 2003. The new government 
highlighted a (turkish) Cypriot nationalism based on the commonalities between Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots and identifying Turks as different from Turkish Cypriots. The 
politics of the new government regarding the identity issue was in line with their 
European Unionist discourse supporting the participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
together in the European Union after a solution to the Cyprus problem. Thus the identity 
of the residents of Northern Cyprus has been the crossing-point between the logic of 
equivalence and difference between Greek Cypriots and Turks, especially following the 
presentation of the Annan Plan. This chapter examines the constant articulation of 
memories in relation to identity as crossing points between the logics of inclusion and 
exclusion that sometimes identifies Turks and sometimes Greek Cypriots as ‘others’ in 
this period.  
In Section One, on “the search for ‘fixity’ in relation to identity after the 
presentation of the Annan Plan”, I examine the articulation of memories in historical, 
 225 
 
political and cultural contexts that are shaped in power relations following the 
presentation of the Annan Plan. Section Two, on ‘identity/otherness: commonalities and 
differences’, examines how the self-other relationships are articulated in the narratives of 
the respondents. In the final section of the chapter, on ‘dominant/public memories as 
autobiographical memories and vice versa’, I explore the interrelationships, parallels and 
differences between public and autobiographical memories. 
 
7.2 Section one: The search for ‘fixity’ in relation to identity after the presentation of 
the Annan Plan 
 
As shown in Chapter Five, from the division of the island in 1974 until 2003, constructive 
strategies were used by the ruling group to construct a Turkish (cypriot) identity by 
promoting unification, identification and solidarity between Turks and Turkish Cypriots, 
as well as differentiation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots through the 
official mechanisms of memory. Although the dominant public memory (1974-2003) is 
highly influential in the memories of the respondents, there were always alternative 
narratives and contested pasts in Turkish Cypriot society during the Denktaş-UBP period. 
The political, social and economic problems in Northern Cyprus were attributed to the 
role of Turkey, and thus to Turks in Northern Cyprus for a long period of time by the 
alternative public narratives. The participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union 
was conceived as the only remedy for these problems.  
 The formation of political, cultural and societal conditions, such as the 
changing of the ruling group, and finally the proposal of the Annan Plan in 2002, led to 
the articulation of the discourses of ‘friendship’ (between Greek and Turkish Cypriots), 
‘Cypriotness’ and ‘peace’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. After the opening of the 
crossings in 2003, Greek and Turkish Cypriots had the opportunity to communicate with 
each other for the first time since 1974. These present political and cultural circumstances 
have also created new dynamics for the re-articulation and re-evaluation of memories in 
relation to identity. After the opening of the crossings, most of the Turkish Cypriots 
crossed the borders for the first time since 1974 and embraced the ‘Others’ 
enthusiastically. It was interesting to see some Turkish Cypriots in the streets trying to 
communicate with each other compassionately, thinking that they were Greek Cypriots 
(Erhürman 2008). 
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As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:33) note, the strategies of 
transformation are often affected by applying subtle rhetorical persuasion. The 
atmosphere that was created after the presentation of the Annan Plan through the 
discourses of the new government was related to subtle rhetorical persuasion. In this 
context, suitable political and cultural conditions were created for the transformation of 
the dominant identity, which was Turkish (cypriot) identity, into a (turkish) Cypriot 
identity constructed through emphasis on the similarities between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots.  
As mentioned in Chapter Four, in the referenda the majority of the Turkish 
Cypriots said ‘yes’ and the majority of the Greek Cypriots said ‘no’. Most Turkish 
Cypriots evaluated this political and cultural development as disappointing. The majority 
of the Turkish Cypriots, who had begun to talk about the good relationship and friendship 
of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the past and at present after the opening of the 
crossings, changed their positive views about the Greek Cypriots: many respondents 
evaluated the result of the referendum with comments such as “Greeks were 
untrustworthy, as in the ‘past’, they did what they were expected to do again…; the ‘past’ 
shed light on the present and thus, the sole friend of a Turk is a Turk”. This situation 
shows how the memories of most of the Turkish Cypriots are re-articulated and re-
negotiated depending on a variety of cultural and political circumstances.  
These new conditions have created a time of uncertainty regarding the identities of 
Turkish Cypriots; hence it is important to consider the inconsistencies, ambiguities and 
complexities about memories in relation to identity that emerged within these conditions. 
This does not mean that all Turkish Cypriots are in the same position; the memories of 
some seem consistent about their identity and thus, about the ‘others’. However, it is 
interesting to examine how most of the Turkish Cypriot respondents have suffered, and 
thus struggled, to re-construct and partially fix their memories following the 2004 
referenda over the Annan Plan. Uncertainty about the Cyprus problem has caused some of 
the Turkish Cypriots’ memory to move back and re-adhere to the discourses about Greek 
Cypriots that were once anchored by the narratives of the dominant public memory during 
the 1974-2003 period.  
Although the memories of the respondents are constantly articulated and re-
constructed, this does not mean that memories completely renew themselves through 
permanent articulation. Articulation does not function like the delete button of a computer 
and it is not about the complete transformation of memories; it points to the dynamism of 
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memories that are re-evaluated and reinterpreted in new political, historical and cultural 
contexts that are shaped in power relations. This re-evaluation could happen through the 
memory’s movement forward or backward. For example, when I say “I made a mistake 
by thinking like that…”, this statement shows that what I thought in the ‘past’ was wrong. 
The statement points to the fact that, what I thought before was exactly the opposite of 
what I am thinking now, at present. However, this statement looks like a fact to me only 
in the conditions of the present. In other words, I have evaluated the past in today’s 
conditions; and the past is articulated in the present.  
 In this respect, the most important question that should be asked after the 
referenda is this: were some of the Turkish Cypriots, those who interpret the ‘past’ with 
Greek Cypriots in a negative manner, thinking in the same way when they embraced the 
Greek Cypriots after the opening of the crossings, and when they said ‘yes’ to the Annan 
Plan? Clearly they were not. In the enthusiastic period after the presentation of the Annan 
Plan, most Turkish Cypriots forgot or chose not to remember some of the memories of the 
‘past’ that were constructed during the Denktaş-UBP period. These forgotten memories 
provided them with the possibility of re-constructing the ‘past’ in present political and 
cultural conditions. ‘What we forget is as crucial as what we remember’ (Samuel 1994: 
x); forgetting and remembering are formed in antagonistic relations and they give us the 
power to transform, reproduce or change. 
 The thin line between what we remember and forget is formed in our selective 
memories and this makes our memories mysterious: the path to solving the mystery of the 
memories of Turkish Cypriots begins with understanding the enthusiastic period that was 
lived after the presentation of the Annan Plan. It should be noted here that this period 
could not be lived with the memories of the ‘past’ that was constructed with hostility, war 
and sorrow. As noted in Chapter One, memories are constantly re-articulated and re-
constructed in power relations; and so our experiences and interpretations, which are 
formed according to our memories, are also changing. It is therefore critical for us to 
recognise the games that our memories play on us, or the games that are played on our 
memories, in order to be aware of how conditions are constructed for the fantasies that 
cause respondents to see Greek Cypriots sometimes as ‘enemies’ and sometimes as the 
best ‘friends’.  
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7.3 Section two: Identity/Otherness: Commonalities and differences  
 
In this section, I adopt Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s major thematic areas in the 
‘discursive construction of national identity’ (1999:30-31) in order to examine how the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity and (turkish) Cypriot identity are constructed in the narratives 
of the respondents. As pointed out in Chapter Three, these authors specified the thematic 
areas as the linguistic construction of a common political past, present, future and a 
common culture (ibid:30). In this context, I explore the commonalities and differences 
between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots; and Turkish Cypriots and Turks in the 
narrations of the respondents, by focusing on stereotypes of Greek Cypriots and Turks 
and major thematic areas, including the linguistic constructions of unshared/common 
past, present and future; and unshared/common culture that are necessary in the discursive 
articulation of identity. 
Most of the time, the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects 
of Northern Cyprus are articulated according to their memories of the ‘others’ (Greek 
Cypriots/Turks). Thus, in this section, I consider the concepts of ‘Greek/Greek Cypriot’ 
and ‘Turk’ as master signifiers that gather free-floating elements/signifiers within a 
paradigmatic chain of equivalence. Statements related to the major thematic areas and 
stereotypes are explored as elements that operate in the organization of most of the 
respondents’ memories in relation to their identity; these elements (statements) fulfill the 
primary role in the construction of identities. They are formed through the complex 
relationship amongst dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories that are 
constructed in power relations; and they struggle to construct the master signifiers with a 
particular content.  
Different statements by the respondents function as floating signifiers in their 
memories. In the sections below on “Turks as ‘us’ and ‘them’ ”, “Greek Cypriots as ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ ” and “ ‘Greek Cypriots/Turks as ‘us’ and/or ‘them’ ”, I explore some of the 
floating signifiers that are related to the unshared/common past, present, future and 
culture in parallel with the characteristics (stereotypes) attributed to Greek Cypriots and 
Turks. The statements have been selected because they represent the major themes in the 
discursive articulation of identity. 
The positive and negative characteristics attributed to ‘Greek Cypriots’ and 
‘Turks’ by the respondents are parallel to their conceptions of an unshared/common past, 
present, future and culture with them. I explore the negative stereotypes attributed to 
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Greek Cypriots as follows: untrustworthy, utilitarian, barbarian, selfish and treacherous; 
and the positive stereotypes as follows: Cypriots, friends, and siblings. On the other hand, 
the negative stereotypes attributed to ‘Turks’ are: dangerous, thief, murderer, savage, 
uneducated, crude; while the positive stereotypes are: saviour, defender, blood relative, 
and sibling. As Demeter (2007:133) argues, “Stereotypes by their nature − not needing to 
be based on facts, but on elements of perception and prejudice”. Although the respondents 
sometimes do not explicitly use these particular terms, they imply them in their narratives.  
 
7.3.1 Turks as ‘us’ and ‘them’   
 
In this part, my aim is to show how Turks that came from Turkey are articulated as ‘us’ or 
‘them’ through the narratives of the respondents about an unshared/common past, present, 
future and culture. The respondents’ conception of Turks provides clues as to how they 
locate themselves in terms of identity. Statements of the respondents were mainly 
obtained in response to the questions regarding what they thought about the “20 July 
Happy Peace Operation” and about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974. They 
were also asked about their expectations from the future and their ideas about the division 
and unification of the island.  
 
7.3.1.1 Unshared/common past, present, future and culture  
 
7.3.1.1.1 Unshared/common past (myths of origin, political successes, defeats and 
crisis, times of prosperity and stability) 
 
7.3.1.1.1.1 Common Origin 
 
As stated in Chapter Two, race is generally represented as one of the natural factors in the 
formation of a national identity by the official discourse. Most of the Turkish Cypriots 
believe in the common origin of Turks and Turkish Cypriots; they emphasize the racial 
sameness between them. The emphasis on the sameness of Turkish Cypriots and Turks 
functions as a strategy in the construction of the Turkish (cypriot) identity:  
 
We have common blood. In the end, we all are of Ottoman descent265 (Ayşe, 
female, aged 31, university instructor).  
 
                                                 
265 In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Kyrenia American University, 28/07/2007 
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We are the Turks who came here after the Ottomans conquered this island266 
(Meltem, female, aged 22, housewife). 
 
 
On the other hand, some respondents reject this idea and talk about a racial similarity 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; they emphasize the commonalities between them. 
These alternative narratives oppose the official discourse that was produced during the 
Denktaş-UBP period:  
 
I do not believe that the Ottomans were our [Turkish Cypriots’] ancestors. I 
believe that the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the result of a more cosmopolitan 
structure267 (İsmet, aged 47, TV programmer). 
 
I read in a newspaper that the DNA of Greeks is the closest DNA to ours. In this 
case, maybe the races of Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the same268 (Sertan, 
male, aged 22, shop owner).  
 
 
In these responses the racial similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is 
emphasized. Sertan, for example, supports his idea about the racial similarity between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots by citing a news story as a kind of evidence. According to 
this news story, the DNA of Turkish and Greek Cypriots is same. İsmet claims that 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the product of a more cosmopolitan structure. In this way, 
Sertan and İsmet highlight the homogeneity of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in their 
narratives. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart note (1999:33), ‘emphasis on similarity 
and homogeneity functions as a constructive strategy’. The respondents’ emphasis on the 
homogeneity between Turkish and Greek Cypriots functions to construct a (turkish) 
Cypriot identity that highlights the commonalities between the two groups. On the other 
hand, when İsmet says ‘I do not believe that the Ottomans were our (Turkish Cypriots) 
ancestors’, he is pointing to the racial dissimilarities between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. 
The respondents’ emphasis on racial dissimilarities functions as the ‘strategy of 
dissimilation that aims to create difference and heterogeneity’ (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart 1999:33) between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. In these cases, the strategies of 
similarity and difference function together in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity 
that identifies Turks as the ‘others’ who are different from the Turkish Cypriots.               
 
 
                                                 
266 In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic parlour, 31/07/2007 
267 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007 
268 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 28 July 2007 
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7.3.1.1.1.2 Turks: Saviours /Occupiers 
 
As was indicated in Chapter Five, although some of the respondents evaluate Turks as 
saviours, some interpret them as occupiers. The respondents who interpret ‘Turks’ as 
saviours generally evaluate the Cyprus war as a crisis that was overcome together with 
their ‘motherland’ Turkey, and thus with Turks in 1974. Here ‘the shared sorrows 
function as a strategy’ (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:38) in the construction of 
Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the argument of the motherland. According to 
the formal discourse (1974-2003), Turks are the heroes and saviours, as they implemented 
the “20th July 1974 Happy Peace Operation” and saved the Turkish Cypriots. Similarly to 
the discourse of the ruling group during 1974-2003, most of the interviewees interpret 
20th July 1974 as the day of salvation of the Turkish Cypriots from Greek ‘cruelty’ by 
their saviours, the Turks; the motherland Turkey brought peace to the island: 
 
They have come and saved our lives. That’s why we are at ease269 (Sevim, female, 
aged 70, housewife).  
 
In the period 1963-1974, the motherland Turkey always backed us. So we thought 
that the Greeks couldn’t give us any harm. The Greeks would play on their radio 
the song ‘bekledim de gelmedin’ [I waited for you in passion but you didn’t turn 
up270], which was broadcast in Turkish. On the other hand, the Turkish radio 
channels would air the song ‘ansızın bir gece gelebilirim’ [I may come one night 
without prior notice271]. We always believed that Turkey would come one day and 
save us from the Greek oppression272 (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert).   
 
Turkey brought peace and quiet here. If the Turkish soldiers hadn’t landed, Greek 
soldiers would have landed on the island. This was published in the newspapers273 
(Tuna, male, aged 26, student).     
 
I view 20th July as the day of salvation from Greek tyranny274 (Melek, female, 
aged 28, instructor). 
 
                                                 
269 In -depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Belediye Evleri, 30/7/2007 
270 ‘I waited for you in passion but you didn’t turn up’ is a Turkish love song. The first lyrics of the song 
are as follows, “I waited for you in passion but you didn’t turn up. Didn’t you ever love me? You didn’t 
wipe away my tears. Tell me! Tell me! Didn’t you ever love me?” 
 
271 ‘Don’t you call me so warm-heartedly’ is a Turkish love song. The song goes as follows: “Don’t you 
call me so warm-heartedly; I may come one night without prior notice, If you miss me, if you haven’t fallen 
asleep, I may die of joy at your doorstep.”   
 
272 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007 
273 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
274 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
 232 
 
Thank God that they arrived, otherwise that would have been the end of the Turks 
here. Maybe we would still be living, but not as Turks: as Greeks, and we would 
be speaking Greek. In other words, I am glad that the Turks arrived here because 
Turkey saved us and encouraged our people by increasing our population275 
(Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).   
 
We, the Turkish Cypriots, escaped a great slaughter as a result of the arrival of 
Turkey276 (Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor).  
 
If Turkey hadn’t arrived on 20th July, all the Turks here would have been 
slaughtered. For example, in Paphos, there were lots of ditches dug and men who 
had been slaughtered were buried there. The Greeks opened fire on our youth and 
people. Murataga and Sandallar are the foremost examples of massacres277 
(Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher). 
 
 
However, there are also respondents who alternatively interpret the “20 July 1974 Happy 
Peace Operation” as an occupation that was realized by the outsiders, the Turks. The 
respondents’ conception of Turks as outsiders points to the national differences between 
Turks and Turkish Cypriots:  
 
Sometimes it is more difficult to save people from their saviours278 (Berk, male, 
aged 27, instructor). 
  
My grandfather always keeps saying that it is more difficult to save us from our 
saviours279 (Ayten, female, aged 23, student) 
 
Turkey came here in 1974 and she is still here; that is the indication that she has 
occupied this place280 (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife) 
 
These responses show how the respondents exclude the Turks by labelling them as 
‘occupiers’ who have a different culture and national identity from the Turkish Cypriots’. 
The emphasis on national differences functions as a strategy for dismantling (Wodak, 
Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:42) the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the 
national sameness and common past of Turkish Cypriots and Turks. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007 
276 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007 
277 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
278 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
279 In- depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 3/09/2007 
280 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic labour, 25/07/2007 
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7.3.1.1.2 Unshared/common present (citizenship, political achievements, current and 
future political problems, crisis and dangers)    
 
7.3.1.1.1Turks: Turkish Citizens (insiders) /Aliens (outsiders) 
 
As noted in Chapter Four, during the Denktaş-UBP period, many Turks migrated to the 
island from Turkey. In order to encourage the migration, the government provided them 
with land and properties; the aim was to increase the numbers of the Turkish population 
on the island. Furthermore, with a law passed at the beginning of 1990s, Turkish people 
had the opportunity to come to Northern Cyprus using only their identity cards. Some of 
the respondents who consider themselves as part of the Turkish nation evaluate Turkish 
people that came from Turkey as ‘citizens’ that live in Northern Cyprus. For these 
respondents, the migration of Turks is a positive decision and a political achievement on 
the way to increasing the numbers of the Turkish population and developing the nation 
using Turkish productive power. According to them, this situation supports the national 
body. These respondents evaluate Turks as insiders; and the emphasis on positive political 
continuity is one of the strategies of inclusion and continuation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, 
Liebhart 1999:37) that functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity:  
 
Turks have reconstructed the state in many fields. If it weren’t for our Turkish 
citizens who came from the mainland Turkey, all sectors would collapse. For 
example, the construction sector would collapse281 (Arif, male, aged 86, retired 
counsellor).  
 
If it weren’t for the Turkish citizens’ support, especially technical support, we 
would be facing a lot of difficulties282 (Aydın, male, aged 80, retired counsellor). 
 
On the other hand, some respondents interpret Turks who live in Northern Cyprus as 
‘aliens’ belonging to a foreign country (Turkey) but living in Northern Cyprus. According 
to them, Turks coming from Turkey are taking jobs and work opportunities away from the 
Turkish Cypriots. These respondents intensely criticise the politics of the 1974-2003 
government which encouraged the immigration of Turks to the island. For them, Turks 
have benefited from unequal opportunities and prestige just because they immigrated to 
the island; with the immigration of Turks, Turkish Cypriots have become second-class 
citizens in their ‘own’ country:  
 
                                                 
281 In-depth interview, Kumsal:Domestic parlour, 20/07/2007 
282 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007 
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I don’t believe that they like us very much. By coming here, they gained an 
undeserved prestige. They think a lot of themselves. They say they saved us and 
that if they hadn’t been here, we wouldn’t have been alive. In Cyprus, in practice, 
they have more rights than we do. As if they own Cyprus themselves283 (Ayten, 
female, aged 23, student).    
 
The immigration of Turks from Turkey is more than you can estimate. I see this 
from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots as disadvantageous, because they have 
usurped our rights of employment. Since their arrival, Turkish Cypriots have been 
treated as second-class citizens284 (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).  
 
I feel that I have to share my bread and my opportunities with Turks that came 
from Turkey. I mean we are in a kind of competition with them. When we look at 
the managerial positions we see that they are all Turks. They are in the decision-
making mechanisms.285…(Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter) 
 
 
These responses indicate how the respondents situate Turks as aliens and outsiders who 
have come to the island and become a problem for Turkish Cypriots. They do not see 
Turks as part of the ‘national body’ as the previous interviewees do. The respondents’ 
division of the population into ‘we’ and ‘Turks’ indicates how they conceive their identity 
as different from Turkish identity. Their complaints about the present situation function as 
a strategy for the transformation of Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot 
identity. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:40 note, the emphasis on a necessary 
difference between now and the future function as a strategy for the transformation of a 
well established identity into another identity.  
 
 
7.3.1.1.3Unshared/common Future (current and future political problems, future 
political objectives, political virtues) 
 
7.3.1.1.3.1Unification/Separation 
 
Some respondents support the idea that Turkish Cypriots are part of the Turkish nation 
and that therefore it is necessary for them to live under their state with the support of the 
‘motherland’ Turkey; they evaluate the constant support of Turkey as essential for the 
security of the Turkish Cypriots on the island, and therefore support the status quo. The 
respondents’ emphasis on positive political continuity between Turks and Turkish 
Cypriots and their protection from a possible threat from Greek Cypriots function as 
strategies of ‘continuation and defence’ that operate to perpetuate the dominance of the 
                                                 
283 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007 
284 In- depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
285 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007 
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Turkish (cypriot) identity that is sustained through negative narratives about the others 
(Greek Cypriots). These respondents therefore do not support the participation of 
Northern Cyprus in the European Union after the solution of the Cyprus problem:    
 
In my view, the island should stay divided, because we have peace. Our soldiers 
are nearby. When we go to bed, we lie in bed in peace286 (Duyal, female, aged 21, 
student). 
 
For me the island is not divided now. We live in our homeland with the support of 
our motherland Turkey. It is better for things to stay as they are. This is similar to 
living in peace, quiet and in unity with people who look like one another in their 
own boroughs in a big city287 (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer). 
 
 
Some of the respondents conceive Greek Cypriots as “Cypriots” and thus, their different 
conception of identity plays an important role in their imagination of a common future 
with Greek Cypriots on the island. These respondents also emphasize the necessity of 
political, cultural and economic independence of Turkish Cypriots from Turks, and thus, 
in the future, from Turkey:  
 
I think what we need to do in future is to break our sick connection with Turkey in 
every aspect and find a way to live with Greek Cypriots on our island, as we are 
Cypriots and this island is ours288 (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer). 
 
I think the best solution is federation with Greek Cypriots. We can’t live 
dependent on Turkey forever. The discourse of motherland and babyland should 
be history. What I mean is that the baby is now an adult! (Laugh)289 (Fide, female, 
aged 26, business chair of the milk industry).  
    
 
Interpretations such as “we are Cypriots”, “this island is ours” and “the discourse of 
motherland and babyland should be history” show how the respondents place Turks 
outside the system of convention to which (turkish) Cypriots belong. These responses also 
provide crucial clues about the future expectations of the respondents. Their desire to be 
independent from Turkey functions as a transformative strategy that aims to transform the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. In Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, 
Liebhart’s (1999:40) terms, the respondents’ emphasis on the ‘necessity of autonomy and 
independence functions as a transformative strategy’. 
                                                 
286 In-depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
287 In- depth interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007 
288 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007 
289 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007 
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7.3.1.1.4 Unshared/common culture (language, religion, everyday culture such as 
eating and drinking habits and clothing)  
 
7.3.1.1.4.1Migrants/settlers 
 
This part considers interpretations of the respondents obtained from their responses to 
questions about their ideas of Turks. Most of the respondents evaluate Turks as the 
‘others’ and thus, as different from Turkish Cypriots. Most of the time, they emphasize 
the differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks by classifying Turks as either 
‘migrants’ or ‘settlers’. They define the migrants as the Turks who came from Turkey 
after the 1990s under the new rule, using only their identity cards; migrants may stay for 
short or long periods of time depending on their job arrangements in Northern Cyprus. On 
the other hand, settlers are the Turks who came to the island from Turkey after 1974 and 
have since raised their families in Northern Cyprus. According to some of the 
respondents, settlers who came to the island after 1974 harmonized better with Turkish 
Cypriot society than the migrants who came after the 1990s. The respondents thus see 
more similarities between themselves and settlers than between themselves and migrants. 
They generally emphasize cultural similarities such as language, lifestyles, eating habits 
and clothing. On the other hand, the majority of the respondents believe that migrants are 
the ones who have ruined the peace in Northern Cyprus; they are dangerous as they kill 
and assault people, and they are responsible for the increase in the number of burglaries in 
Northern Cyprus; they are described as completely different from Turkish Cypriots in 
their lifestyles and traditions. All the respondents got their information about the incidents 
of robberies and rapes from the national newspapers290; thus, as was pointed out earlier, 
media play a primary role in the construction of Turks as ‘others’ by giving present 
information about them:        
 
Alp: One can say the first comers [settlers] were systematically forced to 
immigrate here from various regions of Anatolia through an organised 
programme, This, in fact, was done to preserve the Turkish identity. Up to a 
certain point they had to do this, because at that time a large number of Turkish 
Cypriots had emigrated from the island.   
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the ones who came after the 1990s? 
 
                                                 
290 In events such as robbery, killing and rape most of the national newspapers emphasize that it is Turks 
that came from Turkey who did the crimes. But the newspapers never emphasize it when Turkish Cypriots 
commit a crime.      
 237 
 
Alp: [laughs]…the latecomers [migrants] − we see them in the newspapers every 
day anyway… the late comers are dissimilar… culturally the latecomers are 
different. For example, my brother-in-law is from Turkey but you cannot tell that 
he is. There is a famous Cypriot dish called Colocas, for instance. My brother-in-
law loves it a lot [laughs]…you cannot tell that he comes from Turkey, either from 
his accent or clothing. Most of the time, he speaks like a Cypriot with his Turkish 
Cypriot friends. So nobody can tell that he is from Turkey291 (male, aged 29, male 
optician).   
 
After 1974, Turkish people had to come to the island because the Turkish Cypriot 
society needed a new workforce and human resources. People who came after 
1974 have already become Cypriots. They have been living here for 30 years. 
Their children were born here. However, because of misguided politics, later 
everyone was allowed to enter the TRNC, and as a result of this, there are a lot of 
murderers and thieves in the country. They couldn’t adapt here. People who 
couldn’t manage to make a living in their own countries came here292 (Tezcan, 
male, aged 30, tourism employee).  
 
Those who came in 1974 are closer to us culturally and socially.  Their way of life 
and clothes… the ones after 1995 have been rather problematic. They have a 
completely different culture. Some who are involved in theft or narcotics…in 
short, a number of people have come here who make Turkish Cypriots 
uncomfortable293 (Fide, female, aged 26, business chair of the milk industry). 
 
There is a considerable difference between those that came just after 1974 
[settlers] and the ones that have come recently [migrants]. The ones that came 
earlier were trustworthy. Those people you could call Turks. For example, a 
family who was from Istanbul and was born and brought up there. Who had good 
manners and who did not sabotage the peace and public order… we would sleep 
with our doors or windows open for many years, until the end of 1980’s. Our close 
friends were from Turkey. You wouldn’t bother to stress that you were Cypriot or 
Turkish. Because you knew everyone’s families. The ones who have come 
recently are nonentities. We have no peace or quiet294 (Melek, female, aged 28, 
instructor).   
 
Those who arrived after 1974 [settlers] are completely Cypriot. I have friends who 
can speak with a Cypriot accent better than I do. They never speak with the 
Turkish accent. They live and speak as we do. They benefit from whatever 
facilities we have. There are great differences between those who came soon after 
1974 and those who have come recently [migrants]. Among the newcomers there 
are thieves, robbers or murderers. Illiterate people have come here. You cannot tell 
who they are; a Turk, a Kurd or an Arab295 (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer). 
 
                                                 
291 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007 
292 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: office, 7/08/2007 
293 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007 
294 In- depth interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
295 In- depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007 
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There are also respondents who do not distinguish between Turks as migrants from Turks 
as settlers; they strongly criticise the immigration of Turks to Northern Cyprus, as they 
evaluate them as being culturally different from Turkish Cypriots. These differences are 
interpreted in negative terms:  
 
They [Turks] are completely different from us. They are uneducated and rude. 
They have different life styles and traditions296 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female 
beautician). 
 
We have nothing in common. Not in any subject. Neither in culture, nor in world 
views, nor in way of life nor further, in terms of customs or mores297 (İsmet, aged 
47, TV programmer). 
 
Culturally we have a lot of dissimilarities. Differences with regard to accent, 
clothing, way of life or communal views298 (Ayşe, female, aged 31, instructor). 
 
They are very different from us. Culturally, socially and in many other ways, they 
are very different. They have even altered some of our customs and mores. This is 
not good. We have started to do things we never did before. For example, in terms 
of shopping; we had the ‘arşın’ [a former unit of length], and it converted to a 
‘metre’. After 1974, these changes started and they have spoiled the Turkish 
Cypriot culture. Measurement is a culture, shopping is a culture299 (Emine, aged 
52, female retired official). 
 
In my view, bringing the Turkish migrants here was the biggest wrongdoing 
committed towards the Turkish Cypriots. Because every Turk is not the same. 
Every man has his own culture as a result of the place he lives in. Our roots may 
be the same but I don’t believe that every Turk can live together with others 
harmoniously. For example, when I went and looked at the old city within the 
walls of Nicosia, I witnessed a dreadful scene. There were a lot of Turkish 
migrants. I felt like an outsider. As if they are the hosts and we are the guests. .. 
There is a serious cultural gap and lack of mutual confidence among us. We used 
to be able to sleep with our doors and windows open before the year 1974300 
(Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter).  
 
Before they [Turkish people] came, the island was more peaceful and safer to live 
in. We were living in peace. In the past, there wasn’t this cultural alienation. When 
we were on the street, the people around were similar to us. They were speaking, 
thinking and living like us, but now it is different. People from Turkey are 
different from us with their accent, clothing, and lifestyles and culture. The 
opposite to Turkish Cypriots, they aren’t cool and relaxed and they can’t 
harmonize with the place they live in. They don’t try to improve or change 
themselves in harmony with the environment they are living in. Because of this, 
                                                 
296 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
297 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23 September 2007 
298 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007 
299 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
300 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007 
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Turkish Cypriots feel alienated in their homeland because the majority of people 
are from a different culture. We don’t feel like foreigners but we feel like a 
minority in our homeland301 (Haluk, male, aged 33, English teacher). 
 
 
In these interpretations, the respondents locate Turks as the ‘others’ who are completely 
different from the Turkish Cypriots. Their comments − such as they (Turks) are 
uneducated, rude, opposite to Turkish Cypriots, they are not cool and relaxed and they 
have different lifestyles, traditions, accent, customs, mores, and clothing − function to 
exclude Turks as inferior compared to Turkish Cypriots. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart (1999:38) point out, ‘exclusion is one of the constructive strategies’. The 
respondents’ exclusion of Turks plays a crucial role in the construction of (turkish) 
Cypriot identity that is based on the differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. 
There are also many respondents who support the idea that before Turks came to Cyprus, 
the island was a safer place; in this way, they imply that Turks are dangerous and savage. 
 
7.3.2 Greek Cypriots as ‘us’ and ‘them’   
 
This part examines answers of the respondents in the 40-80 age group when asked if they 
had any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots; and the answers of the 20-33 age 
group when asked what they knew about life with the Greek Cypriots. There are also 
responses to general questions about their feelings about the Greek Cypriots and whether 
they thought they could be partners, sharing the same island/homeland with Turkish 
Cypriots. Additional questions were asked regarding whether things were better or worse 
before the division of the island, what they knew about the period before 1974, how they 
knew this, and how they got information about the Greek Cypriots and about what was 
happening in the South (see Appendix 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
301 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007 
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7.3.2.1 Unshared/common past, present, future and culture  
 
7.3.2.1.1 Unshared/common past (times of prosperity and stability, defeats and 
crisis) 
 
7.3.2.1.1.1 Past: Peace with Friends/Conflict with Enemies 
 
 
The respondents’ conceptions of Greek Cypriots are examined under the heading of ‘past: 
peace with friends/conflict with enemies’. Some respondents believe that Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots shared a common past together in good relationships, as friends. 
However, some reject this idea, as they see Greek and Turkish Cypriots as eternal 
enemies. The public narratives (primarily the narratives of the families, close 
environment, history textbooks and media) play a crucial role in the formation of social 
antagonisms that functions to divide Turkish and Greek Cypriots into two antagonistic 
poles, as enemies and friends.  
 Most of the respondents who conceive Greek Cypriots as enemies narrate the past 
by focussing on the 1963-1974 events as they appear in the history textbooks that were 
used for education in Denktaş-UBP period. Similarly to the history textbooks, these 
interviewees talked about the negative attitude of Greeks towards the Turkish Cypriots’ 
rights, and the inequalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to the history 
textbook of that period, in 1963 Greek Cypriots ruined the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and 
usurped all the rights of Turkish Cypriots; accordingly, the serious disagreements 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots started on that date. The media function to mobilize 
meaning that sustains the constructed past in the memories of the respondents by 
providing present information about the Greek Cypriots: 
  
I remember that we could never live together with them, and that they have always 
viewed us as an enemy. The Greeks have a notorious plan called the Akritas 
plan302 and they still follow that plan. You know what is written in their coffee 
houses? I myself haven’t witnessed it, but read it in the newspapers. And it is still 
kept, written on the walls: “Turks and Dogs cannot enter”; “the best Turk is a dead 
Turk”. Having learned this, it is next to impossible for us to live with them303 
(Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher). 
                                                 
302According to the official discourse, ‘the main purpose of the Akritas plan, which was first published by a 
local Greek newspaper on 21st April 1966, was to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus in pre-determined stages 
and methods, to eliminate the Turkish Cypriot community and to bring about Enosis’ (Uslu 2003:16). The 
goal of the idea of Enosis is to unite Cyprus with mainland Greece. 
 
303 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007 
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It is impossible to come to terms with people who see us as a minority, hate and 
alienate us (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor). 
 
I don’t trust the Greeks. They always put forward their national interests. The 
reason is that they can’t stand us on this island304 (Tuna, male, aged 26, student). 
 
Do you know how many people died in the Kaymakli district of Nicosia in the 
bloody events of 1963? They [Turkish Cypriots] went to the Greek-populated 
areas claiming that the Greeks were their friends and that they wouldn’t harm 
them. Some went to feed their hens, some went to buy clothes for the children, or 
for whatever reason, but they never returned. We don’t want to live such terrible 
events again; that’s why it is better like this in two distinct areas305 (Ülkü, female, 
aged 56, retired official). 
 
There has been enmity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots since time 
immemorial306 (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor). 
 
In my view, they still think that Cyprus belongs to them. I do not trust them307 
(Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer). 
 
 
When Tuna says, “I don’t trust the Greeks. They always put forward their national 
interests. The reason is that they cannot stand us on this island”; Arif says “it is 
impossible to come to terms with people who see us as a minority, hate and alienate us”; 
Esra says, “The Greeks have a notorious plan called the Akritas plan”; and Ülkü asks 
ironically “Do you know how many people died in the Kaymakli district of Nicosia in the 
bloody events of 1963?”, one can see the complex functioning of the public narratives 
mobilizing meaning that articulates Greek Cypriots as a ‘constitutive outside’ which 
threatens the Turkish (cypriot) identity in the respondents’ memories. However, in the 
meantime, it is arguably the existence of the ‘constitutive outside’ which constitutes the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity and the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism that 
functions as a nodal point in the memories of these respondents. The majority of the 
respondents use the term ‘Greek’ instead of ‘Greek Cypriot’ in their narratives; as noted 
in the previous chapter, they may be using the term ‘Greek’ instead of ‘Greek Cypriot’ 
intentionally in order to emphasize the differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots. 
Below are excerpts from the narratives of the respondents who evaluate Greek 
Cypriots as ‘friends’; these respondents, who talk about the common past and friendship 
                                                 
304 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
305 In depth-interview, Famagusta, 30/9/2007 
306 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
307 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007 
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of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, generally focus on their or their families’ good 
relationships in the past, and they emphasise the stability and prosperity in the period 
when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together:  
 
I heard from my family that they lived well in harmony with Greeks in the 1950s, 
and as they were neighbours in various places, they spent most of their time 
together; but starting from the 1960s, the intercommunal relations began to 
deteriorate and the Greeks acted cruelly and ruthlessly, and tormented Turks 
without discrimination, whether children or women308 (Deniz, female, aged 23, 
public relations). 
 
I recall things that my grandmother or elderly people have narrated. I heard from 
them that they didn’t have any enmity in the 1950s and that they became enemies 
later on309 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman). 
 
When I think about what I know about life with Greek Cypriots, I recall the year 
1960 or the period before it. I recall what my father or grandfather has narrated. 
They lived with the Greeks for longer periods. Most of my grandfather’s friends 
are Greeks and he has a good command of Greek. I recall that there was no 
discrimination between the Greeks or Turks. Very close friendships. Living 
together in prosperity310…(Ezgi, male, aged 20, student)    
 
When I was a child, our neighbours were Greeks. When I was five, I had a Greek 
friend. I have always heard good things about the Greeks. My grandmother had 
Greek neighbours, and she would take us to them. We loved them. And when we 
talk about them, we talk of good things about them311  (Emine, aged 52, female 
retired official).  
 
Although they narrate their and their families’ private memories that are based on good 
relationships with Greek Cypriots, these respondents’ narrations about the ‘happier pasts’ 
are generally over when they talk about the period ‘1963-1974’. As explained in Chapter 
Four, during 1963-1974 there was an internal war in Cyprus; and this period was 
subsequently narrated by the official mechanisms of memory that were constructed during 
the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003) as the years of intense Greek attacks on Turkish 
Cypriots. According to the official history, during this period a lot of innocent Turkish 
Cypriot were killed by Greeks in a barbarous way until the ‘1974 Happy Peace 
Operation’ was realized by Turkey. Parallel to the official history (1974-2003), the 
respondents talk about how the Turkish and Greek Cypriots became enemies during this 
period and how the Greek Cypriots killed Turks; it can be argued that the respondents’ 
                                                 
308 In depth-interview, Kyrenia:Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
309 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Cafe, 26/07/2007 
310 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007 
311 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
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public memories are more dominant than their and their families’ autobiographical 
memories about this period.  
 
7.3.2.1.2 Present: No/ Problem 
 
In this part, I consider the respondents’ evaluations of the present political situation. 
Although some of the respondents talk about the economic, political and social problems 
in Northern Cyprus as being due to the Cyprus problem and the division of the island, 
according to other respondents there is no problem in Northern Cyprus; they support the 
continuation of the present political situation:  
 
Today, as Turkish Cypriots, we are definitely in a better situation. We are living in 
security under our state with the support of our motherland. So we haven’t got any 
problems312 (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).   
 
I think there is no problem. If I have my own flag, my own state and my own 
administration, this means that there is no problem. The problem will arise when 
these are going to be made null and void. How will this happen?…There are a 
number of plans for a solution.. Or should I say, so-called peace...  For me, peace 
was brought about in 1974 by the motherland Turkey, and the solution was 
reached313 (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).  
 
We are living in an unrecognized country and we have lots of problems… 
Economic problems. The problems of isolation from the world, and most 
importantly, that we as Cypriots [Greek and Turkish] would not be able to live 
together because of the Cyprus problem314 (Abdullah, male, aged 65, retired 
teacher).      
 
 
The opposing strategies of perpetuation and transformation function in the narratives of 
the respondents above. For example, in Abdullah’s narrative, the strategy of the necessary 
difference between now and the future functions to transform the Turkish (cypriot) 
identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity: thus, when he points to the economic and political 
problems in Northern Cyprus he implies that there should be a difference between now 
and the future. His political ideas construct and are constructed by his memories about his 
memory in relation to (turkish) Cypriot identity; he emphasises the similarities between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots by labelling them as ‘Cypriots’ and implying that he supports 
a possible future with Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, Sevim’s and Tuna’s emphasis 
                                                 
312 In -depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Belediye Evleri, 30/7/2007 
313 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
314 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa:Greenhouse cafe, 21/08/2007 
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on positive political continuity operate as a strategy to perpetuate the status quo, and the 
unity between Turkish Cypriots and the motherland Turkey. In this way, the respondents 
sustain the Turkish (cypriot) identity through their narratives.       
 
 
7.3.2.1.3 Future: Participation in the EU/Division 
 
The respondents’ ideas on an unshared/common future are generally parallel to their 
evaluations about the present; in this part, I examine the expectations of Turkish Cypriots 
for the future regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus. The respondents’ 
expectations are related to how they define themselves in terms of identity and thus, to 
how they define the others; some interpret the division of the island as necessary for the 
peace and security of Turkish Cypriots, as they see Greek Cypriots as a threat to their 
security:  
 
I think keeping the island divided is better, because when we lived with the Greeks 
we were always in horror. We always had nightmares: if the Greeks came.. or they 
would probably come... and so forth. I think we are better off now. More secure315 
(Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife). 
 
Living away from the Greeks is better. They are always treacherous and 
utilitarian. We can’t live together. Having experienced so many hard times with 
the Greeks, I think it is difficult to live together with them316 (Ahmet, male, aged 
50, farmer).    
 
On the other hand, some respondents support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
European Union, because they believe that this will bring political, economic and social 
progress. Depending on the social, political and economic contexts, the differential logic 
that functions to dissolve the existing chains of equivalence between Turkish Cypriots 
and Turks has become predominant in their memories; the idea of Greek Cypriots as 
enemies loses its ground, and this situation gives rise to the imagination of a possible 
future with Greek Cypriots in a united island:   
  
The island should be unified for a solution at the roots between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots and for the development of the Turkish Cypriot society317 (Özdemir, 
male, aged 24, unemployed).   
 
                                                 
315 In -depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Belediye Evleri, 30/7/2007 
316 In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: domestic parlour, 17 July 2007 
317 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 27 August 2007, 
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I want to join the European Union with the Greek Cypriots and have an identity, 
reach economic prosperity; to not live with the worries of war, to integrate with 
the world, to get rid of militaristic structures and pressures. If we don’t join the 
EU, the uncertainties will continue318 (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife).    
 
 
The respondents’ interpretations show their desire for integration with the world, 
economic prosperity and the unification of the island. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart (1999:40) note, ‘the emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the 
future functions as the strategy of dissimilation which is one of the strategies of 
transformation’. The strategies of transformation function to transform the Turkish 
(cypriot) identity into a (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the common future of 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU.   
 
7.3.2.1.4 Unshared/common culture    
 
There are positive and negative interpretations about Greek Cypriots. Although some 
respondents emphasise the constructed differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
such as religion and language, others focus on the similarities between them, such as 
eating habits and lifestyles. Their focus on similarities displaces the differences of 
religion and language; and in these cases, the differential space is expanded and so the 
putative differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots lose their importance:              
 
No bad feeling at all about Greek Cypriots. I feel like a Turkish Cypriot. Only our 
language and religion is different319 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female beautician).    
 
My grandfather always told us that in the same village on religious days, either 
theirs or ours, they would have joint celebrations. Or on New Year’s Eve, they 
would exchange boiled wheat [gollifa]320 (Fide, female, aged 26, marketing, 
statistic and business chair of the milk industry). 
 
Everybody believes in something. One says ‘Allah’ the other says ‘God’. One 
reads the Bible, the other the Koran. Both have the same content321 (Eylem, 
female, aged 22, singer). 
 
You cannot differentiate a Greek Cypriot from a Turkish Cypriot. Their eating 
habits or way of life is completely similar. But you can tell a Turkish Cypriot from 
a Turk322 (Ezgi, male, aged 20, student).  
                                                 
318 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic labour, 25/07/2007 
319 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
320 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007 
321 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007 
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On the other hand, some respondents focus on differences of religion and language 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. They also attribute negative stereotypes to Greek 
Cypriots, such as enmity and selfishness:  
 
I got the impression that the Greeks are not sincere towards the Turks. The 
Orthodox Church has never put aside the Enosis ideal323 (Aydın, male, aged 80, 
counsellor).  
 
The Greek Cypriots are deeply devoted to the church. Each word of the priest is 
equal to an act of law. Because of the fundamental effect of the church, the 
friendship relations of the Greeks stay at a minimum level. Disregarding the 
church factor, there is a nation which has a different language. I can make friends 
with a Greek on the same conditions as with a Frenchman. Maybe I cannot reach 
that point of friendship because they feel long-lasting enmity towards us324 (Tuna, 
male, aged 26, student). 
 
I view them as a community that have always practiced ruling others, been 
favoured and tolerated; and as a greedy community.  I consider them a selfish 
nation devoid of the instinct of sharing325 (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV programmer). 
 
In these responses, the strategies of construction function to construct Turkish (cypriot) 
identity by excluding Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’ who are selfish and insincere and 
who have a different religion and language. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 
(1999:33) suggest, emphasis on the differences functions as the strategy of exclusion, one 
of the constructive strategies.     
 
7.3.3 Greek Cypriots/Turks as us and/or them 
 
In this part of the analysis, I observe the complexities, inconsistencies and ambiguities in 
the respondents’ memories in relation to identity following the referenda that were held in 
the Northern and Southern parts of the island. As explained above, the majority of 
Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ in the referendum through their re-evaluation of the ‘others’ 
(Greek Cypriots). However, the results of the referenda created a period of uncertainty 
regarding the ideas related to the ‘others’, because many Turkish Cypriots hoped to enter 
the European Union as a community but were unable to do this in the end. Most of them 
intensely criticised the Greek Cypriots for their decision in the referendum.  
                                                                                                                                                  
322 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007 
323 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007 
324 In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007 
325 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007 
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There is no consistent time-span for the re-partial fixity in relation to identity to 
take place; as memories are constantly articulated and negotiated during this period, it is 
rare to see Greek Cypriots or Turks categorised as solely ‘us’ or ‘them’ in the memory of 
a particular individual. This is why, in this part of the thesis, I analyse Greek Cypriots and 
Turks as us and/or them, in order to observe the constant articulation and negotiation of 
memories in relation to identity through the narratives of the respondents. The 
inconsistencies in the memories of the respondents do not necessarily reflect the outcome 
of the referenda voting. What is interesting is to examine the changing self-other 
relationships in the memories of single social individuals. Thus Mine, a-28 year-old 
female who said ‘yes’ in the referendum, explains her changing ideas about Greek 
Cypriots after she started to work as a customs and immigration officer for the United 
Nations a few months before the opening of the crossings:  
 
Interviewer: What are your feelings about the Greek Cypriots? 
 
Mine: Well… I have been working with them [Greek Cypriots] for four years. 
Generally, we work together as one Turk and one Greek, or two Turks and one 
Greek, or two Greeks and one Turk, in 12-hour shifts…and finally I understood 
that…Before I started to work there, I said ‘yes’ in the referendum. I started to 
work in 2003. Before I started working, I wanted peace very much. I always 
thought that we could live together as we were all Cypriots. But after getting the 
job in the UN, I started to believe that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live 
together without thinking about their national identities, because I also feel like 
that. For example, when I am working with them, I don’t trust them that much. 
When I am with a Turk, I know that if there is a deficit s/he will meet the deficit, 
but when I am working with a Greek I am less comfortable. 
 
Interviewer: Did you see something go wrong? 
 
Mine: Yes. After some things happened, my ideas [about Greek Cypriots] started 
to change… Actually,… in my family, everybody supports the leftist parties [i.e., 
supporters of the unification of the island] and they want peace. However, after I 
started to work in this job, my ideas changed because, as I said before, I saw their 
different approaches.  
 
Interviewer: Sometimes in work-places there might be problems with Turks as 
well. Don’t you think that this is a normal situation in a place of employment? 
 
Mine: Of course there are times that problems might occur with Turks as well… 
In every nation, there is good and bad...But in my place of employment, I feel the 
separation [between Turks and Greeks]. To put it simply, during the first days of 
my job, there was a race shown on the television, and I saw that we were divided 
into two camps as Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as the supporters of the last two 
runners…I definitely supported the Turk.  Maybe it was a kind of instinct. There 
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were also some things that happened, where I trusted them and then saw that they 
behaved differently when I turned my back.  
 
Interviewer: What kind of things? 
 
Mine: Little things… Like gestures, laughs… When I am with a Turk, I feel safer. 
I can take a nap and rest a bit in my shift hours. But when I am with a Greek, I am 
uncomfortable and worried. I cannot close my eyes as I don’t trust them.  
 
Interviewer: Has something bad happened between you and them?  
 
Mine: No. But the stories that I’ve heard about the things that happened to Turkish 
Cypriots make me feel like that.    
 
Interviewer: Do you think that the island should remain divided or be unified?       
 
Mine: In my view, it is better for each community to have its own administration. 
Because, even in the working environment, we are divided into Turks or Greeks 
and we have different opinions. We don’t break away from each other in terms of 
thought, but in terms of nationality. After having worked with them, my views 
have changed a lot. In my family, everyone favours us living together, everyone 
votes for leftists parties; and I used to think that way myself. When you work 
there, it is completely different. I never thought that one day I would think this 
way. When I was working at university, I had two assistants, one from Pakistan 
and the other from China. I never discriminated between people, but here it is 
rather different.  They are a lot more hostile towards us. I have had enough of 
these things. For example, a Turkish car arrives at the gate, my mother for 
instance; and my mother speaks neither English nor Greek. She tries hard to 
communicate with the Greek officer with a few English words that she 
remembers, and at last she is able to make herself understood. When a Greek man 
comes, he says: ‘I don’t want to speak English because this is a Greek land’ − but 
in fact it is a sovereign British base. Merely because I am a Turk, he doesn’t want 
to help me. And they consistently make us feel this. We, Turks, do our best to help 
them. Most of the Turks can speak Greek. The youngsters can speak English and 
communicate this way. In other words, Turks use every means − a few English, 
Greek or Turkish words or sign language − to make themselves understood. But 
when the Greek cars arrive, they do their best to create difficulties…  “I want to 
speak Greek, speak Greek to me”… When we were first employed, we all bought 
Turkish-Greek, Greek-Turkish dictionaries and started to learn Greek. Later we 
noticed that, after six or seven months, the Greeks had not learned even a word of 
Turkish.  When we went to their offices and they said ‘Galimera’ [‘good morning’ 
in Greek], we said ‘galimera’; but when we absentmindedly said ‘merhaba’ 
[‘hello’ in Turkish] to them, they did not say merhaba in response. Having seen 
these things, I do believe that we cannot live together with them. Therefore, 
maybe because of their education, maybe because of their devotion to their 
religion, or for other reasons, I think they bear a lot of enmity towards us326.  
 
 
                                                 
326 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour ,4/9/2007 
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Mine’s narrative shows how the term ‘Greek/Greek Cypriot’ as a master signifier is 
articulated differently at different times in her memory. When she narrates her ideas about 
Greek Cypriots, she says that in the past, she used to think that Greek Cypriots were 
‘Cypriots’ and that Turkish Cypriots could live together with them. Thus, in the 
beginning, Mine highlights the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by 
focusing on their ‘Cypriotness’; however, after she started to work with Greek Cypriots in 
the same place of employment, her ideas changed. It should be noted that when she 
narrates the period after she started to work, she uses the terms ‘Turks’ and ‘Greeks’ 
instead of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. This shows how she locates Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as two distinct entities in her narrative. Her narration of 
her experiences goes as follows: ‘When I am with a Greek, I feel uncomfortable and 
worried as I don’t trust them’ (implies their being untrustworthy); “When a Greek man 
comes he says: ‘I don’t want to speak English because this is a Greek land’ but in fact it is 
a sovereign British base. Merely because I am a Turk he doesn’t want to help me” 
(implies that they are selfish); ‘I saw that they behaved differently when I turned my 
back’ (implies their being treacherous); ‘Maybe because of their education, maybe 
because of their devotion to their religion or for other reasons, I think they bear a lot of 
enmity towards us’ (implies that they are the enemies). These experiences form Mine’s 
autobiographical memories about Greek Cypriots. However, as was pointed out in 
Chapter One, social individuals experience the events because they understand and 
interpret them in certain ways, and not vice versa.  
 In Mine’s narrative, one can see the constant articulation of her memories about 
Greek Cypriots. However, at this particular time, the moments that appear articulated to 
the dominant discourse about Greek Cypriots (Greeks are enemies, they are treacherous, 
selfish and untrustworthy) that was reproduced through the mechanisms of memory 
between 1974-2003, function to mobilize Mine’s memories. Thus, before she started to 
work with Greek Cypriots, the moments that appear articulated to the dominant discourse 
were functioning as floating signifiers in her memory. However, after she started to work 
with them, these floating signifiers came together within a paradigmatic chain of 
equivalence and filled the meaning of the master signifier (Greeks); although Mine has 
not experienced any serious incidents with Greek Cypriots, she interprets the events in 
parallel with the narratives of the dominant public memory (1974-2003). In other words, 
her autobiographical memories are mediated through the dominant public memory that is 
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constructed through the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism that functions as a 
nodal point.  
 Like Mine, some other interviewees talk about the signification that they give 
to the gestures and behaviours of Greek Cypriots; these bring out the ‘hidden face’ of the 
Greek Cypriots. Zizek (cited in Butler 2005:39) talks about the reversal of meaning that 
can be approached in the examples of master signifiers. Thus, what at first sight seemed 
innocent and intimate becomes treacherous and untrustworthy. However, as Butler 
(2005:31) notes, “our descriptions do not naturally and immutably refer to things, but this 
is the defining feature of the symbolic order − things in retrospect begin to resemble their 
description. As soon as the facts are determined, we have already, whether we know it or 
not, made our choice”. That is, we are already within a discursive construction. In a 
similar vein, one can say that the gestures, laughter or behaviours of Greek Cypriots do 
not naturally or immutably refer to their being untrustworthy and treacherous. The 
respondents’ signification of Greek Cypriots’ gestures as the signs of their being 
untrustworthy and treacherous, resemble the narratives of the official discourse about 
Greek Cypriots that was disseminated by the official mechanisms of memory during 
1974-2003. Although it is possible to accept that Mine lived some unpleasant events as 
she says, what is important here is that the master signifier constituted by the nodal point 
[Turkish (cypriot) nationalism] operates perfectly in gathering these few negative events, 
as it attracts them like a magnet. Similar to a magnet, which is a piece of iron and thus can 
only attract objects containing iron, the master signifier attracts only the elements that are 
similar to it. Thus, although Mine might have some positive experiences with Greek 
Cypriots she doesn’t talk about them, as they are the differences that are not discursively 
articulated to her discourse at this particular time.  
 A similar situation arises in the narration of another respondent, Göktan, a 41- 
year-old male mechanical engineer:  
 
Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots? 
 
Göktan: I was only eight years old. I used to live in the vicinity of Selimiye 
Mosque. So I didn’t live with the Greeks; that’s why I don’t have any idea of what 
it would be like to live with the Greeks. I had never seen any Greeks during that 
period. After the crossings were opened, we started to share some things. But I 
observed that we share a lot of good things with them, we eat and drink together, 
and we enjoy ourselves, but ummm… I don’t want to go into political matters 
because if I do, they clearly….  They want to live together with us but they want 
to be dominant. They make you feel who the boss is.   
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Interviewer: How? 
 
Göktan: When we go into political subjects, you can clearly see that they regard 
themselves as a majority and as superior. .. I couldn’t answer your questions very 
precisely [laughs] because there is nothing specific…. 
 
Interviewer: Can you explain what you mean more clearly? 
 
Göktan: Well... when I go to the other side, they don’t give me that confidence. 
We get along well with one another. We chat together, laugh together, drink and 
entertain together, but I haven’t received that positive energy from them yet, 
because every now and then they say ‘this situation should be like this or that’. 
They say of course the peace can be brought about, but if only they are in power. 
Or they hint at it. That’s why I voted ‘No’ for the Annan plan. Because I don’t 
believe in their sincerity. Although at first I was not certain of this, later I found 
out that by voting ‘No’, I had done the right thing.                             
 
Interviewer: well…What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? 
 
Göktan: Oh dear me! I don’t feel anything. Err… When I go to the other side… 
Err… Irritation… Not exactly. But I don’t have good feelings. As I said, when we 
speak to them err… including me, we may say this situation is over and done with. 
We say we need peace. Of course, but who is clear about the meaning of peace? 
Aren’t we at peace now? Are we at war? We should think about this seriously. .. 
But I feel uncomfortable, one way or another, because there …..I feel that they do 
not see us as equal to them. I got the impression that they want to see us as 
second-class citizens. May be this is only my thoughts…. I am not sure…. But 
they make me feel this, one way or another…. 
 
Interviewer: How? 
 
Göktan: I don’t know. .. Well, either the looks or expression in their faces make 
me feel that they see themselves as superior to us327.   
 
          
Like many respondents, Mine and Göktan describe Greeks as treacherous, selfish and 
untrustworthy; Greeks are represented as the ‘others’ in their narratives.  
However, there can be more than one ‘other’ in the narrative of many respondents. 
When I asked questions about Turks from Turkey I examined how the respondents might 
conceive Greeks as well as Turks as the ‘others’ at the same time. In these cases, it is 
much more difficult to talk about the function of the logics of inclusion and exclusion that 
provides clear-cut lines such as ‘friend-enemy’ or ‘us-them’. Below are Mine’s and 
Göktan’s interpretations about Turks who came from Turkey: 
 
                                                 
327 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 4/09/2007 
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Interviewer: What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? 
How do you feel about it? 
Mine: I think, if the Turkish army hadn’t landed in Cyprus, maybe none of us 
would be alive now. The Greeks would have killed us all. I mean, if we are alive, 
this is because of the motherland Turkey.   
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 
1974? 
 
Mine: If nothing had happened and they hadn’t left their homes, it would have 
been much better. 
 
Interviewer: Why? 
 
Mine: I don’t know. I am on the side of the idea that Cypriots live in Cyprus. They 
[Turkish people] are too many ….  They have changed the order of our 
community, both socially and economically. They work here for much lower 
salaries. And Turkish Cypriots go to the Greek side to do the same job because the 
wages have gone down because of this cheap workforce. A Turk from the 
mainland can make a living with 700 YTL, but a Turkish Cypriot can’t manage it. 
Because of them, the balance in the market has changed.   
 
Interviewer: How about socially?  
 
Mine: For example, because of the Turks from the mainland, I cannot go to the 
harbour and walk there, or elsewhere. I get irritated to leave here to go to my 
aunt’s. 
 
Interviewer: Why? 
 
Mine: Everything is different with Turkish people. I believe that they violate the 
communal order. Their culture, education, life standards, social lives, are different. 
We didn’t use to hear of any cases of violence before. Now thefts, murders, rapes, 
and such …  90% of these are committed by Turkish immigrants.  
 
Interviewer: Where did you get this information? 
 
Mine: From the newspapers. 
 
************** 
 
 
Interviewer: What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? 
How do you feel about it? 
 
Göktan: It was fortunate that they [Turks] came…if we lead a peaceful life, it is 
because of the existence of Turkey. As our old people say, we do not live in fear.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 
1974? 
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Göktan: Their arrival on the island has been a complete tragedy. Already no one 
thinks anything positive about them. They have wrecked our system, and social 
life. To put simply, when I went to Turkey on holiday, I had the opportunity to 
talk to a Turkish man, and the man asked me why the Cypriots do not like Turks 
from Turkey. In response, I asked him if he would like someone who came from 
abroad to rape, to rob, to take over his rights of employment. In the summer, my 
family and I would keep the doors and windows open, but now we double-check if 
the doors or windows are properly closed or locked for security. It is because of 
the negative effects of the Turks from Turkey. Even in the daily newspapers, these 
have become daily routine cases: the other day in a news story, it said that the 
percentage of the inmates in prison is 75% Turkish citizens.   
 
 
Contradictions appear in these narratives about ‘Turks’; the master signifier ‘Turk’ is 
constantly articulated through the opposing narratives of the respondents. Thus, in their 
answers to the first question, Mine and Göktan locate Turks as the saviours of Turkish 
Cypriots from Greek cruelty; they classify Turks as ‘us’ when they talk about them in 
relation to the Happy Peace Operation that was realized in 1974. However, when they 
express their feelings about Turks who migrated to the island after 1974, they locate them 
‘not as the saviours’ but as ‘thieves, killers and dangerous people’ and thus, as the 
‘others’. This shows how the memories of the respondents may be articulated differently 
in the present historical and political contexts.  
When Mine says, “If the Turkish army hadn’t landed in Cyprus, maybe none of us 
would be alive now. The Greeks would have killed us all”; and Göktan says “fortunately, 
they (Turks) have come …if we lead a peaceful life it is because of the existence of 
Turkey” it is clear that they see Turks as the defenders of Turkish Cypriots, as the 
saviours who saved Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). Here one can hear 
the voice of the public memory that was sustained by the official mechanisms of memory 
during the Denktaş-UBP period. As was noted above, the narratives of the official 
mechanisms of memory represent the event ‘20 July Happy Peace Operation’ as the 
salvation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek cruelty by the Turkish soldiers. 
However, in their answers to the second question, Mine and Göktan describe 
‘Turks’ as dangerous and savage people, as aliens, thieves and killers. Hence the reversal 
that gives rise to a new master signifier (Turks) as aliens, thieves and killers is at work in 
their narratives. In the same way that Zizek says that all fears (of economic and moral 
degradation) are exchanged for the fear of the Jew in anti-Semitism, it can be argued that 
the Turkish Cypriots’ fear of economic degradation, political uncertainties and social 
problems are exchanged for the fear of the ‘Turk’. As was stated in Chapter Four, since 
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the separation of the island in 1974, Turkish Cypriots have been living in an unrecognized 
state, and this situation has caused social, political and economic problems for the Turkish 
Cypriots. As they are living isolated and marginalized from the world under economic 
and cultural embargoes, the TRNC is totally dependent on Turkey both economically and 
politically. However, after the presentation of the Annan Plan, a new TRNC government 
(CTP) that sees the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union as the 
solution of the economic and social problems came to power. Thus, within the changing 
political and social circumstances, the Turks who were once seen as ‘saviours’ and 
‘defenders’, are being excluded as the ‘others’ by some Turkish Cypriots. When Mine 
says “I am on the side of the idea that Cypriots live in Cyprus”, “the balance on the 
market has changed because of them (Turks)”; and when Göktan says “the Turkish man 
asked me why the Cypriots do not like Turks. In response, I asked him if he would like 
someone who came from abroad to rape, to rob, to usurp his rights of employment”, one 
can observe how the respondents’ memories, in relation to identity, construct and are 
constructed by their political ideas, shaped by the social and economic problems. In this 
sense, Turkish people function as ‘constitutive outsiders’ that threaten the ‘Cypriot’ 
identity in the memories of the respondents at this particular moment.      
Furthermore, negative stereotypes such as alien, dangerous, thief and murderer are 
attributed to Turks by the respondents. When Mine says “They (Turks) are too many… 
They changed the order of our community”, “everything is different with Turkish people. 
I believe that they violate the communal order”; and when Göktan says “Their arrival on 
the island has been a complete tragedy. Already no one thinks anything positive of them. 
They have wrecked our system, and social life”, they imply that Turks are aliens. 
Furthermore, when Mine says, “Their culture, education, life standard, social life is 
different (she emphasizes that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are different); “because of the 
Turks of the mainland, I cannot go to the harbour and walk there or else. I get irritated to 
leave here to go to my aunt’s”; and when Göktan says “In summer, my family and I 
would keep the doors and windows open but now we double-check if the doors or 
windows are properly closed or locked for security. It is because of the negative effects of 
the Turks”, they are implying that Turks are dangerous and savage. It should be noted 
here that when I asked the respondents where they got the information about Turks, the 
majority said that they got the information from the media and their close environment. 
As was noted above, in the events of robbery, killing and rape, most of the national 
newspapers emphasise that it is the Turks who came from Turkey that are doing these 
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things; the memories of the respondents about ‘Turks’ are mediated through the public 
narratives.  
 
7.4 Section three: Dominant/public memories as autobiographical memories and 
vice versa 
 
As was pointed out in Chapter One, public and autobiographical memories are 
intertwined and it is not possible to separate them with a strict line. In this section of the 
thesis, I explore the interrelationships, parallels and differences between public and 
autobiographical memories. As previously mentioned, in this particular research, in-depth 
interviews were conducted with two different age groups. The 20-33 age group was born 
after the division of the island in 1974; therefore they do not have any autobiographical 
memories with Greek Cypriots prior to the division of the island. Public memories are 
highly important for this age group, since all they know about the ‘others’ is constructed 
by their public memories. On the other hand, the 40-80 age group are those interviewees 
who generally have autobiographical memories with Greek Cypriots. However, it is 
interesting to examine the function of their autobiographical memories as public 
memories: their autobiographical memories have mostly remained in the shadow of the 
dominant/public memories. As explained in Chapter One, autobiographical memories are 
acquired through a complex interrelationship between ontological and public narratives; 
my objective is to examine this interrelationship between public and autobiographical 
memories. 
  
7.4.1 Public memories as lived experiences  
 
The 20-33 age group interviewees have no autobiographical memories of the period 
concerned, so their knowledge of the ‘past’ has been obtained through the public 
narratives which encompass the narratives of their families (i.e., father, mother, 
grandmother, and grandfather), school education (mostly from history textbooks and 
history teachers), close environment such as neighbours and sometimes friends, and the 
mechanisms of memory. When the borders were partially opened in 2003, Turkish 
Cypriots between the ages 20-33 crossed the boundaries to the south for the first time in 
their lives, and met and communicated with Greek Cypriots. Thus, their autobiographical 
memories with Greek Cypriots started to form only after 2003. When they narrate how 
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they felt when they first crossed the boundaries to the southern part of the island, they 
interpret their autobiographical memories in parallel with the dominant/public memories; 
their autobiographical memories are mediated through the dominant/public memories.  
 Some of the respondents say that they were tense and self-conscious in the 
South part of the island as they did not trust Greek Cypriots and felt that they might harm 
them because they were Turkish Cypriots. The dominant/public memories of the ‘past’ 
and the negative stereotypes that are attributed to Greek Cypriots such as their being 
‘untrustworthy’ and ‘barbarian’, function as elements in the formation of their 
experiences. Furthermore, the respondents’ present knowledge about Greek Cypriots, 
which they got from the media, also helps in the formation of the elements that are 
parallel to the concept of ‘Greek Cypriot’ that operates as a master signifier in their 
memories. Most of the respondents explain the reason for their being tense when they first 
crossed the boundaries with their present knowledge about the negative attitudes of the 
Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots who go to the southern part: 
 
When we first went to the Greek side, we were a group of friends. I didn’t feel 
insecure there. But when I went on my own, I felt the need to look to the left or 
right every now and then, as if I was being chased by murderers. When I cross to 
the other side, I try to be more careful. For example, I pay the utmost attention to 
where I should park my car because we hear from the media that the Greeks 
damage cars with Turkish registrations328 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).       
 
When I first crossed the border, I was wearing a necklace with the crescent and a 
star [representing the Turkish flag]. So I sort of felt that they would curse and 
swear at me, abduct me or snatch the necklace off my neck329 (Duyal, female, 
aged 21, student).   
 
You feel alienated when you cross to the other side, and you feel irritated when 
you hear from the media how the Greeks treat Turks who go to the south330 
(Sertan, male, aged 22, shop owner).   
 
 
In addition, nearly all of the respondents in the 20-33 age group, who crossed the 
boundaries for the first time in 2003, say that they felt they were not in their homeland but 
in a foreign country, as this was the first time that they had been in the southern part of 
the island. This shows the function of their public memories in constructing the idea of 
homeland and belonging to a particular place, Northern Cyprus; some of the respondents 
say that when they were in Southern Cyprus, they felt that they did not belong to that part. 
                                                 
328 In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007 
329 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
330 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 28 July 2007 
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This logic appears in the narrations of Haluk, a 33-year-old male English teacher, and 
Nevruz, a 22-year-old female beautician:  
 
Haluk: South Cyprus is not my home. It is like a foreign country.  
Interviewer: Why? 
Haluk: The authority ruling there isn’t my government.  
Interviewer: Ok... If you go to another country like England, would you feel the 
same as you feel in South Cyprus?  
Haluk: Not at all, because I believe that the authority in England is just. On the 
other hand, I believe that the Greek Government isn’t legally competent enough 
and they don’t like Turkish Cypriots because they had a bad experience with us in 
the past. They perceive us as their enemy. According to them, Turkish Cypriots 
are a minority331.  
 
************** 
 
Nevruz: Because I studied to specialize in beauty at a school in the Greek area, I 
went there every day in the morning and returned in the evening. Even so, I felt 
myself a stranger every time I went there. First of all, I didn’t understand their 
language. To communicate with them we had to speak English. I feel like a visitor 
there332 . 
 
In these responses, the differences of geographical location and language play a crucial 
role in the formation of the ideas of the respondents about the homeland. As was stated in 
Chapter Two, differences such as geographical location and language are constructed as 
natural factors in the formation of a nation-state. According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart (1999:38), the respondents’ emphasis on the state-external differences function 
as a constructive strategy’. One can argue that some of the respondents’ emphasis on the 
state-external differences (i.e., geographical location and government in Haluk’s case) 
functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is articulated through the 
discourse about the others (Greek Cypriots). For example, Haluk says that Greek Cypriots 
perceive Turkish Cypriots as their enemies and see them as a minority, therefore he does 
not trust the Greek government, and south Cyprus is like a foreign country for him. Thus, 
like many respondents, Haluk’s idea about the ‘others’ plays a crucial role in the 
formation of his memories about the homeland.  
  
 
 
                                                 
331 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007 
332 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
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7.4.2 Autobiographical memories in the shadow of the dominant/public memories 
(The 40-80 age group) 
 
When the interviewees in the 40-80 age group narrate their memories of living with 
Greek Cypriots, they mostly talk about the ‘dominant public memory’ disseminated by 
the ruling group (1974-2003) as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. Most of the time, 
their autobiographical memories are difficult to examine because the respondents do not 
perceive them as being real as dominant/ public memories. Thus, these memories either 
come out after a deep conversation and/or after more subtle questions. This shows that the 
autobiographical memories of the respondents within this age group mostly stay in the 
shadow of the ‘dominant public memory’ that was sustained by the mechanisms of 
memory and produced during 1974-2003. As many years have passed since the division 
of the island, the autobiographical memories of the respondents have become blurred and 
broken off their connection with ‘reality’. Most of the time, as a result, the 
autobiographical memories of the respondents are uncertain and indefinite, as can be seen 
in the narration of Aydın, an 80-year-old male counsellor:  
  
Interviewer: Do you have any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots? 
Aydın: Enosis was always the aim of Greeks, and the London-Zurich agreements 
are the sign of Enosis. I never forget that in the year 1961, Makarios went to 
Panayia village in Baf and he made an announcement that Enosis could not be 
realized without expelling Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus.   
 
Interviewer: Do you remember how you got the information about Makarios’s 
announcement? 
 
Aydın: Well… At that time, I was reading Zaman newspaper. I got the 
information from Zaman. 
  
Interviewer: How about your personal memories? Did you ever communicate with 
a Greek Cypriot?   
 
Aydın: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: How?  
 
Aydın: We had Greek neighbours in our village.  
 
Interviewer: How was your relationship with them?  
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Aydın: We had good relationships. I remember that we used to take them twisted 
dough cookies [simit] on Bayrams [religious holidays] and they used to bring us 
their traditional bread [pilavuna]333. 
 
 
When I asked Aydın if he had any memories of living with Greek Cypriots, he revealed 
public memories that are articulated through the mechanisms (official history and media) 
instead of his autobiographical memories. This situation shows the predominance of the 
public narratives in his memory. When Aydın says, “Enosis was always the aim of 
Greeks and London-Zurich agreements are the sign of Enosis”, one can hear the voice of 
the official history that was sustained during the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003). He 
also brings out his memory about the announcement by Makarios that was published in 
the Zaman newspaper; it is interesting to observe how the ‘information’ that is provided 
by the official history and media functions as elements in the articulation of his memories 
about Greek Cypriots.  
On the other hand, it was very difficult for Aydın to reveal his autobiographical 
memories. In order to bring these out, I had a deep conversation with him. He recalls that 
he had a good relationship with Greek Cypriots when he narrates his memory that they 
shared their twisted dough cookies and traditional breads. Here it is possible to follow the 
traces of an alternative past in Aydın’s in autobiographical memories, which is about 
common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, shared memories are 
sharper in Aydın’s memories; perhaps because shared memories are constantly repeated 
by the mechanisms of memory. On the other hand, his autobiographical memory, of 
things that he ‘experienced’ privately, is uncertain and hardly remembered. One can argue 
that the reason for this weakness and uncertainty might be that there is no possibility of its 
repetition or/and mobilization by the mechanisms; in consequence, it might lose its 
sharpness after a period of time.  
On the other hand, the majority of the interviewees who talk about their 
autobiographical memories support the idea that individually they might live with Greek 
Cypriots, but they are against the idea that they can be partners sharing the same 
island/homeland because they believe that as a unity and as a nation, Greek Cypriots are 
untrustworthy, as could be seen especially when they said ‘no’ in the referendum. The 
media play a substantial role in their evaluation of Greek Cypriots as a community, 
because apart from the other public narratives, the media were the only way that they 
                                                 
333 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007 
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could get information about Greek Cypriots as a community, especially after the division 
of the island in 1974. This can be seen in the narratives of Arif, a 86-year-old male retired 
counsellor, and Emine, a 52 year-old female retired official: 
 
Arif: There are good individuals among them. But unfortunately, it is difficult to 
say that they are good as a community. It seems to be difficult to live with them at 
present. They want to assimilate us. The church is highly influential on them.  
 
Interviewer: How do you get information about Greek Cypriots? 
Arif: From the media of course334. 
 
************** 
 
Emine: In the past, we had good Greek Cypriot neighbours and friends. There are 
very good individuals among them. We also established good relationships after 
the opening of the crossings. But I was sort of disappointed when they said ‘no’ to 
the referendum. I haven’t seen in them the eagerness, the kind of joy in making 
friends and the desire to build a common future as a community. I noticed among 
them that there was a selfish feeling − that they entered the EU and that they 
somehow saved themselves as a community. They lead a comfortable life and 
they’ve got used to it.  
 
Interviewer: How do you get information about Greek Cypriots? 
 
Emine: We always hear the speeches of their politicians through the media335.   
 
On the other hand, in the case of İclal, an 81-year-old female retired nurse, one can 
observe the role of public memories in the articulation of her memories about Greek 
Cypriots. In her narrative, the inconsistencies and parallelisms between public and 
autobiographical memories also emerge:  
 
Interviewer: Do you have any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots? How 
was life then?  
 
İclal: We would go to wedding ceremonies, for example we would go on 
excursions and sightseeing together, we would dine out together; and in short we 
were living together. We had good relations with the Greeks, we didn’t have any 
problems. Later, the war broke out and everything changed.  
 
Interviewer: Well…what do you think about the reason for the war? 
 
İclal: The politicians. 
     
                                                 
334 In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007 
335 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007 
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Interviewer: How about Greek Cypriots? 
 
İclal: They weren’t the reason. I know because I lived with them. 
 
Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family 
have any fears? 
 
İclal: We were not afraid at all because we got along well with each other then. 
There was no discrimination as Turk or Greek. Everyone was the same.  
 
Interviewer: Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears? 
 
İclal: Not at all. There was no fear at all.  
 
 
In İclal’s autobiographical memories, the alternative past between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots is brought out: she thinks that the reason for the war was not the Greek Cypriots 
but the politicians. She also talks about the common daily lives of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots: they used to go to wedding ceremonies together, they dined together, etc.; and 
she says that there was no fear among Turkish Cypriots, as they got along well with the 
Greek Cypriots. According to İclal, there was no discrimination between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots and thus, they were the same; in this way, she emphasizes the 
similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, in the following conversation 
with İclal, the narratives of the media and her close environment articulate and construct 
her memories in relation to national identity:        
 
Interviewer: What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? 
 
İclal: Now, I feel that we cannot live together. 
 
Interviewer: Why? 
 
İclal: Because they started to become unfriendly. Then we became unfriendly. 
They killed...Then we killed…. This is it…   
 
Interviewer: Can they be our partners sharing the same island/homeland? 
 
İclal: I don’t think so.  
 
Interviewer: You said you could get along well before, so why shouldn’t you be 
able to be on good terms again?  
 
İclal: Because they have changed. Both they and we have changed.  
 
Interviewer: How do you get information about them? How do you know that they 
have changed? 
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İclal: From around, newspapers… from the television. I can also speak Greek. I 
sometimes listen to the Greek news as well. They say that we are their enemies.  
 
Interviewer: What do they say, for example? 
 
İclal: They say that we are the reason for the problems on the island. And we say 
that it is because of them…  their thoughts and our thoughts are different. And 
they say that we are their citizens but we don’t believe in that affection.  
 
Interviewer: What do you hear within your environment?  
 
İclal: They say that they [Greek Cypriots] are the reason that we lost our property. 
Our families, sons and daughters had to leave their homes behind and they 
emigrated.   
 
Interviewer: Haven’t you heard anything positive from your environment? 
 
İclal: They all say negative things. No one speaks positively. I myself have never 
heard anything in favour. In short, I have never heard that the Greeks are very nice 
people or anything of the sort. No one spoke ill of the Greeks before, but now this 
happens often.   
 
 
It is interesting to observe the role of the ‘information’ provided by the public narratives 
in the formation of the elements that function to articulate İclal’s ideas about Greek 
Cypriots. When she says, “Now, I feel that we cannot live together. Because they have 
started to become unfriendly”, this is not related to what she personally experienced but is 
remembered through the public narratives partly constructed by the media. When she 
says, “Because they have changed. Both they and we have changed”, she is using the 
information provided by the public narratives; her close environment also reinforces the 
negative ideas about Greek Cypriots. However, it can also be argued that the dominance 
of the public narratives in İclal’s memory might play the primary role in her evaluations 
of the present information about Greek Cypriots. When she says, “I sometimes listen to 
the Greek news as well. They say that we are their enemies”, one can hear the voice of the 
public narratives that attribute negative stereotypes to Greek Cypriots, such as their being 
enemies. Although it is not possible for the Greek media channel to broadcast a direct 
statement such as “Turks are our enemies”, İclal evaluates what she hears from the Greek 
media channel according to the dominant public memory (1974-2003). It can therefore be 
argued that her ‘experiences’ are mediated through the public memories; in other words, 
she evaluates the public memories as her autobiographical memories. She continues:   
 
 263 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that maintaining the borders that divide the island is a 
good or a bad thing? 
 
İclal: In my view, it is better for the borders to be kept stable. Borders show that 
there is no reason for me to be afraid anymore. We got used to them. Now, they 
have opened the crossings, but we still…are not very keen to go to the other side. 
We get irritated when we go there336. 
 
When İclal’s narrative is considered as a whole, one can observe how the strategies of 
emphasis of sameness and difference function in her memories. When I asked İclal at the 
beginning of the interview if she or her family had had any fears about living with Greek 
Cypriots before 1974, she said that they hadn’t been afraid because they (Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots) had got along well with each other, as there had been no discrimination 
between Turks and Greeks: everyone was the same. She also said that there had been no 
fear at all felt by the Turkish Cypriots as a community. İclal’s emphasis on the 
similarities, but not on the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, shows how 
the strategy of sameness operates to weaken and displace the antagonistic polarity 
between them in her memory regarding this period.  
On the other hand, when she continues to narrate her memories, it is interesting to 
see how the public narratives transformed her ideas about Greek Cypriots after the 
division of the island: now, the borders that divide Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots 
mean security for her; she says that the borders show that there is no reason for her to be 
afraid any more. The strategies of dissimilation function to divide Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots into two opposed camps in her memories. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart (1999:33) suggest, ‘the strategies of dissimilation create a territorial difference 
and heterogeneity’. As stated in Chapter Four, the borders that represent the territorial 
difference reproduce the idea that Turks are different from Greeks; as long as the 
boundaries remain, Turkish Cypriots will be secure because the boundaries protect them 
from the ‘others’. In this way the public memories construct feelings of unity and security 
by arousing fear and anxiety about Greek Cypriots, and provide the necessary context for 
the reproduction of the nation by mobilizing the emotions of the respondents. Below, in 
the final part of this chapter, I analyse in detail the interpretations of the respondents 
about the ‘borders’, in order to see how the public narratives mobilize the ideas of the 
respondents about the others and thus, about the political situation in Cyprus. 
 
                                                 
336 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007 
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7.5 Section four: Borders - Division or unity? 
 
Since the de facto division of the island in 1974, borders have become a part of the 
everyday lives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As explained above, the partial opening of 
the crossings in 2003 has brought out the issues of ‘division’ or ‘unity’ of the island, and 
raised questions about self-other relationships, the notion of homeland, and future 
expectations about the political situation in Cyprus. The statements of the respondents are 
classified according to their content in order to show the similarities and oppositions 
between them. Some of the answers of the respondents about the meaning of the borders 
are as follows:    
 
‘Borders represent our captivity’337 (Fide, female, aged 26, business chair of the 
milk industry). 
‘Frontiers that prevent my freedom’338  (Sertan, male, aged 22, shop owner).    
‘Borders make me feel as if I am kept in a golden cage’339 (Melek, female, aged 
28, instructor).  
‘I don’t like the borders as they represent prohibitions’340 (Selda, female, aged 49, 
radio reporter) 
‘Borders represent the division’341 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman) 
‘Borders represent the separation. The separation of ideas, ideals...They are the 
lines that separate everything’342 (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism employee)  
‘Prevent the friendships between the two communities’343 (Ayten, female, aged 
23, student). 
 
The respondents’ negative expressions about the ‘borders’ as the representation of 
separation, division, captivity and prevention of friendships between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, indicate their desire for the unification of the island, which is a possibility with 
the solution of the Cyprus problem. According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 
(1999:40), the emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future functions 
as a strategy of transformation. The respondents’ desire for the reunification of the island 
functions to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that 
highlights the friendships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots for the reunification of the 
island and for the solution of the economic and political restrictions (i.e., isolation, 
embargoes) that Turkish Cypriots have faced since the division of the island. Thus, when 
                                                 
337 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007 
338 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 28 July 2007 
339 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007 
340 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007 
341 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Cafe, 26/07/2007 
342 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/09/2007 
343 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007 
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the respondents see borders as an obstacle or as a prison, they imagine not only the other 
as not necessarily threatening or/and friendly, but they also perceive the self as restricted, 
not allowed to develop and flourish to its full potential.    
On the other hand, there are many respondents who see the borders as necessary 
for the protection of Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). These 
respondents interpret the borders not as the representation of prohibitions, but as 
guaranteeing the security of their lives:     
 
‘I like the borders that divide us from the Greeks because they don’t like us’344 
(Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).      
‘Borders prevent a possible conflict’345 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official). 
‘Prevent the danger’346 (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).      
‘Borders represent security’347 (Duyal, female, aged 21, student) 
‘Show me where to be cautious’348 (Haluk, male, aged 33, English teacher)    
 
For these respondents, borders prevent the danger and a possible conflict between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots; one can see how the strategies of ‘defence and avoidance’ 
function in their narratives. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) suggest, 
‘defence and avoidance are the strategies of perpetuation and they function to maintain 
and reproduce a threatened national identity’. In these cases, it is the Turkish (cypriot) 
identity that is threatened by the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots). As was noted in Chapter Two, 
the ‘otherness’ is supported through the discourses on security and unity: for many 
respondents, the existence of the borders removes fears and worries as they separate 
Turkish Cypriots from the ‘others’, Greek Cypriots who do not like Turkish Cypriots. In 
addition, the respondents’ interpretations about the necessity of the borders show their 
desire for the continuation of the status quo, that is, the division of the island. Emphasis 
on positive political continuity is another strategy of perpetuation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl 
and Liebhart 1999:39) that functions to maintain the threatened Turkish (cypriot) identity. 
As explained in Chapter Five, the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism is based on 
the argument of the ‘motherland’ that locates Turkey/Turks as the protector of the TRNC/ 
Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). The motherland argument is also 
about the economic and political cooperation and unity between Turkey and the TRNC. 
                                                 
344 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007 
345 In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007 
346 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007 
347 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007 
348 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007 
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These respondents support Turkish rule on the island for the survival and political and 
economic development of the TRNC; hence, when they understand borders as security 
from the ‘other’, they do not just narrate the ‘other’ as threatening; they also narrate the 
self. In this case, the only opportunity for full development is within the constraints of the 
borders.  
As noted in Chapter Four, the physical boundaries of the “imagined” state play a 
crucial role in the construction of the idea of ‘homeland’. The existence of the ‘borders’ 
mobilizes meaning that articulates the sense of belonging; and thus, according to many 
respondents, borders are the frontiers of the homeland/ native country:  
 
‘The borders remind me that everyone has her/his own place to return to’349 
(Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations). 
‘The frontiers of the homeland’350 (Memduh, male, aged 23, student)  
‘Borders show that we are sovereign within our frontiers and we have our own 
state’351 (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer) 
‘Borders specify the native country’352 (Cemre, female, aged 22, unemployed) 
‘Remind us that we have our own state’353 (Mine, female, aged 28, customs and 
immigration officer)   
 
 
On the other hand, according to other respondents, borders divide their country and make 
it smaller; these respondents do not conceive the TRNC as their homeland/native country 
and therefore do not evaluate the borders as the indication of it as such. They also talk 
about the problems that are caused by the borders:  
 
‘Make my country smaller and smaller’354 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female 
beautician).                           
‘Borders are created by the parties that want privilege. No border means no 
privilege’355 (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher) 
‘The cause of our isolation from the world’356 (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor)    
‘For me, the borders are a waste of time because you spend time in vain when you 
stand in a queue to get a visa’357 (Ezgi, male, aged 20, student) 
 
                                                 
349 In depth-interview, Kyrenia:Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007 
350 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party , 24/07/2007 
351 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007 
352In-depth interview, Göçmenköy: Domestic parlour, 27 August 2007 
353 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour ,4/9/2007 
354 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007 
91 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Kardeş Ocağı [Brotherhood Hearth], 23/07/2007 
356 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa:  The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party,7/8/2007 
357 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007 
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These comments are about the issues (i.e., isolation of Turkish Cypriots from the world, 
formal procedures at the crossings, political privileges of the parties because of the 
Cyprus problem) that are caused by the division of the island and the political situation in 
Northern Cyprus. The respondents point to the necessity of the political transformation in 
Northern Cyprus, and thus criticise the status quo. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart 
(1999:41) note, ‘negative connotation of political continuation and positive connotation of 
change are the transformative strategies’. In these cases, the transformative strategies 
function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that is 
based on the reunification of the island under the framework of the Annan Plan, which 
proposes a possible participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU after the 
solution of the Cyprus problem.   
The interpretations of the respondents about the ‘borders’ encapsulate the 
discourses about the other, and therefore the self. Thus the respondents develop different 
discourses of understanding belonging, and, of course, the future, for them and ‘their’ 
island; their evaluations about the borders give crucial clues to their political ideas, which 
construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I examined the complex functioning of the dominant/alternative public 
and autobiographical memories in the articulation of the political ideas of the respondents 
about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. I explored the constant articulation of 
memories in relation to identity as the crossing points between the logics of inclusion and 
exclusion that sometimes locates Turks and sometimes Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’. I 
adopted Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart’s major thematic areas (common past, 
present, future and culture) in the ‘discursive construction of national identity’, for the 
examination of the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity and (turkish) Cypriot 
identity in the narratives of the respondents. I also examined how the autobiographical 
memories are mediated through public memories. 
The respondents’ narratives about the ‘past’ with Turks can be separated under the 
titles of ‘common origin’ and ‘Turks: saviours/occupiers’. Most of the respondents 
emphasize the similarities between Turks and Turkish Cypriots by talking about their 
common origin. The emphasis on the racial similarity of Turks and Turkish Cypriots 
operates as a strategy in the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. On the other hand, 
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there are respondents who focus on the racial similarity between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots; they construct (turkish) Cypriot identity by focussing on the 
commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, when the respondents 
evaluate the common ‘past’ with Turks they locate them as saviours or occupiers. The 
respondents who locate Turks as ‘saviours’ evaluate the Cyprus war as a crisis that was 
overcome together with Turks through the “20 July 1974 Happy Peace Operation”; hence, 
they emphasize the shared sorrows of Turks and Turkish Cypriots, which is one of the 
strategies in the construction of a Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the argument 
of the motherland and the commonalities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. However, 
there are also respondents who evaluate the “Happy Peace Operation” as an occupation 
that was realised by the outsiders. These respondents exclude Turks by labelling them as 
outsiders who have a different culture and national identity. Their narratives function to 
dismantle the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the sameness and common past of 
Turkish Cypriots and Turks.           
 In the narratives of the respondents about a common/unshared present, Turks are 
located as Turkish citizens (insiders) or aliens (outsiders). The respondents who support 
the common present of Turks and Turkish Cypriots evaluate the political decision of the 
government about the immigration of Turks from Turkey as a positive decision to 
increase the number of the Turkish population on the island. For them, this situation 
supports the national body. Their emphasis on positive political continuity is one of the 
strategies of inclusion and continuation that functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) 
identity. On the other hand, some respondents interpret Turks as ‘aliens’ belonging to a 
foreign country (Turkey) but living in Northern Cyprus. According to them, Turks have 
come from Turkey and taken away the jobs of Turkish Cypriots, who have become 
second-class citizens in their country. The respondents’ complaints about the present 
situation show their emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future that 
functions as a transformative strategy. Moreover, according to many respondents, the 
constant support of Turkey is essential for the security of Turkish Cypriots on the island 
in the future; thus they support the status quo. Their emphasis on the positive political 
continuity between Turks and Turkish Cypriots and their protection from a possible 
Greek Cypriot threat function as strategies of continuation and defence that operate to 
perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity which is sustained through the negative 
narratives about the others. On the other hand, some respondents conceive Greek Cypriots 
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as ‘Cypriots’ and their different conception of identity plays an important role in their 
imagination of a common future with Greek Cypriots. 
The respondents also emphasize the cultural differences between Turks and 
Turkish Cypriots by classifying them as migrants or settlers. They see more similarities 
between settlers and themselves than between migrants and themselves; and they 
generally emphasize cultural similarities such as language, lifestyle, eating habits and 
clothing. In contrast, the migrants are labelled as dangerous, as they kill, steal and assault 
people. Media play the main role in the construction of Turks as the ‘others’ because the 
respondents get their information about the incidents of crimes, robberies and rapes from 
the national newspapers. There are also many respondents who do not distinguish 
between Turkish migrants and settlers, and evaluate all the Turks as being culturally 
different from Turkish Cypriots. The Turks are labelled as uneducated, rude, dangerous 
and savage; they have different lifestyles, traditions, accents, customs, mores and 
clothing. Thus these respondents’ narratives function to exclude Turks as inferiors and 
this exclusion constructs the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the differences 
between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots.  
When the respondents talk about the ‘past’ with the Greek Cypriots, the past is 
represented either as peace with friends or conflict with enemies. Those who narrate the 
past as a conflict with enemies focus on the 1963-1974 events as in the official history 
(1974-2003) that was constructed in the Denktaş-UBP period. On the other hand, those 
who talk about the common past and friendship of Greek and Turkish Cypriots generally 
focus on their or their families’ good relationships in the past; although their narratives 
about the ‘happier past’ are generally over when they talk about the 1963-1974 period. 
Thus it can be argued that the respondents’ public memories are more dominant than their 
and their families’ autobiographical memories about this period.         
 I also examined how the opposing strategies of justification and transformation 
function in the narratives of the respondents about their evaluations of the “present” in 
relation to Greek Cypriots. Many respondents points to the economic, political and social 
problems that are caused by the Cyprus problem in Northern Cyprus; and therefore they 
emphasize the necessary difference between now and the future that functions as a 
strategy in the transformation of Turkish (cypriot) identity into a (turkish) Cypriot identity 
that is based on the participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU after the 
solution of the Cyprus problem. Since most of the time, these respondents emphasize the 
similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, I explored how the political 
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ideas of the respondents construct and are constructed by their memories about the 
‘others’. The respondents’ emphasis on positive political continuity operates as a strategy 
in the justification of the status quo (Turkish rule on the island); hence, they sustain the 
Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the unity and cooperation of Turkish Cypriots 
and Turks through their narratives. Their ideas on the future are generally parallel to their 
evaluations of the present. Some respondents interpret the division of the island as 
necessary for the peace of Turkish Cypriots, seeing the Greek Cypriots as a threat to their 
security. On the other hand, there are respondents who support the participation of 
Northern Cyprus in the European Union, as they believe that this will bring them 
economic, social and political progress.    
Moreover, most of the respondents focus on the constructed differences between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, such as religion and language. The emphasis on these 
differences functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity that exclude Greek 
Cypriots as the ‘others’. However, many respondents focus on the similarities between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, such as eating habits and lifestyles; this focus on the 
similarities displaces the differences of religion and language and constructs the (turkish) 
Cypriot identity that is based on the commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.   
I also considered how the result of the referenda on the Annan Plan that proposes 
the possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU, created a period of uncertainty 
about the ideas related to the ‘others’. I explored the changing self-other relationships in 
the memories of single social individuals, while they were answering the questions of the 
in-depth interview: The inconsistencies in their memories are not necessarily the outcome 
of the referenda voting, but of the complex functioning of their memories.  
Another focus of this chapter was on how public memories function as lived 
experiences for the 20-33 age group respondents: when they narrate how they felt when 
they first crossed the boundaries to the southern part of the island, they interpret their 
private memories in parallel with the dominant/public memories. These memories of the 
constructed past (1974-2003) and the negative stereotypes attributed to Greek Cypriots, 
such as their being ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘barbarian’, function as elements in the formation 
of the respondents’ experiences. In addition, the respondents’ present knowledge that they 
got from the media about Greek Cypriots helps to form the elements that are parallel to 
the concept of ‘Greek Cypriot’ which operates as a master signifier in their memories. 
The autobiographical memories of the respondents in the 40-80 age group mostly stay in 
the shadow of the ‘dominant public memory’ that was sustained by the mechanisms of 
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memory produced during 1974-2003: most of the time, the autobiographical memories of 
respondents in this age group are uncertain and indefinite; the shared memories are 
sharpened as they are constantly repeated by the mechanisms of memory. 
The interpretations of the respondents about the borders that divide the island into 
North and South raise questions about self-other relationships, the notion of homeland 
and future expectations regarding the political situation in Cyprus. Negative expressions 
about the borders as the representation of separation, division and captivity, point to the 
desire of some respondents for the unification of the island with the solution of the 
Cyprus problem. On the other hand, many respondents see the borders as necessary for 
the protection of Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). These respondents 
interpret the borders as security for their lives, because borders separate them from the 
‘others’. The physical boundaries of the ‘imagined’ state play a crucial role in the 
construction of their idea of ‘homeland’; and the existence of the borders mobilizes 
meaning that articulates the sense of belonging. According to many respondents, borders 
are the frontiers of the homeland/native country. Thus they support the status quo 
(Turkish rule on the island) and do not favour the participation of Northern Cyprus in the 
EU.     
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CHAPTER 8: FINAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
This research deals with the ‘politics of memory’ and how it is linked to the changing 
power relations in Northern Cyprus. It focuses on the period of the Annan Plan 
(proposing the possible participation of whole Cyprus in the EU after a solution in the 
Cyprus problem) because the plan precipitated an intense struggle between the discourses 
in relation to memory and national identity. The research explores how the mechanisms 
of memory (symbols of tradition, commemorations, history textbooks, media) mobilize, 
articulate and construct the memories in relation to national identity in changing power 
relations; how the respondents’ political ideas about the future prospects of Northern 
Cyprus construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. 
The mechanisms have a crucial influence on the respondents’ political ideas as they 
function to articulate the ‘past’ in the present for the future.         
 In Chapter Five, I examined how the official mechanisms of memory that 
encompass symbols of tradition (flags, national anthem, myths), commemorations 
(monuments, museums, mass graves, martyr’s cemeteries, national days) and history 
textbooks are articulated in changing power relations in Northern Cyprus. Two different 
ruling groups came to power in Northern Cyprus from the division of the island in 1974 
to 2009. These were the President Denktaş and the government of UBP (1974-2003), and 
the government of CTP (2003-2009). In the Denktaş-UBP period the dominant discourse 
was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. However, in the period of the CTP government, the 
dominant discourse was (turkish) Cypriot nationalism. Hence, the dominant discourse 
changes according to the historical and political context shaped in power relations. 
 In this research, I explored how the ruling groups produced and used the 
official mechanisms in order to spread their discourses. In the Denktaş-UBP period, the 
official mechanisms were articulated to sustain the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) 
nationalism that highlighted the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and thus 
supported the division and the status quo (Turkish rule on the island). The flag of Turkey 
and the flag of the TRNC, as crucial symbols of tradition are some of the official 
mechanisms analysed in this research. The two flags together reproduce the argument of 
motherland/babyland that was dominant in the Denktas-UBP period. The argument, based 
on the common past, heritage and identity of Turkish (cypriots) and Turks, was that there 
was a strong unity and cooperation between Turkey and the TRNC. Moreover, Turkey, as 
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the motherland, saved the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots with the Happy 
Peace Operation in 1974 and it continues to defend the babyland from the others (Greek 
Cypriots). Monuments that symbolise either Atatürk or Martyrs of Northern Cyprus are 
the main forms of commemorations of the Denktaş-UBP period. According to the official 
history of this period, Atatürk, the founder and first President of the Turkish Republic, 
represents Turkishness and is the symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. The 
statement below the monument of Atatürk, ‘How happy to say I am a Turk’, locates 
Atatürk as a role model. It is very common to see the monuments of Atatürk and the flags 
in many places including the streets, squares and courtyards of schools. The monument of 
the martyr symbolises a Turkish soldier who was killed by Greeks in the Cyprus war and 
is lying in his mother’s arms; this monument was set up to construct the ideas of Turkish 
Cypriots about Greeks, who are represented as ‘others’ who mercilessly killed Turks. The 
statement below the monument, “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget), recalls a ‘past’ 
that is about the Cyprus war and thus, the Turkish people who died and/or suffered at that 
time. However, the term implies not only the ‘past’, but also the future, as it includes the 
promise of remembrance. Although the monument of Atatürk operates to mobilize the 
ideas about ‘who the Turkish Cypriots are’, the monument of the martyr functions to 
construct the idea about ‘who the others are’. 
 The official discourse (1974-2003) constructed Turkish (cypriot) identity by 
producing a sharp antagonistic relationship between Turks/Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
through the mechanisms. However, the CTP government highlighted the (turkish) Cypriot 
identity based on similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their common life 
in the EU in the future. Sestas and the Peace Cresset, public artworks, were set up in the 
CTP period; the sestas (common, traditional items used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots) 
represent the similar ways of life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they used to live 
together, while the peace cresset is the symbol of the lighting of fires in the villages at the 
time of the referendum as an affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan. 
 Museums, mass graves and martyr’s cemeteries are the other forms of 
commemorations that mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ by arousing 
their fears. In the analysis of the experiences of the respondents about the commemorative 
locations, I adopted Turner’s concept of liminality. The experiences of the respondents 
are structured through a kind of ritual and thus they experience liminality when they visit 
these places; as was stated in Chapter Two, liminality in the museum entails being outside 
of or betwixt and between the normal world. The museum of Barbarism is one of the 
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crucial mechanisms, and it can be seen as a script written by the dominant discourse 
(1974-2003). I examined how the objects in the museum lose their historical relevance 
during the process of museumisation and gain a new meaning in the memories of the 
respondents about Greek Cypriots. The museum mobilizes the negative ideas and fears of 
the respondents who never communicated with a Greek Cypriot before the division of the 
island. This situation shows how autobiographical memories are mediated through public 
memories. However, the official discourse about the museum is often challenged by the 
alternative media and family narratives. 
 The history textbook is the other mechanism that narrates the ‘others’. History 
textbooks were rewritten in the period of the CTP government that supported the 
reunification of the island. In the subsequent textbook, the past between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots was represented more positively than in the previous history textbook in 
order to prepare the ground for a possible reunification. Hence, the history textbooks are 
one of the most remarkable official mechanisms that show how narrations about the 
‘others’ were articulated and constructed in changing power relations.  
 Although the official mechanisms are produced by the ruling groups and it is 
not possible to talk about their alternatives within the period of the dominance of the 
ruling group, the media as another mechanism are more independent in terms of their 
organic relationship with the ruling groups. Chapter Six explored the role of the media 
(particularly the newspapers) in the mobilization and articulation of the memories in 
relation to national identity. The media was the only mechanism through which 
individuals got ‘present’ information about the Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem, the 
Annan Plan and the EU after the division of the island; and I explored how the knowledge 
of the respondents about the political issues is mostly articulated by the media. However, 
the respondents’ memories about the ‘past’ and the ‘others’ play a crucial role in their 
interpretations of ‘information’ about the Annan Plan and the EU. Thus, the respondents’ 
political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus are constructed by their 
memories about the ‘others’. 
 The focus of this research was on newspaper discourses because the variety of 
the newspapers made them the most popular media of the period, within the scope of this 
research. During the referendum period, each national newspaper produced different and 
sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’ that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live 
together. Media narratives bring the ‘past’ which is articulated according to the political 
discourse of the media institution, into the present. In this way, the media play a crucial 
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role in the construction of the social tie or antagonistic relationships between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots and Turks and Turkish Cypriots.  
 In this research, I analysed the narratives of the respondents about the news 
stories that were published in Kıbrıs (supporting the Annan Plan) and Volkan (rejecting 
the Annan Plan) newspapers after the partial opening of the crossings. Depending on the 
political discourse of Kıbrıs, the ‘past’ with Greek Cypriots was represented as a period of 
time that was longed for and the opening of the crossings as a way back to the past. Kıbrıs 
supports the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that is based on the similarities 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their common life; hence it publishes news 
stories about the commonalities and friendships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
following the opening of the crossings. On the other hand, Volkan supports the discourse 
of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism; its news stories are about the commemorative locations 
(i.e the monument of Atatürk, Turkish martyrs’ cemetery) ruined or destroyed by the 
Greek Cypriots. The interpretations of the photographs in these news stories function as a 
single body in the representation of Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’.  
 This research included approaches from a variety of fields such as social 
psychology, sociology, history, politics and media studies; therefore, a consistent 
methodology could not be applied throughout the analysis chapters. In the analysis of the 
narratives of the respondents about flags, monuments, public arts and the media 
discourses Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s (1999), macro strategies (constructive 
and destructive strategies and the strategies of justification, perpetuation and 
transformation) in the discursive formation of national identity play the primary role. In 
the narratives of the respondents, I examined how strategies of justification function to 
justify the status quo (the division and the Turkish rule on the island), strategies of 
perpetuation function to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the 
others (Greek Cypriots), and strategies of construction operate to construct the unity 
between Turkish Cypriots and Turks through the emphasis on the commonalities between 
them. These strategies function as a single body in the articulation of Turkish (cypriot) 
identity that is based on the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and the 
continuation of Turkish rule on the island for the security of Turkish Cypriots. The 
narratives of the respondents show how the mechanisms of memory function to mobilize 
the memories of the respondents in parallel with the official history that was produced 
during the Denktaş-UBP period. On the other hand, the strategies of transformation also 
function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity based 
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on the commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and the participation of 
Turkish Cypriots in the EU for the solution of the economic and political problems in 
Northern Cyprus. Moreover, the strategies of construction operate to construct the 
similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots that articulate the (turkish) Cypriot 
identity.  
 The official mechanisms always carry the constructed past, that is shaped by 
the ruling groups, into the present. I explored how many respondents internalized the 
official history carried by the official mechanisms (history textbooks, symbols of 
tradition, commemorations) as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. In these instances, 
the ‘past’ functions as a ‘nodal point’ around which symbols of tradition, 
commemorations and history textbooks acquire their meaning from their relationship to 
the ‘past’. However, when respondents opposed the constructed past, I examined how the 
respondents’ resistance towards the meaning carried by the mechanisms was supported 
through alternative public memories (i.e the narratives of families, media) or 
autobiographical memories. It is not always possible to determine whether the memories 
of the respondents are parallel or alternative to the official history because there might be 
inconsistencies in the memories of single social individuals about the same period of time 
in history. This situation shows how the memory is a contested territory of 
autobiographical and public memories, partly constructed by the official history. It is also 
interesting to observe that the mechanisms can mobilize the counter memories that 
oppose the discourse carried by them.   
 In this research, I examined how the mechanisms enter into the daily lives of 
the individuals through social practices and media events, and thus are embedded in the 
respondents’ behaviours. The military salutation, raising the flag, singing the national 
anthem, a minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, standing before the 
monuments, and celebrating the national days, are the social practices that are physically 
and/or emotionally practiced by the respondents. These social practices recall the ‘past’ 
that is articulated by the ruling groups. I also explored the intertextual relationship 
between the mechanisms of memory: most of the time the mechanisms function as a 
single body in the construction of discourses on national identity. The different forms of 
mechanisms (i.e the monument of Atatürk, the national anthem, national days, history 
textbooks) are intertwined with each other and work to inculcate norms of behaviour by 
repetition that implies continuity with the constructed past. Furthermore, media carry the 
official mechanisms (i.e., the national anthem, national days) into the homes and 
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everyday lives of people. Most of the time, the media events (celebration of national days, 
commemoration of the martyrs) provide social integration by mobilizing the emotions (i.e 
happiness, pride, sorrow and excitement). Hence, media as one of the mechanisms can 
sustain the dominant discourse. Media as part of the respondents’ daily lives provide the 
opportunity to follow events that normally they might not be able to pursue. 
Although the mechanisms are produced to fix the ‘past’ for the justification of the 
dominant public memory, they do not always provide a total fixity in the memories of the 
individuals. The memories are constantly articulated through the discourses constructed in 
power relations; the respondents’ memories therefore resemble a battlefield of different 
discourses. However, in general individuals prevent antagonisms by ignoring the 
alternative memories (i.e., hatred and grudge towards Greek Cypriots are negative 
feelings). These alternative memories function like a surplus and threaten the partial fixity 
of the respondents’ memories about the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, there are 
many respondents who naturalize and legitimize their memories through mythologizing 
the past. In the mythologizing past, Greeks/Greek Cypriots are transformed into ‘mythical 
beasts’ (i.e tyrants, merciless, cowards, treacherous, unjust, oppressive, selfish) and Turks 
into ‘heroes’ (i.e., powerful, kind, clever, courageous and protective).  This situation 
functions to naturalize the feelings of hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots. I 
also examined the exaggeration and the deeply rooted oppositions that carry the features 
of mythologies in the narratives of the respondents.                  
 In examining the articulation of Turkish (cypriot) identity and (turkish) Cypriot 
identity, I also adopted Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart’s major thematic areas 
(common past, present, future and culture) in the ‘discursive construction of national 
identity’. In Chapter Seven, I consider the concepts of ‘Greek/Greek Cypriot’ and ‘Turk’ 
as master signifiers that gather free-floating elements/signifiers within a paradigmatic 
chain of equivalence. The statements are related to the major thematic areas, and 
stereotypes are explored as elements that operate in the organization of most of the 
respondents’ memories in relation to their identity. Thus the elements (statements) fulfill 
the primary role in the construction of the identities. These elements struggle to construct 
the master signifiers with a particular content, and are formed through the complex 
relationship amongst dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories that are 
constructed in power relations.  
 In addition, I explored how the respondents’ emphasis on the common past, 
common present, common future and common culture between Turks and Turkish 
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Cypriots articulate the Turkish (cypriot) identity. On the other hand, respondents’ 
emphasis on the uncommon past, present, future and culture, function to exclude Turks. 
Their exclusion of Turks constructs the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the 
differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots. In a similar vein, the respondents’ 
emphasis on the common past, present, future and culture between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots articulate the (turkish) Cypriot identity. Their emphasis on the similarities 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their desire for the difference between the 
present and the future (participation of Turkish Cypriots in the EU) function as 
transformative strategies that transform Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot 
identity. In this sense, the emphasis on the unshared past, present, future and culture 
operate to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the differences between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots and on the necessity of continuing the status quo (Turkish 
rule on the island). This latter emphasis functions as a strategy of justification, an attempt 
to justify the present situation. However, I also examined the constant articulation of the 
memories in relation to identity as the crossing points between the logics of inclusion and 
exclusion that sometimes locate Turks, and sometimes Greek Cypriots, as the ‘others’. I 
explored the changing self-other relationships in the memories of single social individuals 
even while they were answering the questions of the in-depth interviews. Thus, the 
memories of the respondents were constantly articulated and constructed while they were 
talking. 
 In this research, I also examined how the autobiographical memories 
(individually peculiar to the social individuals) are mediated through public memories 
which encompass the narratives of families, school education, close environment, official 
mechanisms and media. Hence I was able to determine how the public memories function 
as lived experiences for the 20-33 age group (this age group has no personal memories 
with Greek Cypriots before the division of the island). On the other hand, the 
autobiographical memories of the respondents within the 40-80 age group are generally 
uncertain and indefinite. Thus, the shared memories are sharpened as they are constantly 
repeated by the mechanisms of memory. In this respect, most of the time, the 
respondents’ interpretations about the ‘others’ are not the outcome of what they 
personally lived but what they experience through the social remembering that is partly 
constructed by the mechanisms of memory. 
  The interpretations of the respondents about the mechanisms of memory 
enabled me to observe how the respondents locate themselves in terms of national identity 
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and how they define the ‘others’. However, there are limitations to this research: First of 
all, it is difficult to study memory, especially in a conflict situation, as it is not always 
easy for the respondents to talk about the traumatic events of the past, the Cyprus war and 
the division of the island. It is also difficult for them to talk about their memories in 
relation to national identity because of the political situation in Northern Cyprus. One of 
the other difficulties of researching memory/memories is that when respondents think and 
talk about the mechanisms of memory, they re-construct their versions of ‘reality’ about 
their national identities: their memory is not a store of fixed and stable information and 
their memories are not deposited in their minds waiting for exploration. This situation 
makes this research problematic, as the respondents’ memories are constantly articulated, 
negotiated and constructed, making it impossible to reach a conclusive end result 
regarding their memories. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the primary source of 
‘information’ that constructs the memories of the respondents about their identities and 
about the ‘others’, because memory/memories are articulated through the complex 
functioning of the autobiographical and public memories that are intertwined with each 
other.  
 Despite its limitations, this study managed to explore how the mechanisms of 
memory mobilize and articulate the respondents’ memories in relation to national 
identity. I examined the ways in which the mechanisms articulate not only the past but 
also the present and the future; they have a critical influence on the political ideas of the 
respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. I also examined how the 
autobiographical (private) memories are mediated through public memories (narratives of 
families, close environment, official history, media). Since we think of memories as our 
primary sources of ‘information’, it might be disturbing to see that their ‘reality’ and 
‘truthfulness’ is highly questionable; nevertheless, this knowledge could help to form a 
critical understanding about memory/memories in relation to national identity.  
This research represents a starting point for future comparative research exploring 
the mechanisms of memory in both Turkish and Greek Cypriot societies; it would be very 
useful to compare how these mechanisms articulate and construct the memories in 
relation to national identity and to examine the similarities and differences between the 
memories of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. A range of possibilities for future research is 
also opened up in this study, not only as regards Cyprus, but also for thinking and 
researching the articulation and construction of memory in other divided societies.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Questions used in the questionnaire and in-depth interviews 
 
 
I. Questions used in the questionnaire 
 
1) What is your sex? 
a) Male                b) Female 
 
2) Where are you living now?    
 
3) How old are you? 
 
4) What is your education level? 
 
5) Were you or a member of your family not born in Northern Cyprus?  
(Are you or any of your family members refugees?)  
 
6) Do you have a job?  What is your occupation? 
 
7) How many family members do you have?  
 
8) Is there any martyr in your family or close environment? 
 
9) How do you consider yourself in terms of nationality? 
a) Turkish             b) Turkish Cypriot               c) Cypriot          d) Other 
 
10) How often do you read a newspaper? 
 
11) How often do you buy a newspaper? 
   
12) What is your favourite newspaper? Why? 
 
13) How do you feel about Northern Cyprus’ participating in the European Union? 
 
 
II. Questions used in the in-depth interviews  
 
Questions about memories in relation to national identity  
 
a) Questions for interviewees between the ages 40-80 
 
1) Do you have any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots? What was life like then? 
Do you have direct knowledge of this? How did you obtain that information? How did 
you get to know them (past-present) 
 
2) Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family have any fears? 
Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears? 
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3) What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? What do you think about them? Can 
they be our partners sharing the same island/homeland? How do you get information 
about them? about what is happening in the South and what has happened in the past? 
 
4) Do you think that maintaining the borders that divide the island is a good or a bad 
thing? What do the borders mean to you? 
 
5) Do you think the island should remain divided or be unified? Why? 
   
6) Were things better or worse before the division of the island into North and South? 
What do you know about the period before 1974? How do you know this? 
 
7) What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? How do you feel 
about it? 
   
8) What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974? 
 
b) Questions for interviewees between the ages 20-33  
 
1) What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots? How did you obtain this 
information? How did you get to know what you know about them? 
 
2) Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did your family have any fears? Did 
Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears? 
 
3) What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? What do you think about them? Can 
they be our partners sharing the same island/homeland? How do you get information 
about them? about what is happening in the South and what has happened in the past? 
 
4) Do you think that maintaining the borders that divide the island is a good or a bad 
thing? What do the borders mean to you? 
 
5) Do you think the island should remain divided or be unified? Why? 
   
6) Were things better or worse before the division of the island into North and South? 
What do you know about the period before 1974? How do you know this? 
 
7) What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? How do you feel 
about it? 
   
8) What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974? 
 
Questions about political ideas in relation to the Cyprus Problem 
 
1) What is your view on the Cyprus problem? How would you describe it?  
 
2) What do you think should be done? 
  
3) How would EU membership for North Cyprus affect the security of the Turkish 
Cypriots? 
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4) How would EU membership for North Cyprus affect its economy, culture and politics? 
Do you feel there are going to be foreign influences on the Turkish Cypriots? What would 
they be? 
  
5) Do you share the views of your preferred political party on the EU? 
 
6) What do you think the future will bring regarding the political situation in Northern 
Cyprus? And what do you expect from the future? 
 
Questions about media  
(i.e., the role of the media (especially the newspapers) in everyday life, newspaper 
preferences, frequency in reading of newspapers, etc.] 
 
1) How do you get information about the Cyprus problem? 
 
2) Do you trust the news media? Do you feel the news stories are accurate,  
represent truth or lies? How do you determine this? 
 
3) Do you think newspapers help the Turkish Cypriot community to remember and 
properly commemorate key instances of its past?    
 
4) Are there newspapers that offer distorted accounts of past and present and disorient 
Turkish Cypriots? How?   
 
5) What do you think about the role of the newspapers in the TRNC?  
 
6) Do you think that the newspapers gave out sufficient information about the European 
Union by the time the referendum took place? 
 
7) Does your favorite newspaper reflect your political standpoint about the EU? 
 
8) What do these news stories tell us about the past? Do you feel news stories represent 
truth or lies? 
 
9) What do you think when you read the news headlines? 
 
10) What difference does it make when you see, perform and celebrate the 
commemorative activities, when you are personally involved and when you experience 
them through the media? 
 
11) How do you feel when you hear the national anthem on the radio or TV? Is there any 
difference between when you hear it on the radio/ TV and when you hear(d) it at school?  
 
12) What do you remember about the Greek Cypriots from the media? 
 
13) What do you remember from the media about Turkish people from Turkey? 
14) Do you remember how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were represented in the 
movies? 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 List of the in-depth interview respondents 
 
 
Pros to the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union 
 
Interviewers between the ages 20-33   
1. Haluk (male), 16 July 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 70 minutes 
    Age: 33       
    Occupation: English teacher 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika 
 
2. Mustafa (male), 26 July 2007, Green House Cafe, Köşklüçiftlik, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 56 minutes 
    Age: 29       
    Occupation: Warehouseman 
    Education Level: High School 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
3. Sertan (male), 28 July 2007, domestic parlour, Küçükkaymaklı, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 58 minutes 
    Age: 33       
    Occupation: Shop owner 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika 
 
4. Berk (male), 7 August 2007, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 72 minutes 
    Age: 27       
    Occupation: University instructor 
    Education Level: Post-Graduate 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
5. Tezcan (male), 7 August 2007, place of employment, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 55 minutes 
    Age: 30       
    Occupation: Tourism 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
6. Özdemir (male), 27 August 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli,Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 57 minutes 
    Age: 24       
    Occupation: Unemployed 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi 
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7. Mehmet (male), 30 August 2007, Green House Cafe, Köşklüçiftlik,Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 55 minutes 
    Age: 20       
    Occupation: Student 
    Education Level: University student 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
8. Ezgi (male), 1 September 2007, Green House Cafe, Köşklüçiftlik, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 50 minutes 
    Age: 20       
    Occupation: Student 
    Education Level: University student 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
9. Selen (female), 15 August 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 85 minutes 
    Age: 29       
    Occupation: TV presenter 
    Education Level: Post-graduate 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi 
 
10. Nevruz (female), 21 August 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 55 minutes 
    Age: 22       
    Occupation: Beauty specialist 
    Education Level: High school 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
11. Deniz (female), 1 September 2007, domestic parlour, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 58 minutes 
    Age: 23       
    Occupation: Public relations 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
12. Fide (female), 3 September 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 50 minutes 
    Age: 26       
    Occupation: employee in the milk industry 
    Education Level: Post-graduate 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
13. Ayten (female), 3 September 2007, domestic parlour, Küçükkaymaklı, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 57 minutes 
    Age: 23       
    Occupation: Student 
    Education Level: High school 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika 
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14. Mine (female), 4 September 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 52 minutes 
    Age: 28       
    Occupation: Customs and immigration officer 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
15. Zehra Eylem (female), 7 October 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa 
      Duration: 59 minutes 
      Age: 22       
      Occupation: Singer 
      Education Level: High school 
      Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Star 
 
 
 Interviewers between the ages 40-80 
 
1. Selda (female), 23 September 2007, BRT, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 49 minutes 
    Age: 40 
    Occupation: Radio reporter    
    Education Level: University    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
2. Ergin Sururi (male), 23 July 2007, Kardeş Ocağı, Arabahmet, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 65 minutes 
    Age: 70 
    Occupation: Retired teacher    
    Education Level: University    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika, Halkın sesi 
 
3. İclal (female), 17 July 2007, domestic parlour, Belediye Evleri, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 61 minutes  
    Age: 81  
    Occupation: Retired nurse   
    Education Level: Primary school 
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
4. Emine (female), 18 July 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa 
   Duration: 61 minutes  
   Age: 52  
   Occupation: Retired official   
   Education Level: High school 
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
5. Sevim (female), 17 July 2007, housewife, Belediye evleri, Lefkoşa  
   Duration: 67 minutes  
   Age: 70  
   Occupation: Housewife   
   Education Level: Primary school 
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   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
6. Emete (female), 25.July 2007, domestic kitchen, Küçükkaymaklı, Lefkoşa 
  Duration: 50 minutes  
   Age: 54  
   Occupation: Retired official   
   Education Level: High school 
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
7. Mustafa (male), 16 August 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 95 minutes 
    Age: 68 
    Occupation: Accountant    
    Education Level: high school    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika, Halkın sesi, Yenidüzen 
 
8. Ayça (male), 18 September 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 61 minutes 
    Age: 50 
    Occupation: Tourism employee    
    Education Level: Technical school    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
9. Kemal (male), 21 September 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 45 minutes 
    Age: 51 
    Occupation: Tire marketing expert    
    Education Level: Secondary school    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs 
 
10.İsmet (male), 23 September 2007, BRT, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 50 minutes 
    Age: 47 
    Occupation: TV programmer    
    Education Level: High school    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
 
11. Sevinç (female), 23 September 2007, BRT, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 55 minutes 
    Age: 48 
    Occupation: News speaker    
    Education Level: High school    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen 
  
12. Nahide (female), 23 July 2007, place of employment, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 60 minutes 
    Age: 49 
    Occupation: Book seller    
    Education Level: University    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Afrika  
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13. Gül (female), 25 September 2007, domestic parlour 
    Duration: 62 minutes 
    Age: 54 
    Occupation: Housewife    
    Education Level: Primary school    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen  
 
14. Abdullah (male), 21 August 2007, Green House Cafe 
    Duration: 58 minutes 
    Age: 65 
    Occupation: Retired teacher    
    Education Level: University    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen  
 
15. Hasan (male), 23 September 2007, domestic parlour 
    Duration: 50 minutes 
    Age: 60 
    Occupation: Retired teacher    
    Education Level: University    
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika 
 
 
Cons to the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union 
 
 
Interviewers between the ages 20-33   
 
1.  Ayşe (female), 28 July 2007, office room, Girne 
 Duration: 60 minutes   
     Age: 31 
     Occupation: University instructor 
     Education Level: Post-graduate 
     Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Volkan, Kıbrıslı, Afrika  
 
2.   Memduh (male), 24 July 2007, Ulusal Birlik Partisi, Lefkoşa  
  Duration: 62 minutes   
      Age: 23 
      Occupation: Student 
      Education Level: University 
      Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Guneş, Volkan  
 
3. Tuna (male), 26 July 2007, Demokrat Parti, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 53 minutes 
    Age: 26 
    Occupation: Student 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Demokrat Bakış, Kıbrıslı, Volkan  
 
 
4. Yusuf (male), 30 July 2007, Domestic parlour, Lefkoşa 
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    Duration: 60 minutes 
    Age: 30 
    Occupation: Official 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Demokrat Bakış, Kıbrıslı, Volkan  
 
5. Cemre (female), 27 August 2007, Domestic parlour, Lefkoşa, Göçmenköy 
    Duration: 35 minutes 
    Age: 22 
    Occupation: Unemployed 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Star  
 
6. Doğa (male), 31 August 2007, Domestic parlour, Girne 
    Duration: 46 minutes 
    Age: 27 
    Occupation: Lawyer 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Volkan   
 
7. Melek (female), 31 August 2007, Domestic parlour, Girne 
    Duration: 45 minutes 
    Age: 28 
    Occupation: University instructor 
    Education Level: Post-graduate 
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Kıbrıs Star  
 
8. Duyal (female), 15 August 2007, Office, Nicosia 
    Duration: 50 minutes 
    Age: 21 
    Occupation: Student 
    Education Level: High school 
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs  
 
9. Yusuf (male), 15 August 2007, classroom, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 30 minutes 
    Age: 21 
    Occupation: Student 
    Education Level: High School 
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs  
 
10. Fatoş (female), 17 August 2007, domestic parlour, Girne 
    Duration: 70 minutes 
    Age: 25 
    Occupation: Shop assistant 
    Education Level: High school 
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi  
 
 
11. Ferah (female), 19 August 2007, domestic parlour, Lefkoşa 
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   Duration: 56 minutes 
   Age: 32 
   Occupation: Air hostess 
   Education Level: High School 
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs, Vatan  
 
12. Alp (male), 1 September 2007, Optician, Lefkoşa 
      Duration: 60 minutes 
      Age: 29 
      Occupation: Optician 
      Education Level: High School 
      Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Kıbrıs  
 
13. Namık (male), 3 September 2007, domestic parlour, Girne 
      Duration: 65 minutes 
      Age: 29 
      Occupation: Police 
      Education Level: High School 
      Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Kıbrıs  
 
14. Güliz (female), 31 August 2007, domestic parlour, Girne 
      Duration: 40 minutes 
      Age: 28 
      Occupation: Housewife 
      Education Level: High school 
      Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs  
 
15. Meltem (female), 31 July 2007, domestic parlour, Lefkoşa 
      Duration: 54 minutes 
      Age: 22 
      Occupation: Housewife 
      Education Level: Secondary school 
      Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Kıbrıs  
 
 
Interviewers between the ages 40-80 
 
1. Nurten (female), 21 September 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 45 minutes 
    Age: 60 
    Occupation: Retired history teacher  
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Kıbrıs      
 
2. Aydın (male), 21 July 2007, Kardeş Ocağı, Arabahmet, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 65 minutes 
    Age: 80 
    Occupation: Retired Turkish teacher and counselor 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Kıbrıs      
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3. Erdal (male), 20 July 2007, Kardeş Ocağı, Arabahmet, Lefkoşa 
Duration: 63 minutes   
    Age: 67 
    Occupation: Civil engineer 
    Education Level: University 
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın sesi  
 
4.  Arif (male), 20 July 2007, Domestic parlour, Kumsal, Lefkoşa 
     Duration: 84 Minutes    
     Age: 86      
     Occupation: Retired counsellor 
     Education Level: University  
     Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Volkan 
 
5. Ahmet (male), 24 July 2007, Lefkoşa 
    Duration: 58 minutes 
    Age: 60 
    Occupation: Barber 
    Education Level: Secondary school  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Volkan      
 
6. Alican Kabakçı (male), 30 July 2007, Çiftçiler Birliği, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 65 minutes 
    Age: 49 
    Occupation: Farmer 
    Education Level: High school  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Afrika     
 
7. Esra (female), 23 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 49 minutes 
    Age: 62 
    Occupation: Retired teacher 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Vatan, Halkın Sesi, Volkan     
 
8. Göktan (male), 14 October 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 45 minutes 
    Age: 41 
    Occupation: Mechanical engineer 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs     
 
9. Makbule (female), 1 October 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 100 minutes 
    Age: 61 
    Occupation: Journalist 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Halkın Sesi     
 
10. Emine (female), 30 September 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
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    Duration: 57 minutes 
    Age: 63 
    Occupation: Retired teacher 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Güneş, Halkın Sesi 
 
11. Menekşe (female), 30 September 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 40 minutes 
    Age: 55 
    Occupation: Tailor 
    Education Level: High School  
    Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Halkın Sesi 
 
12. Ülkü (female), 12 August 2007, Domestic Labour, Girne  
    Duration: 68 minutes 
    Age: 56 
    Occupation: Retired official 
    Education Level: High school  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs 
 
13. Salime (female), 12 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 35 minutes 
    Age: 68 
    Occupation: Retired teacher 
    Education Level: University  
    Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs Postası 
  
14. Ali (male), 12 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 51 minutes 
    Age: 69 
    Occupation: Restaurant manager 
    Education Level: Secondary school  
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs  
 
15. Ahmet (male), 17 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
    Duration: 51 minutes 
    Age: 50 
    Occupation: Farmer 
    Education Level: Secondary school  
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Volkan, Vatan  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Photographs  from the history textbook that was published in 1981 and  used in schools 
during the period of President Denktaş and the UBP government. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Examples of portrayals of the village and social life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, from 
the history textbook that was published in 2004 and used in schools during the period of 
the CTP government. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Explanations of the British colonial administration and the reasons behind the Greek and 
Turkish nationalisms, as seen in the history textbook that was published in 2004 and used 
in schools during  the period of the CTP government.   
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